เรื่อง: Managing Insurgencies : How Did Some Insurgencies Get Resolved While Many Others Go On For A Long Time?
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หมวดหมู่:
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งานวิจัย
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มิติ:
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มิติการทูต/Diplomacy
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พื้นที่/ขอบเขต:
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ภายในประเทศ/Domestic/Local
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ผู้เขียน:
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วิทยาลัยป้องกันราชอาณาจักร, Col. Ang Yau Choon
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หน่วยงานเจ้าของ:
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วิทยาลัยป้องกันราชอาณาจักร
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ปีที่พิมพ์:
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2556
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จำนวนหน้า:
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การเปิดเผยข้อมูล:
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สาธารณะ
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บทคัดย่อ:
-
abstract:
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ABSTRACT
Title: Managing Insurgencies: How Did Some Insurgencies Get Resolved
While Many Others Go On For A Long Time?
Field: Military
Name: COL Ang Yau Choon Course: NDC Class: 56
Insurgencies are contests of wills and wits between people.
Knowing who those people are, and understanding what they want (intent
and desired outcomes), why they want it (motivation),and how they intend
to achieve it (strategy, tactics, structure, resources) should naturally be a
key focus in the bid to understand an insurgency and what needs to be
done to counter it. In counter-insurgency (COIN), it is, thus, sensible to
begin with, and maintain, a stakeholder analysis.
To defeat or end an insurgency, my hypotheses are as follow:
1. Addressing the intent and motivation of the insurgents or their
supporters would provide the most enduring solution to the insurgency.
Many COIN forces simply treat insurgency like any other crime, and thus
fail miserably. ‘Addressing’ could mean providing alternative, making it
irrelevant, or satisfying it fully or partially within acceptable boundaries.
2. Denying insurgents a secured environment to plan, coordinate,
prepare, train, amass war material, and move freely in the shadow will
make their operation untenable. It will be extremely helpful to discern
what constitutes this “water insurgent-fishes swim in”, and who, if anyone,
makes it possible, and how it could be made unsuitable for the insurgents.
3. Insurgents need tangible resources (e.g. weapons, funding,
recruitment, and food etc) and support (e.g. intelligence, training) to attack
and evade capture. Identifying the sources of these tangible resources and
supports and denying them from the insurgents will help win the fight.
[note: providing security to insurgent is also a tangible support, addressed
separately as point 2 above due to its great significance]
4. Perception is a key basis of decision, thus action. Actively
anticipating and shaping perceptions of key stakeholders is, thus, a
powerful tool for counter-insurgency success.
