

**Quad - Dynamics, Relevance and the Way
Forward with Recommendations
for India and ASEAN**

By

Colonel Siddharth Chopra

Indian Army

India

Student of the National Defence College

The National Defence Course : Class 62

Academic Year 2019 -2020

Certificate of Research Paper

National Defence College. National Defence Studies Institute has approved Colonel Siddharth Chopra ' s the individual research paper titled “Quad - Dynamics, Relevance and the Way Forward with Recommendations for India and ASEAN.” as a subject in the field of Strategy, and as part of the study of the College curriculum Class 62 Academic year 2019 – 2020

Lt.Gen.

(Pisan Pathom-ame)

Superintendent

National Defence College

Abstract

Title : Quad - Dynamics, Relevance and the Way Forward with Recommendations for India and ASEAN.

Field : Strategy

Name : Colonel Siddharth Chopra **Course** : NDC **Class** : 62

The shift in the economic centre of gravity to Asia and the rise of China as a global superpower in the 21st century has changed the dynamics of the region. The development of the Indo-Pacific regional construct with a focus on a maritime domain has led to the emergence of new forms of security cooperation. The Quad consultation between Australia, India, Japan and USA was revived in 2017 after a failed attempt at coming together as a security dialogue in 2007. This study aims to examine the revival of the Quad under the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific regional construct and theories of alliance/alignment.

The purpose for the revival of the Quad is obscure. Writings on the subject indicate to two factors that have brought the four democracies together for the second time; a shared threat perception towards China and shared objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. The study has examined factors based on key indicators and analysis of official policy documents, statements and remarks of officials at the highest level to reach an inference that even though the four nations have varied reasons to view China as a threat, they aim to coordinate their policies especially in the security and infrastructure development domains to realise their shared objective under the concept of a 'Free, Open, Inclusive and Prosperous' Indo-Pacific.

Having examined the purpose and relevance of the Quad, the study highlights the way forward for the Quad in terms of structural recommendations, and measures to strengthen the partnership in security and infrastructure development domains. Recommendations for India towards balancing its interests in the Quad and overall regional environment, and recommendations for ASEAN in engaging with the Quad are also shortlisted.

Despite some differences among the Quad members in threat perception vis-à-vis China, desired objectives of the grouping and resource availability to support the objectives, the cooperation among the Quad countries is likely to deepen. The Quad is not directed against a particular nation, however there is unity in opposing actions which serve to unilaterally change established rules and are in contravention to internationally accepted behaviour. China's continuing efforts to challenge status quo and rules-based order has contributed to the urgency and timeliness of the Quad to emerge as an effective grouping in the Indo-Pacific region.

Going forward the Quad should take a long term view of the shared objectives and develop strategies accordingly. The focus should be restricted to core themes rather than too diverse an agenda. Security and infrastructure development are identified as the as focus areas for the Quad. In the security field, the Quad should deepen military cooperation to share intelligence, improve interoperability, enhance MDA capabilities, share logistics and improve access to defence technology. In the infrastructure development field, the Quad should cooperate on standard setting, establish an Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Development Coordination Agency and create an Indo-Pacific Quadrilateral Infrastructure Funding Pool as a viable alternative to Belt and Road Initiative.

Preface

The significant changes in the geopolitical and security scene in the Indo-Pacific have brought the region into prominence. The region is marked by key trends: an intense US-China rivalry precipitated by the swift rise of China as a global super power and reducing USA influence; increasing strategic ties between the middle powers Japan, India and Australia; the shared understanding to preserve ASEAN centrality and importance of ASEAN led institutions; and the growing importance of maritime space in order to keep it free and open for trade to flourish.

There is increased consciousness regarding the Indo-Pacific construct and it has emerged as an important theme in main stream dialogue. The concept has translated to national strategies with many countries of the region announcing formal and implied Indo-Pacific strategies. This has brought to light the emerging challenges, opportunities for cooperation and shared approaches among regional actors.

One of the important means to implement the Indo-Pacific strategies is the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the four major democracies of the region; Australia, India, Japan and USA. My interest in selecting the topic was to study the reasons behind the revival of the Quad, whether it is going to emerge purely as a method of containing China or the member nations are looking at the minilateral grouping to meaningfully contribute to regional stability and security.

The views expressed in the study are my own and do not reflect the policy of the Government of India. The opinions and assessments are based on the qualitative data researched from open sources.

Colonel Siddharth Chopra
Student of National Defence College
Course NDC : Class 62
Researcher

Acknowledgement

I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation to National Defence College, Thailand for ensuring an atmosphere which was conducive for learning and constantly stimulating intellectual faculties among the students. The advice and optimism of the faculty gave me the courage and impetus to complete this research project successfully.

I wish to place on record my gratitude to Lieutenant General Pisan Pathom-ame, the Superintendent of National Defence College Thailand, for his guidance and encouragement during the course of my study and research.

I would like to express my sincere thanks to my advisors, Lieutenant General Nopadon Mungdalaton, Consultant, National Defence College, Thailand and Colonel Akkadej Prateapusanond, Deputy Director of Office of Security Sciences, National Defence College, Thailand for their valuable guidance at every stage of this research.

I am most grateful to my fellow students at National Defence College, Thailand for taking time off to respond to my questionnaire and providing me valuable inputs, both of which went a long way in concluding my research paper.

I am indebted to the entire staff of National Defence College, Thailand, for their sustained support over the months of my study and assistance at every step on the way. I want to make a special mention of Lieutenant Colonel Chalernpol Saributra from the research division at National Defence College and wish to thank him for his support during the course of this research.

Colonel Siddharth Chopra
Student of National Defence College
Course NDC : Class 62
Researcher

Contents

	Page
Abstract	i
Preface	iii
Acknowledgement	v
Contents	vii
Contents of Table	ix
Contents of Figures	x
List of Abbreviations	xii
Chapter 1 Introduction	1
Background and Significance of Problem	2
Objectives of Research	13
Literature Review	15
Scope of Research	16
Methodology	17
Limitations and/or Delimitations	19
Research Results for Utilisation	20
Definitions	20
Chapter 2 Related Literature Review - Indo Pacific Concept, Alignment Theory and Multilateralism	24
Indo-Pacific - A Geo-strategic Construct and its Security Challenges	24
Concept of Alliance/Alignment in Security Cooperation	47
Multilateralism in International Affairs	57
Conceptual Framework of the Research	64
Conclusion	68

Contents (cont.)

	Page
Chapter 3 Quad 2.0 - Shared Threat And Shared	
Objectives	71
Shared Threat Perception of the Quad 2.0	72
Shared Objectives of the Quad 2.0	87
Supporting Bilateral/Trilateral Web of Relationships	101
Pressure Points in the Quad 2.0 Partnership	106
Conclusion	113
Chapter 4 Relevance and Potential of Quad 2.0	116
Strategic Space for Quad 2.0 in Indo-Pacific	117
ASEAN Centrality - Inviolable for Regional Security	124
Perspective on Quad 2.0 - Other Regional Powers	132
DIME Analysis - Quad 2.0	140
Conclusion	156
Chapter 5 Conclusion & Recommendations	159
Survey Findings	159
Research Conclusion	162
The Way Forward - Quad 2.0	172
Recommendations for India	181
Recommendations for ASEAN	186
Recommendations for Further Study on the Subject	188
Bibliography	190
Biography	215

Contents of Figures

Figure No.	Page
Figure 1-1 Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.	3
Figure 2-1 Indo-Pacific and Asia-Pacific Regions.	29
Figure 2-2 Indo-Pacific Region - Quad Members Different Views.	32
Figure 2-3 Global Oil Shipping Route Density in SLOCs.	35
Figure 2-4 Notional Indo-Pacific Regional Architecture (Khurana).	39
Figure 2-5 South and East China Sea Territorial Disputes.	44
Figure 2-6 Spectrum of Alignment.	53
Figure 2-7 Conceptual Framework of the Research.	66
Figure 3-1 Asia Power Index - 2019.	73
Figure 3-2 Military Expenditure (In constant USD Million) – Quad and China.	77
Figure 3-3 Military Expenditure (GDP Percentage) – Quad and China.	78
Figure 3-4 Real GDP growth (Annual Percent Change) – Quad and China.	79
Figure 3-5 GDP (Current Prices - USD Billion) – Quad and China.	79
Figure 3-6 China - Ballistic Missile Capability and Ranges.	80
Figure 4-1 Multi/Mini Lateral Organisations in Asia-Pacific Region.	121
Figure 4-2 Strategic Space for Quad in Indo-Pacific Security Architecture.	124

Contents of Figures (cont.)

Figure No.		Page
Figure 4-3	Quad - Bilateral Trade with China (2019).	150
Figure 4-4	ASEAN Trade Partners (2018).	151
Figure 5-1	Share of Global GDP 1990 to 2018 – USA and China.	166

List of Abbreviations

Asia-Africa Growth Corridor	AAGC
Air Defence Identification Zone	ADIZ
Association Of Southeast Asian Nations	ASEAN
ASEAN Regional Forum	ARF
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting +8	ADMM+
ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific	AOIP
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	APEC
Belt and Road Initiative	BRI
Brazil Russia India China and South Africa	BRICS
Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement	COMCASA
East Asia Summit	EAS
European Union	EU
Exclusive Economic Zone	EEZ
Free and Open Indo-Pacific	FOIP
Food and Agricultural Organisation	FAO
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief	HADR
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing	IUUF
Indian Ocean Region	IOR
Indian Ocean Rim Association	IORA
Indo-Pacific Command	INDOPACOM
International Monetary Fund	IMF
Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement	LEMOA
Maritime Silk Road	MSR
National Security Strategy	NSS
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation	NATO
Pacific Command	PACOM

List of Abbreviations (cont.)

Sea Lines of Communication	SLOC
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization	SEATO
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue	QSD
United Nations General Assembly	UNGA
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea	UNCLOS
World Trade Organisation	WTO
Weapons of Mass Destruction	WMD

Contents of Tables

Table No.		Page
Table 3-1	Analysis of Aggregate Power - Quad and China.	76
Table 3-2	Comparison of Maritime Strength - Quad and China.	81
Table 3-3	Details of Quad 2.0 Meetings.	88
Table 3-4	Initial Objectives (IO 1) of Quad as on 12 Nov 2017.	91
Table 3-5	Revised Objectives (RO 2) of Quad as on 07 Jun 2018.	93
Table 3-6	Revised Objectives (RO 3) of Quad as on 15 Nov 2018.	95
Table 3-7	Revised Objectives (RO 4) of Quad as on 31 May 2019.	96
Table 3-8	Shared Objectives of the Quad 2.0.	100
Table 3-9	Relationships between Quad Member Countries.	101
Table 4-1	Multi/Mini-lateral Organisations in Asia-Pacific Region.	118

Chapter 1

Introduction

The ‘**Australia-India-Japan-USA Consultations**’ earlier known as Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is a group comprising of four major democracies across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The group is popularly identified by the acronym ‘**The Quad**’. The Quad was initiated in 2007 but did not progress beyond the first official meeting. The consultations were revived in 2017 and are presently in their nascent stage with member countries in the process of evolving the Quad’s purpose, intentions and goals. Strategic analysts differ in their categorisation of the Quad and many contrasting presumptions have emerged regarding the Quad such as that: it is the genesis of an ‘Asian NATO’ (alliance, axis of democracies, democratic security diamond); it is simply a group to contain China; or it is merely a nuisance with widely divergent views and unlikely to unite behind a common strategic vision. The US Department of State after a Quad meeting of senior officials in Bangkok on 31 May 2019 issued a media note which broadly gives the basis of the Quad consultations. The note specified that the meeting was for ‘consultations on their (member countries) collective efforts to advance a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific and a shared commitment to preserving and promoting the rules-based order in the region’.¹ It is

¹ USA, Department of State. “U.S.-Australia-India-Japan Consultations (‘The Quad’)”. Media Note, May 31, 2019. Available: <https://www.state.gov/us-australia-india-japan-consultations-the-quad/>.

clear that the Quad is symbiotically linked to the Indo-Pacific region, but reasons for its revival and purpose are ambiguous.


Background and Significance of Problem

The Quad had its origins in the ‘Tsunami Core Group’, which was established by the four countries to facilitate response and coordinate relief post the Indian Ocean Tsunami in Dec 2004. At that time, this core group was envisioned only to address the immediate challenges presented by the tsunami and its aftermath. However, it was seen as a model for ad hoc collaboration by multiple countries on an issue of common interest.² The Tsunami Core Group’s evolution into a security dialogue can be attributed to Japanese PM Shinzo Abe who initiated the idea in 2006-07. He was keen to establish values based connections in order to create an ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ through the region. Taro Aso, Abe’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, detailed the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’, as a new pillar in diplomacy that Japan was pursuing as a government wide effort. This Arc, he said would start from Northern Europe and traverse the Baltic States, Central and South Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent, then

² Grossman, Marc. “The Tsunami Core Group: A Step toward a Transformed Diplomacy in Asia and Beyond”, Security Challenges. Vol. 1 No.1, 2005. p.11-14.

cross Southeast Asia finally to reach Northeast Asia (See Figure 1-1).³ The extensive region focussed on the Eurasian landmass covering the entire Europe and Asia. A vague reference to ‘universal values’ as the bedrock for ‘stability and plenty’ also seemed ambiguous. However, the idea laid the seed of a new concept in diplomacy which was based on an ‘open and flexible’ concept.

Figure 1-1 Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.



Source : Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2007>

³ Aso, Taro. “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”, address by Minister for Foreign Affairs at International House of Japan, March 12, 2007. Available : <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/pillar/address0703.html>.

Simultaneous to the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ idea, the notion of Indo-Pacific region as a strategic construct based on a maritime domain was emerging. In marine biology, the idea of Indo-Pacific has long existed as a bio-geographic concept comprising the tropical warm waters of the Indian Ocean and Western/Central Pacific Ocean. As a strategic concept, the evolution is a more recent development with an Indian naval strategist, Khurana being credited to have first written about it in 2007. He wrote that the term ‘Indo-Pacific’, combined the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the Western Pacific Region, inclusive of the contiguous seas off East Asia and Southeast Asia into a singular regional construct. The concept sees the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions as a single interconnected region.⁴ This idea is also resonated in PM Shinzo Abe’s speech titled ‘The Confluence of the Two Seas’ (a phrase drawn from the title of a book authored by an Indian Mughal prince, Dara Shikoh in 1655) delivered in the Indian Parliament on 22 August 2007. While the focus of the speech was the strategic significance of Japan-India relations, Abe stressed the importance that this “broader Asia” remains free, open and transparent for the region’s prosperity. He did not allude to the Indo-Pacific in specific; but he summarized that “We are now at a point at which the Confluence of the Two Seas is coming into being”.⁵ The Indo-

⁴ Khurana, Gurpreet Singh. “Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation”, Strategic Analysis (IDSA), January 2007, Vol. 31, Issue. 1. p. 139-153.

⁵ Abe, Shinzo. “Confluence of the Two Seas”, Speech by PM at the Indian Parliament, August 22, 2007. Available: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-pacific/pmv0708/speech-2.html>.

Pacific concept is now an accepted part of the official strategic vocabulary of USA, Australia, Japan and India.

Synchronous to the emergence of Indo-Pacific concept and developing further on the Tsunami Core Group initiative, the officials of the four member countries met for the first time on the side-lines of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) at Manila in August 2007. This was followed by an expanded version of the annual India-US Malabar Naval Exercise in September 2007. The exercise, then in its ninth edition contained 27 ships of the Indian, American, Japanese, Australian and Singaporean Navies which engaged in simulated wargames and combat manoeuvres about 500 nautical miles east of Visakhapatnam in the Bay of Bengal. Notably, this was the first such multilateral exercise held off India's eastern coast.⁶ Being so close to the first Quad meeting, it drew criticism from China and soon there were divisions over the Quad's principle purpose. The Quad 1.0 faced multiple pressures of the Sino-Australian relations, India's balancing act in its foreign policies, the resignation of PM Shinzo Abe and the lukewarm response of the USA due to the likely effect on the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD - USA, Japan and Australia). The Quad was disbanded with Australia, under the then newly elected PM Kevin Rudd, withdrawing from the meeting in 2008. While the idea was kept alive at the Track 2 diplomacy level, there was no enthusiasm for the Quad at the level of national diplomacy of member countries.

⁶ USA, US Navy 7th Fleet (Public Affairs). "Exercise Malabar 07-2 Kicks Off", Story No. NNS070907-13, September 07, 2007. Available : https://www.navy.mil/submitdisplay.asp?story_id=31691.

The 21st century has seen a perceptible shift in global centre of gravity of economic growth from North America and Europe to Asia, resulting in a change in balance of power and an increasingly multipolar world reshaping the strategic landscape. Asia has emerged as the most dynamic region in the world accounting for two-thirds of global growth. In 2030, the population of Asia is expected to grow to 4.97 billion (58% of global population) and four out of the five largest economies in terms of gross domestic product based on purchasing power parity [GDP (PPP)] are projected to be Asian countries.⁷ The Indo-Pacific is at the centre of global trade and energy supply routes with two-third of entire container trade passing through the region. India, China and Japan are dependent on Indo-Pacific sea routes for their trade and energy supply. Thus, the security of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and an open, free and peaceful Indo-Pacific based on a rule based order is the desired goal. The diverse security issues in the region complicate the landscape. North Korea is continuing in its quest to acquire nuclear weapons and has been regularly testing missile systems that threaten neighbouring states in the region. India and Pakistan continue to have their difference over border issues. The disputes in East China Sea and South China Sea threaten regional stability. Many countries in the region have security dependencies on USA and strong economic links with China. The USA-China rivalry may push countries in the region to choose between their economic partner

⁷ Mann, David. “Looking for Growth? Emerging Asia is the Present and Future”, Standard Chartered, August 16, 2019. Available: <https://www.sc.com/en/feature/looking-for-growth-emerging-asia-is-the-present-and-future>.

and their security partner. The actions of major powers and how countries come together to meet common challenges will shape the regional strategic environment.

Abe in November 2012 built on his idea of ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ and proposed a ‘democratic security diamond’.⁸ This was a call to revive the Quad based on his appreciation of China’s naval and territorial expansion in the East and South China Seas. He underlined that the peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Pacific and Indian Oceans were inseparable and asked Indian and Japanese governments to join together to shoulder more responsibility as guardians of navigational freedom across the Pacific and Indian Oceans. He went ahead to invite Britain and France to participate in strengthening Asia’s security. Abe’s return to power in December 2012 made this idea the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy.

China’s increasingly assertive behaviour in the intervening period between 2014 and 2018 precipitated the return of Quad. China has been challenging Japan’s control over the Senkaku Islands post its nationalisation in 2012. Japan has witnessed an augmented ‘gray-zone’⁹

⁸ Abe, Shinzo. “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”, Live Mint, December 31, 2012. Available: <https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/viqg2XC8fhRfjTUIcctk0M/Asias-democratic-security-diamond.html>.

⁹ Gray Zone Tactics is used in the realm of asymmetrical or hybrid warfare. It is defined as “an effort or series of efforts beyond steady-state deterrence and assurance that attempts to achieve one’s security objectives without resort to direct and sizable use of force.” This can include a mix of conventional warfare, irregular warfare and

coercive behaviour by China and has recorded increased scramble interceptions against encroaching Chinese aircraft, and increasingly regular incursions by China Coast Guard and fishing vessels into the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands.¹⁰ India had a tense 73 day military standoff at the at the border tri-junction with Bhutan and China in summer of 2017¹¹, and China blocked India's membership in the nuclear suppliers group.¹² Australia adopted a foreign interference law in 2018 directed at curbing China's interference in domestic issues.¹³ In the

cyberwarfare with other influencing methods, so that potential adversaries can inconspicuously coerce their targets to serve their interests while avoiding the possibility of large-scale conflict.

¹⁰ Kawashima, Shin. "The Senkaku Crisis in Perspective: An Interview with Former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku", nippon.com, December 05, 2017. Available: <https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00365/the-senkaku-crisisin-perspective-an-interview-with-former-chief-cabi-net-secretary-sengoku.html>.

¹¹ Joseph, Josy. "What is the Doklam issue all about"? The Hindu, January 27, 2018. Available: <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/what-is-the-doklam-issue-all-about/article22536937.ece>.

¹² Aneja, Atul. "No Room for India yet in NSG, Says China", The Hindu, May 22, 2017. Available: <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/no-room-for-indiayet-in-nsg-says-china/article18523724.ece>.

¹³ Cave, Damien and Williams, Jacqueline. "Australian Law Targets Foreign Interference. China is not pleased", The New York

South China Sea, China has ignored international rulings and built artificial and militarised islands challenging the freedom of navigation and adherence to a rules based order. ASEAN's unity and capability to forge a consensus on important issues facing the region such as a code of conduct for the South China Sea will be tested in light of China's white paper on defence where it has claimed that the South China Sea was an "inalienable" part of its territory, and it "exercises its national sovereignty to build infrastructure and deploy necessary defensive capabilities on the islands and reefs in the South China Sea".¹⁴

The emerging geo-strategic environment in Indo-Pacific region has led to renewed interest in the Quad dialogue. The building momentum led representatives from the member countries to meet on the side-lines of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Manila in November 2017, exactly a decade after the last interaction in 2007. This meeting was designed to be a cautious beginning at junior official level to test waters for possible cooperation in coming times. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement post the discussions to state that, "the discussions focussed on cooperation based on their converging vision and values for promotion of peace, stability and prosperity in an increasingly inter-connected region that they share with each other and with other partners.

Times, June 28, 2018. Available: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/world/australia/australia-security-lawsforeign-interference.html>.

¹⁴ Takahashi, Toru. "What Beijing really wants from South China Sea code of conduct", Nikkei Asian Review, August 12, 2019. Available: <https://www.asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/What-eijing-really-wants-from-South-China-Sea-code-of-conduct>.

They agreed that a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region serves the long-term interests of all countries in the region and of the world at large. The officials also exchanged views on addressing common challenges of terrorism and proliferation linkages impacting the region as well as on enhancing connectivity”.¹⁵ The Quad has met six times between 2017 and 2019, with the most significant one being the meeting of the foreign ministers on the side-lines of the UNGA in September 2019. The elevation of the dialogue to the foreign minister level is demonstrative of the leadership of the four countries in institutionalising the Quad 2.0 dialogue. Secretary Mike Pompeo hosted the event and the US State Department statement stated that “wide ranging discussions were held on collective efforts to advance a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific. The four countries reaffirmed their shared commitment to close cooperation on maritime security, quality infrastructure, and regional connectivity in support of a rules-based order that promotes stability, growth, and economic prosperity. The Ministers discussed counter-terrorism and cyber security as other priority areas for ongoing engagement”. An important development was the reaffirmation of the strong support for ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN-led regional

¹⁵ Bhattacharjee, Kallol. “India, Japan, U.S., Australia hold first ‘Quad’ talks at Manila ahead of ASEAN Summit”, The Hindu. November 12, 2017. Available: <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-highlights-indo-pacific-cooperation-at-the-first-quad-talks/article20317526.ece>.

architecture in the US statement.¹⁶ Mutual concerns of the USA, Japan, Australia and India have led them to revive the Quad which seeks to uphold a rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific region.

Concomitant to the revival of the Quad is the increased acceptance of the Indo-Pacific construct. 2017 can be considered as a watershed year for the concept, that year, Japan outlined a vision for a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’, the Australian Foreign Policy White Paper 2017 makes numerous mentions of the term and in the US National Security Strategy 2017, the Indo-Pacific is described as a priority region. Today, a shared understanding of the term has developed, wherein it implies that the Indian and Pacific Oceans are a single, interconnected strategic space, wherein what happens in one has implications in the other. For example, the militarisation of the South China Sea directly affects India and Australia; just as developments in the Indian Ocean have immediate consequences for Japan.¹⁷ In 2018, the USA renamed her Pacific Command as Indo-Pacific Command and has published an Indo-Pacific Strategy Report in June 2019. The ASEAN, during the 34th Semi-

¹⁶ Ortagus, Morgan. “Secretary Pompeo’s Meeting with Quad Foreign Ministers of Australia, India, and Japan”, Spokesperson, US Department of State, September 27, 2019. Available: <https://www.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-quad-foreign-ministers-of-australia-india-and-japan/>.

¹⁷ Jaishankar, Dhruva. “Why 2017 idea of the year is the ‘Indo-Pacific’”, The Hindustan Times. December 29, 2017. Available: <https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/why-2017-idea-of-the-year-is-the-indo-pacific/story-A0fctWmn3s5Nc04PxZrCHO.html>.

Annual Summit in June 2019 in Bangkok, has adopted a document titled ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’. This document, inter alia calls for promoting an enabling environment for peace, stability and prosperity with ASEAN Centrality as the underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and ASEAN-led mechanisms as platforms for dialogue and implementation.¹⁸

The Quad fits into the Indo-Pacific concept but analysts have argued that the unstated rationale for the coming together of four maritime democracies is the growing political, military and economic might of China and its increased assertiveness and apparent hegemonic ambitions. China has not been too enthusiastic about the Quad meetings. In July 2019, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi had said that one of the principles of regional cooperation should be to “focus on openness and inclusiveness, without forming factions or seeking small cliques”.¹⁹ From the security point of view each of the Quad member country has divergent concerns when it comes to China; USA as the resident power and net security provider in the region, has to contend with Beijing’s assertive actions in the South and East China Seas. Japan has concerns over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. India shares a disputed border to its

¹⁸ ASEAN. “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”. June 23, 2019. Available: [https:// www.asean2019.go.th/en /news/asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific/](https://www.asean2019.go.th/en/news/asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific/).

¹⁹ Wire Staff. “Quad Gets an Upgrade as Foreign Ministers of India, Japan, Australia, US Meet”, The Wire, September 27, 2019. Available: <https://thewire.in/diplomacy/quad-gets-an-upgrade-as-foreign-ministers-of-india-japan-australia-us-meet>.

North with China and is suspicious of China's growing influence in its neighbourhood and Indian Ocean Region. Australia has had good economic relations with China, but there are reports of Chinese attempts to interfere in Australia's domestic affairs. The ASEAN is not unanimous in its response to Quad 2.0.

Objectives of the Research

The Quad has been a topic of discussion in academic circles and has been written about extensively, but there is ambiguity regarding why Quad has been revived and what it can achieve. A point of view is that shared strategic views of the Indo-Pacific region and strengthening relations among the four maritime democracies have led to the revival of the Quad. Even though strategic partnerships between the Quad members are steadily deepening there are subtle differences in their vision for the Indo-Pacific. Some analysts see Quad simply as a way to contain an expansionist China and there are reservations in the ASEAN community that the Quad shall impinge upon the 'ASEAN Centrality'. While the consultation amongst the four member countries has been reinitiated under the Quad umbrella, the manner in which the partnership develops will define if it is to survive and be effective in contributing towards stability in the Indo-Pacific Region.

1. Statement of Research Problem.

The Quad consultations are presently in an evolutionary and nascent stage. There is lack of clarity on the rationale behind revival of the Quad and its purpose. The research aims to demystify the revival of Quad and analyse the manner in which the partnership can contribute towards a stable Indo-Pacific Region. **It is felt that the Quad consultation**

has the potential to be effective in contributing towards the vision of a free, open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.

2. Research Question.

In the ten year gap between Quad 1.0 and Quad 2.0, the four countries have significantly boosted security and defence cooperation in form of bilateral/trilateral dialogues and expanded military exercises. Each member country has enunciated their vision for the Indo-Pacific region; analysts see the Quad consultation as an important vehicle to realisation of their Indo-Pacific vision. This notwithstanding, the member countries have subtle differences in the way they view the regional order and conduct diplomacy. Militarily, the Quad countries are not in a binding alliance treaty to respond collectively to an external threat. This obscures Quad's place in the regional security architecture and its inter-relationship with existing intergovernmental forums. The hawkish view is that the Quad 2.0 will lead to an increase in the USA-China power rivalry; while some feel it will dissipate like previous version. The Quad members have stated that the consultations target no one, however there is ambiguity about the about the purpose, relevance and Quad's capability to deliver in its revived form. This leads to the research question - **The Quad might find common cause in balancing against China but will this unequal partnership with differences in threat perception, desired objectives, trade dependencies and resource availability be effective in contributing to security and stability in the Indo-Pacific Region?**

3. Research Objectives.

Major challenges to the viability Quad as grouping exist. First, it is not clear whether the member countries will be able to

maximise cooperation and insulate it from geopolitical rivalries. Second, the Quad perceptibly is linked to security in Indo-Pacific and seeks to balance China's rise in diplomatic and military spheres, for peace and prosperity in the region this has to be managed as not to appear overtly confrontationist towards China. Thirdly, by its nature the Quad is a select grouping, however it espouses an inclusive approach towards smaller nations in the region the support of whom will be critical in the Quad achieving its objectives. In light of the above, the aim of this research is to analyse the geostrategic and security situation in the Indo-Pacific and determine Quad's purpose, relevance and potential in contribution to stability in the region. The objectives to be pursued in the research are as under:-

3.1 To examine the current dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region and identify purpose behind the revival of the Quad consultation.

3.2 To analyse the relevance and potential of the Quad in achieving shared objectives and contributing to stability in the Indo-Pacific.

3.3 To propose the way forward for the Quad and recommendations for India and ASEAN.

Literature Review

Literature review involves understanding of the Indo-Pacific construct and the strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific in detail. The Quad grouping is seen in light of the concept of alliance and alignment in international affairs and multilateralism in foreign policy. The framework developed is used to analyse the factors behind the revival of Quad in

2017. Literature focussing on identifying areas of converging interests and divergent issues of the member countries is analysed to arrive at the relevance of the grouping in the present scenario. The bearing of the Quad consultation on other regional and extra regional players defines their engagement with the grouping, therefore the documents on views of other states and multilateral arrangements are reviewed to arrive at the viability of the Quad. The security strategy papers/white papers on defence, governmental reports and official press releases from Australia, India, Japan and USA are analysed along with books/e-books and published studies/articles/ research work on the subject. In addition, to get a Southeast Asian perspective on Quad survey conducted by Australian Strategic Policy Institute is utilised.

Scope of the Research

The area of study is limited to the Indo-Pacific region and a timeframe covering the period since the revival of the Quad in 2017. The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region and many multilateral/plurilateral security arrangements exist in the region. The scope has been narrowed down to analyse the role of the Quad in contributing towards stability in the region. The Quad originated in 2007 but soon dissipated to be again revived in 2017; the research focuses on Quad 2.0 and its meetings since. The revived grouping is analysed in context of the prevailing geostrategic environment and based on the premise that there is no significant geostrategic shift in the near future. The reasons for revival, interrelationship between member countries and of the Quad with other intergovernmental organisations of the region are analysed to establish the relevance and efficacy of the grouping in achieving its objectives.

While delving into the future, the way forward for Quad, and recommendations for India and ASEAN will be covered.

Methodology

The research utilises a combination of qualitative and quantitative data to improve evaluation by ensuring that the limitations of individual perception developed by analysis of qualitative data are balanced by the strengths of quantitative data. The research methodology is primarily based on a qualitative research method; the purpose of introducing the findings of a survey is to strengthen and confirm the study's conclusions.

The study focusses on understanding the contents of official documents and statements. The published views of strategic analysts and commentators on the subject of Indo-Pacific and the Quad are utilised to form an informed opinion. The data and information forming the basis of this research, has been retrieved from relevant books, e-books on the internet, journals/periodicals, strategy papers/official statements of the Governments of USA, Australia, Japan and India and views of leading think tanks/subject experts.

The assessment of topics related to geopolitics is susceptible to be coloured by individual perception. A preferred method of testing perceptions is by utilising quantitative data. Therefore, to put things in a better perspective and get an overview of the sentiments, existing surveys on the subject and a response to questionnaire based on Google Forms (Survey Administration Application) are utilised. The survey has not been an attempt to obtain the general public perceptions of the Quad; rather has targeted a specific sampling which includes participants of the courses at strategic level in different countries having a stake in the revival of Quad.

The research paper is covered in five chapters. An overview of the chapters is covered below.

1. Chapter 1: Introduction. The chapter covers an introductory brief to include an overview of the Quad, its origins and connect to the Indo-Pacific region. The chapter lays down the outline of the study giving out the aim, research objective, scope and methodology in pursuit of answers to the research question.

2. Chapter 2: Related Literature Review - Indo Pacific Concept, Alignment Theory and Multilateralism. The chapter focusses on literature on the geostrategic importance and dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region, the concept of alliance/alignment in international relations and multilateralism in foreign policy to establish the conceptual framework to be utilised in the research.

3. Chapter 3 : Quad 2.0-Shared Threat and Shared Objectives. Based on the conceptual framework the rationale and purpose for the revival of the Quad is analysed under the heads of shared threats and shared objectives. Factors which are likely to put a strain on the consultation and prevent an effective revival of the Quad are also explored.

4. Chapter 4: Relevance and Potential of Quad 2.0. The focus in this chapter is to examine the relevance and potential of the Quad. The relevance is established by ascertaining the strategic space for the Quad in the Indo-Pacific regional security architecture and its bearing on ASEAN centrality. The potential of Quad is analysed under the DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) paradigm to gauge the extent to which Quad can contribute to region's security dynamics.

5. Chapter 5: Conclusion & Recommendations. This chapter deals with consolidating the study. A reference is drawn to the findings of the survey conducted to support the study to get a broader view of the subject. The recommendations focus on the way forward for the Quad, recommendations for India in its dealing within the Quad and for ASEAN in engaging with the Quad.

Limitations and Delimitations

1. Limitations.

The study of international relations in an era of rapidly changing world politics is very dynamic. The policies of countries are often restructured to respond to the changing environment to suit their respective national interests. The geopolitical and security situation in the region may change based on developments in the region or elsewhere in the world, to which the stake holders are likely to respond based on their national interests. This may not be in tune with the recommendations made in the research. Also, due to the nature of the research topic, the quantitative survey is not be generalised over a large sample base of population. The survey is focused on a specific sample of middle and senior level officials who have a general overview of the prevailing security situation in the region.

2. Delimitations.

The research while analysing an issue of immense geostrategic importance, would refrain from critical analysis of national strategies and policies. The data and material used for the analysis would be obtained from known to be authentic sources (government, semi - government & reliable) available in the open domain. The analysis, inferences drawn

and the recommendations offered would be entirely that of the author as an individual and would not represent the official policies of the Government of India or the organisation represented by the author.

Research Results for Utilisation

There are divergent views on the role and purpose of a revived Quad, one view is that the Quad, as an informal security framework antagonises China and will not be effective in ensuring stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The other view is that the coming together of the four democracies will be a step towards ensuring stability in the region and realising a free and open Indo-Pacific. The research will be based on qualitative content analysis of available literature and a quantitative survey of middle/senior level officials to establish the reasons for the revival of the Quad and its relevance in the prevailing geostrategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region. The research will offer a perspective on the future prospects of the Quad and propose recommendations for India and the ASEAN. It can be utilised for further study into specific areas while analysing the role of Quad in regional geopolitics.

Definitions

The terminology used in the research would be drawn from the standard glossary commonly used worldwide. However, in case of using an unfamiliar term or likelihood of subjective interpretation of certain terms, the intended definition/background information would be covered as explanatory notes in the footnotes. Some basic definitions related to

alliance theory and multilateralism in international relations is covered below.

Alliance. Means Fedder in 1968 described an alliance as a process or a technique of statecraft or a type of international organization. Arnold Wolfer defines an alliance as “a promise of mutual military assistance between two or more sovereign states”. Snyder in 1990 said that “alliances are only the formal subset of a broader and more basic phenomenon, than that of alignment”. Therefore, the primary purpose of most alliances is to combine the member’s capabilities in a way that furthers their respective interests.²⁰

Coalitions. Means Snyder differentiated between alliances and coalitions. According to him, alliances are formed in peace time and coalitions are often found during war. Coalitions lack many of the political functions, such as deterrence of attack, preclusion and restraint of the ally. Fedder defined coalition as “a set of members acting in concert at ‘x’ time regarding one to ‘n’ issues”.²¹

Alignment. Means Formal alliances strengthen existing alignments, or create new ones. Snyder described an alliance as

²⁰ Dwivedi, Dr Sangit Sarita. “Alliances in International Relations Theory”, International Journal of Social Science & Interdisciplinary Research, (IJSSIR). Vol.1 Issue 8, August 2012, p.225-226.

²¹ Ibid.

“a subset of the broader phenomenon alignment”. Alignment occurs when a states brings its policies into close cooperation with another state in order to achieve mutual security goals.²²

Multilateralism. Means It is the process of organizing relations between groups of three or more states. Beyond that basic quantitative aspect, multilateralism is generally considered to comprise certain qualitative elements or principles that shape the character of the arrangement or institution. Those principles are an indivisibility of interests among participants, a commitment to diffuse reciprocity and a system of dispute settlement intended to enforce a particular mode of behaviour. In security arrangements, the principles of multilateralism are best embodied in a collective security system such as NATO, in which a war against one state is considered to be a war against all states, ensuring that any act of aggression against a member of the collective system is met with a response from all members.²³

Minilateralism. Means It is a form of multilateralism offering alternative forms of collective action as complements to and

²² Ibid.

²³ Scott, James. “Multilateralism: International Relations”, Encyclopaedia Britannica. Available: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/multilateralism>.

often substitutes for traditional intergovernmental cooperation. Countries are increasingly participating in an array of flexible, ad hoc frameworks whose membership varies based on situational interests, shared values, or relevant capabilities.²⁴ The process is described by many terms, including ‘smart multilateralism’ and ‘plurilateralism’. Minilateralism can also be defined as a diplomatic process involving a small group of interested parties working together to supplement or complement the activities of international organisations in tackling subjects deemed too complicated to be addressed appropriately at the multilateral level. The process can also include codes of conduct, strategic partnerships and engagement with non-state actors and transnational networks, including NGOs or moderate religious groups.²⁵

²⁴ Patrick, Stewart M. “Making Sense of ‘Minilateralism’: The Pros and Cons of Flexible Cooperation” (Blog Post). Available: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/making-sense-minilateralism-pros-and-cons-flexible-cooperation>.

²⁵ Moret, Erica. “Effective minilateralism for the EU - What, When and How”. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Issue Brief No 17, June 2106, p 1-4.

Chapter 2

Related Literature Review - Indo Pacific Concept, Alignment Theory and Multilateralism

This chapter examines the existing literature in order to establish the framework for the research. The scope of the research involves understanding the purpose for revival of the Quad, its relevance in the regional geopolitics and potential in contributing towards stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The Quad consultations are symbiotically linked to the emerging geostrategic scenario in the Indo-Pacific region. The literature review will focus on three independent themes. Firstly, literature related to the Indo-Pacific regional construct and the security challenges in the region are analysed with an aim to comprehend regional dynamics and its security architectures. Secondly, the concepts of alliance and alignment in security cooperation among states are studied with an intention to reason why nations come close to each other. Thirdly, multilateralism in international affairs is analysed to rationalise as to why select group of nations come together when they already form part of a range of global/regional multilateral institutions.

Indo-Pacific-A Geo-strategic Construct and its Security Challenges

1. Evolution of the Indo-Pacific Regional Construct.

The Indo-Pacific has been recognised as a contiguous bio-geographic region by the marine biologists since long. However, an interconnected Indian and Western Pacific Ocean marine ecosystem did not spontaneously translate into a strategic regional construct. Peter

Cozens, from the Centre for Strategic Studies New Zealand, described the Indo-Pacific as ‘a maritime-strategic continuum that extended from the northern extremities of the Indian Ocean to include, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Australasia, the islands of Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia, and the eastern countries of Asia’¹ The concept has since evolved as a result of an amalgamation of the thoughts of think-tanks and academia of various countries. Two academics who have written extensively on the Indo-Pacific concept are Gurpreet Khurana and Rory Medcalf. Their studies are analysed to contextualise the Indo-Pacific construct for the research.

Many publications attribute the emergence of the Indo-Pacific concept as a regional construct to an academic paper published in 2007 by Khurana.² In his recent essay titled ‘What is the Indo-Pacific? The New Geopolitics of the Asia-Centred Rim Land’³, he traces the emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a geo-political term to the work of Karl Haushofer in 1920 (‘Indopazifischen Raum’-Indopacific Space). Haushofer’s vision represented a non-Atlantic view of the world. Khurana opines that the terminology till early 2000’s was only used in oral discourses in

¹Cozens, Peter. “Some Reflections on Maritime Developments in the Indo-Pacific during the Past Sixty Years”, Maritime Affairs, Vol. 1 (1), Winter 2005, p. 15-35.

² Khurana. “Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation”. Op. Cit. p. 142

³ Khurana, Gurpreet Singh. “What is the Indo-Pacific? The New Geopolitics of the Asia-Centred Rim Land.” ‘Geopolitics by other Means. The Indo-Pacific Reality’(Chapter 1), Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), Rome, February 2019. p. 13-32.

Australia, premised on her two-ocean geo-strategic imperatives. At the highest forums he suggests that the idea was mooted by Japanese PM Shinzo Abe while speaking to the Indian Parliament in August 2007. He analyses that Abe's Indo-Pacific idea was based on the emerging geo-economic imperatives of the countries of the Asian rim-land, shared prosperity, and the attendant need for good order and strategic stability. The idea necessitated exerting restraining pressures upon disruptive tendencies, of either state or non-state players. Therefore, security became the driver of the Indo-Pacific concept. The catalyst for this was the shared concern between India and Japan with regard to the increasing politico-military assertiveness of China. While, Japan sought to enhance the security of its SLOCs, India on the other hand was conscious of the increasing Chinese strategic presence in the Indian Ocean.

Medcalf, the head of the National Security College in Australia, in his article 'Indo-Pacific Visions: Giving Solidarity a Chance'⁴ also talks of Karl Haushofer and puts forward the view that it is a misconception that the Indo-Pacific is a newer idea than the Asia-Pacific framework that it supposedly replaces. He feels that the contours of the Indo-Pacific can be seen in the history of cartography wherein from 1400s to the mid-twentieth century, a typical map titled Asia had the Indo-Pacific in a single frame. He states that the precursors of the Indo-Pacific are based on flourishing regional maritime trade and migration. He cites the spread of Hinduism and Islam to Southeast Asia, Buddhism to China, Japan, and Korea, Chinese geopolitical influence to Southeast

⁴ Medcalf, Rory. "Indo-Pacific Visions: Giving Solidarity a Chance", Special Essay, *Asia Policy*, Volume 14, Number 3, July 2019. p. 79-95.

Asia and the Indian Ocean, and European colonialism and the consequent pan-Asian resistance as examples of regional connectedness. Medcalf suggests that the Asia-Pacific idea arose only later as a way to connect Japan and other Asian economies to USA and Australia, and to keep USA engaged across the Pacific. However, the structural re-emergence of an Indo-Pacific order seemed inevitable once China and India began to reform, increase trade and look outwards. As per him, the Asia-Pacific turned out to be just an evolutionary stage to the Indo-Pacific. This was apparent as China, India, Japan, USA, and others began to compete/cooperate across the Indian Ocean as well as the Pacific. Examples of cooperation are reflected in international responses to the Tsunami of 2004 and combatting Somali piracy. He adds that the countries of Southeast Asia while giving structure to their region through the EAS in 2005 ended up including a much wider range of countries. These included not only 'East Asian' nations but also Australia, New Zealand, India, USA, and Russia. As per him this in a matter of fact reflected the new Indo-Pacific in all but the name.

Medcalf states that the Asia-Pacific as a strategic construct came into prominence in the late 1960s. It was understood as a region connecting Northeast and Southeast Asia with Oceania and the Americas. The purpose of this idea was to reflect and reinforce the US strategic and economic role in Asia and the success of the East Asian industrialised countries as trade partners of USA. The Asia-Pacific construct reached its heights of relevance and institutionalisation by the late 1980s, with the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Its consolidation, including most East Asian and Australasian countries, plus USA, Canada and three Latin American countries, helped allay concerns

about USA retrenchment at the end of the Cold War. China began engaging with Asian multilateralism in the 1990s, through the existing Asia-Pacific institutions as the APEC, ASEAN and its wider security dialogue the ARF. However, the two important factors of the 1990s led to the thoughts of expanding the construct. These were firstly, the rise of India as a substantial economic and military power with interests beyond South Asia; and secondly, the dependence of the economic powerhouses of East Asia on Indian Ocean SLOCs to meet their demand for energy and other resources. The Asia-Pacific institution building reflected these dynamics, for example the ARF went on to include India and other South Asian players in the mid-1990s.⁵


Khurana endorses Medcalf to the end that the rationale for preference for the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept was to primarily accommodate the emerging strategic situation. The term ‘Asia’ was too broad and heterogeneous; and ‘continental’ rather than ‘maritime’. Therefore, the ‘Indo-Pacific’ which signified the integration of two oceans terminology seemed more appropriate. He adds that “the Indo-Pacific concept acknowledges the importance of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) in Asia’s geopolitical and security construct and thereby enables a more holistic comprehension and analyses in comparison to the term Asia-Pacific, wherein the IOR was not included”.⁶ He goes on to describe the Indo-

⁵ Medcalf. “Indo-Pacific Visions: Giving Solidarity a Chance”. Ibid.

⁶ Khurana, Gurpreet. “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept : Retrospect and Prospect”, National Maritime Foundation, November 14, 2017. p.1-7. Available : <https://www.maritimeindia.org/View%20Profile/636215922419657386.pdf>

Pacific as the ‘maritime underbelly of Asia’, which extends from the East African littoral to Northeast Asia and combines the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the Western Pacific Region, inclusive of the contiguous seas off East Asia and Southeast Asia – into a singular regional construct (see figure 2-1).⁷

Figure 2-1 Indo-Pacific and Asia-Pacific Regions.



Source : International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

2. Mapping the Indo-Pacific Region - Differences in Perception.

The extent of the Indo-Pacific region varies amongst the Quad member nations. USA in October 2017 first defined the region to include the entire Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific and the nations that

⁷ Khurana. “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept: Retrospect and Prospect”, Op. Cit. p. 2.

surround them.⁸ This definition of the extent of the Indo-Pacific was shrunk in the National Security Strategy issued in December 2017. As per the document, the Indo-Pacific stretches from the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States.⁹ These boundaries conform to the area of responsibility of the US INDOPACOM. **Australia** is the only Quad member state to lie geographically in both the Indian and Pacific oceans. Australia White Paper on Foreign Policy, 2017 terms the Indo-Pacific as the region ranging from the eastern Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean connected by Southeast Asia, including India, North Asia and the United States”.¹⁰ The Eastern Indian Ocean is a vague description; it is however defined by the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) to extend from the Bay of Bengal to the western coast of Australia.¹¹ **Japan** envisions the two continents of Asia and Africa and the two oceans, the Pacific and Indian oceans, ‘as an overarching, comprehensive concept’

⁸ Tillerson, Rex. “Defining our relationship with India for the next century”, address by US Secretary of State at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), October 18, 2017. Available: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-our-relationship-india-next-century-address-us-secretary-state-rex-tillerson>.

⁹USA, White House. “National Security Strategy of the USA”, December 2017, p. 45-46. Available: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

¹⁰Australia, “2017 Foreign Policy White Paper”, p. 1. Available : <https://www.fpwwhitepaper.gov.au/foreign-policy-white-paper>.


¹¹ UN, Food and Agricultural Organization, Major Fishing Areas, Indian Ocean, Eastern (Major Fishing Area 57). Available: <http://www.fao.org/fishery/area/Area57/en>

connected through ‘a free and open Indo-Pacific.’¹² Therefore, the Japanese construct of the Indo-Pacific is based on combining not just the two large oceans but also the two continents of Asia and Africa. Developing interconnectivity and infrastructure projects among the developing economies of these two large landmasses form the heart of the Japanese concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). For **India**, the definition of the Indo-Pacific is derived from PM Narendra Modi’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. He defined the Indo-Pacific as stretching “from the shores of Africa to that of the Americas”.¹³ Therefore, India takes a maritime view of the region as encompassing all of the Pacific and Indian oceans, stretching from the west coast of USA to the east coast of Africa. Figure 2-2 represents the extent of the Indo-Pacific region.

¹² Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Priority Policy for Development Cooperation FY2017”, p. 9. Available: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000259285.pdf>

¹³ Modi, Narendra. “PM’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue”, June 01, 2018. Available: [https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime Ministers Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue June 01, 2018](https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01,+2018).

Figure 2-2 Indo-Pacific Region - Quad Members Different Views.



Source : Author (IISS image modified to depict varying extent of Indo-Pacific region)

There are variations amongst the Quad members with respect to how they view the western extremities of the Indo-Pacific region. The USA and Australian definition does not encompass the whole Indian Ocean. In contrast the Indian and Japanese definitions are more exhaustive and encompass the whole of the Indian and Pacific oceans. As it is not feasible to segregate the Indian Ocean as per the boundaries laid out by USA and Australia, the study will proceed with the maritime space defined by including the entire Indian and Pacific oceans as the Indo-Pacific region.

The perception of the Indo-Pacific is not consistent among other regional players too. **France**, with sizeable presence in terms of island territories and EEZ in the region, defines the Indo-Pacific to constitute a maritime and land geographical area shaped by interactions

around strategic centres of gravity of India, China, Southeast Asia, Australia and comprises the Indian, Pacific and Southern Oceans and forms a security continuum spreading from the East African coastline to the Western American seaboard.¹⁴ **China** prefers to use the traditional term Asia-Pacific or Asia-Indo-Pacific and does not give any credence to the Indo-Pacific regional construct. However, the Chinese led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), especially the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) espouses the Indo-Pacific regional construct. **ASEAN** was not too enthusiastic about the Indo-Pacific idea initially. This was influenced by the view that the conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific would force smaller countries to take sides between USA and China, and lead to weakening of the ASEAN. Some ASEAN countries like Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore were supportive of the Indo-Pacific construct. Indonesia holds strategic significance and geographical centrality in the Indo-Pacific. As an archipelagic country, it overlooks four key maritime chokepoints and controls the movement of strategic commodities between the Indian and Pacific oceans. This led President Jokowi to embrace the new concept with optimism. In his address at the 9th EAS Summit in Myanmar in November 2014, he said, “Indonesia should assert itself as the ‘Porus Maritime Dunia’ (World Maritime Axis) and in determining the future of the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions”.¹⁵ ASEAN has recently embraced the construct with the adoption of ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific

¹⁴ France, Ministry of the Armed Forces. “France and Security in the Indo-Pacific” 2018. p.2. Available: www.defense.gouv.fr.

¹⁵ Wितular, Rendi A. “Presenting Maritime Doctrine”, Jakarta Post, November 14, 2014. Available: <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/14/presenting-maritime-doctrine.html>.

(AOIP)' at the 34th ASEAN Summit at Bangkok in June 2019 and defines the Indo-Pacific as a combination of the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.¹⁶

3. Premise of the Indo-Pacific Regional Construct.

The Indo-Pacific regional construct is based on the growing interconnectedness between the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific region. This is primarily based on the economic rise of the East, South East and South Asian countries. Chinese MSR initiative and India's Act East Policy will further contribute to economic and trade integration. There has been a rise in trade and the consequent increase in density of shipping in the SLOCs of Indian Ocean and South China Sea. With economic rise the dependence on fossil fuel imports from the Middle East transiting through these congested SLOCs has also increased (see figure 2-3).


Pooja Bhatt in her essay 'Evolving Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific : Deliberating India's Position' brings out the linkage between the trade and security in the Indo-Pacific construct¹⁷. The term has shifted focus the maritime domain of Asia and its related security perceptions. Since the end of the Second World War, Asian security concerns were linked to the land-based territorial construct and negligible attention was paid to the security and foreign policy of the high seas or maritime waters. However, the expanding maritime trade among the regional and international countries over the past decades and the lack of an overarching institutional

¹⁶ ASEAN. "ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific". Op. Cit.

¹⁷ Bhatt, Pooja. "Evolving Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific: Deliberating India's Position", Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Fall 2018. p.53-78.

architecture for maritime governance at the regional level, aggravated by an increase in traditional and non-traditional security threats in the high seas, provided compelling reasons for the littorals of the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean to cooperate. Therefore, reinforcing that the Indo-Pacific construct has a maritime security dimension rather than a continental dimension where the natural need to protect the trade flowing through the SLOCs is paramount

Figure 2-3 Global Oil Shipping Route Density in SLOCs.



Source : US Energy Information Administration

4. Limitations/Criticism of Indo-Pacific Regional Construct.

Medcalf while analysing the Indo-Pacific construct comments that “no simple theory or single strategic system captures all contingencies”.¹⁸ The same is true of the Indo-Pacific construct. Medcalf feels that the

¹⁸ Medcalf, Rory. “Pivoting the Map: Australia’s Indo-Pacific System”, *Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC)*, ANU College of Asia & the Pacific, Centre of Gravity Series Paper #1, 2012. p. 1-8.

Indo-Pacific region includes a large part of the world and is too large to be a significantly bounded zone of strategic interaction. The large size of the region may prevent the establishment of a cohesive, inclusive set of security or diplomatic institutions to solve security issues. Developments in one part of the Indo-Pacific region may not be of equal importance to other parts. Indo-Pacific security challenges are common across all of its sub-regions; therefore it is not a fully integrated, interdependent strategic system. For example, tensions on the Korean Peninsula are not of immediate concern to India, and similarly India-Pakistan tensions for East Asian countries.¹⁹ The sheer size does make considering the Indo-Pacific as one connected region difficult but as Asia is becoming the global centre of economic gravity, any conflict there involving a major power would have a global impact.

Khurana analyses that the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the Western Pacific differ substantially in many aspects such as the levels of economic development of countries, their social parameters and the security environment. The Western Pacific has been affected by major traditional military threats in the past due to adverse actions of dominant military powers. The IOR on the other hand did not have an assertive local power. The potential maritime rivalries (less the India-Pakistan rivalry) in the IOR thus remained dormant, and have not yet translated into military insecurities. The non-traditional security issues, such as piracy, organised crime involving drugs and small-arms, illegal fishing, irregular migration, and human smuggling are more prevalent in the IOR.

¹⁹ Medcalf, Rory. "Reimagining Asia: From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific", The Asan Forum, Open Forum, June 26, 2015. p. 1-23. Available: www.theasanforum.org/reimagining-asia-from-asia-pacific-to-indo-pacific/.

Therefore to club both regions into one is not prudent. However, with the rising footprint of the Chinese Navy, traditional military threats can no longer be ruled out in the IOR.²⁰

On the question whether the Indo-Pacific construct is meant for balancing against or excluding China, Medcalf offers a balanced view stating that “the reality is that in the Indo-Pacific region there is a growing interconnectedness of many nations economic and strategic interests, especially that of China and India. The US strategy in the Indo-Pacific is to contain China and the Chinese influence in the overall Indo-Pacific is more diluted than in an exclusively East Asian setting. However China’s economic, energy, diplomatic, commercial and strategic interests in the region make her a quintessential Indo-Pacific power. To keep China out of the Indian Ocean would be an unsustainable folly, on the other hand China should not possess a veto over the security dialogues or relationships other states may choose to develop”.²¹

5. Indo-Pacific Regional Security Architecture.

Medcalf opines that workable Indo-Pacific regional order should include great-power bilateralism alongside a growing role for inclusive regional institutions, with the EAS, ARF and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting+8 (ADMM+) reflecting an essentially Indo-Pacific footprint.²² Khurana offers a notional architecture to the Indo-Pacific

²⁰ Khurana. “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept : Retrospect and Prospect”. Op. Cit. p. 1-2.

²¹ Medcalf. “Pivoting the Map: Australia’s Indo-Pacific System”. Op. Cit. p. 4-5.

²² Medcalf. “Pivoting the Map: Australia’s Indo-Pacific System”. Ibid. p. 5.

construct. The same is represented as a triangle as shown in the figure 2-4.²³ It illustrates the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision at its apex and forms the conceptual level. The second level of the hierarchical triangle is the Political Level, and at the third is the Executive-Level representing functional cooperation. At the conceptual level, the FOIP vision was defined by Admiral Davidson as under.


“Free means, ‘Free’ both in terms of security - being **free from coercion** by other nations - **and in terms of values and political systems**. As also ‘Free’ means nations do not have to choose who they trade with and who they partner with because of fear or coercion. An ‘Open Indo-Pacific’ means **all nations should enjoy unfettered access to the seas and airways** upon which our nations and economies depend. An Open Indo-Pacific includes **open investment environments, transparent agreements between nations, protection of intellectual property rights, fair and reciprocal trade**—all of which are essential for people, goods, and capital to move across borders for the shared benefit of all”.²⁴

²³ Khurana, Gurpreet Singh. “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ Idea: Origins, Conceptualizations and the Way Ahead”, *Journal of Indian Ocean Rim Studies*, Special Issue on Indo-Pacific, October-December 2019. p. 11.

²⁴ Davidson, Admiral Phil. “Introduction to Indo-Pacific Security Challenges”, Keynote speech delivered by Commander US INDOPACOM, at Halifax International Security Forum, 17 November 2018. *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs*, Spring 2019. p. 3-10.

Khurana concludes that the future contours of the regional geopolitical and security environment will be based upon how the Indo-Pacific concept is materialised through the cooperative structures at the Political Level, and what functional activity supports it at the Executive Level.

Figure 2-4 Notional Indo-Pacific Regional Architecture (Khurana).



Source : Journal of Indian Ocean Rim Studies, Khurana.

6. Indo-Pacific Vision and the Quad.

The Quad is a nascent partnership. It is widely seen as an important facet of the member countries Indo-Pacific vision. Summarised below are the reflection of the Quad in official documents/releases of the member countries.

6.1 **USA.**USA has been traditionally following the ‘Hub and Spokes’ policy, wherein USA acts as the hub with the Asian nations with military ties to it forming the spokes. The National Security Strategy of 2017 states that “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region and

among other things seeks to increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India to preserving mutual interests in the Indo-Pacific region”.²⁵ The Indo-Pacific Strategy Report of 2019 while calling China a revisionist power, mentions that “the Quad is an important forum to discuss the respective Indo-Pacific visions of the four countries, all grounded in an affirmation of ASEAN centrality and building on existing trilateral relationships. Quad Consultations focus on upholding the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, increasing connectivity consistent with international law and standards, and coordinating on counter-terrorism and maritime security efforts”.²⁶

6.2 Australia. The Australian Foreign Policy White Paper was published in 2017; therefore it does not make a specific mention of the Quad. It states that “Australia remains strongly committed to her trilateral dialogues with the United States and Japan and, separately, with India and Japan. As also open to working with our Indo-Pacific partners in other plurilateral arrangements”.²⁷

6.3 Japan. The Japanese Defence White Paper, 2019 does not make a direct reference to the Quad but notes that China is expanding and intensifying its military activities at sea and in the air and such

²⁵ USA, National Security Strategy. Op.Cit. p. 45-47.

²⁶ USA, Department of Defense. “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report - Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting a Networked Region”. June 01, 2019. p. 48-49. Available: <https://www.media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/Department-of-Defense-Indo-Pacific-Strategy-Report-2019.pdf>.

²⁷ Australia. “The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper”. p. 40. Op. Cit

military developments represent a serious security concern. It recognises that USA will seek to increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia and India and develop a strong defence networks with its allies and partners.²⁸ PM Shinzo Abe responded to a question on closer military cooperation amongst the Quad stating that “the military aspect is not the only aspect to the Quad concept and there were more comprehensive aspects to the concept”. He added that “for the stability of the region it was important that the Japanese Self-defence Force, Australian Navy, American Navy and the Indian Navy cooperate to contribute to stability”.²⁹

6.4 **India.** In the Ministry of Defence Annual Report 2018-19, it is mentioned that “India has abiding interests in Indo-Pacific region and its engagements with the countries and institutions in the region have been deepening”.³⁰ The Minister of External Affairs while answering to a question in the parliament stated that “these consultations have focused on cooperation in areas such as connectivity, sustainable development, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation and maritime and cyber security, with a view to promoting peace, stability and prosperity in an increasingly inter-

²⁸ Japan, Ministry of Defence. “Defense of Japan 2019”. p. 49-50. Available: [https:// www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2019/ DOJ2019_Full.pdf](https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2019/DOJ2019_Full.pdf)

²⁹ Stutchbury, Michael and Grigg, Angus. “The word according to Japan’s PM Shinzo Abe”. Australian Financial Review. January 18, 2018. Available: https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/0003_26829.pdf.

³⁰ India, Ministry of Defence. “Annual Report 2018-19”. p. 5. Available: <https://www.mod.gov.in/documents/annual-report>

connected Indo-Pacific region that the four countries share with each other and with other partners”.³¹

7. Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region.

In order to explore the security dimension of the Quad, it is necessary to identify the major security challenges as they present themselves in the Indo-Pacific region. These are covered under two heads, firstly, traditional security Challenges and secondly, non-traditional security challenges.

7.1 Traditional Security Challenges. There are six potential flash points in the Indo-Pacific region. These are the contested water of the South China Sea, and East China Sea, the interstate issues of Korean Peninsula, China-Taiwan crises, India-China border dispute and India-Pakistan dispute. These challenges are summarized in succeeding paragraphs below.

7.1.1 South China Sea. The South China Sea lies to the northwest of Southeast Asia and is bordered by most of the Southeast Asian countries and China. South China Sea holds a strategic location for global shipping trade with an estimated USD 3.37 trillion trade passing through in 2016. This includes over 64 percent of China’s maritime trade and nearly 42 of Japan’s maritime trade. The United States has approximately 14 percent of its maritime trade passing through the region

³¹ India, Ministry of External Affairs. “Features of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue”, Answer to Question No. 2114 in Parliament, January 03, 2019. Available: <https://www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/MoDAR2018.pdf>.

and is less reliant on South China Sea.³² The Malacca Straits is the doorway to South China Sea and is the second-busiest oil shipping line after Strait of Hormuz. In 2016 it accounted for approximately 15 billion barrels per day of crude oil trade flow.³³ The contested sea territory claim has the potential to cause SLOCs insecurity in South China Sea. There has not been any major standoff, however the territorial maritime dispute has the potential to escalate and disturb the regional stability. The Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal, Natuna Islands and Macclesfield Bank are the centre of disputed claims between Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and China (see figure 2-5). The most notable claim is China's nine-dash line that covers most of the region. Disregarding international laws, China is building artificial islands across South China Sea to expand its naval presence and exploring the exploitation of vast potential reserves of natural resources.


7.1.2 East China Sea. The East China Sea connects the major economic powerhouse of East Asia, namely, China, Japan, and South Korea. The shipping lines from South China Sea naturally continue to the East China Sea region making it strategically important. The notable maritime dispute in the region is the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. The Islands are located in southeast of Japan and at the southwestern tip of China (see figure 2-5). China and Japan claim the rights over the region

³² China Power Team. "How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?" CSIS. October 02, 2017. Available: <https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/>

³³Thailand, Ministry of Energy. "Strait of Malacca Key Chokepoint for Oil Trade". Available: <https://energy.go.th/2015/strait-of-malacca-key-chokepoint-for-oil-trade/>

within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles. Japan has been managing the islands since 1895; however, China reclaimed the region by citing the historic rights over the area. In 2012, Japan officially nationalized the islands to which China replied in 2013 by declaring an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) covering most of the region.³⁴

Figure 2-5 South and East China Sea Territorial Disputes.



Source : Money Morning Staff Research, NPR, Google News.

7.1.3 Korean Peninsula. The North/South Korea border is one of the most heavily armed borders in the world. North Korea remains internationally isolated and continues to pursue its aim for development of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. The situation continues to be disturbed and a resolution seems distant. The predictions cover the

³⁴ CFR Info Guide Presentation. “China’s Maritime Disputes”, Council of Foreign Relations. Available: <https://www.cfr.org/interactives/chinas-maritime-disputes>.

spectrum with scenarios ranging from a North Korea triggered conflict to a gradual reunification with the South.

7.1.4 China-Taiwan Crisis. Tension between China and Taiwan continue. Militarily, analysts view the build-up of the Chinese capability as an indicator of an imminent invasion; others doubt such a direct move and predict a continued low-level military intimidation over a sustained period of time.

7.1.5 Sino-India Border Dispute. China and India in the past have been considered continental powers who share an outstanding border dispute. However, the rising naval capabilities and ambitions of both countries will lead to projection of power into each other's maritime peripheries, i.e. India in the South China Sea and China in the Indian Ocean Region. This has significant implications for maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region.

7.1.6 India-Pakistan Dispute. India and Pakistan have long standing issue over disputed borders especially in the state of Kashmir. The nations are nuclear capable and have fought four wars. The potential of the conflict for spilling over to the maritime domain in the Indian Ocean region is a possibility, where threats to shipping could materialise.

7.2 Non-Traditional Security Challenges. The multi-faceted non-traditional security challenges in the Indo-Pacific are summarised below:-

7.2.1 Piracy. Piracy has a major impact on commercial shipping. The incidents of piracy around the Strait of Malacca have reduced due to successful implementation of multilateral engagements by ASEAN. However, there has been a rise in piracy off the coast of Somalia in the Indian Ocean. This threat is magnified with modern equipment which

enables pirates to operate in the range of 1,500 nautical miles from Somali coastline. Modern piracy is a complex problem that is a manifestation of socio-political problems. Purely naval solutions will only suppress the problem and it is felt that the solution should look beyond the sea.

7.2.2 Terrorism. Terrorism in the region is primarily related to separatist movements; however it does have the potential to escalate with links to international terrorism by Islamic extremists. Terrorism is a threat to regional security which needs a concerted and collective effort of all nations to curb.

7.2.3 Transnational Crimes. Various crimes have been clubbed under this head, these include drug trafficking, small-arms trafficking, human trafficking, IUU (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated) fishing and smuggling. All the above issues need a multilateral and multi-faceted approach to tackle.

7.2.4 Cyber Crime. The frequency and scale of cyber-attacks rises every year. The cost of cybercrime to the world economy is expected to increase to USD 6 trillion by 2021.³⁵ Cybercrime is not restricted to national borders or regional distinctions. Therefore, a multi-stakeholder approach with inputs from different sectors and disciplines including bilateral and multilateral agreements, participation of international associations is needed to tackle cybercrime. Greater cooperation can enable the development of much stronger cybersecurity capabilities. This will help to deter repeated and persistent online threats and enable better investigation, apprehension and prosecution of malicious agents.

³⁵ Morgan, Steve (Ed). “2019 Cybercrime Report”, Herjavec Group. January 2020. p. 1-2. Available: <https://www.herjavecgroup.com/the-2019-official-annual-cybercrime-report/>.

7.2.5 Environmental Degradation. The region is susceptible to various effects of environmental degradation which will have a major impact on human and economic security. Key environmental challenges in the region include food and water insecurity, marine pollution and global climate change. Responses to environmental crises must include both a crisis response and a long-term preventive defence.

7.2.6 Natural Disasters. The Indo-Pacific region is one of the most disaster-prone areas in the world, with frequent natural disasters to include earthquakes, tsunamis, tropical storms, flooding, landslides, forest fires and volcanic eruptions affecting millions of people every year. Global warming is causing a rise of sea levels leading to heat waves, droughts, storms, rains becoming more extreme and common.³⁶ The rising frequency of natural disasters in the region poses grave security risks to the countries of the region. This necessitates greater cooperation in the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations.

Concept of Alliance/Alignment in Security Cooperation

A review of literature on the Quad highlights the lack of clarity on the terminology with respect to different types of security cooperation. In order to understand what type of a security grouping the Quad is likely to develop into there is a need to study the concept of alliance in international relations. The concept of alliance has been understood very broadly and flexibly. At times, inadvertently it has been used as an umbrella term to define any form of security cooperation. The first logical

³⁶ Asia Development Bank. “Climate Change and Disasters in Asia and the Pacific”, August 07, 2019. Available: <https://www.adb.org/news/infographics/climate-change-and-disasters-asia-and-pacific>.

question is **what are the types of security cooperation and how does one differentiate each type?**

1. Types of Security Cooperation.

1.1 Alliance. Walt gives a very broad based definition of an alliance; he defines it as “a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more states”.³⁷ He states that an alliance should cover both formal and informal forms; this effectively implies that an alliance covers cases where there is a formal written treaty, as well as informal mutual understandings based on verbal assurances for security cooperation. He suggests that even though the nature of alliance may vary, “the primary purpose of most alliances is to combine the member’s military capability in a way that it furthers respective interests”. Therefore, an alliance may be structured to have coordinated response to converging interests or an adhoc form that does not aim for coordinated policies and action. The NATO is an example of a formal alliance. However, the issue with such a broad definition of alliance is that it is so vast that it covers all types of security arrangement between states and blurs the difference between alliances and collective security arrangements. What has traditionally distinguished alliances from many other security arrangements between states is the emphasis that they place on military forms of assistance, especially the use of force. Murrow clarifies that “the alliance’s main functions are firstly, defence, which entails a commitment by allies to assist each other in case of military aggression and secondly, deterrence,

³⁷ Walt, Stephen M. “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse”, Survival, Vol.39, No.1, Spring 1997. p.156-179.

which seeks to prevent third parties from attacking the allies by signalling a commitment to military intervention on each other's behalf".³⁸

1.2 Alignment. Snyder gives a more focussed definition of an alliance as "formal association of states for the use of (or non-use) of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of their members, against specific other states, whether or not these others are explicitly identified".³⁹ He notes that an alliance is a subset of 'alignment' that refers to "a set of mutual expectations between two or more states that they will have each other's support in disputes or wars with particular other states".⁴⁰ Wilkins compares the definition of an alliance put forward by Walt and Snyder and contends that the latter should be adopted because the former is too broad based. Wilkins presents four subtypes of alignment: 'alliance', 'coalition', 'security community' and 'strategic partnership'.⁴¹

1.3 Coalition. Where Walt saw coalitions as one of the subcategories of alliances, Snyder differentiated between the two. According to him alliances are formed in peace time and coalitions are often found

³⁸ Morrow, James D. "Alliances: Why Write Them Down?" Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.3 No.1, June 2000. p. 67-68.

³⁹ Snyder, Glenn H. "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut", Journal of International Affairs, Vol.44, No.1, Spring/Summer 1990. p.103-123.

⁴⁰ Snyder. Ibid.

⁴¹ Wilkins, Thomas S. "Alignment, Not 'Alliance'-The Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment", Review of International Studies, Vol.38, 2012. p.53-76.

during war.⁴² Wilkins argues that these two should clearly be separated on the premise that “whereas alliances are relatively broad-based and permanent institutions, usually based upon formal treaties, coalitions are more informal, narrowly-focused, and short-lived. Alliances are when a future threat is clearly identified and planned for (specific threat). Coalitions form when this threat has not been foreseen and states are caught by surprise (non-specific or unexpected threat)”.⁴³

1.4 Security Community. Wilkins presents the definition as “a peaceful comity of states through gradual confidence building and integration”.⁴⁴ The examples of security communities include the EU and ASEAN, where states cooperate to eliminate the use of military forces as a means of achieving their own gains within the political sphere and to establish an exclusive shared identity. Wilkins identifies two different types of a security community: ‘pluralistic’ and ‘amalgamated’. The former is concerned with inter-governmental entities like the ASEAN that guarantee a high level of national sovereignty while the latter refers to supranational entities like the EU where the member states delegate their sovereignty to a higher authority to a great extent.⁴⁵

⁴² Snyder. “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut”. Op. Cit.

⁴³ Wilkins. “Alignment, Not ‘Alliance’-The Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment”. Op. Cit.

⁴⁴ Wilkins. Ibid.

⁴⁵ Wilkins. “Alignment, Not ‘Alliance’ – the Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment”. Ibid.

1.5 Strategic Partnership. Wilkins classifies strategic partnership as the latest subcategory of alignment and proposes the following definition, “structured collaboration between states (or other ‘actors’) to take joint advantage of economic opportunities, or to respond to security challenges more effectively than could be achieved in isolation. Besides allowing information, skills, and resources to be shared, a strategic partnership also permits the partners to share risk”.⁴⁶ He suggests that a strategic partnership is characterised by the following four attributes. First, it is organised primarily based on a general purpose called a ‘system principle’. Secondly, the development of a strategic partnership is a goal-driven rather than threat-driven. Thirdly, a strategic partnership is likely to be an informal entity without a formal alliance treaty, guaranteeing a greater degree of autonomy compared to the other forms of alignments. This informality is one of the advantages over other types of alignment as it is less likely to provoke the states that are targeted or excluded and does not require high level of responsibility. Finally, economic cooperation can emerge from or can be a key factor for the establishment of a strategic partnership as the term has its origin in the business world.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Wilkins, Thomas S. “Russo-Chinese Strategic Partnership: A New Form of Security Cooperation?” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.29, No.2, September 2008. p.358-383.


⁴⁷ Wilkins. “Alignment, Not ‘Alliance’ – The Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment”. Op. Cit.

2. Categorising the Spectrum of Alignment.

Lalwani and Byrne in their essay ‘The Quad : Alliance or Alignment’ base their summary on Wilkins subtypes of alignment.⁴⁸ They have chosen to categorize this spectrum of alignment from a formal alliance to a strategic partnership along two continuous vectors: the scope of challenge and the depth of commitments. The scope of challenge varies in terms of whether the grouping focuses on a broad/diffused or narrow/concentrated challenge. The depth of commitments is defined by the degree of contributions, in terms of financial, material, political, or organisational, and if the same is voluntary or binding. They further give an example of each to ease understanding. A specific and costly alignment might be a military alliance with mutual defence commitments to provide resources and come to the aid of a partner for e.g. NATO. A specific yet shallow term-limited alignment might look more like a coalition for e.g. counter-ISIS coalition. A deep commitment to a broader set of security challenges rather than a specific adversary might look more like a security community for e.g. ASEAN. Finally, a flexible alignment seeking some sort of strategic convergence, but with broad scope to a variety of security or geopolitical challenges and with low voluntary commitments, might be classified as a strategic partnership, for e.g. BRICS. The types of alignment are differentiated by plotting along the two vectors mentioned above in Figure 2-6

⁴⁸ Lalwani, Sameer & Bryne, Heather. “The Quad: Alliance or Alignment”. Stimson Centre. Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Project, Policy Paper. April 10, 2019. p. 1-2. Available: http://www.india-seminar.com/2019/715/715_lalwani_and_byrne.htm

Figure 2-6 Spectrum of Alignment.



Source : Author (based on Lalwani and Bryne: Distinction of Types of Alignments)

3. Why do Nations Align?

Having seen the types of alignment, the next logical question is **what leads nations to align with each other?** Many theories have been explored to explain alliance formation and performance. Two contemporary theories on alliance formation are based on Balance of Power and Balance of Threat. Dwivedi in a paper titled ‘Alliances in International Relations Theory’ explains the two theories.⁴⁹

3.1 Balance of Power (BoP). The motive behind the theory is to prevent any nation or combination of countries from achieving a dominant position. As per the theory, nations are more likely to join the weaker coalition to prevent formation of a hegemonic one i.e., ‘balancing’ rather than join the dominant one in order to increase the probability of joining the winning sides i.e., ‘bandwagoning’. This concept was put

⁴⁹ Dwivedi, Dr Sangit Sarita. “Alliances in International Relations Theory”, p.227-230. Op. Cit.

forward by Kenneth Waltz in 1979. The objective of creating a system of BoP is to protect the security and independence of the particular nations. No single entity within the system should be allowed to gain dominance over the others. According to Morgenthau in the BoP theory, nations form alliances to offset growing powers and restore the balance.⁵⁰

3.2 Balance of Threat (BoT). The theory was put forth by Stephan Walt, he suggests that alliances tend to emphasise state's desire to balance against security threats. Walt alters Waltz's version of alliance formation by stating that states do not balance against power but rather against threats. Walt finds that it is the general tendency of states to 'balance' against the most threatening state or coalition, rather than 'bandwagoning' with it. The level of threat a state poses to others is a function of its power, geographic proximity, offensive military capabilities and perceived aggressiveness.⁵¹

3.2.1 Aggregate Power. It is the total power of states. The greater a state's total resource e.g., population, industrial and military capability, and technological prowess, the greater a potential threat it can pose to others.

3.2.2 Geographical Proximity. The ability to project power declines with distance; states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away. States are more likely to make their alliance choices in response to nearby powers than in response to those that are distant.

⁵⁰ Dwivedi. Ibid.

⁵¹ Dwivedi. "Alliances in International Relations Theory". Ibid.

3.2.3 Offensive Power. It is the ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state. States with large offensive capabilities are more likely to provoke an alliance than are those that are incapable of attacking. States that are viewed as aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them.

3.2.4 Other Factors. The perception of intent plays a crucial role in alliance choices. Ideology is also one factor among many that may encourage alignment. States will prefer to ally with governments whose political outlook is similar to their own; however, ideology is a weaker cause of alliance formation. Also, a large aid relationship is more often the result of alignment than a cause of it. Economic ties can create or reinforce strong alliance relations, particularly when one partner is heavily dependent on the other.

3.3 Theory of Strategic Partnership. Wilkins formulated a theoretical framework to specifically explain how a strategic partnership is formed and developed.⁵² He felt that alignment theories were not adequate to understand the reason for strategic partnerships. He proposed an analytical framework called a strategic partnership model that divides phases of a strategic partnership into the following three: formation, implementation, and evaluation. Wilkins explains it is the uncertainty in the external environment creates a condition for the formation of a strategic partnership as prospective member states (or actors) attempt to counter it through combining capabilities and forces. He further argues

⁵² Wilkins. "Alignment, Not 'Alliance' - The Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment". Op. Cit.

that states that form a strategic partnership do not necessarily share a common threat perception. In view of uncertainty in the external environment, states seek to approach possible collaborators based on mutual interests, rather than shared values or ideology, which become solidified into a system-principle. He contends that the essence of a strategic partnership is ‘inter-state cooperation to achieve mutual objectives’.

4. Summary: Spectrum of Alignment.

It can be summarised from the study of theories on alliances that the military component and a commitment to signal a collective deterrence to prevent an aggression, besides assurance to militarily assist each other in case of a military aggression is an essential feature of alliance. A coalition on the other hand is in response to a crisis situation, therefore is short lived and focused. A security community is coming together of nations to eliminate chances of use of military force between them and establish a shared identity. A strategic partnership is formed to respond to security challenges in cohesively than in isolation while allowing greater degree of autonomy, informality and flexibility in identification of goals. An alliance is threat driven whereas a strategic partnership is goal driven. Further, study on alliances reveals that that nations ally to balance power or threats. Post World War II, a bipolar balance of power developed with nations of Western Europe siding with USA in the NATO military alliance, while USSR’s satellite-allies in Central and Eastern Europe became unified under Soviet leadership in the Warsaw Pact. The fear of mutual destruction fuelled by an arms race avoided a direct confrontation between the superpowers, but it did not deter political meddling or limited military interventions by the superpowers in various Third World nations. The balance of power theory is more applicable in a bipolar world, post the

collapse of the USSR, the world transformed into a unipolar system and the theory lost its relevance. The balance of threat theory, where nations form alliances against a perceived threat emerged as more contemporary. The theory on strategic partnerships is more relatable in a multipolar world where nations cooperate to address mutually shared objectives rather than a shared common threat perception.

Multilateralism in International Affairs

Many theories have been proposed to define multilateralism and multilateral institutions. The definition put forth in a research brief by the United Nations University is that multilateralism refers to collective, cooperative action by states (when necessary, in concert with non-state actors) to deal with common challenges and problems when these are best managed collectively at the international level. International peace and security, economic development and international trade, human rights, functional and technical cooperation, and the protection of the environment, among others, require joint action to reduce costs and to bring order and regularity to international relations. Such common problems cannot be addressed unilaterally with optimum effectiveness. This rationale persists because all states face mutual vulnerabilities and share interdependence. They all will benefit from, and thus are required to support, public goods. Even the most powerful states cannot achieve security, environmental safety, and economic prosperity as effectively (if at all) in isolation or unilaterally. Therefore the international system rests upon a network of regimes, treaties, international organisations, and shared practices that

embody common expectations, reciprocity, and equivalence of benefits.⁵³ This definition describes the role of institutions such as the UN and WTO.

1. Challenges to Multilateralism.

The world is facing complex challenges such as climate change, pandemic diseases and protracted conflicts. In today's times narrowly interpreted national interests, big-power politics, coercion, competition and confrontation are overtaking cooperation, dialogue and respect for international law. The UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres⁵⁴ had said that "multilateralism is under fire precisely when we need it most".

The United Nations University lists the challenges to multilateralism under systemic, hegemonic and normative sources.⁵⁵

1.1 The maintenance of international peace and security is one of the main objectives of international organisations, however the structural or **systemic challenge** is that many armed conflicts are either domestic/transnational/ involving non-state actors rather than inter-state actors and it has been difficult in finding consensus in dealing with such conflicts.

1.2 The **hegemonic challenge** is that through economic and military pre-eminence, the stronger nations are in a position to exercise discretion in terms of its support for international organisations decisions and adherence to a rules based order. Powerful states have been known to

⁵³ Newman, E., Thakur, R., & Tirman, J. "Multilateralism under Challenge". United Nations University, Research Brief, No.1, 2006. p. 3.

⁵⁴ Guterres, António. "Address to the General Assembly," September 25, 2018. Available: <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-09-25/address-73rd-general-assembly>.

⁵⁵ Newman et al. "Multilateralism under Challenge". Op. Cit.

circumvent established international organisations in matters related to their individual national interests.

1.3 The **normative challenge** was in the way that decisions are made and implemented. The established multilateral organisations do not always meet standards of accountability and transparency to be considered legitimate. Also, the consensus and majoritarian basis of decision making of some international organisations have been questioned by issues of legitimacy. In many multilateral organisations, the status quo/inactivity is acceptable if agreement to act through consensus or majority according to the rules of procedure cannot be achieved. However, observers feel that if international organisations cannot act in response to the most pressing global problems then their legitimacy should be questioned.

Munich Young Leaders, highlighted concerns on issues concerning multilateralism and multilateral institutes.⁵⁶ The main points are as under:-

1. Membership and decision making structures of international organisations like the UNSC and the international financial institutions are outdated. These institutions do not adequately reflect the increased influence of non-Western powers and emerging middle powers, thus affecting their legitimacy and efficacy.

⁵⁶ Eisentraut, S., Erber, C., Von Hammerstein, E. & Merk, A (Eds.), “Multilateralism is Dead. Long Live Multilateralism!” Munich Young Leaders Report, Munich Security Conference and Körber-Stiftung, 2019, p. 6-8. Available: https://www.koerber-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/koerber-stiftung/redaktion/munich-young-leaders/pdf/2019/Multilateralism-is-Dead_Long-Live-Multilateralism.pdf.

2. The geopolitical shifts and mounting great power rivalries are putting strain global cooperative efforts. In order to effectively uphold a system of multilateral cooperation; the system's biggest players need to agree on the basics of cooperation.

3. The trend of rising nationalism poses a challenge to the multilateral order.

2. Minilateral Organisations-an Alternative to Multilateralism.

To tide over some of the challenges of large multilateral organisations and their limitations, there is a rise of an innovative form of cooperation in the form of minilateral or plurilateral initiatives, also known as 'sub-groups of multilateral actors'. In a paper titled 'Between Minilateralism and Multilateralism: Opportunities and Risks of Pioneer Alliances in International Trade and Climate Politics' it is brought out that Minilateral alliances are a new, more flexible form of 'modular multilateralism' and offer great potential for both international trade and climate policy.⁵⁷ This is based on the premise that smaller groups reach agreement more quickly and cooperation research shows that groups with a limited number of members can achieve more ambitious agreements than is the case with the multilateral context. In the global trading system many countries have reacted to the slow progress of the multilateral process by concluding bilateral and regional treaties outside of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It is however felt that minilateral groupings

⁵⁷ Brandi, C., Berger, A., & Bruhn, D. "Between Minilateralism and Multilateralism: Opportunities and Risks of Pioneer Alliances in International Trade and Climate Politics". German Development Institute, Briefing Paper 16/2015. p. 1-2.

should augment the multilateral process, even supporting it in the ideal scenario and not replace it.

In the security domain while NATO is an example of a formal alliance, minilateralism can be viewed as a flexible cooperation. An example which lies at the extreme end of the spectrum is the Astana format which includes Russia, Turkey and Iran. This has brought together Iran and Turkey in a minilateral arrangement for addressing issues in the Syria crisis within the framework of a rigid tactical agenda. An alliance of these nations would have been otherwise been unimaginable since both countries have regional leadership ambitions.⁵⁸ Patrick opines that ad hoc minilateral organisations offer disaggregated approaches to international cooperation and bring certain advantages, including speed, flexibility, modularity, and possibilities for experimentation. However, its risk is that minilateralism could undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of indispensable international organizations and even accelerate the world's coalescence into rival coalitions.⁵⁹

3. Minilateralism in Indo-Pacific Region.

A review of literature on the rise of minilateralism in the security domain in Indo-Pacific region highlights three themes. Firstly, the pre-eminence of USA alliance arrangement is likely to continue,

⁵⁸ Truevtsev, Konstantin. "Astana Format: What Has Been Done and What Needs to Be Done". Valdai Discussion Club, The Eastern Perspective, July 11, 2019. Available: [https:// www.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/astana-format-what-has-been-done-and-what-needs-to-be-done/](https://www.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/astana-format-what-has-been-done-and-what-needs-to-be-done/)

⁵⁹ Patrick, Stewart M. "Making Sense of "Minilateralism": The Pros and Cons of Flexible Cooperation". Op. Cit. p. 2.

secondly, minilateral arrangements are likely to fill the deficiencies of the USA alliance systems and thirdly, relevance of regional multilateralism may fall.

3.1 Pre-eminence of USA Alliances. Tongfi Kim opines that from the early years of the Cold War, the security order of the Asia-Pacific region has been driven by USA led ‘hub-and-spokes’ bilateral alliance system. In the post-Cold War era, there has been gradual development of minilateral cooperation resulting in ‘connecting of the spokes’, like in case of the Quad.⁶⁰ He summarises that minilateral cooperation has been successful only to a limited extent and bilateral security cooperation with USA would continue to remain an important. Therefore he feels USA allies should not place any less emphasis on bilateral security cooperation and pursue minilateral cooperation as a complement to bilateral ties with the USA.

3.2 Strategic Space for Minilateral Arrangements. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis shares Kim’s views that the USA-led system of formal alliances remains the main pillar of the regional security architecture in Asia and the linking of the spokes through informal bilateral and minilateral agreements for security collaboration between regional and extra regional USA treaty allies or close security partners, notably Japan, Australia, India, UK and France is rising. The emerging security cooperations are centred on the Indo-Pacific maritime conceptualisation of the region and address some of the deficiencies of the formal USA led alliances. Their functional and informal characteristics allow countries to

⁶⁰ Kim, Tongfi. “Asia’s Minilateral Moment”. *The Diplomat*, June 13, 2017. Available: <https://www.thediplomat.com/2017/06/asias-minilateral-moment/>.

pursue security cooperation both in conjunction with USA and independent of it.⁶¹ Burgess conceptualises the regional security architecture as a ‘three-layer’ framework, with the USA-led alliance system as the first, the various ‘inter-spoke’ regional bilateral alignments as the second and multilateral ASEAN centric groupings, such as the ADMM+, as the third layer. He feels that emerging minilateral arrangements will create new tier between the first and second layer.⁶² Atanassova argues that minilaterals rather than creating a new tier between the first and second provides a connective link between the two. She summarizes that minilaterals are a critical pillar of the security architecture web. They bring important strategic benefits to the partners at a relatively little cost. The pooling of capabilities and resources enhances burden sharing, reinforces the deterrent capabilities of the partners with USA and strengthens their ability to tackle common threats, especially the non-traditional security challenges.⁶³

3.3 Relevance of Regional Multilateralism. Sara Teo feels that multilateralism is on a decline at the global level. In the Indo-Pacific, regional multilateralism too is under pressure for its perceived inability to address regional problems. She attributes the recent rise of minilateral

⁶¹ Atanassova-Cornelis, Elena. “Alignment Cooperation and Regional Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific.” The International Spectator, Vol. 55, Issue 1, 2020. p. 18-33.

⁶² Burgess, Stephen, F. & Beilstein, J. “Multilateral defence cooperation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region: Tentative steps toward a regional NATO”? Contemporary Security Policy. Vol. 39(1), December 2017. p. 261-263.

⁶³ Atanassova-Cornelis, Elena. “Alignment Cooperation and Regional Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific.” Op. Cit.

platforms, such as the Quad 2.0, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC), Sulu Sea trilateral patrols, and ‘Our Eyes’ initiative⁶⁴ to fill this gap.⁶⁵ She argues that in ASEAN-centric regional multilateral platforms which involve both China and USA, the two powers may use the platform to compete for regional leadership and balance the other’s influence. On the other hand, the exclusive nature of minilateral initiatives centred on one major power, like USA and China in the Quad 2.0 and LMC respectively, creates separate spheres of influence in the Indo-Pacific. This potentially side-lines broad ASEAN centric regional multilateralism and poses a challenge to the extant regional multilateral architecture.

Conceptual Framework of the Research

It is observed that despite earlier apprehensions, the Indo-Pacific regional construct has gained acceptance. This is evident from the Indo-Pacific strategies/ vision documents published by different countries. ASEAN too has come out with its collective Indo-Pacific vision. The commonality in the Indo-Pacific strategy is that at the core of it lies the vision for a ‘Free and Open’ Indo-Pacific and the ‘adherence to a Rules Based Order’. There are varied security challenges in the region which demand a collaborative effort to mitigate. The traditional threats range from disputed land border centric bilateral issues to maritime centric


⁶⁴ **Our Eyes Initiative** is an intelligence sharing network comprising six ASEAN member states.

⁶⁵ Teo, Sarah. “Could Minilateralism Be Multilateralism’s Best Hope in the Asia Pacific”? *The Diplomat*, December 15, 2018. Available: <https://www.thediplomat.com/2018/12/could-minilateralism-be-multilateralisms-best-hope-in-the-asia-pacific/>

multilateral issues. Non-traditional threats such as piracy, terrorism, cyber-attacks and issues arising from environmental degradation too are live in the region. The Quad has been recently revived and the review of literature on Indo-Pacific concept highlights that there are differences in the way the Quad member countries view the region and there is limited consensus on the reasons for revival of the Quad consultations or the purpose of the grouping. The study of literature on alignment theory and multilateralism highlights that the Quad comes closest to categorised as a strategic partnership and consultations due to its distinct flexible and informal nature appears to conform to a minilateral arrangement.

Having studied the literature on three themes, the conceptual framework for research has been formulated and is diagrammatically represented on the following page (see figure 2-7).

Figure 2-7 Conceptual Framework of the Research.



Source : Author

The conceptual framework for the study is to analyse the Quad through the prism of a combination of two alliance theories; the Walt Balance of Threat Model and Wilkins Strategic Partnership Model. Walt theorised that states partner to balance against a shared threat. He identifies threat to be a combination of four factors; aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive capability and intent. The emergence of China as a superpower in the region will be analysed as potential threat to the Quad member countries. Wilkins proposes that strategic partnership emerge in response to uncertainty in nations external environments and do not necessarily share a common threat. He theorises that interstate cooperation is to achieve shared objectives. A strategic partnership has a wider canvas than an alliance, which primarily addresses a specific security issue. Shared objectives in a strategic partnership can encompass issues including security, economics, environmental and infrastructure development. The focus will be on identifying the mutual objectives of the Quad in the region and analyse the convergence of interests and priorities of member countries. The purpose of the analyses through a prism of two independent theories is to establish the purpose of the Quad. The relevance and potential will be analysed by carrying out a DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic) analysis and incorporating inputs of a survey. Having identified the potential of the Quad the study will recommend the way forward for the Quad and also propose some issues for India and ASEAN.

Conclusion

The recent focus on the Quad consultations by the leaders of the four member countries signifies the importance being attached to the grouping post its revival in 2017. The Indo-Pacific regional construct has gained traction and the confluence of the two oceans is now being seen as a contiguous strategic space. The economic and military rise of China along with the varied traditional and non-traditional challenges defines the complex security dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region. States have come up with their Indo-Pacific strategy with core being the vision of a 'Free and Open' Indo-Pacific. The Quad is seen as an important part of this strategy. The grouping in itself is in a nascent stage, with the member in the process of defining its purpose and charting its future course. A review of literature on the theories of alignment and alliance formation do not indicate the Quad as an 'Asian NATO' (alliance) but point towards categorising the Quad as a strategic partnership. The legitimacy and effectiveness of multilateral institutions is increasingly being tested. A study of literature on multilateralism indicates that large global multilateral institutions are facing challenges of major power rivalry, placing of individual national interests first and changing nature of conflict. In the present day of growing interconnectedness, the overall decision making process and the efforts of the multilateral institutes in addressing vital global/regional issues is being seen as suboptimal. This has contributed to emergence of more flexible and informal minilateral groupings in the spheres of trade, climate politics and security. The security architecture in the region prior to the end of the cold war and emergence of China was defined by the US led alliances and partnerships in what is referred to as the USA's 'Hubs and Spokes' policy. In the Indo-Pacific region too,

minilateral security partnerships, such as the Quad have emerged. Analysts in the emerging three tier Indo-Pacific security architecture, categorise minilateral partnerships as a link between USA led alliances and the various bilateral partnerships between states of the region.

To investigate the reasons for revival of Quad a synthesis of two alliance/alignment theories of international relations based on Balance of Threat theory advocated by Stephan Walt and Strategic Partnerships Model espoused by Thomas Wilkins is found to be appropriate. The potential shared threat perception of China will be analysed under the balance of threat theory and the potential of shared objectives in the Indo-Pacific as glue binding the member countries will be analysed using the Strategic Partnership Model. This framework reflects the views of Admiral Davidson, Commander of the US INDOPACOM on security cooperation shared in a speech in Honolulu.

“Of course, security cooperation is more than fighting together in wars; it also means preventing war by presenting **credible deterrent to would be adversaries**. Security cooperation **includes working together to respond to humanitarian crises and natural disasters**—such as relief for the hurricane and tsunami that struck Indonesia just two months ago. Security cooperation also **means working together in areas like countering terrorism; illegal drugs; illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; and human trafficking**. In brief, cooperating in times of peace and war to make our people safer and the Indo-Pacific more secure.”⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Davidson, Admiral Phil. “China Power: Up for Debate”. Prepared Remarks of speech delivered by Commander, US INDOPACOM at

A careful analysis of the shared threat (**would be adversary**) and shared objectives (**areas identified for working together**) will assist in formulating an informed view of the relevance of the Quad, and the extent and manner it can contribute towards stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Honolulu, Hawaii, November 29, 2018. Available: <https://www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1702301/china-power-up-for-debate/>.

Chapter 3

Quad 2.0: Shared Threat Perception and Shared Objectives

In the previous chapter literature on Indo-Pacific strategic construct, alignment theories and rise of minilateral partnerships as an alternative to global/ regional multilateral organisations were analysed to establish a conceptual framework for the research. A study of concepts of alignment highlights that the alignment spectrum is quite vast and painting all relations with a broad brush to categorise them as alliances is not prudent. Based on the literature study, the Quad can be classified as a security partnership within the Indo-Pacific construct.

The endeavour in this chapter is to address the first objective of this research and ascertain the purpose behind the revival of the Quad. Wilkins theory of Strategic Partnerships suggests that it is not mandatory for states to share a common threat and they can enter into a partnership solely based on uncertainty in external security environment. However, for a security partnership to evolve solely based on an uncertain external environment without the existence of a plausible threat appears contradictory. This gap is aimed to be filled by Walt's theory which is based on the premise that states ally to balance against a threat. The analysis in the chapter will firstly look at potential common threat to the Quad to establish a shared threat perception as per Walt's theory. Secondly, Wilkins theory will be applied to identify the shared objectives of the Quad. Thirdly, apart from the Quad the four member countries also engage at the bilateral and trilateral amongst each other. These relationships

supports the revival of the Quad, therefore the bilateral and trilateral relations will be seen to examine how they augment the purpose of the Quad. Fourthly, since the Quad was not successful in its first iteration, divergent issues amongst the Quad partners which are likely to appear as pressure points in the partnership will be examined to get a holistic view of the Quad.


Shared Threat Perception of the Quad 2.0

Asia's economic transformation is constantly reshaping the global distribution of power. This has security implications for the Indo-Pacific. The 2019 Lowy Institute Asia-Power Index is a study of distribution of power in the region.¹ USA ranks overall first with China on the second spot (see figure 3-1), however USA's power is declining as its lead of 10 points over China in 2018 has reduced to 8.6 points in 2019. In the 2019 index, USA lies in a negative influence zone, implying that it is less able to translate its resources and power into broad based influence. China rise in the region is signified by its first rank in economic resources, economic relationships and diplomatic influence. China is ranked below USA in military capability; however it is worth noting that the Chinese defence budget is more than double that of Japan, India and 10 ASEAN nations combined. Japan is the only nation to rival China in infrastructure

¹ Lowy Institute Asia-Power Index is a comprehensive study which uses eight categories: Economic Resources, Military Capability, Resilience, Future Resources, Diplomatic Influence, Economic Relationships, Defence Networks and Cultural Influence across 126 indicators and track distribution of power in Asia.

investment in South and Southeast Asia. India is categorised as an underachiever relative to its size and potential.²

Figure 3-1 Asia Power Index - 2019.



Source : Lowy Institute, <https://power.lowyinstitute.org/>

Walt's theory defines threat as a combination of four elements, aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive capabilities and intent. Therefore, the theory categorises threat from a military perspective posing danger to national independence leading countries to align to mitigate the threat. A common threat to the Quad member states sovereignty and integrity can develop either from a powerful nation or an alliance of nations. The Indo-Pacific security architecture does not have alliance blocks as was seen during the cold war era. Analysts point towards a rising and assertive China as a potential threat to the Quad. China has territorial

² Lemahieu, Hervé et al. "Asia Power Index 2019". Lowy Institute, Sydney, 2019. Available: <https://power.lowyinstitute.org/>.

disputes with two of the Quad members, India and Japan, who are geographically nearest to China and share borders. India shares a disputed land border along the Himalayas and Japan shares a disputed maritime border in the East China Sea centred on the Senkaku/Diaoyu island chain³. Therefore, unless these disputes are resolved amicably, India and Japan will continue to view China as a threat to its territorial integrity. Australia and USA are geographically too far separated from China to view it as a direct physical threat to its territorial integrity. USA views China as a revisionist power which threatens its influence in the Indo-Pacific.

China as a potential threat in the region was identified by the famous political scientist Nicholas Spykman as early as 1942. Spykman proposed the ‘Rimland Theory’ to counter Mackinder’s Heartland Theory. The theory states that “who controls the rimland, rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world”.⁴ He had predicted that China “will be a continental power of huge dimensions in control of a large section of the littoral” of the group of marginal seas that he referred to as the “Asiatic Mediterranean”, which he described as composed of the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. These seas control China’s access to the Pacific Ocean and the SLOCs connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Spykman felt that “a modern, vitalised, and militarised China of 400 million (today China’s population is approximately 1.38 billion) is going to be a threat not only to Japan, but also to the position of

³ The **Senkaku/Diaoyu island chain** in the East China Sea has claims involving China, Japan and Taiwan.

⁴ Meinig, Donald W. “Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History”. The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 1956. p. 553-569.

the Western Powers in the Asiatic Mediterranean”. He warned that Chinese sea and air power could one day control the “Asiatic Mediterranean”.⁵

Ashley Tellis, in his lecture titled ‘Indo-Pacific Geopolitics and US-India Relations’ looks at the Chinese threat to world order in light of Spykman’s Rimland Theory.⁶ Tellis is of the view that USA feels that there is a need to identify China as a rising threat and engage with other nations in order to prevent its hegemony and an eventual threat to the outlying islands of North America, Australia and Japan. He opines that the rise of China may eventually dominate Asia and then China will extend its influence far into Europe and Africa, thereby dominating the Eurasian landmass and the ‘World Island’. Drawing from history, he identifies three prerequisites for China to look outward, firstly, no threat from the North, secondly, no succession challenge within the state and thirdly, no internal state disorders. His view is that all three potential threats are mitigated in the present times with excellent relations with Russia, Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and China’s tough handling of domestic disorders. He feels that China will emerge as a bigger competitor to USA than the erstwhile USSR, since it will be able to rival USA not only militarily but also economically. This presents a situation where there is a rivalry between two relatively equal powers. In his view

⁵ Sempa, Francis P. “Nicholas Spykman and the Struggle for the Asiatic Mediterranean”. *The Diplomat*, January 09, 2015. Available: <https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/nicholas-spykman-and-the-struggle-for-the-asiatic-mediterranean/>.

⁶ Tellis, Ashley. “Indo-Pacific Geopolitics and US-India Relations”. Lecture delivered at Observer Research Foundation, October 19, 2019. Available: https://youtube/_mfgndk-CJM.

the Quad is an effort to balance the Chinese threat in the Indo-Pacific region and the globe as such.⁷

1. China as a Common Threat to Quad - An Analysis under Walt's Balance of Threat Theory.

1.1 Aggregate Power. Aggregate power in the context of military threat can be narrowed down to the potential to wage war and the ability to sustain it. Four themes from the Lowy Institute Power Index (see Table 3-1) are picked to analyse the relative position of the Quad members and China in order to analyse the aggregate power.⁸

Table 3-1 Analysis of Aggregate Power - Quad and China.

Theme	Sub Themes	Position / Score				
		USA	China	Japan	India	Aus
Military Capability	Overall	1st	2nd	7th	3rd	8th
		94.7	66.1	29.5	44.2	28.2
	• Defence Spending	100	35.3	7.4	9.9	3.9
	• Armed Forces	73.5	92.1	26.5	100	31.9
	• Weapons & Platform	100	60.5	28.6	27.5	17.4
	• Signature Capabilities	100	70.1	35.5	31.7	35.7
	• Asian Military Posture	100	79.8	66.4	74.2	77.4
Defence Networks	Overall	1st	9th	4th	8th	2nd
		86.0	24.1	44.9	24.5	69.0
	• Regional Alliance Network	100	7.2	79.7	0.0	80.0
	• Regional Non-Aligned Partners	65.0	43.1	27.6	58.7	88.8
	• Global Arms Transfers	100	19.8	9.9	4.9	7.1

⁷ Tellis, Ashley. "Indo-Pacific Geopolitics and US-India Relations".

Op. Cit.

⁸ Lemahieu, Hervé et al. "Asia Power Index 2019". Op. Cit


Table 3-1 Analysis of Aggregate Power - Quad and China. (cont.)

Theme	Sub Themes	Position / Score				
		USA	China	Japan	India	Aus
Economic Resources	Overall	2 nd	1 st	3 rd	4 th	9 th
		92.5	93.0	34.3	24.4	12.5
	• Size	82.1	100	22.8	39.8	5.1
	• International Leverage	100	86.5	36.4	7.8	6.1
	• Technology	100	78.5	55.5	18.6	36.6
	• Connectivity	98.3	100	33.9	16.2	9.4
Diplomatic Influence	Overall	3 rd	1 st	2 nd	6 th	8 th
		79.6	96.2	90.9	68.5	56.9
	• Diplomatic Network	97.3	100	83.9	67.1	47.5
	• Multilateral Power	75.2	89.2	100	57.9	53.2
	• Foreign Policy	100	99.5	54.9	80.4	70.1

Source : Lowy Institute, <https://power.lowyinstitute.org/>


In the military capability and defence networks theme, USA scores over China due to its relatively modern military and strong alliance network in the Indo-Pacific. China and USA are nearly equally matched in the economic resources. The quantitative indicators in military and economic power of China and Quad members are further evaluated over a period of time.

Figure 3-2 Military Expenditure (In constant USD Million) - Quad and China.



Source : SIPRI, <https://www.sipri.org/>

Figure 3-3 Military Expenditure (GDP Percentage) - Quad and China.




Source : SIPRI, <https://www.sipri.org/>

China has steadily increased its military budget and is modernising its military. The military budget has grown five-fold from USD 45 billion in 2005 to USD 250 billion in 2018 (see chart 3-1). In isolation this seems alarming but when the military expenditure is seen in relation to the percentage expenditure of the GDP it does not stand out (see chart 3-2). It is however to be noted that the Chinese budget dwarfs that of India, Australia and Japan. This is an estimate by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and does not include the spending on internal security. The USA still spends almost two and half times more than China as its military expenditure.

The economies of the four Quad countries and China are interdependent, with China being one of the largest trading partners of each of the four nations. China's economy boomed in the early part of the century to become the second largest economy, that growth rate has however slowed down (see chart 3-3). International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts are till 2024, but it projects China to be the largest


economy by 2030 and albeit growing at a much slower rate, India is likely to be the third largest in the world (see chart 3-4).

Figure 3-4 Real GDP growth (Annual Percent Change) - Quad and China.



Source : IMF DataMapper, https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH


Figure 3-5 GDP (Current Prices - USD Billion) - Quad and China.



Source : IMF DataMapper, <https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD>

1.2 Geographical Proximity. With long range missiles and aircraft capable of targeting any place on the globe, the geographical proximity element has relatively less impact while analysing overall threat.⁹ China can target India, Japan and USA military assets in Indo-Pacific with a combination of ballistic and cruise missiles launched from air, land and sea (see figure 3-2). China also has a relatively small but developing contingent of nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking USA homeland. India and Japan face a conventional threat to their territorial integrity from China due to the geographical proximity.

Figure 3-6 China - Ballistic Missile Capability and Ranges.



Source : CSIS

1.3 Offensive Capabilities. It is not feasible to draw a clear distinction between its offensive and defensive capabilities. In assessing

⁹ Miyagi, Takashi. “The Changing Security Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific : Re-Emergence of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue”. Bachelor Thesis, Malmo University, Spring 2019.

the offensive capability, a comparison is drawn between the maritime strength of China vis-à-vis the Quad navies in Table 3-2. The Chinese navy has grown a rapid pace but both in terms of assets and institutional knowledge of operating high-end platforms like the aircraft carriers and nuclear powered submarines it lags the Quad Navies. However, only numbers cannot measure the maritime capabilities; a US congressional report states that in the next 15 years, Asia will witness a progressively receding frontier of USA dominance. USA would probably still prevail in a protracted war but Chinese forces will become more capable of achieving limited objectives without ‘defeating’ USA forces.¹⁰

Table 3-2 Comparison of Maritime Strength - Quad and China.

	China	US	Japan	Aus	India	Remarks
Aircraft Carriers	2	11	-	-	1	
Amphibious Assault Ships	1	22	4*	2*	-	*Helicopter Carriers
Amphibious ships	59*	28	5	1	9	*LST, LPD& LSM
Cruisers	1	22	-	-	-	
Destroyers	33	69	27	3	10	
Frigates	54	11*	17	8	13	* LCS Ships
Corvettes (1300T)	42	-	-	-	11	
Coastal Patrol Craft *	86	13	6	13	10	* > 1500 Ton
SSK Submarine*	50	-	20	6	14	*Diesel Electric
SSN Submarine (Nuclear Propulsion)	6+4*	53+14*	-	-	1	* SSBN

Source : Compiled from CRS Report, Royal Australian Navy website, Indian Navy website, Japan Self Defence Force website and China Maritime Studies Institute.

¹⁰ O'Rourke, Ronald. “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities - Background and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service (CRS), May 21, 2020. p .34. Available: <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf>

1.4 Intent. Aggressive intent ascertained over diplomatic, military or economic space is an important indicator in framing threat perception. Turcsanyi has defined Chinese assertiveness as “when China actively pursues its interests and acts boldly toward achieving its goals, even if they contradict the interests of other actors. An assertive action by China must be significantly different from both the actions of other countries and previous norms”.¹¹ Based on this, three areas of Chinese assertion namely, South China Sea, East China Sea and border dispute with India stand out. In the South China Sea, China claims an area outlined by the nine dash line and has carried out reclamation of land to strengthen its territorial claims and construct military facilities to bolster its physical control of the disputed Islands. In East China Sea, by unilaterally declaring an ADIZ, China claims the right to regulate all flights transiting the zone. The ADIZ overlaps that of South Korea and Taiwan, and covers the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands.¹² On the border dispute with India, in 2017 there was a standoff between the Indian and Chinese army at the border tri-junction between India, Bhutan and China. China was trying to construct a road in Bhutanese territory;

¹¹ Turcsany, Richard Q. “What’s Really Behind Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea?” The Diplomat, December 22, 2017. Available: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/whats-really-behind-chinese-assertiveness-in-the-south-china-sea/>

¹² O'Rourke, Ronald. “US-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress”. Congressional Research Service (CRS), August 1, 2018. p. 6-10. Available : <https://www.news.usni.org/2020/02/04/report-on-u-s-china-competition-in-east-south-china-sea/>.

the Indian troops intervened at the request of Bhutan to stop the construction.¹³ Lately, in June 2020 there has been a clash between the two armies in the area of Eastern Ladakh, following consequent mobilisation of land and air resources from both sides towards the borders.

2. China Threat - Analysis of Official Documents of Quad Members.

The extent of threat posed by China is analysed through its reflection in defence white papers or similar official publications of Quad member countries. The official stance of Quad members towards ‘China as a threat’ gathered from their respective latest papers ranges from USA classifying China as a ‘revisionist power’ to ‘near benign’ Indian view.

2.1 **USA.** USA terms China as a ‘Revisionist Power’ and states that China is willing to accept friction in the pursuit of a more expansive set of political, economic, and security interests.¹⁴ USA clearly recognises China as a threat and senses that China seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and ultimately global pre-eminence in the long-term. These US views are based on Chinese investment in a broad range of military programs and weapons, including those designed to improve power projection; modernise its nuclear forces; and conduct increasingly complex operations in domains such as cyberspace, space, and electronic warfare operations. The strategy makes direct reference to China’ militarisation of the South China Sea by placing long-range surface-to-air missiles/ anti-ship cruise missiles on the disputed Spratly

¹³ Joseph, Josy. “What is the Doklam issue all about?” .Op Cit.

¹⁴ USA, Department of Defense. “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report - Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting a Networked Region”. p. 6-10. Op. Cit.

Islands and employing paramilitary forces in maritime disputes vis-à-vis other claimants. No direct reference of East China Sea is made, however Chinese development of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which could be used to prevent navigation /overflight in the maritime and air domains near China's periphery are mentioned.

2.2 Japan. The Defence of Japan 2019 white paper states that China is strengthening capabilities in the domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum in addition to nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. Japan's concerns are that China engages in unilateral, coercive attempts to alter the status quo based on its own assertions that are incompatible with existing international order.¹⁵ Also highlighted is the high-level growth of China's defence budget without transparency, engaging in broad, rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms. Japan shares USA's concerns regarding China's enhanced capabilities in the domains of space, cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum and A2/AD. Overall Japan feels that the Chinese Navy and Air Force frequent advances to the Pacific Ocean and Sea of Japan represent a serious security concern. It feels that in the East China Sea, the Chinese Navy and Air Force have expanded and intensified their activities, specifically around the Senkaku Islands, resulting in a one-sided escalation of activities and creating a situation of great concern. In the South China Sea, Japan states that China is moving forward with militarization, as well as expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains by deploying aircraft thereby continuing its unilateral efforts to change the status quo by coercion to create a fait accompli.

¹⁵ Japan, Ministry of Defence. "Defence of Japan 2019". p. 18-27. Op Cit.

2.3 Australia. Australia recognises China as a global power but feels that China will not match the global strategic weight of USA. Due to the growth of China's national power, including its military modernisation, Australia views China's policies and actions having a major impact on the stability of the Indo-Pacific. Overall Australia does not consider China as an open threat and rules a major conflict between the USA and China as unlikely. Australia does recognise that there are a number of points of friction in the Indo-Pacific region in which differences between the US and China could generate rising tensions. These points of friction are listed as the East China and South China Seas, the airspace above those seas, and in the rules that govern international behaviour, particularly in the cyber and space domains. Australia states that does not take sides on competing territorial claims in the South China Sea but in what seems to be targeted at China, voices concern that land reclamation and construction activity by claimants raises tensions in the region. Following this, Australia opposes the use of artificial structures in the South China Sea for military purposes and the assertion of associated territorial claims and maritime rights which are not in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). With respect to the East China Sea, Australia opposes any unilateral action which changes the status quo.¹⁶

2.4 India. India is most benign regarding its view on China as a threat. The report following the Doklam stand-off and Wuhan informal head of state summit, it is stated that relations with China have

¹⁶ Australia, Department of Defence. "Defence White Paper 2016". p .53-58. Available: <https://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf>.

moved towards greater stability in the overall context of closer developmental partnership and there has been improved and sustained stability in the India-China border areas.¹⁷ On the security environment, the report is silent about the China threat in general, increased Chinese naval presence in IOR and developments in the South China Sea. The strategists in India however have a different view and see China as threat to its territorial integrity. Hardening of views towards China are visible after the recent heightening of tensions along the Sino-Indian border following the clash between the two nations where for the first time since 1967 lives were lost due to a skirmish on the border.

3. Summary: China - As a Threat to Quad.

A rapidly modernising Chinese navy and long range missiles arsenal possesses the capability to target India, Japan and critical American air and naval bases in the Western Pacific. India's territorial integrity is increasingly being challenged by China along the borders and Chinese Navy's increasing footprint in the IOR is also viewed as a threat in Indian security circles. Western analysts are unified in their view that China challenges international laws and conventions with respect to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and overflight in its declared ADIZ in the East China Sea.

China has gained an increasingly favourable military position in the Indo-Pacific, but cannot decisively alter the security dynamics and displace USA from its position of primacy. Data suggests that the Chinese military rise is in line with its economic rise and there is a relative decline of USA in the region. Due to the wide variance in their declaration of

¹⁷ India, Ministry of Defence. "Annual Report 2018-19". p. 1-8.
Op. Cit.

China threat by the member countries, it seems fair to argue that even though the Quad is wary of China's economic and military rise, a common potential Chinese traditional military threat to the Quad is not the overarching reason for the growing cooperation between the Quad countries. In the event of a conflict along the border with India or in the maritime domain in the South China Sea this growing cooperation is unlikely to translate into formation of a coalition. The existing USA-Japan or USA-Australia alliances may combine to become a trilateral coalition but with India's leanings towards maintaining 'strategic autonomy', it is unlikely to include India. Even though the Quad sees China's rise as a threat to world order, a direct threat in traditional military terms emanating from China to one or more Quad members does not form the basis for the cooperation. However, China's increasing military and economic might, aggressive actions and opaque infrastructure investment in weaker economies of the region does have a major bearing on bringing the Quad countries closer to cooperate and on selection of shared objectives of the Quad.

Shared Objectives of the Quad 2.0

The Quad has met six times since its revival (see table 3-3). These meetings have been held at senior official level except for a meeting of the foreign ministers in 2019.

Table 3-3 Details of Quad 2.0 Meetings.

Meet	Date	Location	Level	Assessment
1	12 Nov 17	Manila	Senior Official	The Quad was revived after a gap of 10 years.
2	07 Jun 18	Singapore	Senior Official	
3	15 Nov 18	Singapore	Senior Official	
4	31 May 19	Bangkok	Senior Official	
5	26 Sep 19	New York	Foreign Minister	This was the inaugural meet at the ministerial level. It signifies an increased importance to Quad by the member countries.
6	04 Nov 19	Bangkok	Senior Official	

Source : Author

The meetings have not lead to joint statements as is the common practice with multilateral institutions. After each meeting each of the member countries have issued their own respective official statement. The official statements of each of the member countries have been studied to arrive at the common points which have then been identified as the shared objectives of Quad 2.0. Some statements have included aspects which are not common to other nations statements, these aspects have then been analysed to see whether they figure in any other official statement or comment. The member countries have regularly chosen to modify certain key words in the statements with respect to earlier statements these to have been refected in the analysis. To arrive at the shared objectives of the Quad, the statements of each meeting are sequentially analysed below.

1. First Quad 2.0 Meet - November 12, 2017.

The Quad was revived on the side-lines of the East Asia Summit at Manila in 2017. This first meeting of Quad 2.0 was driven by renewed interest of the grouping in Japan, who chaired the meet and reciprocal interest in India, Australia and the USA. The meeting was convened around the theme of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’, and addressed seven core themes: the rules-based order in Asia, freedom of navigation and overflight in the maritime commons, respect for international law, enhancing connectivity, maritime security, the North Korean threat and non-proliferation, and terrorism.¹⁸

The meeting did not result in a combined statement, but individual statements were issued by each member country. Based on the statements of member countries the initial objectives identified for the Quad 2.0 can be summarised in table 3-4.¹⁹ While the USA and Australian

¹⁸ Panda, Ankit. “US, Japan, India, and Australia Hold Working-Level Quadrilateral Meeting on Regional Cooperation - The ‘Quad’ is back.” *The Diplomat*, November 13, 2017. Available : <https://www.thediplomat.com/2017/11/us-japan-india-and-australia-hold-working-level-quadri-lateral-meeting-on-regional-cooperation/>

¹⁹ Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). “Australia-India-Japan-United States Consultations on the Indo-Pacific”, November 12, 2017. Available: <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media/Pages/aus-india-japan-us-consultations-on-the-indo-pacific/>

USA, Department of State (DoS). “Australia-India-Japan-US Consultations on the Indo-Pacific”, November 12, 2017. Available: <https://www.state.gov/australia-india-japan-u-s-consultations-on-the-indo-pacific/>.

statements covered all the seven themes under the conceptual domain of ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’, Japan’s statement did not mention the aspect of ‘connectivity’ and the Indian statement did not include any aspect related to the ‘freedom of navigation and overflight’, ‘respect for international law’, and ‘maritime security’. The Indian statement seems to cater for the Chinese sentiments on these contentious issues and makes a mention of India’s ‘Act East Policy’ being the cornerstone of its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. The members resolved to continue with the discussions and deepen cooperation based on shared values and principles.

Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). “Australia-India-Japan-US Consultations on the Indo-Pacific”, November 12, 2017. Available: https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001789.html.

India, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). “India-Australia-Japan-US Consultations on Indo-Pacific”, November 12, 2017. Available: <https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29110/india+australiajapanus+consultations+on+indopacific+November+12+2017>.

Table 3-4 Initial Objectives (IO) of Quad as on 12 Nov 2017.

Principal Concept - Promote Free and Open Indo Pacific						India also includes the aspect of 'Inclusive' and 'Prosperous'. USA and Australia make reference to increased prosperity and security.
IO's	Objective	US	Aus	Jap	Ind	Assessment
IO 1.1	Uphold rules based order in Indo-Pacific	✓	✓	✓	✘	India's statement calls for cooperation based on converging vision and values for promotion of peace.
IO 1.2	Ensure freedom of navigation and overflight	✓	✓	✓	✘	It is believed that India did not refer to these aspects to cater for China's sensitivities. India has otherwise supported these issues.
IO 1.3	Respect for international law	✓	✓	✓	✘	
IO 1.4	Maritime security in Indo-Pacific	✓	✓	✓	✘	
IO 1.5	Increase connectivity	✓	✓	✘	✓	Japan did not make a reference to connectivity. However, Japan is the second largest investor in connectivity projects in Asia after China.
IO 1.6	Control proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)	✓	✓	✓	✓	The control of WMD was specifically directed at North Korea, less in case of India which made a general reference to proliferation linkages.
		✓	✓	✓	✓	
IO 1.7	Counter Terrorism					

Source : Author

2. Second Quad 2.0 Meet - June 07, 2018.

The Quad met for the second time on the side-lines of the ASEAN-centred Senior Officials Meeting at Singapore. There is an emergence of congruence in the thoughts of the member countries as reflected in the statements. A significant development was the inclusion of support for ASEAN centrality and ASEAN led mechanism in the statement of all the Quad members. The principle concept too has evolved to include ‘inclusive’ and ‘prosperous’ which is aimed at overcoming the exclusive nature of the Quad partnership and laying stress on regional connectivity infrastructure projects. The analysis of the statements and revised objectives of the Quad are tabulated in table 3-5.²⁰ The changes are represented by an italic font.

²⁰Australia, DFAT. “Australia-India-Japan-United States Consultations”, June 07, 2018. Available: <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media/Pages/aus-india-japan-us-consultations-on-the-indo-pacific>.

USA, DoS. “US-Australia-India-Japan Consultations”. June 07, 2018. Available: <https://www.state.gov/u-s-australia-india-japan-consultations/>.

Japan, MoFA. “Japan-Australia-India-US Consultations”, June 07, 2018. Available: https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002062.html.

India, MEA. “India-Australia-Japan-US Consultations”, June 07, 2018. Available: <https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29961/indiaaustraliajapanus+consultations>.

Table 3-5 Revised Objectives (RO 2) of Quad as on 07 Jun 2018.

Principal Concept								
Promote Free and Open Indo Pacific		Promote Free, Open, <i>Inclusive and Prosperous</i> Indo Pacific		Prosperous ✘	Free ✘	Prosperous ✘	✓	Aimed at better acceptability and conveys an added focus towards connectivity and development
IO's	Objective	RO's	Objective	US	Aus	Jap	Ind	Assessment
IO 1.1	Uphold rules based order in Indo-Pacific	RO 2.1	Uphold rules based order in Indo-Pacific	✓	✓	✓	✓	Indian statement refers to a rules based order.
IO 1.2	Ensure freedom of navigation and <u>overflight</u>	RO 2.2	Ensure freedom of navigation and <u>overflight</u>	✓	✓	✓	✘	No reference in Indian statement
IO 1.3	Respect for international law	RO 2.3	Respect for international law	✓	✓	✓	✘	
IO 1.4	Maritime Security in Indo-Pacific	RO 2.4	Maritime <i>Cooperation</i> in Indo-Pacific	✓	✓	✓	✓	Maritime issues covered under maritime cooperation
IO 1.5	Increase connectivity	RO 2.5	Increase connectivity and <i>sustainable development</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	Japan includes connectivity in its statement. Development added as an objective
IO 1.6	Control proliferation of WMD	RO 2.6	Regional Security including - Counter Terrorism (CT), Non proliferation	✓	✓	✓	✓	Clubbed under a broader canvas of regional security
IO 1.7	Counter Terrorism							
		RO 2.7	<i>Support for ASEAN centrality and ASEAN led mechanisms</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	Unanimity amongst all members; aimed at better acceptability of Quad
		RO 2.8	<i>Promote good governance</i>	✓	✓	✓	✘	India includes HA&DR as an objective instead

Source: Author

3. Third Quad 2.0 Meet - November 15, 2018.

The Quad met for the third time at Singapore. The statements of the member countries have an increased similarity in the language used. Issues related to regional security are clubbed under one umbrella objective and include Maritime Security, Counter Terrorism, Non-proliferation and Cyber. The analysis of the statements and further revised objective of the Quad are tabulated in table 3-6.²¹ Apart from the undermentioned

²¹ Australia, DFAT. "Australia-India-Japan-United States Consultations", November 15, 2018. Available: <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media/Pages/australia-india-japan-united-states-consultations-2018>.

objectives the situation in Sri Lanka and Maldives with respect to Chinese debt traps was also discussed and this prompted the Quad members to include development of quality infrastructure in their statements.

USA, DoS. “US-Australia-India-Japan Consultations”, November 15, 2018. Available: <https://www.state.gov/u-s-australia-india-japan-consultations-2/>.

Japan, MoFA. “Japan-Australia-India-US Consultations”, November 15, 2018. Available: https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press1e_000099.html.

India, MEA. “India-Australia-Japan-US Consultations”, November 15, 2018. Available: <https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/30593/indiaaustraliajapanus+consultations>.

Table 3-6 Revised Objectives (RO 3) of Quad as on 15 Nov 2018.

Principal Concept								
Promote Free, Open, Inclusive and Prosperous Indo Pacific		Promote Free, Open and Inclusive Indo Pacific		Prosperous ✘	Free ✘	Prosperous ✘	Prosperous ✘	Indian statement does not contain 'Prosperous'. Therefore the concept amended accordingly
RO's	Objective	RO's	Objective	US	Aus	Jap	Ind	Assessment
RO 2.1	Uphold rules based order in Indo-Pacific	RO 3.1	Uphold rules based order in Indo-Pacific	✓	✓	✓	✓	No change.
RO 2.2	Ensure freedom of navigation and <u>overflight</u>	RO 3.2	Ensure freedom of navigation and <u>overflight</u>	✓	✓	✓	✘	
RO 2.3	Respect for international law	RO 3.3	Respect for international law	✓	✓	✓	✘	
RO 2.4	Maritime Cooperation in Indo-Pacific	RO 3.4	<i>Regional Security including - Maritime, Counter Terrorism, Non-proliferation and Cyber</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	Maritime and Cyber security covered under the canvas of regional security
RO 2.6	Regional Security including - CT, Non proliferation							
RO 2.5	Increase connectivity and sustainable development	RO 3.5	Increase connectivity and sustainable development	✓	✓	✓	✓	
RO 2.7	Support for ASEAN centrality and ASEAN led mechanisms	RO 3.6	Support for ASEAN centrality and ASEAN led mechanisms	✓	✓	✓	✓	Support also for other regional institutions such as Pacific Islands Forum and Indian Ocean Rim Association
RO 2.8	Promote good governance	RO 3.7	Promote good governance	✓	✓	✓	✘	No reference in Indian statement
		RO 3.8	<i>Development of quality infrastructure</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	Based on sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of all nations, as well as transparency, economic viability, debt sustainability and financial responsibility.

Source : Author

4. Fourth Quad 2.0 Meet - May 31, 2019.

The Quad met for the fourth time at Bangkok. From the analysis of the statements, it is evident that the statements of the member countries appear to be stabilising and there is an increasing similarity in the choice of words. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) is added as an objective. The analysis of the statements and further revised objective of the Quad are tabulated in table 3-7.²²

²² Australia, DFAT. "Australia-India-Japan-United States Consultations", May 31, 2019. Available: <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media/Pages/australia-india-japan-usa-consultations>.

Table 3-7 Revised Objectives (RO 4) of Quad as on 31 May 2019.

Principal Concept								
Promote Free, Open and Inclusive Indo Pacific		Promote Free, Open, Prosperous and Inclusive Indo Pacific		Prosperous	Free	Prosperous	✓	Australian statement refers to 'Prosperous' instead of 'Free'. Indian statement again refers to 'Prosperous' in addition to 'Free'.
RO's	Objective	RO's	Objective	US	Aus	Jap	Ind	Assessment
RO 3.1	Uphold rules based order in Indo-Pacific	RO 4.1	Uphold rules based order in Indo-Pacific	✓	✓	✓	✓	No change.
RO 3.2	Ensure freedom of navigation and overflight	RO 4.2	Ensure freedom of navigation and overflight	✓	✓	✓	✘	
RO 3.3	Respect for international law	RO 4.3	Respect for international law	✓	✓	✓	✘	
RO 3.4	Regional Security including - Maritime, Counter Terrorism, Non-proliferation and Cyber	RO 4.4	Regional Security including - Maritime, Counter Terrorism, Non-proliferation and Cyber	✓	✓	✓	✓	
RO 3.5	Increase connectivity and sustainable development	RO 4.5	Increase connectivity and sustainable development	✓	✓	✓	✓	
RO 3.6	Support for ASEAN centrality and ASEAN led mechanisms	RO 4.6	Support for ASEAN centrality and ASEAN led mechanisms	✓	✓	✓	✓	
RO 3.7	Promote good governance	RO 4.7	Promote good governance	✓	✓	✓	✘	
RO 3.8	Development of quality infrastructure	RO 4.8	Development of quality infrastructure	✓	✓	✓	✓	
		RO 4.9	<i>Cooperate in regional disaster response</i>	✓	✘	✓	✓	

Source : Author

USA, DoS. "US-Australia-India-Japan Consultations-The Quad". May 31, 2019. Available: <https://www.state.gov/u-s-australia-india-japan-consultations-the-quad/>

Japan, MoFA. "Japan-Australia-India-US Consultations", May 31, 2019. Available: https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002464.html.

India, MEA. "India-Australia-Japan-US Consultations", May 31, 2019. Available: <https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31403/indiaaustraliajapanunited+states+consultations>.

5. Fifth Quad Meet - September 26, 2019.

The Quad got a significant impetus when the foreign ministers met on the side-lines of the United Nations General Assembly meet in New York. The member countries did not issue individual statements, only USA which hosted the meet issued a statement which was in consonance to the earlier statement of May 31, 2019. Following the meeting, the Senior US State Department officials conducted a briefing for the media, which gave important insight into the objectives of the Quad.²³ The main issues are analysed below.

5.1 Quad Grouping. While emphasising on the institutionalising the Quad initiative, the official was clear in stating that, “this is not an alliance directed at – against a country”. On being questioned on whether the Quad was an Asian version of the NATO alliance or if that was feasible for the Quad, the answer was in the negative. The official elaborated by giving the example of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) not being successful and negative thoughts of Cold War which arise when there is consideration of alliances. The termed the Quad as a “positive cooperative mechanism”.

5.2 Concerns of Quad. The official stated that the Quad was unanimous in furthering the principles of democracy and a free and open Indo-Pacific. Without a clear reference to China, citing examples of

²³ USA, DoS. “Readout of U.S.-Australia-India-Japan Ministerial (“The Quad”)”, FPC Briefing, September 26, 2019. Available: <https://www.state.gov/readout-of-u-s-australia-india-japan-ministerial-the-quad/>.

Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka²⁴, Maldives²⁵ and concerns of Malaysia he referred to the threat posed by bad development, bad infrastructure investment, the trap that threaten countries due to predatory lending, unsustainable debt, or projects not contributing to the economic well-being are executed. He highlighted that the main concern was “the national security implications of not having the options that allow for the free and open development of our partner countries in the region.”

5.3 Purpose of Quad. From the answers to questions, the near term focus of the Quad is assessed as close cooperation in the areas of counter terrorism, HADR, maritime security cooperation, development finance, cyber security, and information sharing on infrastructure, development and maritime domain awareness. The official clarified that the Quad was not seeking to set up institutions like banking mechanisms, but countries coordinating on common issues.

²⁴The strategic **Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka** lies six nautical miles north of one of the world's busiest shipping lanes where an estimated 36,000 ships ply. The 1.5 billion dollar port was built with Chinese loans by China Merchants Port Holdings (CMPH). In December 17, the debt-strapped Sri Lankan government, unable to pay the loan struck a deal with CMPH to inject 1.1 billion dollars in exchange for an 85% stake and a 99-year lease of the port to CMPH.

²⁵ **Maldives** has a GDP of approximately 5 billion dollars and owes China 3.5 billion dollars (inclusive of government loans, private loans and sovereign guarantees) for projects implemented in the island nation.

5.4 Security Dimension of Quad. The official underlined that the security in the region was an outfall of people's well-being and democratic principles. The areas which were touched upon were maritime domain awareness, and the need to have freedom of navigation and overflight under existing laws which look after the interests of a majority of the nations in the region. The official was specifically queried on inclusion of Australia in the Malabar Exercise²⁶; the aspect was left to the discussed at a later stage.

6. Sixth Quad 2.0 Meet - November 04, 2019.

The Quad met for the sixth time in Bangkok. While appreciating Thailand's chairmanship of ASEAN, they agreed to enhance coordination on quality infrastructure investment based on international standards such as the 'G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment'. Australia and USA make a mention of strengthening cooperation in the Mekong sub-region and Japan states that views on regional issues including North Korea were discussed. The statements were similar to previous statements.²⁷ The shared objectives are summarised in table 3-8.

²⁶ **Malabar Exercise** is a trilateral naval exercise involving USA, Japan and India as permanent partners. In 2007, when Quad 1.0 was born, Australia and Singapore also participated in the exercise. This is believed to have provoked a Chinese outcry leading to a freeze of Quad 1.0 initiative.

²⁷ Australia, DFAT. "Australia-India-Japan-United States Consultations", November 04, 2019. Available: <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media/Pages/australia-india-japan-united-states-quad-consultations>.

Table 3-8 Shared Objectives of the Quad 2.0.

Principal Concept - Promote Free, Open, Prosperous and Inclusive Indo Pacific	
1	Support for ASEAN Centrality and ASEAN led mechanisms.
2	Uphold rules based order in Indo-Pacific.
3	Ensure freedom of navigation and overflight.
4	Respect for international law.
5	Regional security to include - maritime, counter terrorism, non-proliferation and cyber.
6	Increase connectivity and promote sustainable development.
7	Promote good governance in the region.
8	Development of quality infrastructure.
9	Cooperate in Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR).

Source : Author

The Indian statements have not made a mention of rules based order and freedom of navigation. However, PM Modi in his keynote address at the Shangri-La dialogue had stated that common rules based order for the region, which applied equally to all individually as well as to the global commons and equal access as a right under international law to the use of common spaces on sea and in the air that would require freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce and peaceful settlement of disputes in

USA, DoS. “US-Australia-India-Japan Consultations-The Quad”. November 04, 2019. Available: <https://www.state.gov/u-s-australia-india-japan-consultations-the-quad-2/>.

Japan, MoFA. “Japan-Australia-India-US Consultations”, November 04, 2019. Available: https://www.mofa.go.jp/np/press/page4e_001157.html.

India, MEA. “India-Australia-Japan-US Consultations”, November 04, 2019. Available: <https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32006/indiaaustraliajapanunited+states+consultations>.

accordance with international law as important elements of India's vision for the Indo-Pacific Region.²⁸ Thus the two aspects have been included in the shared objectives of the Quad.

Supporting Bilateral/Trilateral Web of Relationships

Apart from the Quad, the four member countries also share six bilateral relations of varying closeness between each other, two trilateral relationships and one trilateral naval military exercise (see table 3-9). It is important to understand the nature of these relationships to get an understanding of dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region.

Table 3-9 Relationships between Quad Member Countries.

Relationship	USA	Japan	Aus	India	Remarks
Bilateral (6)					
• USA - Australia	●		●		Alliance (under ANZUS treaty)
• USA - Japan	●	●			Alliance
• USA - India	●			●	Strategic Partnership
• Japan - Australia		●	●		Special Strategic Partnership
• Japan - India		●		●	Special Strategic & Global Partnership
• Australia - India			●	●	Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
Trilateral (3) + Trilateral Exercise (1)					
• USA - Australia - Japan	●	●	●		Strategic Dialogue
• USA - Japan - India	●	●		●	Dialogue
• Japan - Australia - India		●	●	●	Dialogue
• Malabar Exercise	●	●		●	Trilateral Naval Exercise
Quadrilateral (1)					
USA-Japan-Australia-India	●	●	●	●	Consultations
Legend ● USA ● Japan ● Australia ● India					

Source : Author

²⁸ Modi, Narendra. “Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue”. Op. Cit.

1. **Bilateral Relationships.**

All six bilateral relationships feature 2+2 dialogues which involve the foreign and defence ministries. The bilateral relationships from the security point of view are discussed below.

1.1 USA- Australia. The US-Australia strategic and defence relationship under the broader Australia-New Zealand-US (ANZUS) alliance is very close. In 2007, they signed the Treaty on Defence Trade Cooperation which has eased restrictions associated with the International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR) by creating a framework for defence trade without prior government approval. The US maintains 2,500 Marines as part of a rotational deployment in Darwin. The Talisman Sabre military exercise held in July 2019 included 34,000 personnel from the US and Australia as well as troops from Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom and observers from India and South Korea.²⁹

1.2 USA - Japan. USA and Japan are key allies, with Japan providing US a platform to project power in Indo-Pacific region. The US exclusively uses 85 military facilities in Japan. Okinawa which hosts 37 facilities is an important US forward logistics base.³⁰ The countries have

²⁹ ADM Correspondent. “China Watches as Exercise Talisman Sabre Gets Underway,” Australian Defence Magazine, July 8, 2019. Available : <https://www.australiandefence.com.au/defence/land/china-watches-as-talisman-sabre-gets-underway>.

³⁰ Chanlett-Avery, Emma et al. “The U.S.-Japan Alliance”, Congressional Research Service, June 13, 2019. Available: <https://www.crsreports.congress.gov/RL33740>.

an effective and robust cooperation to cover normal circumstances and eventualities of an armed attack against Japan.

1.3 USA - India. USA and India relation is the only bilateral US relation within the Quad which is not an alliance. The two countries have had a strategic partnership since 2004 and the relationship has grown stronger since the signing of the civil nuclear deal in 2007. In 2016, the US designated India as a major defence partner and in 2018, India was granted Strategic Trade Authorization tier 1 status, which allows India to receive license-free access to a wide range of military and dual-use technologies that are regulated by the Department of Commerce. The two countries signed a Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2015, a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016. In 2019, US became one of India's largest arms suppliers on account of increase in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) processes. USA is India's biggest partner in military exercises and they conducted their first ever tri-service military exercise in 2019. Increasing closeness notwithstanding, India's relation with Russia and the need to have a balanced approach to China can drive a wedge in the security relations with USA.

1.4 Japan - Australia. Japan's first security agreement outside the US-Japan alliance was signed in 2007 with Australia. The specific issues of the agreement include counterterrorism, peace operations, disaster response, international law enforcement, and counter proliferation of WMD. They share a common wariness of China's increasing military and political strength and participate in many military exercises together. They are planning their first bilateral air exercises and are negotiating a

visiting forces agreement. In addition, they have mutually agreed to develop defence cooperation among Australia, Japan and USA.

1.5 Japan - India. In comparison to the above, Japan-India relation is relatively undeveloped. Japan had imposed economic sanctions on India after India's nuclear tests in 1998 and also voiced its reservations on Indo-US civil nuclear deal in 2005. Relations have improved since and now Japan is part of the Trilateral Malabar Exercise since 2015. In addition, the two nations conduct their own maritime and air exercises. India is relatively more reluctant to adopt a position seen as confrontational by China. Overall the defence relation provides a balance to China, and for Japan, a chance to train in the Indian Ocean. It is only in November 2019 that the first Japan-India 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting was held. India and Japan seek to cooperate on the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC). Japan has made offers to India about the sale and co-production of defence equipment, and agreements on defence technology and the security of classified communications have been concluded.

1.6 India - Australia. The Australia-India relationship is the most underdeveloped. The major difference between the nations was the Indian nuclear test of 1998 and the sale of Uranium by Australia to India as India was not a signatory to the NPT. Overcoming the differences, they became strategic partners in 2009 and signed the Framework for Security Cooperation in November 2014. Australia desires participation in Malabar Exercise, but India has been resisting Australia's inclusion as it does not want the Malabar Exercise to be seen as a military manifestation of Quad. The two countries hold biennial naval exercise AUSINDEX and India's Air Force participated in Australia's Pitch Black exercise. India and Australia have initiated a trilateral dialogue with Indonesia also.

2. Trilateral Relationships.

2.1 **USA - Japan - Australia.** The three nations have pursued a formal trilateral strategic grouping through meetings of heads of state and naval exercises since 2006. The trilateral relationship is based on the strong bilateral alliances that the United States has with Japan and Australia as also deepening Japan-Australia security relationship. The issues in the trilateral are generally common to the ones discussed for the Quad. In the area of connectivity the countries have announced trilateral infrastructure investment partnership in 2018 with the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), announcing an initial US investment of USD 113 million.³¹

2.2 **Japan - USA - India.** The relationship has been operational since 2007 but has recently been gaining momentum. The first summit meeting among the leaders of the three countries was held on side-lines of the G-20 Summit of 2018. The ‘JAI’ dialogue also focuses on achieving a ‘free, open and inclusive’ Indo-Pacific and has issues common to that shortlisted for Quad.

2.3 **India - Australia - Japan.** This trilateral was initiated in June 2015. David Scott feels that the ‘IAJ’, for China represents a degree of ‘intra-Asia balancing’ by India and a setback to Beijing’s ‘anti-encirclement’ (fan weijiao) strategy of the past decade. The IAJ is an

³¹ USA, Embassy at Singapore. “OPIC Convenes First Trilateral Meeting to Promote Infrastructure Investment Collaboration During Visit to Southeast Asia”, July 17, 2018. Available: <https://www.sg.usembassy.gov/opic-convenes-first-trilateral-meeting-to-promote-infrastructure-investment-collaboration-during-visit-to-southeast-asia/>

Indo-Pacific framework without the US and thus offers unique opportunities.³²

Pressure Points in the Quad 2.0 Partnership

1. China's Rise as Military and Economic Superpower.

With the turn of the twenty-first century, it is clear that the most profound transformation in global geopolitics has been the diplomatic, political and military rise of China. China has undoubtedly abandoned the 'Hide your strength, bide your time' dictum given by Deng Xiaoping in 1990 and embraced Xi Jinping's 'China Dream' in which China aims to regain its rightful place in the international system. While delivering his report at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC)³³, Xi clearly indicated that China was parting ways from three decade logic of keeping a low profile when he stated that "It is time for us to take centre stage in the world and to make a greater contribution to humankind". Xi repeatedly described China as a 'great power' or a 'strong power'. Two important facets of growing

³² Scott, David. "India's new trilateral with Australia and Japan: China-centric nuances". Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. China-India Brief 54, July 2015.

³³ Xi Jinping, "Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era", Speech at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017. Available : http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf.

China are firstly, the ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) or the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) which aims to build roads, railways and other infrastructure projects in order to solidify Chinese economic and political influence and secondly, a deadline of 2035 for China to have a ‘world-class’ military. On the military, Xi said, “A military force is built to fight. Our military must regard combat readiness as the goal for all its work and focus on how to win when it is called upon”. Referring to Taiwan and the South China Sea, he added that Beijing “would not tolerate” attempts to separate sovereign territory.

2. Emerging USA-China Rivalry.

China issued its latest Defence White Paper in 2019, titled ‘China’s National Defence in the New Era’. The document can be seen as a response to the ‘USA’s 2017 National Security Strategy’, which signalled the shift in USA’s strategy focus on counterterrorism and extremism to competition and possible conflict with China and Russia. The Chinese paper identifies that USA and China are now competing superpowers, and China’s military is growing to the point where they will be able to challenge USA. The White Paper summarizes the overall character of USA’s defence efforts by declaring that it raises international strategic competition. The paper highlights the significant increase in USA’s defence expenditure, focus on increasing capacity in nuclear, outer space, cyber and missile defence. The Chinese feel that USA has realigned its security and defence strategies and adopted unilateral policies which are

provocative, intensify competition among major countries and undermine global strategic stability.³⁴

The white papers of the two nations indicate that there is intense rivalry brewing between USA and China in the Indo-Pacific region. However, presently unlike USA, China's ambition lies in gaining regional supremacy rather than global supremacy. It aims to enhance its economic and military power to displace US from its hegemony in Asia-Pacific. China with its economic, Infrastructure development, diplomacy and military activities is reshaping the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific and therefore compelling states in the region to re-calibrate their ties with China. According to Hugh White, USA has three options; firstly it can resist China and try to preserve the status quo. Secondly, it can step back from its dominant role leaving China to attempt to establish hegemony. Or thirdly, remain in Asia on a new basis allowing China a larger role but also maintaining a strong presence of its own.³⁵ His analysis is that most US strategists feel that option one is the only option and the same is reflected in the white paper wherein USA has chosen a confrontational approach to contain China. Few consider the second option but most do not consider the third. He argues that the third option is the best that serves USA's interests.

³⁴ China, State Council Information Office. "China's National Defense in the New Era". July, 2019. Available: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm

³⁵ White, Hugh. The China Choice Why We Should Share Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. p. 4-6.

On the contrary, the other member countries are more cautious in their approach towards China. They prefer that China be engaged rather than be isolated or confronted. The reason for this is the economic integration of China and other resident countries of the Indo-Pacific region. The countries depend on Chinese trade for continued growth and domestic stability, something strategists feel is a role the US cannot fulfil in the future. Singapore's PM echoes the dichotomy of middle powers while commenting on the US-China rivalry, stating that "If you are friends with two countries which are on different sides, sometimes it is possible to get along with both, sometimes it's more awkward when you try to get along with both. I think it's very desirable for us not to have to take sides, but the circumstances may come when ASEAN may have to choose one or the other".³⁶

3. America First Policy.

In the initial months of its tenure the Trump administration abandoned the Obama administration's 'Pivot to Asia' strategy and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Trump unsettled allies and partners both in Europe and Indo-Pacific by his pledge to put 'America First'. The 'pivot,' or also referred to as the 'rebalance' to Asia involved deepening and strengthening alliance commitments with USA treaty allies including Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and building new partnerships with Southeast Asian states. In this calculus India assumed a central role,

³⁶ Wong, Catherine. "Singapore leader Lee Hsien Loong warns region may have to choose between China and US". South China Morning Post, November 15, 2018. Available: <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2173479/singapore-leader-lee-hsien-loong-warns-region-may-have-choose>.

with the potential to develop into a key strategic ally.³⁷ The Obama administration ‘rebalance’ to Asia, while warning of the consequences of a rising China that disrupted the rules-based international order, still held out hope for cooperation and was thus seen as largely non-confrontational. The Trump ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ is seen as more confrontational and lacks a coherent regional trade and economic agenda like the TPP. This has raised broader doubts about the strength and duration of USA’s commitments as also confidence of American leadership.

4. Japan’s Reservations to USA Policies in the Region.

Japan places a multilateral trade agreement as a fundamental element of its Indo-Pacific strategy. Japan was not supportive of USA’s decision to withdraw from the TPP in 2017 and brokered the TPP-II or the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in 2018.³⁸ Japan also views dealing with North Korea in a different light as that of USA. The Japan-South Korea relationship (which affects an effective trilateral coordination between Japan, South Korea and USA) and the cost sharing issues puts strain on the Japan-USA alliance.

³⁷ Fly, Jamie. “Trump’s Asia Policy and the concept of the Indo-Pacific”, SWP Working Paper, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, October 2018. p. 2.

³⁸ Kiyan, Olga. “A Tale of Two TTPs”. Harvard Political Review, February 22, 2020. Available: <https://www.harvardpolitics.com/world/a-tale-of-two-ttps/>.

5. Australia's Balancing Act between China and USA.

Australia does not want to offend China due to the economic dependence but is at the same time wary of growing Chinese influence. Australia to hedge the decline of USA in the region seeks to have greater engagement and broader security cooperation with ASEAN and Pacific nations. This is visible in the AUSINDEX exercise between Australia and India, through the Pacific Endeavour naval deployment, which visited India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam, and through the inclusion of Japan in the USA-Australia Talisman Sabre exercise for the first time in 2019.³⁹

6. India's Ambivalence in Pursuing Closer Relations with USA.

India is the only country in the Quad which is not a USA ally. India has historically followed the policy of 'nonalignment' and lately it has been pursuing 'strategic autonomy' or 'pragmatic and outcome-oriented' foreign policy. PM Modi's keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018 in effect highlighted India's vision of the Indo-Pacific. In addition to the 'Free and Open', he placed equal emphasis on 'Inclusive' and stated that "India does not see the region as a strategy or as a club of limited members; it does not consider such a geographical definition as directed against any country; nor as a grouping

³⁹ Panda, Ankit. "A First: Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force Joins US-Australia Talisman Sabre Exercise," The Diplomat, June 25, 2019. Available: <https://www.thediplomat.com/2019/06/a-first-japans-maritime-self-defense-force-joins-us-australia-talisman-sabre-exercises/>.

that seeks to dominate.”⁴⁰ India varies in her perception of the Indo-Pacific region with regard to USA and Australian perception, since their perception excludes a huge swath of India’s strategic vista to the west.⁴¹ India favours multilateralism and hopes to maintain a balance in its relations with USA and China. It has been wary of joining any security architectures that could antagonize China. India resists Chinese assertiveness in South Asia, IOR and South East Asia but has been resistant to outright confrontation with China. India has tried to engage Russia, Japan, Australia and ASEAN countries in equal measure as potential balancers of China’s influence. India aims to pursue stable relations with all powers; it is a part of minilateral Organisations with China like the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral dialogue, Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). India has historically had good relations with Russia and Iran, which does not always fall under the same strategic calculus as USA.

⁴⁰ Modi. “Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue”. Op Cit.

⁴¹ Swaine, Michael, “Creating an Unstable Asia: The U.S. ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ Strategy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 02, 2018. Available: <https://www.carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/02/creating-unstable-asia-u.s.-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy-pub-75720>

Conclusion

This chapter has aimed to address the purpose behind the revival of the Quad. Wilkins theory has been applied to analyse the official statements of the Quad member nations to identify shared objectives of the partnership. The Quad has also been seen through the prism of Walt's Balance of Threat theory to gauge the extent to which China is seen as a common threat to the quad nations. Mark Esper, the US Secretary of Defence had stated that, "under President Xi's rule, the Chinese Communist Party is heading even faster and further in the wrong direction – more internal repression, more predatory economic practices, more heavy-handedness, and most concerning for me, a more aggressive military posture. The PRC's growing economic, military, and diplomatic power often manifests itself in ways that are threatening, coercive, and counter to the rules-based international order."⁴² He emphasised on the risks of Chinese military modernisation goals of achieving complete military modernisation by 2035 and to dominate Asia as the preeminent global military power by 2050.

The reason for USA's concern primarily emerges from the need to protect its present world leader status and its ideological incompatibility with China. China's economic growth has led to it modernising the military and increasing influence over other countries.

⁴² Esper, Mark T. "US Secretary of Defence Prepared Remarks at the Munich Security Conference". US Department of Defence, February 15, 2020. Available: <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2085577/remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-mark-t-esper-at-the-munich-security-conference/>.

USA seems convinced that it is just a matter of time until China becomes a world superpower and threatens global structures as they exist today. To combat this, USA has chosen a confrontational and containment route. This view is not equally supported by other Quad countries.

The world is more economically interdependent today than ever in the past. Economic globalisation has resulted in interactions in trade, commerce and services. International travel, tourism, education, climate change cooperation, and technology exchange ties states together as a global community. In spite of their wariness to China's rise, a physical threat to national security such as a military aggression does not emerge as a common thread binding the Quad. Considering the differing status of partnerships between the Quad nations it seems unlikely that in the event of threat of a military confrontation with China, the Quad nations would form a military alliance and commit resources to oppose China. Nonetheless the China factor and its assertive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific is an important feature which has brought the Quad nations closer together. The Quad consultations are evolving into a flexible cooperation around shared objectives.

Compared to the earlier version, Quad 2.0 has the backing of ever strengthening bilateral/trilateral relations between member countries and the emerging Indo-Pacific concept to accommodate the grouping. Hanada identifies three important shifts in the relationships of the Quad; Australia-Japan security relations, India's approach to USA and Japan and USA's rebalance to Asia. He also evaluates that the Quad has been careful in not explicitly referring to China in any statement.⁴³ Study of

⁴³ Hanada, Ryosuke. "The Role of US-Japan-Australia-India Cooperation, or the 'Quad' in FOIP: A Policy Coordination Mechanism

media releases reveal that the Quad 2.0 has evolved shared objectives focused towards a ‘Free, Open, Inclusive and Prosperous’ Indo-Pacific. The members have a conceptual consensus on the broad framework behind the Quad; however their individual politico-security considerations in the region vary subtly, leading to differing priorities. The relevance of the Quad will be an outcome of the member countries commitment to the objectives and the Quad’s potential can only be fully realised if it is accepted as evolved strategic partnership in the Indo-Pacific region.

for a Rules-Based Order.” cogitASIA, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, April 10, 2019. Available: [https://www.Cogitasia.com/the-role-of-the-quad-in-the-free-and-open-indo-pacific-concept-a-policy-coordination-mechanism-for-rules-based -order/](https://www.Cogitasia.com/the-role-of-the-quad-in-the-free-and-open-indo-pacific-concept-a-policy-coordination-mechanism-for-rules-based-order/).

Chapter 4

Relevance and Potential of Quad 2.0

In the previous chapter the endeavour was to establish the purpose for revival of the Quad. Walt's Balance of Threat theory and Wilkins's Strategic Partnership theory formed the basis to identify plausible shared threat and shared objectives of Quad 2.0. The dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region with respect to bilateral/trilateral relationships among the Quad members and likely pressure points, both internal and external also have been analysed. By keeping in perspective the shared objectives of Quad 2.0 identified in the previous chapter, the focus in this chapter is to address the second objective and establish the relevance and potential of the Quad 2.0. To address the relevance of Quad 2.0 in the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific, firstly, the multiple frameworks which contribute to the security of the complex Indo-Pacific region are analysed to ascertain the strategic space for the Quad. Secondly, the importance of ASEAN to regional security and Quad's commitment to maintain the central position of ASEAN is analysed. The perception of South East Asian nations to the emergence of the Quad have been analysed in a survey conducted by ASPI, the important aspects will be linked to this study. Thirdly, the perception of other regional powers to the Quad will be analysed. The potential of the grouping will be analysed under the DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) paradigm to gauge the extent to which Quad can contribute to region's security dynamics. The above factors will form the base for the recommendations in the following chapter.

Strategic Space for Quad 2.0 in Indo-Pacific

Political scientists Buzan and Weaver, who developed the ‘Regional Security Complex Theory’, envisaged East Asia as one Regional Security Complex (RSC) which was formed by the merger of the Northeast and the Southeast Asian RSCs.¹ The East Asian RSC was thought to be unique as it had institutions led by the smaller powers as the bigger resident powers (China and Japan) faced legitimacy issues as leaders. In a later article, Buzan opines that in this past decade the East Asian RSC and the South Asian RSC is in the process of merging to form an ‘Asian Super-Complex’. He attributes this to four key trends which are defining the Asian geopolitics: the ongoing rise of China and India, the weakening of the US, the ongoing contest over defining an Asian regional identity, and the emergence of balancing against China.² These trends are also often quoted as the rationale behind the emergence of Indo-Pacific and the revival of Quad 2.0. The Indo-Pacific can be considered a maritime reflection of the ‘Asian Super Complex’. Buzan’s theory is corroborated by the fact that East and South Asia are today increasingly tied together in political and security terms. China has become more active in South Asia in Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives. India with its ‘Act East Policy’ has increased interactions with other regional middle

¹ Garcia, Zenel. “Power Cycles and Security Complexes : Evolution of the East Asian Super Complex”. *Asian Politics & Policy*, Vol. 8, Issue 4, October 2016. p. 538-558.

² Buzan, Barry. “The Geopolitical Reconstruction of Asia: A Reflection Ten Years on from Regions and Powers”, *Politique Étrangère*, 2012/2 (Summer Issue). p. 331 - 344.

powers and its acceptance into ASEAN led organisations has improved its standing in East Asia. However, comparing the two Asian powers, China has a longer-standing and deeper-rooted position in South Asia than India has in East Asia. Other Asia-Pacific powers are also increasing their spheres of influence, Japan is more visible in South Asia and Australia too has realigned its Pacific centric focus to a more balanced two ocean outlook which has resulted in increasing visibility in the Indian Ocean region and South East Asia.

1. Regional Security Intergovernmental Organisations.

The region has many regional agreements, regimes, and institutions in the economic and security spheres which are expanding their membership to increase participation. These developments signal the emergence of a greater integrated region. Table 4-1 lists the various security and cooperative regional intergovernmental organisations and the same is represented on a map at figure 4-1 to show the spread of the organisations across the region.

Table 4-1 Multi/Mini-lateral Organisations in Asia-Pacific Region.


	US	Jap	Ind	Aus	Other Important States	Members	Remarks
• ASEAN Centric Multilateral Forums							
East Asia Summit (EAS)	✓	✓	✓	✓	ASEAN China Russia ROK	18	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Heads of State level • Strategic dialogue and cooperation on political, security and economic challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)	✓	✓	✓	✓	ASEAN China EU Russia ROK	27	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Foreign Minister level. • Dialogue and consultation on political and security issues for confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM +)	✓	✓	✓	✓	ASEAN China Russia ROK	18	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defence Ministers level. • Strengthen security and defence cooperation for peace, stability and development. • Seven areas of cooperation - maritime security, counter-terrorism, HADR, peacekeeping operations, military medicine, humanitarian mine action and cyber security.

	US	Jap	Ind	Aus	Other Important States	Members	Remarks
ASEAN Plus Three (APT)		✓			ASEAN China ROK	13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Covers wide range of areas - political-security, trade and investment, finance, energy, tourism, agriculture and forestry, environment, education, health, culture and arts, etc.
• Sub Regional Minilateral Forums in Asia-Pacific Region (West to East)							
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)			✓		China Russia Pakistan CAR	8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Central Asia centric Maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in the region. Executive Committee of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) one of two bodies.
C5 + 1	✓				Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan Turkmenistan	6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> US led Central Asia centric grouping. Further US vision in Central Asia : To build CAR resilience to short and long-term threats to stability; to strengthen independence from malign actors; and to develop political, economic, and security partnerships with US.
Indian Ocean Regional Association (IORA)			✓	✓	S Africa Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Singapore	22	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Indian Ocean rim centric. Strengthening economic cooperation and social development of the region.
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)			✓		South Asian countries	8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> South Asia centric. Decisions taken on the basis of unanimity; and bilateral and contentious issues are excluded. Affected by India-Pak tensions.
Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)			✓		Thailand Bangladesh Sri Lanka	7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bay of Bengal littoral countries centric. Platform for intra-regional cooperation between SAARC and ASEAN members. Sector-driven cooperative organization, security not an identified sector.
Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC)	✘	✘	✘	✘	China Thailand Vietnam	6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mekong river riparian countries centric. Focus on water and related development issues.
Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC)			✓		India Thailand Vietnam	6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> India and Mekong river riparians less China. Cooperation in tourism, culture, education, as well as transport and communications.
Forum For India Pacific Islands Co-Operation (FIPIC)			✓		Pacific Island nations	15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cooperation between India and 14 Pacific Islands with focus on Blue Economy.
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)				✓	N Zealand	18	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political and economic policy organisation of Western Pacific Island nations.
• Selective Regional Partnerships / Arrangements							
Southwest Pacific Dialogue (SwPD)				✓	Philippines Indonesia N Zealand	6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ministerial level Exchange views and information on important issues in the region.
Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)				✓	UK N Zealand Malaysia Singapore	5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Defence relationships established by multi-lateral agreements. Consult in the event or threat of an armed attack for deciding response. No commitment to intervene militarily.

	US	Jap	Ind	Aus	Other Important States	Members	Remarks
US-Jap-ROK (UJK) Trilateral	✓	✓			ROK	3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Important forums for exchange of ideas on regional and global issues. • India common link between Quad and RIC. • US has some reservations, however India maintains that it does not prioritise between similar minilateral forums.
Aus-Ind-Indonesia (AIIn) Trilateral			✓	✓	Indonesia		
Russia-India-China (RIC) Trilateral			✓		Russia China		
US-Japan-India (UJI) Trilateral	✓	✓	✓		-	3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As discussed in Chapter 3.
US-Japan-Australia (UJA) Trilateral	✓	✓		✓	-		
India-Aus-Japan (IAJ) Trilateral		✓	✓	✓	-		
• Maritime Centred Multilateral Forums							
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)			✓	✓	France S Arabia Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Thailand	24	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Biennial meetings of littoral states of the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean regions respectively. • Represented by Naval Chiefs. • Forum to increase maritime security cooperation, discussion of regional maritime issues and promote friendly relationships.
Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)	✓	✓		✓	Canada France ROK China Russia	21	
Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF)	✓	✓	✓	✓	ASEAN China Russia N Zealand ROK	18	

Source : Author (compiled from various sources)

Figure 4-1 Multi/Mini Lateral Organisations in Asia-Pacific Region.



Source : Author

2. Indo-Pacific Security Architecture.

Thomas Wilkins puts forth the view that in the Indo-Pacific security architecture there are primarily three power centres; firstly, the USA Hub-and-Spoke (H&S) alliance system, secondly, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) strategic partnership, and thirdly, the ASEAN security community.³ The three are different in their institutional form of security cooperation; the H&S is an alliance, SCO a strategic partnership, and ASEAN a security community. These three pillars have emerged as exclusive organisations to provide security for its membership through coordinated policy objectives aimed at both internal and external

³ Wilkins, Thomas S. “Evolving Security Alignments of the Indo-Pacific: The US Alliances, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and ASEAN”, *Japan Review*, Vol.3 No.2 Fall 2019. p. 1-3.

security challenges. Wilkins feels that each of these alignments stands out as a pole of power and puts forward their own distinct visions of regional order. USA led H&S alignment is of maritime democracies in the Pacific, backed by the USA military predominance, whereas the Sino-Russian authoritarian compact is at the heart of the SCO, backed by China's economic initiatives and institution building, alongside Russia's superpower nuclear arsenal. Compared with these two blocs, the ASEAN seeks to retain its centrality through an expansive institutional and normative framework.⁴


In recent developments the exclusive nature of these pillars is changing and becoming more inclusive. The H&S alliance systems is transforming with emerging trilateral dialogues and 'inter spoke' cooperation between allies (Japan and Australia) and amongst allies and other regional powers Japan/Australia/South Korea and India/Indonesia). The SCO includes a high degree of security cooperation on both traditional and non-traditional security threats, but it does not involve a mutual defence pact as in alliances. In 2017, it has been expanded to include India and Pakistan as permanent member. USA's request for SCO observer status was denied, leading her to come up with a strengthened C5+1 initiative and a defined Central Asia policy. The ASEAN security community is based on amicable internal cooperation between South East Asian nations which seeks to safeguard their mutual external interests through strength in numbers. Since the 1990s, ASEAN has sought an external orientation to shape the wider regional security order in the Indo-Pacific. This is conducted through multilateral institutions such as ARF, EAS, ASEAN+3, and ADMM+.

⁴ Wilkins. Ibid.

3. Quad's Place in Indo-Pacific Security Architecture.

Considering the Wilkins model and Jimbo three layers framework (discussed in Chapter 2), the Quad countries are integrated in all the three pillars and all three layers of the regional security architecture framework as well as in the sub regional minilaterals and maritime institutions. The Quad can serve as an enabler to strengthen security cooperation among its four members, as well in other bilateral, trilateral and multilateral arrangements in the complex regional security architecture. The SCO pillar is a Eurasian Landmass centric security framework; however the USA H&S pillar and ASEAN pillar is Indo-Pacific centric. Therefore, the integration of Quad member countries is more relevant in the context of the USA H&S pillar and ASEAN pillar (see figure 4-2). The Quad offers a unique platform for the member countries to discuss shared objectives and coordinate their policies to showcase an integrated stance on issues while interacting in other multi/minilateral institutions. For the Quad to be effective it must pursue engagement and avoid open confrontation with China while ensuring cooperation, primacy and strengthening of ASEAN led frameworks.

Figure 4-2 Strategic Space for Quad in Indo-Pacific Security Architecture.



Source : Author

ASEAN Centrality - Inviolable for Regional Security

1. Importance of ASEAN in Indo-Pacific Security Architecture.

With its inclusive approach, ASEAN’s importance has grown from being a regional institution to achieving relative success as a convener of multilateral dialogue and a cooperative platform in the Indo-Pacific region. ASEAN has an established framework which addresses a wide spectrum, including the leaders-level ASEAN Summit and EAS, the foreign ministers-led ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and ARF and the defence ministers-led ADMM and the ADMM-Plus. Regardless of the challenges of ASEAN led institutions, they have better acceptability. Sarah Teo opines that since its establishment, the ASEAN narrative has

been one of ‘strength in weakness’. Its member states possess neither sufficient economic nor military resources to be threatening. ASEAN is able to leverage this ‘weakness’ to serve as the convenor of regional multilateralism that includes major powers such as China, Japan and the US. She gives the example of competition between China and Japan over leadership of the EAS in the mid-2000s, which resulted in ASEAN assuming the reins of the new multilateral platform by default.⁵ However in the present age of great power rivalry, the importance of ASEAN pillar will depend on the extent it can come across as a credible independent actor and overcome the risk of deepening divisions within ASEAN.

2. ASEAN as a Security Community.

ASEAN has been successful in safeguarding the interests of its members through cooperation within ASEAN and presenting strength in numbers externally. ASEAN had a combined GDP of USD 2.95 trillion⁶ and a combined defence budget of USD 40 billion⁷. ASEAN has established protocols to deal with non-traditional security issues such as terrorism, transnational crime, piracy and armed robbery at sea, unregulated population migration and environmental disasters. But the ASEAN

⁵ Teo, Sarah. “Strengthening the ASEAN-Centric Multilateral Security Architecture”, East Asia Forum, January 07, 2020. Available: <https://www.eastasiaforum.org>.

⁶ Pletcher, H. “Gross domestic product of the ASEAN countries from 2008 to 2018”, Stastica.com, December 06, 2019. Available: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/796245/gdp-of-the-asean-countries/>

⁷ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military Expenditure Database 2018. Available: <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>.

security community also has limitations as a pole of alignment in the Indo-Pacific. Firstly, ASEAN lacks the critical mass of power resources and capabilities to assert its influence on being threatened by another alignment bloc or individual powerful states. Secondly, it does not have a collective defence agreement or nor does it plan to combine its military capabilities to combat an external adversary. Thirdly, due to the diversity in political makeup and national power ASEAN is also prey to external factors putting pressure on its neutrality with members being pulled to take sides in a great power rivalry. These factors diminish the ability of ASEAN to act cohesively as a united front and deal with traditional security disputes such as the South China Sea.⁸ ASEAN has been proactive in enunciating the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AIOP) with ASEAN Centrality as the underlying principle. The Outlook shares common objectives with the Quad in terms of upholding the rules-based regional architecture, maritime cooperation, connectivity and sustainable development.⁹ There is belief in the ASEAN community that AOIP places ASEAN as a neutral regional organization which should engage with both the Quad and China to facilitate peace and stability the Indo-Pacific region.¹⁰

⁸ Wilkins, Thomas S. “Evolving Security Alignments of the Indo-Pacific: The US Alliances, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and ASEAN”. Op. Cit. p. 4-6.

⁹ ASEAN. “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”, Op. Cit.

¹⁰ Sulaeman, Fadhil Haedar. “ASEAN, the Quad, and China: A Security Contestation for the Indo-Pacific Region”, The National Interest, April 20, 2020. Available: <http://asc.fisipol.ugm.ac.id/2020/04/20/asean-the-quad-and-china-a-security-contestation-for-the-indo-pacific-region/>.

3. Importance of ASEAN Support to Quad.

William Choong feels that for the Quad to be viable it needs ASEAN's support; and for such support to be forthcoming, the grouping must not be seen as a form of soft containment of China.¹¹ The statements of the Quad members reveal that the potential of the Quad and its sustainability are hinged on the response and support of the partners around it. Towards this end the Quad has been unanimous in declaring its respect for ASEAN centrality in the region. Australia Foreign Policy White Paper 2017 emphasises that Southeast Asia frames Australia's northern approaches and is of profound significance. Southeast Asia sits at a nexus of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific which underlines ASEAN's central role in convening the region's strategic forums.¹² Japan too strongly supports ASEAN centrality as part of its core approach to Asian regional cooperation and 'Free and Open' Indo-Pacific Concept. USA states that ASEAN sits at the geographical centre of the Indo-Pacific and is central to the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.¹³ Modi while speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue said that the ten countries of South East Asia connect the two great oceans (Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean) in both the geographical and civilizational sense. Southeast Asia is at its (Indo-Pacific region) centre and ASEAN has been and will be central to

¹¹ Choong, William. "Quad goals: wooing ASEAN", The Strategist, July 11, 2018. Available: <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au>.

¹² Australia. "Foreign Policy White Paper 2017. Op. Cit. p. 43

¹³ USA, Department of State. "A Free and Open Indo-Pacific - Advancing a Shared Vision". November 04, 2019. Available: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf>. p. 6.

its future.¹⁴ Sarah Teo summarizes the effort of the Quad in wooing ASEAN by stating that even if the major powers form like-minded coalitions to address specific issues, they would still turn to ASEAN-centric platforms because they offer the highest returns for broader multilateral consultations and collaboration.¹⁵ The Quad countries are focussed on supporting and strengthening the ASEAN-centric multilateral security architecture with the purpose of backing it as the best option for both ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries for wider-level regional multilateralism.

4. ASEAN's Perception of Quad 2.0.

The ASEAN community has two primary concerns regarding the revival of the Quad. First, the Quad will threaten ASEAN centrality and second, the Quad is an extension of great-power rivalry at the expense of ASEAN interests. Saha analyses that ASEAN's cautiousness towards the Quad initiative is because of its sensitivity of being overshadowed and the possibility of dilution of ASEAN centrality. She feels that the cold response may be due to common objectives of Quad and ASEAN led initiatives wherein the Quad's objective to enable regional security architecture for the maintenance of rules based order is also objective of the ARF and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight falls within the mandate of the ASEAN Maritime Forum

¹⁴ Modi, Narendra PM. "Prime Minister's Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue - June 01, 2018". Op. Cit.

¹⁵ Teo, Sarah. "Strengthening the ASEAN-Centric Multilateral Security Architecture". Op. Cit.

(AMF) and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF).¹⁶ ASEAN was initially reluctant in embracing the Indo-Pacific Construct; however the issue of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) should allay the above concerns. The AOIP clarifies that ASEAN Centrality is the underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, with ASEAN-led mechanisms as platforms for dialogue and implementation of the Indo-Pacific cooperation, while preserving their formats. In addition, ASEAN may also seek to develop, where appropriate, cooperation with other regional and sub-regional mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions on specific areas of common interests to complement the relevant initiatives.¹⁷


Dr. Huong Le Thu, of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute conducted a survey to test perceptions of the Quad among the Southeast Asian policy and expert communities through a quantitative survey in 2018. The survey provides an overview of regional sentiments regarding the Quad. As per the survey, Southeast Asian perceptions of the Quad are diverse and there's no such thing as one 'ASEAN view'. The survey does however dispel certain negative perceptions about the Quad; especially the two widely held notions, firstly that the revival of the Quad will lead to destabilisation of South East Asia and secondly, that the ASEAN led frameworks will lose their primacy in the region. The Survey highlights

¹⁶ Saha, Premesha. "The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: Why ASEAN Remains Cautious", Observer Research Foundation (ORF), ORF Issue Brief, Issue No. 229, February 2018. p. 2.

¹⁷ ASEAN website. "ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific".
Op. Cit.

the general acceptance of the initiative by Southeast Asian nations, but there is a general lack of understanding regarding the reasons for the revival of the Quad. The Southeast Asian nations also see the Quad as an important platform to balance the rising Chinese ambitions in the region. The important findings of the survey are summarised as under.¹⁸ Similar questions have been included in the survey conducted in support of this research to get a perspective of middle and high ranking officials.


Does Quad contribute to stability in the region? Contrary to the belief that Southeast Asians are predominantly negative about the Quad; the respondents were enthusiastic about the Quad. 55% either strongly agreed (14%) or agreed (41%) that the Quad would contribute to the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region, 31% were neutral and only 14% either disagreed or strongly disagreed.



¹⁸ Le Thu, Huong. “Southeast Asian perceptions of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Survey findings”. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, ASPI Special Report, 2018. The detailed survey has 16 questions and has been analysed SEA nation wise/ASEAN view. Some views of non ASEAN members have also been taken.


How does the Quad affect the existing regional security frameworks?

Some feel that SEA sees Quad ‘with concern’, as they fear that it will affect ASEAN’s leading role in regional affairs. 44% thought that the Quad complements existing regional security frameworks, 19% thought that it challenges the framework, 17% thought it side-lines the framework, and 12% thought that it doesn’t affect the framework at all.




Does it matter if the Quad receives support from Southeast Asia?

Quad members are open about the importance of ASEAN support to the initiative and ASEAN centrality. The view of the ASEAN members echoes the sentiment. 39% considered Southeast Asian support to be critical, 30% highly beneficial and only 12% thought it did not matter.




Do you think the Quad is ‘an anti-China bulwark?’ Only 21% thought Quad is merely anti-China framework and it is dangerous, 36% thought that it was necessary; cumulatively 57% of respondents



associated the Quad with the need to balance China. 28% thought that it shouldn't be seen that way, and 15% thought that the Quad merely projects as 'anti-China'.

How does your country refer to the Quad? Only 7% subscribed to Quad being a dangerous irritant for China. Most considered Quad being a 'welcomed initiative' (39%) and an equal number thought it to be 'vague idea' (36%). Only 5% thought it as an 'unnecessary distraction'.



Perspective on Quad 2.0 - Other Regional Powers

1. China.

Chinese reactions to the Quad consultations are of prime importance. Many analysts see the unstated aim of the grouping is to constrain China's growing power in Asia through possible military and economic cooperation. Adam Ni feels that China's suspicions are two fold; firstly, the military dimension of the Quad could take the form of expanded military cooperation that would raise the cost for China to use or threaten the use of force, including in relation to the East and South China Seas and secondly, the economic dimension could take the form of expanded economic and infrastructure cooperation that would compete with China's Belt and Road Initiative.¹⁹ China does not subscribe to the

¹⁹ Ni, Adam. "China's Options Towards the (Re) emerging Quadrilateral Security Dialogue." Real Clear Defence, March 05, 2018.

Indo-Pacific concept in general as it implies erosion of its pre-eminence in Asia-Pacific and on their part has been wary of the grouping since its origins.

In 2007, when the Quad originated, there were two iterations of the Malabar exercises, one prior to the maiden meeting and one following the same. The first exercise was held in April 2007 in the Western Pacific and comprised the navies of India, Japan and US. The exercise was deemed hostile by Chinese officials, but Beijing did not issue a formal diplomatic protest. However, the Chinese reaction to the announcement of the first Quad meeting in June 2007 was immediate and it issued demarches' (diplomatic protests) to the Quad members seeking to know the purpose behind their meeting.²⁰ Post the meeting to assuage Chinese apprehensions, Australia and India reacted cautiously. The Australian Foreign Minister at that time, Alexander Downer went into overdrive in his public reassurances to Beijing that China was not under threat. India was more subtle, with officials commenting that they were mindful of China's concerns, and met without a formal agenda and decided not to

Available:https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/03/05/chinas_options_towards_the_reemerging_quadilateral_security_dialogue_113148.html.

²⁰ Varadarajan, Siddharth. "Four-power meeting drew Chinese demarche", The Hindu, June 14, 2007. Available: <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/Four-power-meeting-drew-Chinese-d%C3%A9marche/article14777286.ece>.

publicise the event widely.²¹ Notwithstanding the above, the second iteration of the Malabar Naval Exercise was held in the Bay of Bengal in 2007 in an expanded version, including the Australia and Singapore Navies. This strategic convergence of Quad in the Asian maritime commons led China to believe that the Pacific's big democracies had ganged up with India to form an anti-China coalition and China upped the political ante to pressure individual states on this. Eventually in 2008, with the change of government in Australia, it unilaterally withdrew from the arrangement stating that the format had been a one-off and that Australia did not plan to pursue it further. This decision was motivated by fears of antagonizing China and Rudd's personal hopes to reboot the Sino-Australian relationship.²²

China's reaction to the Quad has been more measured in its second avatar. China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi in March 2018 dismissed the revival of the Quad as a "headline-grabbing" strategic idea "like the foam on the sea that gets attention but will soon dissipate". He went ahead to compare the Quad to China's One Belt, One Road which

²¹ Nicholson, Brendan. "China warns Canberra on security pact". *The Age*, June 15, 2007. Available: <https://www.theage.com.au/national/china-warns-canberra-on-security-pact-20070615-ge54v5.html>.

²² Eisentraut, Sophie and Gaens, Bart. "The US-Japan-India-Australia Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Indo-Pacific alignment or foam in the ocean?" *FIIA (Finnish Institute of International Affairs)*, FIIA Briefing Paper 239, May 21, 2018. p. 2-3

had the “support of 100 countries”.²³ Even though USA has taken a hard-line by labelling China as a revisionist power and a strategic rival in its National Security Strategy, the Chinese reaction is based on the premise that Japan, Australia and India are unwilling to openly confront China and cannot afford the high cost associated with such an action. Reinforcing this thought is Japan dropping the word “strategy” from its own Free and Open Indo-Pacific to court better ties with China. The Australian White Paper has been careful to highlight continued commitment to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China and describes China as a major geopolitical player with the capacity to influence Australia’s international interests. India continues to back its Act East policy as its vision for the Indo-Pacific and hopes to consolidate its position in Eurasia through the India-China-Russia trilateral mechanism. China also feels reassured that India’s commitment to ‘strategic autonomy’ will not allow it to fully align itself with the US against China. Most Chinese observers believe that there is no need to overreact, and the key to handling the Quad is to be more active in dealing with India, Japan and Australia.²⁴ China’s reaction to the Quad has the potential to influence future course

²³ Krishnan, Ananth. “Chinese Foreign Minister dismisses Quad, calls for India, China to not fight but dance”, India Today, March 8, 2018. Available: <https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/chinese-foreign-minister-dismisses-quad-calls-for-india-china-to-not-fight-but-dance-1184483-2018-03-08>.

²⁴ Minghao, Zhao. “No need to overreact as Quad ups gear”, Global Times, September 29, 2019. Available: <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1165867.shtml>.

taken by the grouping. Adam Ni presents three broad Chinese policy options;²⁵ he offers no recommendation but under the present geopolitical scenario, option three seems in line with China's demonstrated stance.

1.1 Reassurance. China continues to emphasize to the Quad nations its intent to develop peacefully through public statements and diplomatic channels.

1.2 Punishment. China applies a high degree of economic and diplomatic pressure on Quad nations to demonstrate the cost of challenging China's interests and thus deter further challenges. This option could take the form of economic coercion, formal diplomatic protests, and the downgrading of bilateral cooperation in key fields.

1.3 Reassurance and Caution. China continues to emphasize its peaceful intent while also signalling its willingness to impose an economic and political cost on the Quad nations should they continue to challenge China's interests.

2. Russia.

Russia's reaction to the re-emergence of Quad has not positive and restrained. Russia does not distinguish between the Indo-Pacific construct and the Quad. The development is perceived to contradict Russia's interests and Quad is seen as a military axis within the US Indo-Pacific strategy. While speaking at the Raisina Dialogue, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov sharing Chinese concerns said that the Asia-Pacific cooperation was centred on Southeast Asia; however the Indo-Pacific concept was to reconfigure the existing structure to exclude

²⁵ Ni, Adam. "China's Options Towards the (Re)emerging Quadrilateral Security Dialogue." Op.Cit.

China. He added that “terminology should be unifying, not divisive.”²⁶ Russian strategist Tsvetov is of the opinion that the development of the Quad will lead to shifting the focus of Eurasian integration southward. This is in contradiction to Russia’s attempt to pull it northward through its Greater Eurasian Partnership²⁷ and Russia risks losing India as a friendly country and one of the biggest buyers of its defence equipment.²⁸

3. Pakistan.

Pakistan interprets Quad as a threat to Pakistan’s interests. It fears Quad and Indo-Pacific concept may reduce focus on Pakistan with USA led ‘War on Terror’ losing its centrality in regional geopolitics. Quad elevates India in taking on a greater regional role, which may change the dynamics in IOR. The strengthening of USA-India ties are interpreted as an ‘Indo-US nexus’ which is seen as directed at marginalising Pakistan.

²⁶ Sharma, Ashok. “Russia Says US Indo-Pacific Strategy is to Contain China”, The Diplomat, January 15, 2020. Available: <https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/russia-says-us-indo-pacific-strategy-is-to-contain-china/>.

²⁷ **The Greater Eurasian Partnership** is a Russian idea which was first announced in 2015. It is a loosely defined initiative with a goal to unite the Eurasian Economic Union, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and ASEAN countries with a network of free trade areas, technical standards harmonization treaties, and political consultation mechanisms.

²⁸ Korostikov, Mikhail. “Moscow’s View of the Quad & The Indo-Pacific: Threatening Russia’s Space”, South Asian Voices, February 13, 2019. Available: <https://southasianvoices.org/moscow-view-of-indo-pacific-threatening-russia-regional-space/>.

To balance this Pakistan increasing relies on China for its economic and security assurances.²⁹

4. France.

France is the only European nation to promulgate an Indo-Pacific policy. France has territory in the Indian and Pacific and sees a naval role in both oceans. It has 85% of its maritime Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) in the Indo-Pacific, along with 8,000 defence personnel and 1.6 million citizens. France has steadily increased its engagement in the Indo-Pacific, its policy states that France supports and wishes to contribute to the building of a regional security architecture, wherein France its experience as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), its operational know-how in the maritime security domain, and a major contribution to the establishment of an area of peace and stability, based on the full respect of international law.³⁰ President Macron has suggested a ‘Paris-Delhi-Canberra Axis’ (France-India-Australia Trilateral) as an established regional structure.³¹ The

²⁹ Clarke, Benjamin. “Pakistan and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Current and Future Perceptions”, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, IPRI Journal No. XIX, 2019. Available: <https://www.doi.org/10.31945/iprij.190102>. p. 44-55.

³⁰ France , Ministry of the Armed Forces. “France and Security in the Indo-Pacific”, 2018 (updated May 2019). p. 2-4. Op. Cit.

³¹ Raja Mohan, C; Medcalf, Rory; and Tertrais, Bruno. “New Indo-Pacific Axis”, The Indian Express, May 08, 2018. Available: <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/emmanuel-macron->

French Defence Minister Florence Parly has commented that France would protect its sovereign interests in the region and ensure regional stability against great-power competition by using its military assets, regional cooperation, and multilateralism. She was critical of China's military manoeuvres in the South China Sea and added that France's navy would continue to navigate more than twice a year in the South China Sea.³² Overall it seeks closer economic, diplomatic, and military cooperation with Australia, India, Japan, and the ASEAN to maintain stability and provide a viable diplomatic alternative to US and China. China views the proposed 'axis' and an increased military component of France's Indo-Pacific policy with suspicion.

5. South Korea.

South Korea with its growing middle power potential, democratic credentials and robust strategic relationships with Quad countries is most suited to join Quad. However, her pursuit of balanced regional diplomacy and tense relationships with Japan and China has dictated distancing from the Quad.³³ The South Korean ambassador to

india-france-relations-paris-delhi-canberra-axis-malcolm-turnbull-narendra-modi-5167221/.

³² Fusaro, Paola. "France's Delicate Balancing Act in the Indo-Pacific", The German Marshal Fund, June 06, 2019. Available: <http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2019/06/06/frances-delicate-balancing-act-indo-pacific>.

³³ Corben, Tom. "South Korea and the Quad: Missing Out or Opting Out?" The Diplomat, December 23, 2017. Available: <https://>

Australia, Lee Baeksoon while raising concerns about the Quad has commented that the focus for the Indo-Pacific should be regional cooperation rather than exclusive security groupings.³⁴

DIME Analysis - Quad 2.0

Strategists have for long used the DIME acronym (Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic) to describe the instruments of national power. It is increasingly clear that an evaluation of foreign policy initiative cannot be complete by utilising only one of the above instruments. This is apparent in the Quad member nation's statements and reflective in the shared objectives. Accordingly, the Quad has dropped the 'security dialogue' tag and is known by a broader terminology of 'consultation'. The following analysis is aimed at understanding Quad's potential and its limitations in order to get a clear picture of its relevance in the emerging Indo-Pacific regional construct.

1. Diplomatic.

The essence under the diplomatic instrument is to analyse engagement and interaction within the Quad, with other regional structures and countries.

1.1 Quad is a limited member consultation which offers a platform for like-minded states for policy coordination on identified

www.thediplomat.com/2017/12/south-korea-and-the-quad-missing-out-or-opting-out/.

³⁴ Murray, Lisa. "South Korea uneasy about the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue", Financial Review, November 02, 2018. Available: <https://www.afr.com/politics/south-korea-uneasy-about-the-quadrilateral-security-dialogue-20181102-h17fie>.

shared objectives. It has the potential to overcome the constraints of bilateral relations and alliance burden-sharing problem amongst member countries. It can bring together more material resources to overcome emerging challenges.

1.2 Strong bilateral and trilateral arrangements exist between the member countries which allow the Quad consultations to skip the confidence building stage amongst them. Based on the existing level of trust, the consultations can directly discuss specific policy issues based on a shared understanding which have a bearing on regional security.

1.3 The Quad offers a degree of flexibility or spontaneity and in comparison to the ASEAN led forums. The ASEAN way of following the principles of non-interference and consensus based decision making is essential for maintaining cohesion among the ASEAN states, however the Quad can offer an alternative in select contentious issues which may not find favour in process oriented regional cooperative forums. Therefore, the Quad can be a result oriented initiative in an increasingly uncertain security environment. This does not imply that the Quad replace ASEAN as the fulcrum of regional security cooperation. The Quad could be a forum to exchange ideas and coordinate positions among like-minded nations on specific aspects. This can add the much needed weight behind an issue and assist in achieving consensus in larger multilateral forums.

1.4 The Quad members have added 'inclusivity' to their respective visions of the Indo-Pacific. Considering the shared objectives identified include the likes of maritime security, adherence to rules based order and freedom of navigation, the option of including other countries

which share the basic objectives as occasional partners as observer nations can strengthen the initiative.

1.5 There are fundamental differences in the manner in which India wishes to approach the Quad consultations. India is not an alliance partner of the US and its outlook is shaped by the desire to maintain equilibrium between engagement and autonomy. India seeks deeper strategic coordination within the Quad consultation, US-India-Japan trilateral and India-Australia-Japan trilateral in addition to the India-China-Russia trilateral, SCO and BRICS framework.³⁵

2. Information.

Under the information instrument the infrastructure and processes by which Quad can work together to gather, share and utilise information are analysed.

2.1 Information sharing within the Quad is restricted since it is not an alliance. Only Australia has an intelligence sharing pact with the US, Japan which is an US ally is not part of the ‘five eyes’³⁶ intelligence

³⁵ Jaishankar, S. “India, the United States and China”, IISS-Fullerton Lecture, Singapore, July 20, 2015. Available: <https://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2015-f463/july-636f/fullerton-lecture-jaishankar-f64e>.

³⁶ **The Five Eyes** is an Intelligence Alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and USA. These countries are parties to the multilateral UKUSA Agreement, a treaty for joint cooperation in signals intelligence (SIGINT). As the processed intelligence is gathered from multiple sources, the intelligence shared is not restricted to SIGINT and involves defence intelligence, human intelligence (HUMINT) and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT).

sharing cooperation framework. Japan however has been selectively included under the ‘five eyes plus 3’ for intelligence sharing specifically with respect to North Korea. India is at present not part of any intelligence sharing framework.

2.2 There is space for information sharing in enhancing the region's Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). The Quad can take the lead in synthesising regionally-coordinated MDA capabilities to optimally monitor developments in the maritime domain. The Quad members individually already support these capabilities; the Quad could serve as the main platform through which these capabilities are strengthened in a more coordinated manner.³⁷

2.3 The Quad members are part of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)³⁸. The initiative has an Information Sharing Centre (ISC) for information sharing in combating piracy and armed robbery against ships at sea. A similar Information Fusion Centre for Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) has been set up in India by linking all the coastal radar

³⁷ Hornung, Jeffrey W. “The Potential of the Quadrilateral”, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (CSIS), February 21, 2018. Available : <https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/02/the-potential-of-the-quadrilateral.html>.

³⁸ The **Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia** (ReCAAP) is the first regional government-to-government agreement to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia. The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC) is located in Singapore

chains of partner countries bordering the Indian Ocean. Real time sharing of information between such centres involving resources of the Quad could greatly expand the area of visible ocean space. The Quad's value lies in better coordination of efforts to improve MDA capabilities across the region.

2.4 The accident of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 highlighted the inadequate Search and Rescue (SAR) and aerial surveillance capabilities in the vast Indo-Pacific region. The Quad can pool in aerial and satellite resources to coordinate surveillance in the region. The network of satellites, reports from maritime aircraft, ships and submarines can be fused to get a comprehensive picture. This will allow the Quad to share the whereabouts of white (traders) and grey (warships) shipping movements in the larger Indo-Pacific area, on a single network and on real-time. This can also be expanded to share inputs from partner countries like the 'Eyes in the Sky' initiative³⁹ in the Malacca straits and Pacific Maritime Surveillance Program⁴⁰ initiated by Australia in the Western Pacific Ocean.

³⁹ **Eyes in the Sky** is an initiative by four ASEAN countries (Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) to conduct joint air patrols over the Malacca Strait using maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). A MPA carries a Combined Mission Patrol Team, comprising a Mission Commander from the host country and officers from the participating states.

⁴⁰ **Pacific Maritime Security Program** began in 2018 as a civilian aerial surveillance service across the Central and Western Pacific region. When fully implemented, the Pacific Maritime Surveillance Program Aerial Surveillance will provide up to 1,400 hours of aerial

3. Military.

The essence of the military instrument involves building force capability as deterrence, to threaten the application of force, applying force or enabling other parties to apply force to impose will on another state or non-state actor. India is the only one of the four countries to share a land border with China, along which the two countries have fought a war. Historically, a land border is considered more sensitive than a maritime border and therefore India's higher conventional threat perception of China makes it more cautious. India is also the only non-alliance partner in the Quad, and thus has a unique basis for assessing threat compared with the other three countries. Presently there is no treaty between Japan and Australia to indicate a combined response to an external threat. Therefore, a military cooperation in the Quad will not be against a conventional threat to ensure mutual defence.

3.1 The Quad members are participating in many multilateral joint exercises together; the important ones are RIMPAC (maritime exercise hosted by US involving 22 participant nations), MALABAR (US, India and Japan), COPE NORTH (air exercise involving USA, Japan and Australia), PITCH BLACK (air exercise hosted by Australia involving US, India and 12 other nations), KAKADU (maritime exercise hosted by Australia involving USA, Japan, India and 22 other nations). Joint exercises are feasible in naval domain (anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface, air interception mine sweeping and anti-piracy), counter terrorism, SAR operations, cybersecurity and HADR. A joint exercise within the Quad (involving all members/bilateral/trilateral) improves interoperability of surveillance each year across the Central and Western Pacific through two dedicated long-range aircraft based in the region.

forces, assists in sharing of best practices and development of common SOPs. The first step towards Quad exercises has been taken with India hosting a ‘CT-TTX’ (counter-terrorism table-top exercise) involving all Quad members in November 2019.⁴¹ The Malabar Exercises provide a good option for a combined Quad maritime exercise in the future.

3.2 Interoperability within the Quad militaries can also be enhanced by use of common military equipment and similar software systems. As USA allies, Australia and Japan already share common equipment. India and USA have signed the COMCASA which will make available USA equipment to India. However, challenges remain with USA opposed to India purchasing S-400 missile defence system from Russia. This can result in India facing USA sanctions under the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) instituted to check arms purchases from Russia.⁴²

⁴¹ Press Trust of India. “India to Host First Counter-Terrorism Exercise for Quad Nations This Week”. The New Indian Express, November 20, 2019. Available: <https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2019/nov/20/india-to-host-first-counter-terrorism-exercise-for-quad-nations-this-week-2064315.html>.

⁴² Press Trust of India. “India's buying of S-400 from Russia will have serious implications on defence ties: US”, The Economic Times, May 31, 2019. Available: <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indias-buying-of-s-400-from-russia-will-have-serious-implications-on-defence-ties-us/articleshow/69592036.cms?from=mdr>.

3.3 The four Quad countries are the biggest and most advanced in the region (sans China) and have numerous interactions with other littoral states of the Indo-Pacific. They offer an opportunity to collectively assist in capacity building of smaller militaries through enhanced military cooperation.

3.4 The Quad countries can pool in resources to carryout joint patrolling or sectorized patrolling in the vast Indo-Pacific region to protect the SLOCs. An important test for Quad unity will be on the US coordinated Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea. Australia is becoming less sensitive about upsetting China and is seen as the most likely Quad candidate to join the FONOPS.⁴³ Japan and India, the two Quad members which share territorial disputes with China may not be enthusiastic in joining the FONOPS. In 2017, when Japan was considering joining the FONOPS, China warned that it would be crossing a ‘red line’ if it did so and reacting to the same China stepped up pressure and tension in the East China Sea. Japan is restricted in conduct of FONOPS by the interpretation under Article 9⁴⁴ of its constitution which could render the operations controversial and

⁴³ Kurlantzick, Joshua. “Will Australia Join South China Sea FONOPS? Don’t Count on It”, Council for Foreign Relations, March 02, 2017. Available: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/will-australia-join-south-china-sea-fonops-dont-count-it>.

⁴⁴ **Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution** is a clause in the National Constitution of Japan outlawing war as a means to settle international disputes involving the state.

unconstitutional.⁴⁵ India considers the South and East China Seas, Western Pacific Ocean, and their littoral regions as secondary areas of maritime interest.⁴⁶ Even though India's interests are being challenged by China in the IOR, Indian Navy would like to avoid any direct confrontation with PLA Navy. It can be argued that it is for these reasons that India has not made a reference to freedom of navigation as a discussion point in the press releases post the Quad meetings. The nations can agree on logistics agreements giving access to port and airfield facilities to each other as a first step to joint patrolling.

3.5 The Quad can explore possibilities for joint production of military hardware to reduce costs and have commonality right from the equipment inception stage. However, this has its challenges since it involves US losing its primacy as the biggest arms exporter to the other nations and Japan which is the other major arms manufacturer has not had much success with its bid to sell equipment to India and Australia. Japan's submarine deal with Australia has failed and a negotiation on the sale of US-2 SAR aircraft has stalled with India.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Valencia, Mark J. "Joining the Quad: Fear Versus Greed". The Diplomat, December 15, 2017. Available: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/joining-the-quad-fear-versus-greed/>.

⁴⁶ Indian Navy. "Indian Maritime Doctrine", 2009 (Updated 2015). Available: <https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian-Maritime-Doctrine-2009-Updated-12Feb16.pdf>

⁴⁷ Jain, Purnendra. "Shared anxieties drive India–Japan defence ties upgrade", East Asia Forum, December 12, 2019. Available: <https://>

4. Economic.


The economic instrument focuses on furthering of prosperity. Even though Quad is not a trade pact, economy has a bearing on the other instruments and the quest for economic growth has a major influence on conduct of foreign policy. The Quad has identified providing better alternatives for infrastructure development in the region and enhancing regional connectivity as objectives.

4.1 The Quad countries are anxious about China's rise in the diplomatic and military spheres, which is undoubtedly backed by China's economic strength. Even before the Quad re-emerged analysts have been of the opinion that economic issues should be taken off the table as a topic for Quad coordination.⁴⁸ Chinese economy is greatly enmeshed with the global economy and attempts at its economic isolation will not bear fruit. China is amongst the largest trading partner with all Quad nations (see chart 4-1), and these economic links are likely to influence the decisions of the Quad members.

www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/12/12/shared-anxieties-drive-india-japan-defence-ties-upgrade/.

⁴⁸ Lohman, Walter. "Responding to China's Rise: Could a 'Quad' Approach Help?" The National Interest, June 25, 2015. Available: <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/responding-chinas-rise-could-quad-approach-help-13182>.

Figure 4-3 Quad - Bilateral Trade with China (2019).




Source : UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development)

4.2 The economic integration of Quad does not seem likely as there are differences in the manner in which the member countries approach trade partnerships. The US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has left only Japan and Australia as part of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CP-TPP). India is not a member of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Indian reservations in becoming a part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) may leave only Japan and Australia as members of the proposed free trade agreement. India has indicated an interest in negotiating bilateral trade agreements with countries. The long term impact and how each Quad member nation deals with the after effects of the Corona pandemic will need a separate study.

4.3 With respect to the Southeast Asia, China's share of trade (imports and exports) is rising while that of US is falling. The US is both a smaller export market for ASEAN than China and a smaller

source for the region's imports (see chart 4-2). Since 2017, the flow of investment from the US is lower than China. Japan is an important export market for the ASEAN and it is the region's second-largest source of development assistance. India lags in economic involvement in the region and with ambiguity over its RCEP participation it will hold lesser influence. Collectively Europe is an important investor in Southeast Asia, its second-largest trading partner and the region's leading aid donor.⁴⁹ ASEAN is not likely to choose any one of its economic partners over other purely based on security dynamics in the region. It is more likely to balance and manage the geostrategic and geo-economic interests.

Figure 4-4 ASEAN Trade Partners (2018).



Source : UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development)

⁴⁹ Lohman, Walter. "Southeast Asia's future tied to great power competition", *Geopolitical Intelligence Services*, September 23, 2019. Available: <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/southeast-asias-future-tied-to-great-power-competition,politics,3054.html>.

4.4 In the past two decades to keep pace with the rapid economic development, the demand for infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific has surged. Regional connectivity offers an opportunity to the Quad to showcase its relevance. In this space it will have to compete with China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013. The BRI envisages development and investment initiatives involving construction of railways, energy pipelines and highways stretching from East Asia to Europe through the six main economic corridors. Lately, BRI has faced concerns on three accounts; firstly, is about how China is engaging with recipients of its Official Development Aid (ODA). As a normal practice, advanced countries while giving out loans or other forms of aid generally impose a cap to prevent them from lending disproportionate amounts. The aid policy is regulated by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). China is not a member of OECD.⁵⁰ There is fear that in case of poorer countries, the financing required for BRI projects may expand debt to unsustainable levels. For example, the construction of the Lao PDR section of the Kunming - Singapore Railway has an estimated cost of US\$ 6 billion which was nearly 40 percent of GDP of Laos in 2016.⁵¹ Such projects will increase

⁵⁰ Kawashima, Shin. "The risks of 'One Belt, One Road' for China's neighbours". The Japan Times, April 24, 2018. Available: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/04/24/commentary/world-commentary/risks-one-belt-one-road-chinas-neighbors/#.XqgOevkzbIU>

⁵¹ Ruta, Michele. "Three Opportunities and Three Risks of the Belt and Road Initiative". The Trade Post, May 04, 2018. Available:

debt to GDP ratios for poorer countries and put them at high risk. Secondly, there is a danger of recipient nations falling in a ‘debt trap’ due to the high rate of interest of loans, opaque bidding processes, requirement to utilisation of Chinese firms for construction and inflated costs of construction. The US Vice President, Mike Pence has warned against China’s ‘debt diplomacy’ toward developing nations stating that “China uses so-called ‘debt diplomacy’ to expand its influence. Today, that country is offering hundreds of billions of dollars in infrastructure loans to governments from Asia to Africa to Europe to even Latin America. Yet the terms of those loans are opaque at best, and the benefits flow overwhelmingly to Beijing.”⁵² An example of this is the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, wherein China’s loan was at higher interest rates (6.3%, as against the 0.25-3% of a loan from the World Bank or the Japan-US led Asia Development Bank) and Sri Lanka unable to service these loans was compelled to hand over 70% stake in the port to China for 99 years.⁵³ Thirdly, it is a concern that China’s infrastructure projects are driven by

<https://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/three-opportunities-and-three-risks-belt-and-road-initiative>.

⁵² Pence, Mike. USA Vice President’s Remarks on the Administration’s Policy Towards China’, Hudson Institute, 4 October 2018. Available: <https://www.hudson.org/events/1610-vice-president-mike-pence-s-remarks-on-the-administrations-policy-towards-china-102018>.

⁵³ Nagao, Dr Satoru. “Competing Visions: BRI Vs FOIP?” (Chapter 8 of Infrastructure, Ideas, and Strategy in the Indo-Pacific), Henry Jackson Society, March 2019. p. 52-53.

Beijing's strategic goals, rather than the goals or objectives of the recipient countries. The Quad countries can offer better alternatives with higher transparency and accountability. They can also contribute to a joint infrastructure funding pool to allow developing countries an alternative and avoid over dependence on China's infrastructure institutions and loans.

4.5 Each of the Quad member nations has dedicated capital for infrastructure development in the region. The US under the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) of 2018 has appropriated \$1.5 billion each fiscal year from 2019 to 2023 security programs and \$210 million per year to promote democracy, strengthen civil society, human rights, rule of law, transparency, and accountability in the Indo-Pacific region.⁵⁴ In addition, US has a US\$113.5 million seed funding investment into strategic initiatives in the Indo-Pacific focused on encouraging private investment, improving cyber connectivity and security, sustainable infrastructure development, energy security, and access announced by White House.⁵⁵ The US has also created a new US International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC) and raised its spending cap

⁵⁴ Martin, Michael F. "The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) of 2018", Congressional Research Service, April 04, 2019. Available: <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11148.pdf>.

⁵⁵ USA, White House Spokesperson. "President Donald J. Trump's Administration is Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific", 30 July 2018. Available: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-administration-advancing-free-open-indo-pacific/>.

to US\$60 billion.⁵⁶ Japan in 2016, has dedicated US\$200 billion over five years toward infrastructure development in the region⁵⁷ and in 2018, has created an additional US\$50 billion fund for infrastructure.⁵⁸ Australia has promised US\$2 billion in funding for infrastructure and US\$1 billion in financial support to small and medium-sized Australian businesses to operate in the South Pacific.⁵⁹ India's track record in infrastructure projects is poor and it itself needs major infrastructure investment at home. However, India is now cooperating with Myanmar and Thailand on the India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Friendship Highway and with Myanmar on the Kaladan Multi-Modal project, which connects Sittwe on the Bay of Bengal coast in Myanmar with the Indian state of

⁵⁶ Runde, D.F. and Bandura, Romina. "The BUILD Act has passed: What's Next?" Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 12, 2018. Available: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/build-act-has-passed-whats-next>.

⁵⁷ Rajah, R. "An emerging Indo-Pacific infrastructure strategy", The Interpreter, August 03, 2018. Available: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/emerging-indo-pacific-infrastructure-strategy>.

⁵⁸ Yuda, Masayuki. "Abe pledges \$50bn for infrastructure in Indo-Pacific", Nikkei Asian Review, June 11, 2018. Available : <https://www.asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Future-of-Asia-2018/Abe-pledges-50bn-for-infrastructure-in-Indo-Pacific>.

⁵⁹ Shoebriidge, Michael. "Morrison's Pacific Pivot", The Strategist, November 09, 2018. Available : <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/morrison-pacific-pivot/>.

Mizoram.⁶⁰ Japan is supporting India in multiple infrastructure projects; they have initiated a plan to build a network of road, rail, and port links along the Bay of Bengal to increase connectivity between South and Southeast Asia. The two nations have even announced plans for an Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), spanning both land and ocean.⁶¹ These initiatives can be harmonised under the Quad umbrella to come across as one coordinated initiative. The ‘Blue Dot Network’ that has been jointly launched by the US, Japan and Australia announced in November 2019 at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum in Bangkok⁶² can serve as the node for the coordination.

Conclusion

The security dynamics of East Asia, South East Asia and South Asia are increasingly interlinked. Analysts are looking at this emerging integrated region as one ‘Super Asian RSC’. The Indo-Pacific concept is a mirror image of this thought extending beyond the Asian landmass into the maritime domain integrating the Indian Ocean with the Western

⁶⁰ Jaishankar, Dhruva. “Acting East: India In The Indo-Pacific”, Brookings Institution India, Impact Series, October 2019. p. 22.

⁶¹ Chaudhury, D.R. “Pushing back against China’s One Belt One Road, India, Japan build strategic ‘Great Wall’”, The Economic Times, May 16, 2017. Available: <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/infrastructure/pushing-back-against-chinas-one-belt-one-road-india-japan-build-strategic-great-wall/articleshow/58689033.cms>.

⁶² Lyn, Jennifer. “US Blue Dot Network to counter China’s BRI”. Asia Times, May 21, 2020. Available: <https://asiatimes.com/2020/05/us-blue-dot-network-to-counter-chinas-bri/>.

Pacific Ocean. One or more of the Quad members are part all of the existing regional security/consultative forums in the region. In this complex web of regional forums, the Quad finds its strategic space as a link between these institutions, especially the US led Hub and Spokes pillar and the ASEAN led pillar. The Quad seeks to fill the gap of a potential weakening of the US-led alliances and the prospect of an imminent Chinese regional hegemony. The Quad's strength lies in supporting ASEAN centrality in the region and being one of many lanes of cooperation rather than the overwhelming one.

Initial reservations about the Quad have been mitigated to some extent as it is increasingly becoming clear that the Quad is shaping up to be an informal and needs based partnership rather than a formal threat-based alliance. The Quad has prioritised its objectives as addressing various non-traditional regional security challenges and supporting sustainable development in the region. The Quad has been conscious in not antagonising China by keeping the focus on non-traditional security. The members, especially Japan and India have been vocal in conveying that the Quad is not aimed at containing China. Nonetheless, there is a degree of suspicion in how the Quad is viewed by China and restraint in how it is viewed by other nations in the region.

The Quad is part of developing inclusive security architecture in the region that increasingly reflects the diversity of views of middle powers to the region's array of security challenges. The Quad, while respecting each other's sensitivities, must use its combined diplomatic leverage to balance a prospective Chinese domination and steer the region towards stability. Image does matter; the Quad should pay attention to how it is perceived. It cannot come across as a purely anti-China grouping

and should work at crafting merit based arguments to win over support in the region. The military and information instrument has the advantage of established relations amongst the Quad members, as also with other nations in the region. The Quad must develop these relations and strongly back countries/ multilateral groupings in righteous initiatives to achieve their priorities. The Quad can collectively adopt a constructive approach and offer a viable alternative to smaller nations in development of infrastructure and regional connectivity projects based on their needs. Based on the understanding of Quad's potential and its limitations discussed under the DIME paradigm, the way forward for the Quad, recommendations for India and proposals for ASEAN shall be covered in the next chapter.

Chapter 5

Conclusion and Recommendations

Having analysed the shared threat, shared objectives, relevance and the potential of the Quad in the previous chapters, this chapter shall focus on consolidating the study and proposing the way forward for the Quad to develop the initiative in a manner that it contributes to regional cooperation. Recommendations for India in its dealing within the Quad and for ASEAN in engaging with the Quad will also be listed. While considering the above, reference is drawn to the findings of a survey conducted to support the study to get a broader view of the subject. Some areas for further study specifically related to ASEAN and the Quad are also recommended at the end.

Survey Findings

A qualitative study the Quad to test the perceptions about the revival of the Quad, impact on relations with China, effect on ASEAN and its future prospects was conducted online by means of a questionnaire utilising the Google Forms platform. The survey targeted a select audience of middle and senior level officials who are undergoing structured learning in premier institutes in India, Japan, US and Thailand. Owing to the above, it is believed that the respondents have a general understanding of geostrategic situation in the Indo-Pacific region. The responses reflect their personal views which may not always align with the official viewpoint of respective governments. The detailed results of the survey are presented as an appendix attached to the study.

Survey Highlights.

143 individuals have responded to the survey questionnaire. A majority of the respondents belong to India (98). Most of the respondents are from a military background (91%). 80% of the respondents have a professional experience of over 20 years. The highlights of the survey are as under.

1. The views of the respondents are split on the purpose behind the revival of the Quad. 27% feel Quad has been revived to maintain regional power balance, 25% feel Quad will counter a common China threat and 32% feel Quad has come together to achieve shared objectives.

2. Most respondents (39%) thought that the Quad was a Strategic Partnership; only a minority (11%) thought Quad to be an Alliance. 22% thought Quad was a Coalition and 25% felt Quad was a Security Community.

3. The respondents are split in their views on Quad effecting space for member states individual engagement with China. 35% agree/strongly agree that Quad will reduce space for engagement with China, while 37% disagree/strongly disagree.

4. The Quad statements univocally supported ASEAN centrality and ASEAN led mechanisms. The survey supports this argument with a majority (62%) feeling that Quad complements the ASEAN frameworks in the region rather than side-lining (10%) or challenging (9%) it.

5. The Quad statements have shown restraint, so as not to antagonise China. In this regard the survey indicates that the Quad has not been very successful. Most respondents (52 %) viewed Quad is an Anti-China platform and a sizeable percentage (35%) thought it was not Anti-China but projected as such.

6. The findings of the survey show that divergent interests among members (39%) and a lack of focused objectives (32%) are the biggest challenge which the Quad will face in being effective as a grouping.

7. The general response to the initiative is encouraging, 44% find the Quad a welcome as against only 2% who feel it will lead to a conflict in the region. An encouraging 75% of the respondents agree/strongly agree that Quad will contribute to regional stability.

8. A majority (75 %) of the respondents had a positive view about the Quad and either agreed/strongly agreed that Quad will contribute to stability and peace in the Indo-Pacific region. A minority (4%) thought otherwise and 21% were undecided.

The results of the survey along with the findings of the surveys conducted by Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) on Southeast Asian perceptions of the Quad¹ in October 2018 and ASEAN Studies

¹ Le Thu, Huong. “Southeast Asian perceptions of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Survey findings”. ASPI, Special Report, October 2018. Available: <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/southeast-asian-perceptions-quadrilateral-security-dialogue>. (This study tested perceptions of the Quad among the Southeast Asian policy and expert communities through a quantitative survey. It collected 276 answers from staff from government agencies, militaries, academia, think tanks, businesses, media and university students from all 10 ASEAN countries. It is regarded as the first comprehensive study of Southeast Asian perceptions of the Quad.)

Centre on the State of Southeast Asia 2020² in January 2020 are utilised to support the concluding arguments of the study and while suggesting recommendations.

Research Conclusion

India, Japan, US and Australia had coordinated their actions to respond to the challenge posed by post-disaster relief in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. This was the first time that the four countries had worked together on a regional scale. Subsequently, Japanese PM Shinzo Abe's vision of '*Confluence of Two Seas*' formed the basis for the four major maritime democracies of the Indo-Pacific region to come together and hold their first security dialogue in May 2007. The informal grouping was called the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, abbreviated to the 'Quad'. This meeting was soon followed by an enlarged version of the India-US Malabar Naval Exercise by including Japan, Australia and Singapore. Till date, this exercise remains the only military exercise with troops associated with the Quad. The idea behind the first iteration of the Quad was to get like-minded democracies together; but it lacked specificity about its purpose and objectives. Quad 1.0 faced both external and internal pressures. Externally, China promptly

² Tang, SM. et al. "The State of Southeast Asia: 2020", ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, January 2020. Available: https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/TheStateofSEASurveyReport_2020.pdf (1308 respondents from 10 ASEAN member states participated in the 2020 edition of the survey, which sought to understand the perceptions of Southeast Asians on regional affairs and ASEAN's engagements with its dialogue partners. The survey addresses few questions on the perception of the Quad)

opposed the move and filed official demarches with the Quad members demanding to know why such an initiative was being established. Internally, India faced protests over alignment with US owing to the Quad and the civil nuclear deal between the two countries; Japan and Australia elected new governments which did not display the same enthusiasm as the previous incumbents to the initiative; and US prioritised firming its existing alliances in the region rather than invest in the Quad. The Quad 1.0, which was based more on shared values or ideology of like-minded democracies rather than shared interests disintegrated owing to lack of congruence on major challenges facing the region or the means of addressing them.

The Quad was revived in 2017 when the member countries pulled the consultations out of its 10 year hiatus for a meeting on the sidelines of the EAS. This revival was not a sudden move, following the fall off Quad 1.0 there was a decade of increased strategic engagements and relationship building between the four countries. The strengthened bilateral relations between the nations are defined by timely summit meetings and regular ‘2+2’ ministerial dialogues. In addition, there are three separate established trilateral security dialogues between the Quad members. As is natural with resurgence of any failed initiative, the Quad in its second iteration was looked at with scepticism. The Quad was termed as an ‘Asian NATO’³, seen as impinging on ‘ASEAN Centrality’⁴

³ Huang, Cary. “US, Japan, India, and Australia: is Quad the first step to an Asian NATO?” South China Morning Post, November 25, 2017. Available: <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2121474/us-japan-india-australia-quad-first-step-asian-nato>.

and argued to be revived as an ‘Anti-China Bulwark’⁵. The motive to revive the initiative was to have a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific region; however what clearly emerged was that to signal widening of the scope from merely a security dialogue, the name of the grouping was changed to ‘Australia-India-Japan US Consultations’, with the first spot in the list being occupied by the country issuing their respective statements. Nonetheless, the acronym ‘Quad’ had stuck and the consultations are now distinguished in literature as ‘Quad 2.0’. This research had set out to identify the purpose behind the revival of the Quad, its relevance in the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific region and potential to contribute towards security and stability of the region. The conceptual framework for research was based on the literature reviewed on three independent themes. Firstly, the Indo-Pacific regional construct and the security challenges in the region, secondly, the concepts of alliance and alignment in security cooperation among states and thirdly, multilateralism in international affairs and foreign policy.

The economic rise of East, Southeast and South Asian countries in the last three decades has contributed to the shift in geopolitical centre of gravity from Europe towards Asia. The economic progress has led to an increase in volumes of maritime trade and flow of energy resources in

⁴ Tsvetov, A. “Will the Quad Mean the End of ASEAN Centrality?” The Diplomat, November 15, 2017. Available: <https://www.thediplomat.com/2017/11/will-the-quad-mean-the-end-of-asean-centrality/>.


⁵ Huang, K. “US-led Quad coalition a ‘useful anti-China bulwark’ in Asia,” South China Morning Post, October 23, 2018. Available : [https:// www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/ article/2169715 /us-led-quad-coalition-useful-anti-china-bulwark-asia](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2169715/us-led-quad-coalition-useful-anti-china-bulwark-asia).

the Indian and the Western Pacific Oceans. This has drawn attention towards the maritime domain of Asia and necessitated the transition of the regional view from a land-centric 'Asia-Pacific' to a maritime-centric 'Indo-Pacific'. The Indo-Pacific integrates the Indian and Pacific Oceans into a strategic region. The construct is a consequence of the shifting geopolitical realities and the realisation of the importance of the high seas to the littoral countries of the two oceans. This concept has gained currency and found increasing inclusion in foreign policy agendas of different nations. While the Indo-Pacific region is an economically vibrant region, it is also home to multiple security flashpoints. Few issues contributing to regional insecurity are the contested space of South China Sea, territorial dispute over the Senkaku Island chain, China's claims over Taiwan and the India-Pakistan border problem. The region is also under an existential nuclear threat with North Korea under an authoritarian ruler possessing nuclear weapons with long-range missile delivery systems. Among the non-traditional threats, the need to protect commerce through the piracy infested waters of Western Indian Ocean and Malacca, terrorism, natural disasters, climate change and cybersecurity contribute to insecurity among stake holders in the region.

It is noteworthy that the Indo-Pacific concept aligns with the Maritime Silk Road as part of China's Belt and Road Initiative and represents an underlying competition to shape the regional order. Another important dynamic of the Indo-Pacific region is the US-China rivalry which is increasingly playing out on the global scale. The basis of this rivalry is the economic rise of China in the last two decades to a state of near parity with the US. The share of global GDP of the US has declined from its high in early 2000s, while that of China has grown over four fold

(see chart 5-1). The US calls China a ‘revisionist power’, which threatens to change the current system. Both countries possess comparative advantages in the region; China enjoys an upper hand economically, through trade and connectivity projects, whereas US holds an advantage in diplomacy and as a dominant military power.

Figure 5-1 Share of Global GDP 1990 to 2018 - USA and China.



Source : World Bank, <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>

China’s diplomatic rise, military modernisation and investment in infrastructure development beyond its borders are axiomatic to its economic rise. China has emerged as the leading manufacturing country and an integral part of the global economic system. Its flagship BRI projects are designed to further enhance its economic and diplomatic clout in the region. China’s increasing presence has not been equally welcomed and there are reservations against the change of guard in the region.⁶ There have been doubts raised regarding the impact of the

⁶ As per the State of SEA Survey 2020, 52.2% saw China as the most influential power in the politico-strategic realm; double that of the

Chinese infrastructure projects on weaker economies of the region. Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka is often quoted an example reflecting the near subjugation of the economically weaker countries to Chinese influence. There are also concerns regarding the possible dual use of facilities being created by China especially at Djibouti, Gwadar and Hambantota. China has become more assertive in the regional maritime space, especially so in the East and South China Seas. The South China Sea is among the world's most important maritime trade routes and is presently under dispute due to China's unilateral and excessive claims. Since 2009, when China officially introduced the nine-dash line map, the tension has continued to grow. The intensity has increased since 2016, when China disregarded the judgment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in favour of Philippines against China's claims. China has increased its sphere of influence with a growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean region to protect its shipping against the piracy threat.

Contemporary theories on alliance formulation are based on Balance of Power and Balance of Threat. These theories aim to put a rationale to why nations align. As per the Balance of Power theory, weaker nations ally to protect their security and independence to balance power of a hegemonic opposition. On analysis it appears that the Balance of Power theory cannot be applied in the coming together of the Quad, for conceptually it stems from the fear among smaller powers of the rise of a larger rival power. The Balance of Threat theory is more contemporary and was developed to rationalise the shortcomings of the Balance of Power theory. As per the Balance of Threat theory, nations ally to balance

US (26.7%). But 85.7 of the respondents registered concern over this matter.

against a nation whose superior resources they perceive as posing a threat to national independence. To define the level of threat, factors such as geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions are used. This implies that the threat is primarily to be ascertained based on the capacity and intent to wage a war. According to the theory, it is reasoned that during the Cold War the rationale for the formation of the NATO alliance was the aggressive military intentions of the Soviet Union in Europe. On comparing this with the Quad, it emerges that India, Australia and Japan do not perceive China as posing a similar existential threat to that posed by the Soviet Union to NATO and thus the need to align against a 'China Threat' is low. This reasoning is backed by the fact that China has not openly declared itself as ideologically hostile to the Quad countries nor has it threatened the Quad countries with nuclear/conventional forces. Among the Quad, it is only the US National Security Strategy, which mentions China as the threat to American interests in the Indo-Pacific. The white papers and official statements from the crucial government ministries of the other three members of the Quad have centred their focus on the growth and developmental aspects and maintenance of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region. The Quad member countries and China's continued prosperity requires continued economic interactions amongst themselves and with the rest of the nations in the region, especially ASEAN. This prevents absolute hardening of stance against each other. Quad collectively, has chosen to be diplomatically correct to say that it is not directed towards any particular country. The Quad therefore cannot be called an alliance and cannot be seen focussing solely on 'China Threat' balancing.

In the present day multilateral world order, theorists have further categorised alignments as alliance, coalitions, security community and security partnerships based on the level of commitment and the scope of the challenges addressed. A security partnership has a low level of commitment and has the potential to address a broad range of issues. While the Balance of Power and Balance of Threat theories focus on alliances, Wilkins theory on strategic partnership fills the gap and prioritises mutual interests as the foundation for collaboration between states as against a common threat or similar ideology. The continued rise of China does arouse caution and concern in the policy elite of the Quad countries. Balancing Chinese rise serves as an actuator for the Quad 'strategic partnership'. The Quad represents a recent trend in international relations wherein compared to alliances and large multilateral institutions, more flexible minilateral security partnerships offer a valuable means to address selective security challenges. This format allows the members to avoid grand strategic designs and cooperate where interests converge.

The Quad 2.0 has met six times since revival, but the member countries have not issued a joint statement after the meetings. The shared objectives of the consultations are identified through the member countries official statements. The Quad focuses primarily on security cooperation in non-traditional fields and aims to propagate freedom, openness and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. The Quad also prioritises infrastructure development and regional connectivity and aims to promote alternatives for infrastructure projects with high standards and quality as against those with opaque bidding processes. Within the Quad there is a general convergence of ideas, but subtle differences in the outlook exist. The most visible difference is the lack of a common

understanding of the Indo-Pacific region as a theatre and the delimitation of its scope. Also among the identified shared objectives, India has repeatedly avoided a mention of ‘upholding rules based order’ and ‘ensuring freedom of navigation’ in the Indo-Pacific. India has preferred to refer to the issue obliquely as ‘promotion of peace in the region’.

A priority of the Quad has been to reassure ASEAN that the Quad would not displace the security community from its central position in regional affairs. To assuage any misgivings on the aspect of Quad impinging on ‘ASEAN Centrality’, the statements have repeatedly and univocally called for support to ASEAN centrality and ASEAN led mechanisms. The survey too supports this argument with a majority (62%) feeling that Quad complements the ASEAN frameworks in the region rather than side-lining (10%) or challenging (9%) it. The ASPI survey is more conservative with 44% finding Quad complementary and 20% each side-lining and challenging. Another common outcome of the meetings is the restraint shown in the statements so as to signal the inclusive nature of the consultations and not to antagonise China. However, in this regard the survey indicates that the Quad has not been as successful. Most respondents (52 %) viewed Quad as an anti-China platform and a sizeable percentage (35%) thought it was not Anti-China but projected as such. The ASPI survey is on similar lines with 57% viewing Quad as anti-China.

An analysis of the Quad under the DIME paradigm suggests that Quad’s strengths in the diplomatic instrument lie in presenting a united voice on the issues of common interest in the regional forums and increased engagement of ASEAN. The Quad needs ASEAN support for establishing legitimacy and the ASEAN needs Quad’s diplomatic backing

to initiate respect for international law and upholding a rules based order in the region. The Code of Conduct for South China Sea under negotiation between ASEAN and China will be a testing ground for this proposition. For it to be effective, robust, legally binding and consistent with international law, it should not fall prey to a one-sided arrangement borne out of consultations facing internal and external pressures. In the military instrument, the strength lies in focussing on non-traditional security challenges which transcend international borders. The Quad has potential to work together in the field of cyber security, counterterrorism, maritime security and HADR. Joint exercises in these domains present an opportunity to learn from each other's operational experiences, enhance interoperability and formulate common SOPs. The Quad should engage with Indo-Pacific littorals to bolster their defence capabilities and preserve national interests along their shores. Joint anti-piracy patrols and sharing of intelligence will make the SLOCs safer. The economic instrument offers opportunity in coordinating efforts, meaningfully prioritising and assisting littoral nations in sustainable development while preserving the environment and preventing debt stress.

The study of literature and findings of the survey show that divergent interests among members (39%) and a lack of focused objectives (32%) are the biggest challenge which the Quad will face in being effective as a grouping. The general response to the initiative is encouraging, 44% find the Quad a welcome as against only 2% who feel it will lead to a conflict in the region. An encouraging 75% of the respondents agree/strongly agree that Quad will contribute to regional stability. While Indonesia and South Korea have emerged as choice candidates for the expansion of the Quad to a 'Quad Plus', it is however felt that the Quad

needs to define itself by institutionalising the consultations before considering an expansion. A significant development in the Quad was the upgradation of the consultations to a ministerial level meeting in September 2019 and perhaps set the stage for a summit level meeting in the future. The future prospects of the Quad will be guided by three main factors; firstly, the extent of China's assertive behaviour in the region and how much it can push the accepted rules based order in its pursuit to be a dominant regional power. Secondly, US reaction to China's diplomatic, military and economic rise and the support it will get from other Quad members. Lastly, the intra-relationship between the middle powers, Japan, Australia and India in the Quad.

Quad 2.0 is three years young. The Quad member countries should work in the direction of synergising the Quad activities with the FOIP vision. Engaging with ASEAN and respecting ASEAN centrality will be an important line of operation towards this end. Through the course of the research the basic objectives and cooperative content of the Quad has become clear. This can be summarised as identification of the Indo-Pacific as the regional construct for cooperation with focus on two main themes. First is security, with particular emphasis on maritime cooperation to ensure freedom of navigation and overflight in the Indo-Pacific; and second is infrastructure development, with focus on cooperation in regional connectivity projects.

The Way Forward - Quad 2.0

Understanding the Indo-Pacific construct, the security architecture in the region and challenges associated with the Quad are important in order to assess how the consultations may progress in the coming years.

The Quad is not likely to develop into a ‘quasi-alliance’ and thus it is important to scale down expectations and not expect the Quad to be an answer to all security and connectivity issues in the region. While evaluating the future of the Quad, there are two key considerations. Firstly, due to varying concerns of the proponent nations, the Quad cannot be overly adversarial to China. The Quad would not be an effective tool if the purpose is to contain or confront China. The Quad’s actions, especially with regards to maritime security issues have to be balanced and calibrated for an adversarial approach to China in the maritime domain may escalate Chinese assertiveness for fear of encirclement. Secondly, it cannot be understated that for the Quad to be viable, it needs ASEAN’s support. Therefore, it is important to shape a positive engagement with ASEAN and respect its centrality in regional affairs.

This paper has analysed the Quad as minilateral security partnership; a flexible arrangement with focus on mutually agreeable shared objectives with a politico-military aim to further a free, open, inclusive and a prosperous Indo-Pacific region. The Quad can potentially take two approaches; first, a narrow functional approach or second, a broader whole of the government approach. It will be counterproductive for the Quad to have an extensive agenda on the wide range of issues. It should not use the initiative to venture into regional trade groupings, global issues like climate change and non-regional security issues. The Quad should focus on specific and concrete areas to cooperate on that will have visible impacts. With this as the backdrop, the proposals for the way forward focusses on three themes, firstly, structural recommendations for the Quad consultations to enhance the dialogue process, secondly, the Quad assuming a soft security dimension in

the maritime domain and thirdly, Quad coordination on infrastructure development and connectivity projects.

1. Structural Proposals.

The proposals under this head focus on institutionalization of the Quad consultations and initiatives towards focussed cooperation among Quad members in the future.

1.1 Quad Secretariat. The creation of a Quad secretariat is proposed along with the chairmanship rotating every three years among the members. At present the Quad does not have any structure and the six meetings have been held at the side-lines of other meetings like the EAS and ASEAN meeting. The member countries have not issued a joint statement after the meetings. There have been subtle differences in the statement of individual members, leading to conjecture and lack of clarity. The institutionalisation of the Quad secretariat will result in better coordination among members, monitoring of effective implementation of Quad projects and activities and function like a one point contact for other agencies.

1.2 Head of State Meeting. A biennial head of state meeting among the Quad nations is proposed. The meeting at the highest level will demonstrate that the members of the Quad are prepared to elevate the visibility of the Quad. It will give an impetus to the Quad consultations, as it will set the tone and provide top-down instructions for the lower level meetings. This meeting need not be a separate summit meeting purely for the Quad but can be held on the side-lines of existing summit meetings like the EAS, G-20 or UN General Assembly meet. At the culmination of this meet it is imperative that a joint statement be released to signal unity of effort among the members.

1.3 Ministerial Level Meeting. Defence, infrastructure development and foreign affairs are plausible avenues for collective Quad activities. It is proposed that the existing '2+2' foreign and defence ministers meetings format which already exists bilaterally amongst all the Quad nations be expanded to a joint Quad '2+2' ministerial format with an annual meeting. The '2+2' working group format will be useful in laying the groundwork for head of state meeting.

1.4 Working Groups on Politics and Defence. To support meeting at the higher level it is proposed that working group on politics and defence be set up. This working group should comprise of senior-level officials from the foreign and defence ministries. The group will be responsible for the groundwork, coordination and streamlining the agenda for meeting at the ministerial level. While meetings at summit and ministerial level are scheduled meets, those at the working group level can be more frequently held in person or even impromptu via video teleconference. This will provide the needed continuity to the discussions at the higher level and also be responsible for the secretarial work, including issue of joint statements and conduct of press conferences. For a start, the working group can coordinate activities related to maritime security to include data sharing, updated maritime domain awareness and capacity building efforts, thereby avoiding any duplication or redundancies.

1.5 Working Group on Infrastructure Development. A working group on infrastructure will facilitate coordinating regional economic and developmental assistance. The group can work with the

‘Blue Dot Network’⁷ which provides an existing platform for realising the infrastructure development component of the Quad. India should join the network as it would demonstrate that all four Quad nations are committed to creating a roadmap to sustainable and high-quality infrastructure for developing countries. The working group can also take under its umbrella various infrastructure initiatives already being operated by individual countries or in collaboration like the Japan-India sponsored Asia-Africa Growth Corridor.

2. Security Dimension.

Japan and Australia individually share the status of allies with the US. The US-Japan alliance is governed by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation which regulates that an armed attack against either nation in the territories under the administration of Japan would lead to combined action to meet the common danger. US-Australia alliance is part of the Australia, New Zealand and US Security Treaty (ANZUS) which is not legally enforceable and does not require the allies to send armed forces to fight on each other’s behalf. India does not share any alliance status with US. Therefore, the proposals in the security dimension are based on soft security policy dynamics focussed on non-traditional threats in the region.

⁷ **Blue Dot Network** (BDN) is an initiative of the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC), and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). The BDN was launched as a multi-stakeholder initiative that aims to bring governments, the private sector and civil society together to promote high quality, trusted standards for global infrastructure development around the world.

2.1 Strategic Policy Context. The Quad is an integral part of the Indo-Pacific regional construct, therefore there needs to be convergence on the strategic framework defining the Indo-Pacific. The current narrower definition of the region by US and Australia restricts the broader approach taken by Japan and India. For commonality and clarity as a strategic framework, a maritime space which includes the whole of Indian and Pacific Oceans is proposed to be commonly adopted as the Indo-Pacific region.

2.2 Maritime Security Cooperation. There are many potential areas where the Quad can work together on the maritime front. At the core of the issue is upholding rules based order in the maritime domain. The support to international laws and norms, specifically the UN convention on Laws of the Seas (UNCLOS) is an important step to achieve this. India, Japan and Australia are signatories to the UNCLOS; the US has not ratified it. Even though the US has been committed to abiding by the principles, ratification of the UNCLOS by the US will bolster the Quad's moral standing and legitimacy in pursuing maritime issues. The Quad is committed to safeguarding SLOCs from interdiction by non-state actors (pirates or terrorists). Joint patrols in coordination with other regional players in identified incident prone areas are proposed to keep SLOCs safe for merchant traffic. The Quad is also committed to freedom of navigation and overflight; in this regard the Quad should strongly support the ASEAN for the finalisation of a balanced South China Sea Code of Conduct. Coordination is also necessary to reduce the risk of accidents or unplanned naval encounters, for which adherence to the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) is necessary to be adhered to.

2.3 Naval Exercises. Closer naval cooperation between the Quad countries is proposed to be based on confidence building measures (CBMs) and joint training exchanges. This will result in greater interoperability amongst the navies, which can graduate to commonality of equipment at a later stage. Interoperability will enhance common communication protocols, development of doctrines, refining of tactics and enhance the professional development of personnel. Exercise Malabar led by India, Exercise Kakadu led by Australia and other multilateral exercises like the ASEAN Multilateral Naval Exercise offer opportunities for enhanced cooperation amongst navies. Exercise Malabar participation is proposed to be expanded to include Australia, France and United Kingdom as also other regional navies as observers.

2.4 Maritime Domain Awareness. The Quad should cooperate on issues of Maritime Domain Awareness by sharing of intelligence, greater access to technology, commonality of equipment and joint use of military infrastructure such as ports and airstrips. It is proposed that the cooperation be extended to have seamless integration with ASEAN through the Information Fusion Centre at Singapore.

2.5 Engaging Coast Guards of Littoral States. Since Coast Guards are law-enforcement agencies their increased cooperation is likely to be more acceptable than that of navies. Increased cooperation among Quad countries' Coast Guards is proposed to tackle issues related to drug/human smuggling, illegal fishing, and other maritime law enforcement activities. This enhanced coordination can also be utilised to form the basis for collaboration and capacity building efforts with Coast Guards of littoral states across the Indo-Pacific.

2.6 Non-Conventional Security Areas. Cooperation in non-conventional security areas, such as Search and Rescue (SAR) activities in peacetime, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), cyber security and counter terrorism activities is proposed as the initial order of business for the Quad. A beginning has been made with the first ever Quad counter terrorism table top exercise in 2019, this model should be expanded to other non-traditional security areas.

3. Infrastructure Development.

Asian Development Bank (ADB) report published in 2017 projected that developing Asia will need an investment of USD 26 trillion from 2016 to 2030, or USD 1.7 trillion per year, if the region is to maintain growth momentum, eradicate poverty, and respond to climate change. Currently, the annual spending is about half that at USD 881 billion.⁸ In July 2017, US, Japan and Australia pledged a new partnership dedicated to promoting infrastructure investment in the Indo-Pacific with its purpose ‘to facilitate private sector involvement in infrastructure projects that are transparent, non-discriminatory and free from the burden of unsustainable debt’.⁹ Therefore, infrastructure development and connectivity projects do potentially play a central role in the Quad’s regional calculus. The commitment of the Quad nations in this area indicates

⁸ Asian Development Bank. “Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs”, 2017. Available: <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/227496/special-report-infrastructure.pdf>.

⁹ Adamson, Frances. “Australian Perspectives on the Indo-Pacific”, Australia DFAT, October 12, 2018. Available: <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/speeches/Pages/australian-perspectives-on-the-indo-pacific.aspx>

that they aim to offer an alternative to China's ambitious strategic network of infrastructure projects in the MSR and BRI. The Quad should not compete with but rather complement the Chinese efforts.

3.1 Coordination Agency. The Quad should prepare a joint infrastructure funding pool for development in the region's developing countries. With the premise that India joins the infrastructure partnership, it is proposed that an Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Development Coordination Agency be established to coordinate the activities of the Quad in the field of infrastructure development and connectivity projects. The proposed agency should work in unison with the working group on infrastructure and under the precepts of the Blue Dot Network.

3.2 Engaging China. Japan has attended the BRI Forum for International Cooperation in May 2017 and engages with China on infrastructure development projects in Southeast Asia like the Eastern Economic Corridor in South East Asia.¹⁰ India engages with China in the BRICS New development bank (NDB) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). India is the second largest shareholder in the China-led AIIB and its largest borrower. The AIIB has invested \$2.894 billion in 13 projects in India.¹¹ The proposed coordination agency could likewise

¹⁰ Yuanzhe, Ren and Rongsheng, Zhu. "Japan a natural partner in BRI development" Global Times, September 06, 2018. Available : <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1118591.shtml>.

¹¹ Ganesh, Venkatesh. "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank mulls \$2.2-billion loan for Indian infra projects". The Hindu Business Line, November 15, 2019. Available: <https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-mulls-22-billion-loan-for-indian-infra-projects/article29985244.ece#>.

interact with Chinese financing agencies to raise the overall quality of regional infrastructure. This will encourage transparency for negotiation, tendering process and contracts.

3.3 Areas of Focus. It is proposed that the focus in the field of infrastructure development should be on funding projects that better integrate the Indo-Pacific as a coherent regional order. Towards this end, the Quad could focus on building and maintenance of infrastructure in the maritime domain, such as ports and harbours. The priorities should go to already committed projects like the Matarbali port project in Bangladesh, the Trincomalee port project in Sri Lanka and the Chabahar port project in Iran.

Recommendations for India

India's position in the Quad is quite unique; firstly, India does not form part of the US hub-and-spoke alliance framework and therefore does not enjoy a formal security guarantee from the US. Consequently, it also does not similarly benefit from access to modern US technology and intelligence. Secondly, as US allies Japan and Australia support a US led international order, whereas India supports a multi-polar world order within which it aims to retain its strategic autonomy. It therefore views the Quad as one of the minilateral consultative groupings it is part of, like the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral. Thirdly, unlike the other Quad members it shares a long non-demarcated land border with China, which is often a source of tension between the two countries. India can ill afford a limited war on its borders or a potential maritime dispute with China in the Indian Ocean Region. Fourthly, even though it aspires to be a maritime nation, the sub allocation of defence budget between the services indicates

that India's primary focus continues to be its continental borders. Fifthly, though it espouses an expansive Indo-Pacific vision, India is still in the process of building a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean and considers seas to the east of Malacca straits its secondary area in maritime strategy. Lastly, India is both a recipient of infrastructure development aid and a major donor itself. The India centric proposals keep the above aspects in perspective.

1. Enunciate an Indo-Pacific Policy.

India formulated its 'Look East Policy' post the cold war and its decision to liberalise the economy in the early 1990s. Since 1991, it has actively pursued bilateral engagements and multilateral forums in South East Asia underscoring the importance of the region in its contemporary international relations. The Look East Policy evolved to a more action oriented 'Act East Policy' in 2014. India's engagements with ASEAN, Japan and South Korea have steadily increased in the last five years. India is involved in more than 30 sectoral dialogue mechanisms and seven Ministerial-level interactions in addition to annual summit-level meetings with ASEAN. India and ASEAN share trade of over US\$ 80 billion.¹² PM Modi at the Shangri-La Dialogue outlined India's Indo-Pacific vision. He based the vision on an Indo-Pacific that is free, open and inclusive, and one that is founded upon a cooperative and collaborative rules-based order. He emphasised on ASEAN's centrality as a key characteristic of

¹² De, Prabir. "Shared Values, Common Destiny: What we expect from the 16th ASEAN-India Summit", Economic Times, November 11, 2018. Available: <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/blogs/et-commentary/shared-values-common-destiny-what-we-expect-from-the-16th-asean-india-summit/>.

the Indo-Pacific at the regional level. India has increasingly been referring to the Indo-Pacific while talking about its engagement with the countries of South, Southeast and East Asia. De feels that gradually Act 'East' is getting transformed into Act 'Indo-Pacific'.¹³ It is proposed that India enunciate a comprehensive Indo-Pacific policy to cover the emerging geopolitical scenario and Indo-Pacific region in totality, including areas to its west. This will remove the ambiguity surrounding India's role in the Indo-Pacific region. The policy should focus on the measures outlined in the PM Modi's address to include; India's view of multilateralism and regionalism, SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision, use of common spaces on sea and in the air in accordance with international law, promotion of maritime safety and security from traditional and non-traditional threats, and regional connectivity and infrastructure development.

2. Maintain Strategic Autonomy.

India should not be fixated on the Quad as the only means of deepening cooperation with like-minded security partners in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad should not become an overbearing front face of Indian diplomacy, it should continue with engagements in other tri-laterals and ASEAN led multilateral forums in equal measure. It is proposed that India balance its engagement in the Quad to maintain its strategic autonomy.

¹³ De, Prabir. "Act East to act Indo-Pacific: Agenda for the new government". *Economic Times*, June 01, 2019. Available: <https://www.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/act-east-to-act-indo-pacific-agenda-for-the-new-government/articleshow/69591279.cms?from=mdr>.

3. Enhance Engagement with ASEAN.

Since 1991 India has been committed to enhancing its relationship with ASEAN countries. India has underlined the centrality of ASEAN in its Indo-Pacific vision and the 'Act East' policy provides framework for initiatives aimed at increasing its cooperation with ASEAN members. India has upgraded its bilateral relationship to the level of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Vietnam in 2016 and with Indonesia in 2018. It should consider an upgradation of its relations with Thailand and enhance cooperation in the field of science and technology, defence, space and health. India should conduct more joint military exercises with ASEAN nations. The MILAN military exercises hosted by India presents an opportunity for building naval cooperation, the maritime forces of Southeast Asia should be invited to be a part of these exercises. Thailand and Malaysia conduct coordinated naval patrols with India; the frequency is proposed to be enhanced to secure the waters from the southern tip of India to the Malacca Straits. India-Thailand-Singapore naval exercises can be enhanced to include Malaysia and Indonesia. In addition to cooperation in the maritime domain, exercises in other non-traditional fields such as humanitarian mine action and counter terrorism should be enhanced.

4. Expand Malabar Exercises to Include Australia.

India has led the Malabar Exercises involving US and Japan. However, it has so far resisted Australia's request to join the exercises. The Quad has made it clear that it does not entail a mutual defence treaty. However, a meaningful security partnership can achieve three things. Firstly, countries share information, strategic assessments, domain awareness and intelligence. Secondly, it can improve each other's capacity through

joint training, common equipment, technological assistance, and access to facilities. Thirdly, it can improve interoperability by the development of standard communication protocols and SOPs for specific contingencies. With this rationale, it is proposed that the Malabar Exercises include Australia and efforts be made to enhance the participation to include other naval powers like France and United Kingdom. The exercise is proposed to be conducted in India's primary area of responsibility, i.e. the Indian Ocean Region.

5. Do Not Join US Led South China Sea FONOPS.

The South China Sea is beyond India's primary sphere of interest. India should push for a maritime division space among the Quad countries, followed by allocation of resources and capability to areas and zones where each has an advantage. Even though India has reposed faith in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and has abided by it in resolving its maritime dispute with Bangladesh, it is not recommended for India to join a joint Quad FONOPS in the South China Sea. The maritime division of Indo-Pacific would justify such an action.

6. Join the Blue Dot Network.

India should join the Blue Dot Network as it will create growth opportunities for the nation. The Blue Dot Network can be used to facilitate land and maritime connectivity between Northeast India, Bangladesh and Southeast Asia. This will enhance trade in the thus far neglected areas.

7. Improve Delivery in Infrastructure Development Projects.

India is already involved in various international connectivity projects like the Chabahar Port in Iran, Sittwe Port in Myanmar, Kaladan Multi-Modal project and India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Friendship Highway. India and Indonesia have also agreed to develop and

manage the Sabang Port. There is a need for India to improve its delivery with better planning and greater involvement of the private sector.

Recommendations for ASEAN

The State of SEA - 2020 survey¹⁴ gives interesting insights into the how Southeast Asia views the Indo-Pacific and the Quad. Firstly, the regions understanding of the Indo-Pacific as a construct has marginally increased, 61% saw the concept as unclear in 2019 which dropped to 54% in 2020. At the same time 28.4% respondents in 2020 saw Indo-Pacific as a viable option for new regional order as against 17.2% in 2019. Secondly, when it came to the Quad, 45.8% saw Quad having a positive/very positive impact on Southeast Asian security compared to 16.2% who felt it will have negative/very negative impact and 38% no impact. Thirdly, 61.6% felt their country should participate in security initiative and military exercises with Quad. The above response indicates a positive trend towards both the Indo-Pacific construct and the Quad.

The restrained positivity can be attributed to ASEAN adopting the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The document highlighted ASEAN's cautious and neutral approach while stressing ASEAN centrality through ASEAN-led mechanisms, dialogue and cooperation to promote peaceful cooperation, a rule-based framework, and the pursuit of an open and inclusive regional order that does not close the door to any state.¹⁵ The recommendations for ASEAN are aligned with the AOIP.

¹⁴ Tang, SM. et al. "The State of Southeast Asia: 2020". Op. Cit. p 32-35.

¹⁵ Singh, Bhubhinder and Henrick, TZ. "ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific : Seizing the Narrative?" S Rajaratnam School of

1. Increase Understanding on Quad.

It is appreciated that the Quad is a nascent partnership, however the surveys have shown that there is limited understanding about the Quad and its objectives. To improve understanding, clear misconceptions and develop a nuanced view it is proposed that ASEAN countries have debates and seminars on the Quad. There should be an endeavour to overcome the lack of information so that ASEAN leaders and policymakers can form educated opinions and engage with Quad based on it.

2. Maintain Neutrality and Diversify Engagements.

The ASEAN should avoid being pulled into the US-China rivalry and engage with both. This will go a long way in keeping the region out of the great power politics. ASEAN should also engage with Japan, Australia, India and the EU in the security realm to derive benefits from operational experience of each country.

3. Confirm Transparency in Infrastructure Projects.

ASEAN member states should be careful in not compromising sovereignty at the expense of foreign investment. The planned infrastructure and connectivity projects should be transparent and meet international standards. It can derive combined benefits out of the BRI and BDN.

4. Keep South China Sea Conflict Free.

As a neutral regional organisation ASEAN is best suited as a mediator and facilitator in the Indo-Pacific region. It should ensure an equal negotiation of the South China Sea Code of Conduct and keep the region free from any militarisation and escalation to a conflict like situation.

International Studies (RSIS), January 23, 2020. Available : <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/asean-outlook-on-indo-pacific-seizing-the-narrative/>

5. Focus on ASEAN Unity and Consensus Building.

A priority for ASEAN countries, regardless of differences in perception and national approaches, is to make certain that the ASEAN and its institution continue to assume leadership in regional affairs. To maintain its relevance the grouping has to remain united on difficult issues. One way to get around absolute consensus is to apply minilateralism principles wherein expedient and robust responses to shared threats can be adopted by selected members to later be adopted on the collective and multilateral level, for example, the ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Convention.¹⁶ In contentious issues this approach may prove more beneficial than a status quo approach.

Recommendations for Further Study on the Subject

This study is the first study carried out on the Quad at the NDC, Thailand and can form the bases for future studies on the subject. The following four topics related to ASEAN and the Quad is recommended for further study at the NDC.

1. Implications on ASEAN Centrality with the revival of the Quad.
2. Blue Dot Network and/or BRI - Future of Infrastructure Development in Southeast Asia.

¹⁶ Heydarian, Richard Javad. “At a Strategic Crossroads: ASEAN Centrality amid Sino-American Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific”, Brookings Institution, April 2020. Available: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/at-a-strategic-crossroads-asean-centrality-amid-sino-american-rivalry-in-the-indo-pacific/>

3. Synthesis between ASEAN led security mechanisms and the Quad.

4. Congruence of ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and the Free, Open, Inclusive and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Vision of the Quad.

Bibliography

Books

Hemmings, Dr John. (Ed). Infrastructure, Ideas, and Strategy in the Indo-Pacific. London: Henry Jackson Society, 2019.

White, Hugh. The China Choice Why We Should Share Power. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013.

Journals

Atanassova-Cornelis, Elena. “Alignment Cooperation and Regional Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific.” The International Spectator, Vol. 55, Issue 1, 2020. p. 18-33.

Bhatt, Pooja. “Evolving Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific: Deliberating India’s Position”, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Fall 2018. p.53-78.

Brandi, C., Berger, A., and Bruhn, D. “Between Minilateralism and Multilateralism: Opportunities and Risks of Pioneer Alliances in International Trade and Climate Politics”. German Development Institute, Briefing Paper 16/2015. p. 1-4.

Burgess, Stephen, F.and Beilstein, J. “Multilateral Defence Cooperation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region: Tentative Steps Toward a Regional NATO”? Contemporary Security Policy. Vol. 39(1), Issue 2, December 2017. p. 258-279.

Buzan, Barry. “The Geopolitical Reconstruction of Asia: A Reflection Ten Years on from Regions and Powers”, Politique Étrangère, 2012/2 (Summer Issue). p. 331 - 344.

- Clarke, Benjamin. "Pakistan and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Current and Future Perceptions", Islamabad Policy Research Institute, IPRI Journal No. XIX, 2019. Available: <https://www.doi.org/10.31945/iprij.190102>. p. 44-55.
- Cozens, Peter. "Some Reflections on Maritime Developments in the Indo-Pacific During the Past Sixty Years", Maritime Affairs, Vol. 1(1), Winter 2005, p. 15-35.
- Davidson, Admiral Phil. "Introduction to Indo-Pacific Security Challenges", Keynote speech delivered by Commander USINDOPACOM, at Halifax International Security Forum, 17 November 2018. Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Spring 2019. p. 3-10.
- Dwivedi, Dr Sangit Sarita. "Alliances in International Relations Theory", International Journal of Social Science & Interdisciplinary Research, (IJSSIR). Vol.1 Issue 8, August 2012, p.224-237.
- Eisentraut, Sophie and Gaens, Bart. "The US-Japan-India-Australia Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Indo-Pacific alignment or foam in the ocean?" FIIA (Finnish Institute of International Affairs), FIIA Briefing Paper 239, May 21, 2018. p. 1-7.
- Fly, Jamie. "Trump's Asia Policy and the Concept of the Indo-Pacific", SWP Working Paper, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, October 2018. p. 1-10.
- Garcia, Zenel. "Power Cycles and Security Complexes: Evolution of the East Asian Super Complex". Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 8, Issue 4, October 2016. p. 538-558.

- Grossman, Marc. "The Tsunami Core Group: A Step toward a Transformed Diplomacy in Asia and Beyond", Security Challenges. Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005. p.11-14.
- Khurana, Gurpreet Singh. "Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation", Strategic Analysis (IDSA), January 2007, Vol. 31, Issue. 1. p. 139-153.
- Khurana, Gurpreet Singh. "What is the Indo-Pacific? The New Geopolitics of the Asia-Centred Rim Land." 'Geopolitics by other Means. The Indo-Pacific Reality' (Chapter 1), Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), Rome, February 2019. p. 13-32.
- Khurana, Gurpreet Singh. "The 'Indo-Pacific' Idea: Origins, Conceptualizations and the Way Ahead", Journal of Indian Ocean Rim Studies, Special Issue on Indo-Pacific, October-December 2019. p. 1-19.
- Medcalf, Rory. "Indo-Pacific Visions: Giving Solidarity a Chance", Special Essay, Asia Policy, Volume 14, Number 3, July 2019. p. 79-95.
- Medcalf, Rory. "Pivoting the Map: Australia's Indo-Pacific System", Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC), ANU College of Asia & the Pacific, Centre of Gravity Series Paper #1, 2012. p. 1-8.
- Meinig, Donald W. "Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History". The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 1956. p. 553-569.
- Moret, Erica. "Effective Minilateralism for the EU - What, When and How". European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Issue Brief No 17, June 2106, p 1-4.

- Morrow, James D. "Alliances: Why Write Them Down?" Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.3 No.1, June 2000. p. 63-83.
- Newman, E., Thakur, R., & Tirman, J. "Multilateralism under Challenge". United Nations University, Research Brief, No.1, 2006. p. 1-8.
- Saha, Premesha. "The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: Why ASEAN Remains Cautious", Observer Research Foundation (ORF), ORF Issue Brief, Issue No. 229, February 2018. p. 1-12.
- Scott, David. "India's new trilateral with Australia and Japan: China-centric nuances". Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. China-India Brief 54, July 2015. p. 1-9.
- Snyder, Glenn H. "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut", Journal of International Affairs, Vol.44, No.1, Spring/Summer 1990. p.103-123.
- Walt, Stephen M. "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse", Survival, Vol.39, No.1, Spring 1997. p.156-179.
- Wilkins, Thomas S. "Alignment, Not 'Alliance' - The Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment", Review of International Studies, Vol.38, 2012. p.53-76.
- Wilkins, Thomas S. "Russo-Chinese Strategic Partnership: A New Form of Security Cooperation?" Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.29, No.2, September 2008. p.358-383.
- Wilkins, Thomas S. "Evolving Security Alignments of the Indo-Pacific: The US Alliances, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and ASEAN", Japan Review, Vol.3 No.2 Fall 2019. p. 1-10.

Newspapers/e-Newspapers

Abe, Shinzo. “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”, *Live Mint*, December 31, 2012. Available: <https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/viqg2XC8fhRfjTUIcctk0M/Asias-democratic-security-diamond.html>.

Aneja, Atul. “No Room for India yet in NSG, Says China”, *The Hindu*, May 22, 2017. Available: <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/no-room-for-indiayet-in-nsg-says-china/article18523724.ece>.

Bhattacharjee, Kallol. “India, Japan, U.S., Australia hold first ‘Quad’ talks at Manila ahead of ASEAN Summit”, *The Hindu*. November 12, 2017. Available: <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-highlights-indo-pacific-cooperation-at-the-first-quad-talks/article20317526.ece>.

Cave, Damien & Williams, Jacqueline. “Australian Law Targets Foreign Interference. China is not pleased”, *The New York Times*, June 28, 2018. Available: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/world/australia/australia-security-lawsforeign-interference.html>.

Chaudhury, D.R. “Pushing back against China’s One Belt One Road, India, Japan build strategic ‘Great Wall’”, *The Economic Times*, May 16, 2017. Available: <https://www.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/infrastructure/pushing-back-against-chinas-one-belt-one-road-india-japan-build-strategic-great-wall/articleshow/58689033.cms>.

Choong, William. “Quad goals: wooing ASEAN”, *The Strategist*, July 11, 2018. Available: <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au>.

- Corben, Tom. "South Korea and the Quad: Missing Out or Opting Out?" *The Diplomat*, December 23, 2017. Available : <https://www.thediplomat.com/2017/12/south-korea-and-the-quad-missing-out-or-opting-out/>.
- De, Prabir. "Shared Values, Common Destiny: What we expect from the 16th ASEAN-India Summit", *Economic Times*, November 11, 2018. Available: <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/blogs/et-commentary/shared-values-common-destiny-what-we-expect-from-the-16th-asean-india-summit/>.
- De, Prabir. "Act East to act Indo-Pacific: Agenda for the new government". *Economic Times*, June 01, 2019. Available : <https://www.economictimes.india times.com/news/defence/act-east- to-act-indo-pacific-agenda-for-the-new-government/ articleshow/69591279.cms?from=mdr>.
- Ganesh, Venkatesh. "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank mulls \$2.2-billion loan for Indian infra projects". *The Hindu Business Line*, November 15, 2019. Available: <https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/asian-infrastruc-ture-investment-bank-mulls-22-billion-loan-for-indian-infra-projects/article 29985244.ece#>.
- Huang, Cary. "US, Japan, India, Australia: is Quad the first step to an Asian NATO?" *South China Morning Post*, November 25, 2017. Available: <https://www. scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2121474/us-japan-india-australia-quad-first-step-asian-nato>.
- Huang, K. "US-led Quad coalition a 'useful anti-China bulwark' in Asia," *South China Morning Post*, October 23, 2018. Available:<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/articl>

e/ 2169715/us-led-quad-coalition-useful-anti-China-bulwark-asia.

Jain, Purnendra. “Shared anxieties drive India–Japan defence ties upgrade”, East Asia Forum, December 12, 2019. Available: <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/12/12/shared-anxieties-drive-india-japan-defence-ties-upgrade/>.

Jaishankar, Dhruva. “Why 2017 idea of the year is the ‘Indo-Pacific’”, The Hindustan Times. December 29, 2017. Available: <https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/why-2017-idea-of-the-year-is-the-indo-pacific/story-A0fctWmn3s5Nc04PxZrCHO.html>.

Joseph, Josy. “What is the Doklam issue all about”? The Hindu, January 27, 2018. Available: <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/what-is-the-doklam-issue-all-about/article22536937.ece>.

Kawashima, Shin. “The risks of 'One Belt, One Road' for China's neighbours”. The Japan Times, April 24, 2018. Available: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/04/24/commentary/world-commentary/risks-one-belt-one-road-chinas-neighbors/#.XqgOevkzbiU>

Kim, Tongfi. “Asia’s Minilateral Moment”. The Diplomat, June 13, 2017. Available: <https://www.thediplomat.com/2017/06/asias-minilateral-moment/>.

Korostikov, Mikhail. “Moscow’s View of the Quad & the Indo-Pacific: Threatening Russia’s Space”, South Asian Voices, February 13, 2019. Available: <https://southasianvoices.org/moscow-view-of-indo-pacific-threatening-russia-regional-space/>.

- Krishnan, Ananth. "Chinese Foreign Minister dismisses Quad, calls for India, China to not fight but dance", India Today, March 8, 2018. Available : <https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/chinese-foreign-minister-dismisses-quad-calls-for-india-china-to-not-fight-but-dance-1184483-2018-03-08>.
- Lyn, Jennifer. "US Blue Dot Network to counter China's BRI". Asia Times, May 21, 2020. Available: <https://asiatimes.com/2020/05/us-blue-dot-network-to-counter-chinas-bri/>.
- Minghao, Zhao. "No need to overreact as Quad ups gear", Global Times, September 29, 2019. Available: <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1165867.shtml>.
- Murray, Lisa. "South Korea uneasy about the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue", Financial Review, November 02, 2018. Available: <https://www.afr.com/politics/south-korea-uneasy-about-the-quadrilateral-security-dialogue-20181102-h17fie>.
- Nicholson, Brendan. "China warns Canberra on security pact". The Age, June 15, 2007. Available: <https://www.theage.com.au/national/china-warns-canberra-on-security-pact-20070615-ge54v5.html>.
- Panda, Ankit. "US, Japan, India, and Australia Hold Working-Level Quadrilateral Meeting on Regional Cooperation - The 'Quad' is back." The Diplomat, November 13, 2017. Available: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/us-japan-india-and-australia-hold-working-level-quadrilateral-meeting-on-regional-cooperation/>
- Panda, Ankit. "A First: Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force Joins US-Australia Talisman Sabre Exercise," The Diplomat, June 25,

2019. Available: <https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/a-first-japans-maritime-self-defense-force-joins-us-australia-talisman-sabre-exercises/>.

Press Trust of India. “India to Host First Counter-Terrorism Exercise for Quad Nations This Week”. The New Indian Express, November 20, 2019. Available: <https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2019/nov/20/india-to-host-first-counter-terrorism-exercise-for-quad-nations-this-week-2064315.html>.

Press Trust of India. “India's buying of S-400 from Russia will have serious implications on defence ties: US”, The Economic Times, May 31, 2019. Available: <https://www.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indias-buying-of-s-400-from-russia-will-have-serious-implications-on-defence-ties-us/articleshow/69592036.cms?from=mdr>.

Rajah, R. “An emerging Indo-Pacific infrastructure strategy”, The Interpreter, August 03, 2018. Available: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/emerging-indo-pacific-infrastructure-strategy>.

Raja Mohan, C; Medcalf, Rory; and Tertrais, Bruno. “New Indo-Pacific Axis”, The Indian Express, May 08, 2018. Available: <https://www.indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/emmanuel-macron-india-france-relations-paris-delhi-canberra-axis-malcolm-turnbull-narendra-modi-5167221/>.

Sempa, Francis P. “Nicholas Spykman and the Struggle for the Asiatic Mediterranean”. The Diplomat, January 09, 2015. Available: <https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/nicholas-spykman-and-the-struggle-for-the-asiatic-mediterranean/>.

- Sharma, Ashok. "Russia Says US Indo-Pacific Strategy is to Contain China", The Diplomat, January 15, 2020. Available: <https://www.thediplomat.com/2020/01/russia-says-us-indo-pacific-strategy-is-to-contain-china/>.
- Shoebridge, Michael. "Morrison's Pacific Pivot", The Strategist, November 09, 2018. Available: <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/morrison-pacific-pivot/>.
- Stutchbury, Michael & Grigg, Angus. "The word according to Japan's PM Shinzo Abe". Australian Financial Review. January 18, 2018. Available: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000326829.pdf>.
- Sulaeman, Fadhil Haedar. "ASEAN, the Quad, and China: A Security Contestation for the Indo-Pacific Region", The National Interest, April 20, 2020. Available: <http://www.asc.fisipol.ugm.ac.id/2020/04/20/asean-the-quad-and-china-a-security-contestation-for-the-indo-pacific-region/>.
- Takahashi, Toru. "What Beijing really wants from South China Sea code of conduct", Nikkei Asian Review, August 12, 2019. Available: <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/What-Beijing-really-wants-from-South-China-Sea-code-of-conduct>.
- Teo, Sarah. "Could Minilateralism Be Multilateralism's Best Hope in the Asia Pacific"? The Diplomat, December 15, 2018. Available: <https://www.thediplomat.com/2018/12/could-minilateralism-be-multilateralisms-best-hope-in-the-asia-pacific/>.

- Teo, Sarah. “Strengthening the ASEAN-Centric Multilateral Security Architecture”, East Asia Forum, January 07, 2020. Available: <https://www.eastasiaforum.org>.
- Tsvetov, A. “Will the Quad Mean the End of ASEAN Centrality?” The Diplomat, November 15, 2017. Available: <https://www.thediplomat.com/2017/11/will-the-quad-mean-the-end-of-asean-centrality/>.
- Turcsany, Richard Q. “What’s Really Behind Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea?” The Diplomat, December 22, 2017. Available : <https://www.the-diplomat.com/2017/12/whats-really-behind-chinese-assertiveness-in-the-south-china-sea/Wire>
- Staff. “Quad Gets an Upgrade as Foreign Ministers of India, Japan, Australia, US Meet”, The Wire, September 27, 2019. Available: <https://thewire.in/diplomacy/quad-gets-an-upgrade-as-foreign-ministers-of-india-japan-australia-us-meet>.
- Witular, Rendi A. “Presenting Maritime Doctrine”, Jakarta Post, November 14, 2014. Available : <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/14/presenting-maritime-doctrine.html>.
- Wong, Catherine. “Singapore leader Lee Hsien Loong warns region may have to choose between China and US”. South China Morning Post, November 15, 2018. Available: <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2173479/singapore-leader-lee-hsien-loong-warns-region-may-have-choose>.
- Valencia, Mark J. “Joining the Quad: Fear Versus Greed”. The Diplomat, December 15, 2017. Available : <https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/joining-the-quad-fear-versus-greed/>.

- Varadarajan, Siddharth. “Four-power meeting drew Chinese demarche”, The Hindu, June 14, 2007. Available: <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/Four-power-meeting-drew-Chinese-%C3%A9marche/article14777286.ece>.
- Yuanzhe, Ren and Rongsheng, Zhu. “Japan a natural partner in BRI development” Global Times, September 06, 2018. Available: <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1118591.shtml>.
- Yuda, Masayuki. “Abe pledges \$50bn for infrastructure in Indo-Pacific”, Nikkei Asian Review, June 11, 2018. Available: <https://www.asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Future-of-Asia-2018/Abe-pledges-50bn-for-infrastructure-in-Indo-Pacific>.

Thesis

- Miyagi, Takashi. “The Changing Security Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific: Re-Emergence of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue”. Bachelor Thesis, Department of Global Political Studies, Malmö University, Spring 2019. p. 15-17.

Electronic Data Base

- Abe, Shinzo. “Confluence of the Two Seas”, Speech by Prime Minister at the Indian Parliament, August 22, 2007. Available: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-pacific/pmv0708/speech-2.html>.
- ADM Correspondent. “China Watches as Exercise Talisman Sabre Gets Underway,” Australian Defence Magazine, July 8, 2019. Available: <https://www.australiandefence.com.au/defence/land/china-watches-as-talisman-sabre-gets-underway>.

- Adamson, Frances. “Australian Perspectives on the Indo-Pacific”, Australia DFAT, October 12, 2018. Available: <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/speeches/Pages/australian-perspectives-on-the-indo-pacific.aspx>
- ASEAN. “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”. June 23, 2019. Available: <https://www.asean2019.go.th/en/news/asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific/>.
- Asia Development Bank. “Climate Change and Disasters in Asia and the Pacific”, August 07, 2019. Available: <https://www.adb.org/news/infographics/climate-change-and-disasters-asia-and-pacific>.
- Asian Development Bank. “Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs”, 2017. Available: <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/227496/special-report-infrastructure.pdf>.
- Aso, Taro. “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”, address by Minister for Foreign Affairs at International House of Japan, March 12, 2007. Available: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/pillar/address0703.html>
- Australia, “Foreign Policy White Paper 2017”. Available: <https://www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/foreign-policy-white-paper>.
- Australia, Department of Defence. “Defence White Paper 2016”. Available: <https://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/Docs/2016-2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf>.
- Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. “Australia-India-Japan-United States Consultations on the Indo-Pacific”, November 12, 2017. Available: <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/>

media/Pages/aus-india-japan-us-consultations-on-the-indo-pacific.

Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. “Australia-India-Japan-United States Consultations”, June 07, 2018. Available: <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media/Pages/aus-india-japan-us-consultations-on-the-indo-pacific>.

Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. “Australia-India-Japan-United States Consultations”, November 15, 2018. Available: <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media/Pages/Australia-india-japan-united-states-consultations-2018>.

Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. “Australia-India-Japan-United States Consultations”, May 31, 2019. Available : <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media/Pages/australia-india-japan-usa-consultations>.

Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. “Australia-India-Japan-United States Consultations”, November 04, 2019. Available: <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media/Pages/Australia-india-japan-united-states-quad-consultations>

CFR - Info Guide Presentation. “China’s Maritime Disputes”, Council of Foreign Relations. Available: <https://www.cfr.org/interactives/chinas-maritime-disputes>.

Chanlett-Avery, Emma et al. “The U.S.-Japan Alliance”, Congressional Research Service, June 13, 2019. Available : <https://www.crsreports.congress.gov/RL33740>.

China Power Team. “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?” CSIS. October 02, 2017. Available : <https://www.chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/>

- China, State Council Information Office. “China’s National Defense in the New Era”. July, 2019. Available: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm.
- Davidson, Admiral Phil. “China Power: Up for Debate”. Prepared Remarks of speech delivered by Commander, USINDOPACOM at Honolulu, Hawaii, November 29, 2018. Available: <https://www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1702301/china-power-up-for-debate/>.
- Eisentraut, S., Erber, C., Von Hammerstein, E. & Merk, A (Eds.), “Multilateralism is Dead. Long Live Multilateralism!” Munich Young Leaders Report, Munich Security Conference and Körber-Stiftung, 2019. Available: <https://www.koerber-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user-upload/koerber-stiftung/redaction/munichyoung-leaders/pdf/2019/Multilateralism-is-Dead-Long-Live-Multilateralism.pdf>
- Esper, Mark T. “US Secretary of Defence Prepared Remarks at the Munich Security Conference”. US Department of Defence, February 15, 2020. Available : <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2085577/remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-mark-t-esper-at-the-munich-security-conference/>.
- France, Ministry of the Armed Forces. “France and Security in the Indo-Pacific”, 2018. Available : www.defense.gouv.fr.
- Fusaro, Paola. “France’s Delicate Balancing Act in the Indo-Pacific”, The German Marshal Fund, June 06, 2019. (Blog Post) Available: <http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2019/06/06/frances-delicate-balancing-act-indo-pacific>.

- Guterres, António. “Address to the General Assembly,” September 25, 2018. Available: <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-09-25/address-73rd-general-assembly>.
- Hanada, Ryosuke. “The Role of US-Japan-Australia-India Cooperation, or the ‘Quad’ in FOIP: A Policy Coordination Mechanism for a Rules-Based Order.” cogitASIA, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, April 10, 2019. Available: <https://www.cogitasia.com/the-role-of-the-quad-in-the-free-and-open-indo-pacific-concept-a-policy-coordination-mechanism-for-rules-based-order/>.
- Heydarian, Richard Javad. “At a Strategic Crossroads: ASEAN Centrality amid Sino-American Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific”, Brookings Institution, April 2020. Available: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/at-a-strategic-crossroads-asean-centrality-amid-sino-american-rivalry-in-the-indo-pacific/>
- Hornung, Jeffrey W. “The Potential of the Quadrilateral”, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (CSIS), February 21, 2018. (Blog Post). Available: <https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/02/the-potential-of-the-quadrilateral.html>.
- India, Ministry of Defence. “Annual Report 2018-19”. Available: <https://mod.gov.in/documents/annual-report>.
- India, Ministry of External Affairs. “Features of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue”, Answer to Question No. 2114 in Parliament, January 03, 2019. Available: https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/MoD_AR2018.pdf.

- India, Ministry of External Affairs. “India-Australia-Japan-US Consultations on Indo-Pacific”, November 12, 2017. Available: <https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29110/indiaaustraliajapanus+consultations+on+indopacific+November+12+2017>.
- India, Ministry of External Affairs. “India-Australia-Japan-US Consultations”, June 07, 2018. Available : <https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29961/indiaaustraliajapanus+consultations>.
- India, Ministry of External Affairs. “India-Australia-Japan-US Consultations”, November 15, 2018. Available : <https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/30593/indiaaustraliajapanus+consultations>.
- India, Ministry of External Affairs. “India-Australia-Japan-US Consultations”, May 31, 2019. Available: <https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31403/indiaaustraliajapanunited+states+consultations>.
- India, Ministry of External Affairs. “India-Australia-Japan-US Consultations”, November 04, 2019. Available : <https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32006/indiaaustraliajapanunited+states+consultations>.
- Indian Navy. “Indian Maritime Doctrine”, 2009 (Updated 2015). Available: <https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian-Maritime-Doctrine-2009-Updated-12Feb16.pdf>
- Jaishankar, Dhruva. “Acting East: India In The Indo-Pacific”, Brookings Institution India, Impact Series, October 2019. p. 1-39.
- Jaishankar, S. “India, the United States and China”, IISS-Fullerton Lecture, Singapore, July 20, 2015. Available : <https://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2015-f463/july-636f/fullerton-lecture-jaishankar-f64e>.

- Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Priority Policy for Development Cooperation FY2017”. Available: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000259285.pdf>
- Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Australia-India-Japan-US Consultations on the Indo-Pacific”, November 12, 2017. Available : https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001789.html.
- Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Japan-Australia-India-US Consultations”, June 07, 2018. Available : https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002062.html.
- Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Japan-Australia-India-US Consultations”, November 15, 2018. Available: https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press1e_000099.html
- Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Japan-Australia-India-US Consultations”, May 31, 2019. Available : https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002464.html.
- Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Japan-Australia-India-US Consultations”, November 04, 2019. Available: https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page4e_001157.html.
- Japan, Ministry of Defence. “Defense of Japan 2019”. Available: https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2019/DOJ2019_Full.pdf.
- Kawashima, Shin. “The Senkaku Crisis in Perspective: An Interview with Former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku”, nippon.com, December 05, 2017. Available: <https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00365/the-senkaku-crisis-in-perspective-an-interview-with-former-chief-cabinet-secretary-sengoku.html>.

- Khurana, Gurpreet. “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept: Retrospect and Prospect”, National Maritime Foundation, November 14, 2017. p. 1-7. Available: [https:// maritimeindia.org/View%20 Profile /636215922419657386.pdf](https://maritimeindia.org/View%20Profile/636215922419657386.pdf).
- Kiyan, Olga. “A Tale of Two TTPs”. *Harvard Political Review*, February 22, 2020. Available: <https://harvardpolitics.com/world/a-tale-of-two-ttps/>.
- Kurlantzick, Joshua. “Will Australia Join South China Sea FONOPs? Don’t Count on It”, *Council for Foreign Relations*, March 02, 2017. Available: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/will-australia-join-south-china-sea-fonops-dont-count-it>.
- Lalwani, Sameer & Byrne, Heather. “The Quad: Alliance or Alignment”. *Stimson Centre. Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Project, Policy Paper*. April 10, 2019. Available: [http://www.india-seminar.com/2019/715/715_lalwani_and_byrne .htm](http://www.india-seminar.com/2019/715/715_lalwani_and_byrne.htm).
- Le Thu, Huong. “Southeast Asian perceptions of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Survey findings”. *Australian Strategic Policy Institute, ASPI Special Report*, 2018. p. 1-48. Available: <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/southeast-asian-perceptions-quadrilateral-security-dialogue>.
- Lemahieu, Hervé et al. “Asia Power Index 2019”. *Lowy Institute, Sydney*, 2019. Available: <https://power.lowyinstitute.org/>.
- Lohman, Walter. “Responding to China's Rise: Could a 'Quad' Approach Help?” The National Interest, June 25, 2015. Available: <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/responding-chinas-rise-could-quad-approach-help-13182>.

- Lohman, Walter. “Southeast Asia’s future tied to great power competition”, Geopolitical Intelligence Services, September 23, 2019. Available: <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/southeast-asias-future-tied-to-great-power-competition,politics,3054.html>.
- Mann, David. “Looking for Growth? Emerging Asia is the Present and Future”, Standard Chartered, August 16, 2019. Available: <https://www.sc.com/en/feature/looking-for-growth-emerging-asia-is-the-present-and-future>.
- Martin, Michael F. “The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) of 2018”, Congressional Research Service, April 04, 2019. Available: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11148.pdf>.
- Medcalf, Rory. “Reimagining Asia: From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific”, The Asan Forum, Open Forum, June 26, 2015. p. 1-23. Available: www.theasanforum.org/reimagining-asia-from-asia-pacific-to-indo-pacific/.
- Modi, Narendra. Ministry of External Affairs, India. “PM’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue”, June 01, 2018. Available: https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime_Ministers_Keynote_Address_at_Shangri_La_Dialogue_June_01_2018.
- Morgan, Steve (Ed). “2019 Cybercrime Report”, Herjavec Group. January 2020. Available: <https://www.herjavecgroup.com/the-2019-official-annual-cyber-crime-report/>.
- Ni, Adam. “China’s Options Towards the (Re)emerging Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.” Real Clear Defence, March 05, 2018. Available: <https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/>

03/05/chinas_options_towards_the_reemerging_quadrilateral_security_dialogue_113148.html.

Ortagus, Morgan. “Secretary Pompeo’s Meeting with Quad Foreign Ministers of Australia, India, and Japan”, Spokesperson, US Department of State, September 27, 2019. Available: <https://www.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-quad-foreign-ministers-of-australia-india-and-japan/>.

O'Rourke, Ronald. “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities - Background and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service (CRS), May 21, 2020. Available: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf>.

O'Rourke, Ronald. “US-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress”. Congressional Research Service (CRS), August 1, 2018. Available: <https://news.usni.org/2020/02/04/report-on-u-s-china-competition-in-east-south-china-sea/>

Patrick, Stewart M. “Making Sense of ‘Minilateralism’: The Pros and Cons of Flexible Cooperation” (Blog Post). Available: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/making-sense-minilateralism-pros-and-cons-flexible-cooperation>.

Pence, Mike. USA Vice President’s Remarks on the Administration’s Policy Towards China’, Hudson Institute, 4 October 2018. Available: <https://www.hudson.org/events/1610-vice-president-mike-pence-s-remarks-on-the-administrations-policy-towards-china102018>.

- Pletcher, H. “Gross domestic product of the ASEAN countries from 2008 to 2018”, Stastica.com, December 06, 2019. Available: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/796245/gdp-of-the-asean-countries/>.
- Runde, D.F. and Bandura, Romina. “The BUILD Act has passed: What’s Next?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 12, 2018. Available: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/build-act-has-passed-whats-next>.
- Ruta, Michele. “Three Opportunities and Three Risks of the Belt and Road Initiative”. The Trade Post, May 04, 2018. (Blog Post). Available : <https://www.blogs.worldbank.org/trade/three-opportunities-and-three-risks-belt-and-road-initiative>.
- Scott, James. “Multilateralism: International Relations”, Encyclopaedia Britannica. Available: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/multilateralism>.
- Singh, Bhubhindar and Henrick, TZ. “ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific: Seizing the Narrative?” S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, January 23, 2020. Available: <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/asean-outlook-on-indo-pacific-seizing-the-narrative/>
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military Expenditure Database 2018. Available: <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>.
- Swaine, Michael, “Creating an Unstable Asia: The U.S. ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ Strategy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 02, 2018. Available: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/02/creating-unstable-asia-u.s.-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy-pub-75720>.

- Tang, SM. et al. “The State of Southeast Asia: 2020”, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, January 2020. Available: https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/TheStateofSEASurveyReport_2020.pdf
- Tellis, Ashley. “Indo-Pacific Geopolitics and US-India Relations”. Lecture delivered at Observer Research Foundation, October 19, 2019. Available: https://youtu.be/_mfgndk-CJM.
- Thailand, Ministry of Energy. “Strait of Malacca Key Chokepoint for Oil Trade”. Available: <https://energy.go.th/2015/strait-of-malacca-key-chokepoint-for-oil-trade/>.
- Tillerson, Rex. “Defining our relationship with India for the next century”, address by US Secretary of State at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), October 18, 2017. Available: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-our-relationship-india-next-century-address-ussecretary-state-rex-tillerson>.
- Truevtsev, Konstantin. “Astana Format: What Has Been Done and What Needs to Be Done”. Valdai Discussion Club, The Eastern Perspective, July 11, 2019. Available: <https://www.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/astana-format-what-has-been-done-and-what-needs-to-be-done/>.
- USA, Department of State. “Australia-India-Japan-US Consultations on the Indo-Pacific”, November 12, 2017. Available: <https://www.state.gov/australia-india-japan-u-s-consultations-on-the-indo-pacific/>.
- USA, Department of State. “US-Australia-India-Japan Consultations”. June 07, 2018. Available: <https://www.state.gov/u-s-australia-india-japan-consultations/>.

- USA, Department of State. “US-Australia-India-Japan Consultations”, November 15, 2018. Available: <https://www.state.gov/u-s-australia-india-japan-consult-ations-2/>.
- USA, Department of State. “US-Australia-India-Japan Consultations-The Quad”. May 31, 2019. Available: <https://www.state.gov/u-s-australia-india-japan-consultations-the-quad/>.
- USA, Department of State. “Readout of U.S.-Australia-India-Japan Ministerial (“The Quad”)”, FPC Briefing, September 26, 2019. Available: <https://www.state.gov/readout-of-u-s-australia-india-japan-ministerial-the-quad/>.
- USA, Department of State. “US-Australia-India-Japan Consultations-The Quad”. November 04, 2019. Available: <https://www.state.gov/u-s-australia-india-japan-consultations-the-quad-2/>.
- USA, Department of Defense. “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report - Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting a Networked Region”. June 01, 2019. Available: <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>.
- USA, Department of State. “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific - Advancing a Shared Vision”. November 04, 2019. Available: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf>.
- USA, Embassy at Singapore. “OPIC Convenes First Trilateral Meeting to Promote Infrastructure Investment Collaboration During Visit to Southeast Asia”, July 17, 2018. Available : <https://www.sg.usembassy.gov/opic-convenes-first-trilateral-meeting-to->

promote-infrastructure-investment-collaboration-during-visit-to-southeast-asia/.

USA, US Navy 7th Fleet (Public Affairs). “Exercise Malabar 07-2 Kicks Off”, Story No. NNS070907-13, September 07, 2007. Available: https://www.navy.mil/submitdisplay.aasp?story_id=31691.

USA, White House. “National Security Strategy of the USA”, December 2017. Available: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

USA, White House Spokesperson. “President Donald J. Trump’s Administration is Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, 30 July 2018. Available: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-administration-advancing-free-open-indo-pacific/>.

UN, Food and Agricultural Organization, Major Fishing Areas, Indian Ocean, Eastern (Major Fishing Area 57). Available: <http://www.fao.org/fishery/area/Area57/en>

Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, Speech at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017. Available: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf.

Appendix - Survey Findings and Results : Quad - Dynamics, Relevance and Way Forward

About the Survey

1. Need for the Survey.

The research methodology for study on the topic of Quad - Dynamics, Relevance and Way Forward has been primarily based on a qualitative research method. Towards this end, white papers, official documents, press releases/media handouts, transcripts of lectures conducted by high dignitaries and views of subject experts have been studied to get an insight into the countries stand on Quad in particular and defence and security related issues of the Indo-Pacific region in general. This survey has been conducted to understand the perceptions of senior/middle level functionaries towards the present status and possible future prospects of the Quad.

2. Survey Methodology.

This survey was conducted online using the Google Forms platform. The survey was circulated among senior and middle level participants undergoing strategic level courses at premier institutions in India, Japan, US and Thailand. This purposive sample method was used to satisfy the criteria that the respondents have adequate knowledge of regional affairs as inferred from the various course curriculums and their job profiles. The participation in the survey was voluntary and an option not to reveal personal information was left to the respondents. The survey findings are not meant to be representative of the extant official views of respective countries on the Quad. The survey results do however serve to present the prevailing attitude of the future military leaders and other individuals in policy formulation positions. The small size of the survey means that it does not represent a broad-based opinion. However for the purpose of this study, the survey does help in ‘gauging the mood’ and confirming the results and recommendations of the researcher.

3. Survey Format.




Some of the questions have been drawn from the survey conducted by Australian Strategic Policy Institute in 2018 on the perceptions of the Quad in Southeast Asia targeted at strategic experts.¹⁹² The questions on themes common to the earlier survey were aimed at checking the depth of similarity of the perception about the Quad from the strategic elites to mid/senior level officers. As also, to see if there has been a major shift in perception between 2018 and 2020 wherein there is

¹⁹² Le Thu, Huong. “Southeast Asian perceptions of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Survey findings”. Op. Cit.

more clarity on the purpose of the Quad, the level consultations itself have been raised with an one off ministerial level meet in September 2019 and the ASEAN centrality being spoken off with greater alacrity. The survey has 14 mandatory questions which were required to be answered by the respondents. These questions had multiple choices from which the respondent had to select one answer. If the respondent felt that the choice offered did not agree with his thought process, an option was given to the respondent to enter his answer. The fifteenth question was open ended and asked the respondents to record their comments or suggestions. The circulated questionnaire is attached as annexure to this appendix. The order of the questions has been changed while presenting the findings to club related questions together for better understanding.

4. Background of the Respondents.

A total of 143 respondents from various nationalities responded to the survey. The sample was focused on individuals undergoing strategic level courses of instruction. A majority of the respondents belong to India (98). Most of the respondents are from a military background (91%). 59 % of the respondents have a professional experience between 20 to 25 years. 21% have experience of over 25 years and 18% between 15 to 20 years. The breakdown of the details of the respondents is represented below.




Survey Results

1. Understanding the Quad.


1.1 *How do you view the purpose behind revival of Quad?*

Among the five options presented to the respondents, the views are split between the need to maintain regional power balance (Balance of Power Theory) - 27%; counter China threat (Balance of Threat Theory) - 25%; and achieving shared objective (Wilkins Theory of Strategic Partnerships) - 32%. The nature of responses is similarly reflected in the analysis of literature on the Quad. There is a tendency to loosely and interchangeably apply the theory on basis for formulation of alliances.




1.2 *Alignment theories categorise security cooperation based on scope of challenge and depth of commitment. How do you perceive the Quad?*

The understanding of what the Quad is or is not, is an important question. Most respondents (39%) thought that the Quad was a 'Security Partnership' which required low commitments from the members and the range of issues they delved could be flexible with a broad scope. Only a minority (11%) thought Quad to be an 'Alliance', which has been one of the choice categorisation of the grouping.




1.3 *What is Quad's relationship with the concept of 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP)?*

The purpose of this question was to gauge the understanding of position of the Quad in the Indo-Pacific construct. The Quad's relationship to the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) construct is a fundamental one. The Quad and the FOIP share similar principles, where in the FOIP can be seen as the 'ends' of a strategy and the Quad as a 'way' to operationalise the FOIP. Most respondents (41%) were firm in stating that the Quad is an integral part of the FOIP.




1.4 *Quad 1.0 was not successful, what do you think is the major challenge confronting Quad 2.0?*

The response to this question indicates that most respondents (39%) feel that the outlooks of the four members are too divergent for the Quad to come up with common agendas. This feeling gets carried forward into a high percentage of respondents (32%) feeling that the Quad lacks focused objectives and has unclear goals. The Quad is in a nascent stage and institutionalisation of the Quad is likely of obviate the above perceptions.




1.5 How do you view Quad affecting the security environment in Indo-Pacific?

Most respondents (44%) feel that the Quad is a welcome initiative and will contribute to stability in the region. A slightly lower percentage (34%) of the respondents feels that the Quad raises tensions but will not seriously aggravate security situation. Both these views are balanced and a very small percentage (2%) feels that Quad re-emergence will lead to conflict. The ASPI survey in a similar line of question had 14% respondents considering Quad confrontational, a lower percentage in this survey indicates an improved understanding of the Quad. Both surveys had a similar percentage (14 % and 18%) considering Quad not having a major impact.



1.6 To summarise, Quad will contribute to stability and peace in Indo-Pacific region?


A majority (75 %) of the respondents had a positive view about the Quad and either agreed/strongly agreed that Quad will contribute to stability and peace in the Indo-Pacific region. A minority (4%) thought otherwise and 21% were undecided. The findings are an improvement of the percentages in the ASPI survey which had 55% holding a positive view, 31% fence sitters and 14% negative views. The surveys show that most respondents were enthusiastic about the Quad and puts to rest the often publicised negative view.



2. Quad's relationship with regional actors (China and ASEAN).


2.1 *Is Quad an Anti-China platform?*

One of the commonly held perceptions is that Quad is an Anti-China platform. The Views of the respondents were split, 52 % saw it as such and 48% did not. Most respondents (47%) saw Quad as a necessity to balance China and 35% questioned Quads projection as Anti-China while they felt it was not a platform specifically targeted against China.




2.2 *Will the Quad be effective in countering China's increasing economic and strategic dominance in the region?*

Quad is not a solution to all the security issues facing the Indo-Pacific region. China's fast rise has brought about a new dimension to the region. Views about China's rise itself are varied but most respondents (46%) see Quad as an option which will partially limit China's economic and strategic domination. The success of Quad will be determined by its future course in standing up for a free and open Indo-Pacific and providing viable alternatives for infrastructure development. A large percentage (49%) felt Chinese economic and strategic dominance in the region is somewhat imminent.




2.3 *The Quad reduces the space for member states individual engagement with China?*

All the member countries share an important economic relation with China. While the US has lately been adopting a confrontationist approach with China, Australia, India and Japan have propagated a more consultative relationship. The respondents are equally split in their views on whether Quad will restrict dialogue between the individual member countries and China. 35% of the respondents agree/strongly agree, while 37% disagree/strongly disagree. The rest 29% are fence sitters and neutral.



2.4 *How does the Quad affect ASEAN led security frameworks (EAS, ARF and ADMM+)?*


A commonly propagated view is that the Quad will have an adverse effect on 'ASEAN Centrality' in regional affairs. The survey does not support this view. A majority of the respondents (62%) feel that Quad complements the existing regional frameworks. Only 19% view it as challenging or side-lining the ASEAN frameworks. The ASPI survey findings were similar with the largest proportion of respondents (44%) stating Quad as complementing the ASEAN frameworks. That survey had also found that the majority of those who emphasise the Quad's challenge to ASEAN are often citizens of non-ASEAN states.



3. Quad's Future Prospects.


3.1 *In the short term (1-3 years) what should the Quad do?*

While only one activity cannot be the charter for the Quad, the aim of asking this question was to gauge the focus of Quad's activities in the immediate future. Given the military background of most respondents, half of them (51%) have prioritised a higher visibility capacity building through joint exercises over focus on diplomacy with frequent high level meetings (31%) and more regular lower visibility joint patrolling and surveillance activities. A minority (4%) want Quad to keep a low profile.




3.2 *What should the Quad's primary focus in the medium term (3-10 years) be?*

In the medium term, most of the respondents (54%) want Quad to focus on improving its acceptability in Southeast Asia and to be seen as legitimately backing 'ASEAN Centrality'. An equal percentage (16% each) wants India's closer integration to forge a stronger alignment, and more activities to enforce 'rules based order' in the Indo-Pacific. These two issues are more directed towards China, compared to the majority view to first invest in ASEAN support to the initiative.




3.3 *What are Quad's prospects in the long term (>10 years)?*

In the long term, majority of the respondents (54%) want the partnership to focus on the infrastructure development and regional connectivity projects. Also a significant percentage (35%) feel Quad should by then put itself in a position to be a major player which can collectively shape the security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region. A minority (3%) are not too enthusiastic about the Quad's long term prospects and feel it will succumb to Chinese pressure.



3.4 *Should the Quad be expanded to include...*

This question dealt with obtaining the views of the respondents on expansion of the Quad. The 'Quad Plus' has been debated in the literature on the subject and the ASPI survey concluded that expanding the Quad was unpopular with 68% of ASEAN respondents feeling that the Quad shouldn't be further expanded. In this survey, four clear options for expansion were listed, these were, Indonesia, South Korea, France and China. An option to state that the Quad membership was adequate and needed no further expansion was also given; the respondents could list more than one country while suggesting an expansion. A high number of expansion votes went to Indonesia (56) and South Korea (63), while France was a less popular choice (19). Out of the respondents almost one third (42) felt that Quad in its current form was adequate and no expansion was necessary. Some respondents (6) suggested Vietnam as a potential country to be included in the Quad.



Biography

- Full Name :** Colonel Siddharth Chopra
- Date of Birth :** 13 April 1977
- Education Background :**
- Bachelor of Science (BSc), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
 - Bachelor of Technology (B Tech), Mechanical Engineering, Jawaharlal Nehru Technical University, New Delhi.
 - Masters in Science (MSc) in Defence and Strategic Studies, Madras University, Chennai.
- Military Courses :**
- Young Officers (Armour) Course, 1999.
 - Automotive Instructors (Armour) Officers Course, 2001.
 - Electronics and Mechanical Officers Degree Engineering Course, 2004.
 - Junior Command Course, 2008.
 - Defence Services Staff Course, 2010.
 - Senior Command Course, 2014.
- Military Experience:**
- Tank Troop Leader, 1999.
 - Armoured Squadron Commander, 2007.
 - Operations Staff Officer in Mountain Brigade, 2011.

- Staff Officer in Military Secretary Branch, Army Headquarters, 2012.
- Armoured Regiment Commander, 2015.
- Directing Staff at Defence Services Staff College, 2018.

Current Position :

Attending National Defence College,
Thailand - Class 62.

Quad - Dynamics, Relevance and the Way Forward with Recommendations for India and ASEAN

**Colonel Siddharth Chopra (India), NDC-62
choprasunny77@rediffmail.com**

ABSTRACT

The shift in the economic centre of gravity to Asia and the rise of China as a global superpower in the 21st century has changed the dynamics of the region. The development of the Indo-Pacific regional construct with a focus on a maritime domain has led to the emergence of new forms of security cooperation. The Quad consultation between Australia, India, Japan and USA was revived in 2017 after a failed attempt at coming together as a security dialogue in 2007. The purpose for the revival of the Quad is obscure. Writings on the subject indicate two factors that have brought the four democracies together for the second time; a shared threat perception towards China and shared objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. The study has examined factors based on key indicators and analysis of official policy documents, statements and remarks of officials at the highest level to reach an inference that even though the four nations have varied reasons to view China as a threat, they aim to coordinate their policies especially in the security and infrastructure development domains to realise their shared objective under the concept of a 'free, open, inclusive and prosperous' Indo-Pacific.

Having examined the purpose and relevance of the Quad, the study highlights the way forward for the Quad in terms of structural recommendations, and measures to strengthen the partnership in security

and infrastructure development domains. Recommendations for India towards balancing its interests in the Quad and overall regional environment, and recommendations for ASEAN in engaging with the Quad are also shortlisted.

Despite some differences among the Quad members in threat perception vis-à-vis China, desired objectives of the grouping and resource availability to support the objectives, the cooperation among the Quad countries is likely to deepen. The Quad is not directed against a particular nation, however there is unity in opposing actions which serve to unilaterally change established rules and are in contravention to internationally accepted behaviour. China's continuing efforts to challenge status quo and rules-based order has contributed to the urgency and timeliness of the Quad to emerge as an effective grouping in the Indo-Pacific region.

**Keywords : Australia-India-Japan-USA Consultation (QUAD),
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), Free and Open
Indo-Pacific (FOIP)**

Going forward the Quad should take a long term view of the shared objectives and develop strategies accordingly. The focus should be restricted to core themes rather than too diverse an agenda. Security and infrastructure development are identified as the as focus areas for the Quad. In the security field, the Quad should deepen military cooperation to share intelligence, improve interoperability, enhance MDA capabilities, share logistics and improve access to cutting edge defence technology. In the infrastructure development field, the Quad should cooperate to create an Indo-Pacific Quadrilateral Infrastructure Coordination Agency and an

Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Funding Pool as a viable alternative to Belt and Road Initiative.

Introduction

The '**Australia-India-Japan-USA Consultation**' comprises of the four major democracies across the Indian and Pacific Oceans and is popularly identified by the acronym '**The Quad**'. The four Quad countries coordinated on a regional platform for the first time while responding to the challenge posed by the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Subsequently, Japanese PM Shinzo Abe's vision of 'Confluence of Two Seas' formed the basis for them to hold their first security dialogue in May 2007 as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Facing external and internal pressures, Quad 1.0 disintegrated with Australia's withdrawal in 2008. The Quad was revived in 2017 strengthened by increased strategic engagements in the intervening period between the four countries. The grouping is presently in the nascent stage with ambiguity surrounding Quad's purpose, intentions and goals. Strategic analysts differ in their categorisation of the Quad and many contrasting presumptions have emerged such as the Quad is the genesis of an 'Asian NATO', or it is 'a group to contain China', or it is 'a nuisance with widely divergent views'. These categorisations notwithstanding there is increasing agreement within the Quad that China's rise in the Indo-Pacific region is also accompanied by China's increasing assertive behaviour and steady erosion of a rules based order. The initiative aims to secure a 'free, open, prosperous and inclusive' Indo-Pacific region.

As is natural with resurgence of any failed initiative, the Quad 2.0 is looked at with scepticism. There is ambiguity regarding why Quad has been revived and what it can achieve. A point of view is that a shared strategic view to advance a free, open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific region and shared commitment to preserving and promoting the rules-based order in the region is behind the revival of the Quad. Some analysts see Quad simply as a way to contain an expansionist China. The Quad has received a lukewarm response from the ASEAN community as there are reservations that the Quad shall impinge upon ‘ASEAN Centrality’.

Research Objectives

The research is an attempt to identify the purpose behind the revival of the Quad, its relevance in the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific region and its potential to contribute towards security and stability of the region.

1. Statement of the Problem.

The research is guided by the statement that the Quad consultation has the potential to be effective in contributing towards the vision of a free, open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.

2. Research Question.

The Quad might find a common cause in balancing against China but will this unequal partnership with key differences in threat perception, desired objectives, trade dependencies and resource availability be effective in contributing to security and stability in the Indo-Pacific Region?

3. Research Objectives.

3.1 To examine the current dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region and identify purpose behind the revival of the Quad consultation.

3.2 To analyse the relevance and potential of the Quad in achieving shared objectives and contributing to stability in the Indo-Pacific.

3.3 To propose the way forward for the Quad and recommendations for India and ASEAN.

Scope of the Research

The area of study is limited to the Indo-Pacific region. The study focusses on the timeframe covering the period since the revival of the Quad in 2017. The revived grouping is analysed in context of the prevailing geostrategic environment. The study is based on the premise that there is no significant geostrategic shift on part of the important regional players in the near future. The reasons for revival, interrelationship between member countries and of the Quad with other regional organisations are analysed to establish the relevance and potential of the grouping in achieving its objectives. While delving into the future, the way forward for Quad and recommendations for India and ASEAN are covered.

Methodology

The research methodology is primarily based on a qualitative research method. The study focusses on understanding the contents of official documents, statements and views of strategic analysts on the subject to form an informed opinion. To put things in a better perspective, quantitative data from existing surveys on the subject and a response to a

questionnaire is utilised. The purpose of introducing the findings of the questionnaire is to strengthen and confirm the study's conclusions. The survey was targeted at a specific sampling which included participants of the courses at strategic level in different countries.

Literature Review

To achieve the research objectives the conceptual framework was based on the literature reviewed on three themes. Firstly, the Indo-Pacific regional construct and security challenges, secondly, the concepts of alliance and alignment and thirdly, multilateralism in international affairs. The security strategy papers/white papers on defence, governmental reports and official press releases from Australia, India, Japan and USA are analysed along with books/e-books and published studies/articles/research work on the subject.

Research Results

The research objectives were met by defining the Indo-Pacific strategic environment and establishing the nature of the Quad partnership. The research then looks at plausible common threat and shared objectives to ascertain the purpose of Quad's revival. An analysis of the Quad under the DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic) paradigm is conducted to establish the relevance and potential of the Quad. The research results are summarised as under.

1. Indo-Pacific Strategic Environment.

1.1 Indo-Pacific Regional Construct. The economic rise of Asian countries in the last three decade has led to an increase in maritime trade and flow of energy resources in the Indian and Western Pacific

Oceans. The focus on the maritime domain and need to maintain internationally accepted rules based order has necessitated the integration of Indian and Pacific Oceans into a strategic construct.

1.2 Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific region has multiple security flashpoints. Issues contributing to regional insecurity are the contested space of South China Sea, territorial dispute over the Senkaku Island chain, tensions in the Korean Peninsula, China's claims over Taiwan and India's border disputes with China and Pakistan. Among the non-traditional threats are, piracy in Western Indian Ocean and Malacca, terrorism, frequent natural disasters, effects of climate change and cybersecurity.

1.3 US-China Rivalry. China's economic rise, increasing diplomatic influence and military modernisation threatens to displace USA from its primary position in the Indo-Pacific region. USA sees China as an authoritarian revisionist power which seeks to advance their parochial interests at others' expense. China's rise and assertive actions are also seen with caution by other regional players.

2. Nature of Quad Partnership.

Classically alliances need some form of military commitment ; the Quad does not meet this requirement and therefore cannot be classified as an alliance. Study of the Quad and China utilising the precepts of the Balance of Threat theory reveals that the Quad nations have varying nature of threat from China. USA sees China as a revisionist power which competes with it for regional and global influence. Japan has maritime disputes over the Senkaku island chain and views Chinese actions in the South China Sea and East China Sea as incompatible with existing international order. Australia is relatively insulated due to its geographic

separation but also views Chinese claims in the South China Sea as not having any legal basis. India faces a physical territorial threat along its northern borders with China and also views increasing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean Region and South Asia as unsettling. This varied threat perception does not classify China as a common adversary in the traditional sense and the Quad cannot be viewed as focussing solely on to balance a 'China Threat'.

Modern theorists categorise alliance as a form of alignment with other forms being coalition, security community and security partnership. Distinction between each is based on the level of commitment and the scope of challenges addressed. A security partnership has a low level of commitment and has the potential to address a broad range of issues. The theory on strategic partnership prioritises mutual interests as the foundation for collaboration between states as against a common threat or similar ideology. The assertive actions of China arouse concern Quad countries. It has served to bring them together and added to the urgency and importance attached to the revival of the Quad. The Quad recognises that there is a need to ensure that established international rules based order in the region is not overwhelmed and the Indo-Pacific grows to be a free, open, inclusive and prosperous region. This serves as an actuator for the Quad 'strategic partnership'. The Quad also represents a recent trend in international relations wherein compared to large multilateral communities, more flexible 'minilateral' security partnerships offer a valuable means to address selective security challenges. This format allows the members to avoid grand strategic designs and cooperate where interests converge.

3. Shared Objectives of the Quad.

The Quad has not issued joint statements after the meetings. The shared objectives are identified through the member countries official statements. The Quad focuses primarily on security cooperation and prioritises infrastructure development and regional connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region. Within the Quad there is a general convergence of ideas, but subtle differences in the outlook also exist. The shared objectives of the Quad under the principle concept of a free, open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific identified are:-

3.1 Support for ASEAN Centrality and ASEAN led mechanisms.

3.2 Uphold rules based order in Indo-Pacific.

3.3 Ensure freedom of navigation and overflight.

3.4 Respect for international law.

3.5 Regional security to include-maritime, counter terrorism, non-proliferation and cyber security.

3.6 Increase connectivity and promote sustainable development.

3.7 Promote good governance in the region.

3.8 Development of quality infrastructure.

3.9 Cooperate in Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response.

4. DIME Analysis.

An analysis of the Quad under the DIME paradigm suggests that Quad's strengths in the diplomatic instrument lie in presenting a united voice on the issues of common interest in the regional forums and increased engagement of ASEAN. The Quad needs ASEAN support for establishing legitimacy and the ASEAN needs Quad's diplomatic backing

to ensure respect for international law and upholding a rules based order in the region. In the military instrument, the strength lies in focussing on non-traditional security challenges which transcend international borders. The Quad has potential to work together in the field of cyber security, counterterrorism, maritime security and HADR. Joint exercises in these domains present an opportunity to learn from each other's operational experiences, enhance interoperability and formulate common SOPs. The Quad should engage with Indo-Pacific littorals to bolster their defence capabilities and preserve national interests along their shores. Joint anti-piracy patrols and sharing of intelligence will make the SLOCs safer. The economic instrument offers opportunity in coordinating efforts, meaningfully prioritising and assisting littoral nations in sustainable development while preserving the environment and preventing debt stress.

5. Highlights of the Survey Findings.

The Quad statements have repeatedly and univocally called for support to ASEAN centrality and ASEAN led mechanisms. The survey supports this argument with a majority (62%) feeling that Quad complements the ASEAN frameworks in the region rather than sidelining (10%) or challenging (9%) it. Another common outcome of the meetings is the restraint shown in the statements so as to signal the inclusive nature of the consultations and not to antagonise China. However, in this regard the survey indicates that the Quad has not been as successful. Most respondents (52 %) viewed Quad as an Anti-China platform and a sizeable percentage (35%) thought it was not Anti-China but projected as such. The findings of the survey show that divergent interests among members (39%) and a lack of focused objectives (32%)

are the biggest challenge which the Quad will face in being effective as a grouping. The general response to the initiative is encouraging, 44% find the Quad a welcome as against only 2% who feel it will lead to a conflict in the region. An encouraging 75% of the respondents agree/strongly agree that Quad will contribute to regional stability.

Recommendations

The recommendations of the study are covered under three heads, firstly, the way forward for the Quad, secondly, recommendations for India and thirdly, recommendations for ASEAN

1. The Way Forward - Quad 2.0.

While evaluating the future of the Quad, there are two key considerations. Firstly, the Quad should refrain from being seen as overly adversarial to China. Secondly, for the Quad to be viable, it needs ASEAN's support. The way forward focusses on three themes, firstly, structural recommendations for the Quad to enhance the dialogue process, secondly, the Quad assuming a soft security dimension in the maritime domain and thirdly, Quad coordination on infrastructure development and connectivity projects in the Indo-Pacific.

1.1 Structural Proposals. The proposals under this head focus on institutionalization of the Quad consultations and initiatives towards focussed cooperation among Quad members in the future.

1.1.1 Quad Secretariat. A Quad secretariat should be established with the chairmanship rotating every three years among the members. The institutionalisation of the Quad secretariat will result in better coordination among members, monitoring of effective implementation

of Quad projects and activities and function like a one point contact for other agencies.

1.1.2 Head of State Meeting. A biennial head of state meeting among the Quad nations is recommended. This meeting will demonstrate that the members of the Quad are prepared to elevate the visibility of the Quad.

1.1.3 Ministerial Level Meeting. The '2+2' foreign and defence ministers meetings format which exists in bilateral relations amongst all the Quad nations is recommended to be expanded to a joint Quad '2+2' ministerial format with an annual meeting.

1.1.4 Working Groups on Politics and Defence. To support meeting at the higher level it is proposed that working group on politics and defence comprising of senior-level officials be set up. The group will be responsible for the groundwork, coordination and streamlining the agenda for meeting at the ministerial level and also have the responsibility for the secretarial work, including issue of joint statements and conduct of press conferences.

1.1.5 Working Group on Infrastructure Development. A working group on infrastructure will facilitate coordinating regional economic and developmental assistance. The group can work with the 'Blue Dot Network' which provides an existing platform for realising the infrastructure development component of the Quad.

1.2 Security Dimension. Japan and Australia individually share the status of allies with USA; however India is not an ally of USA. Thus, the proposals in the security dimension are based on soft security dynamics focussed on non-traditional threats in the region.

1.2.1 Strategic Policy Context. The Quad is integral to the Indo-Pacific regional construct, therefore there needs to be convergence on the strategic framework defining the Indo-Pacific. For commonality and clarity the maritime space which includes the whole of Indian and Pacific Oceans is proposed to be commonly adopted as the Indo-Pacific region.

1.2.2 Maritime Security Cooperation. Joint patrols in coordination with other regional players in identified incident prone areas are proposed to show Quad's committed to safeguarding SLOCs for maritime trade. The Quad is also committed to freedom of navigation and overflight; in this regard the Quad should strongly support the ASEAN for the finalisation of a balanced South China Sea Code of Conduct. Coordination is also necessary to reduce the risk of accidents or unplanned naval encounters, for which adherence to the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) is necessary to be adhered to.

1.2.3 Naval Exercises. Closer naval cooperation between the Quad countries is proposed to be based on confidence building measures (CBMs) and joint training exchanges. This will result in greater interoperability amongst the navies, which can graduate to commonality of equipment at a later stage. Exercise Malabar participation is proposed to be expanded to include Australia as a participant and France, and other regional navies as observers.

1.2.4 Maritime Domain Awareness. The Quad should cooperate on issues of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) by sharing of intelligence, greater access to technology, commonality of equipment and joint use of military infrastructure such as ports and airstrips.

1.2.5 Engaging Coast Guards of Littoral States. Increased cooperation among Coast Guards of Quad countries and that of littoral states across the Indo-Pacific is proposed to tackle issues related to drug/human smuggling, illegal fishing, and other maritime law enforcement activities.

1.2.6 Non-Conventional Security Areas. Cooperation in non-conventional security areas, such as Search and Rescue (SAR) activities in peacetime, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), cyber security and counter terrorism activities is proposed with regular exercises.

1.3 Infrastructure Development. Infrastructure development and connectivity projects play a central role in the Quad's objectives. This commitment indicates that they aim to offer an alternative to China's ambitious strategic network of infrastructure projects under the BRI.

1.3.1 Coordination Agency. An Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Development Coordination Agency is recommended to be established to coordinate the activities of the Quad in the field of infrastructure development and connectivity projects. The proposed agency should work in unison with the working group on infrastructure and under the precepts of the Blue Dot Network.

1.3.2 Engaging China. The proposed coordination agency should endeavour to work with Chinese aided financing agencies to raise the overall quality of regional infrastructure. This will encourage transparency for negotiation, tendering process and contracts.

1.3.3 Focus on Maritime Infrastructure. The focus in the field of infrastructure development should be on funding projects that better integrate the Indo-Pacific as a coherent regional order. Quad could

focus on building and maintenance of infrastructure in the maritime domain, such as ports and harbours.

2. Recommendations for India

India's position in the Quad is unique as it does not form part of the US hub-and-spoke alliance framework and does not enjoy a formal security guarantee from the US. It also does not benefit from access to modern US technology and intelligence. India supports a multi-polar world order within which it aims to retain its strategic autonomy. India shares a long non-demarcated land border with China, which is often a source of tension between the two countries. India espouses an expansive Indo-Pacific vision but is still in the process of building a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean and considers seas to the east of Malacca straits its secondary area in maritime strategy. India is both a recipient of infrastructure development aid and a major donor itself. The India centric proposals keep the above aspects in perspective.

2.1 Enunciate an Indo-Pacific Policy. India has based its vision of the Indo-Pacific on the Act East Policy. India should enunciate a comprehensive Indo-Pacific policy to cover the emerging geopolitical scenario and Indo-Pacific region in totality, including areas to its west. The policy should focus on India's view of multilateralism and regionalism, SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision, use of common spaces on sea and in the air in accordance with international law, promotion of maritime safety and security from traditional and non-traditional threats, and regional connectivity and infrastructure development.

2.2 Maintain Strategic Autonomy. India should not be fixated on the Quad as the only means of deepening cooperation with like-minded security partners in the Indo-Pacific. It should continue with engagements in other tri-laterals and ASEAN led multilateral forums.

2.3 Enhance Engagement with ASEAN. India's Act East policy provides framework for initiatives aimed at increasing its cooperation with ASEAN members. India must consider upgrading its bilateral relationship to the level of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Thailand as it has recently done with Vietnam and Indonesia. India should conduct more joint military exercises with ASEAN nations. India-Thailand-Singapore naval exercises can be enhanced to include Malaysia and Indonesia. Exercises in other non-traditional fields such as HADR and counter terrorism should also be enhanced.

2.4 Expand Malabar Exercises to include Australia. Malabar Naval Exercise is led by India and involves USA and Japan. The Malabar Exercises should include Australia and efforts be made to enhance the participation to include other naval powers like France. The exercise is proposed to be conducted in India's primary area of responsibility, i.e. the Indian Ocean Region.

2.5 Refrain from Joint South China Sea FONOPS. The South China Sea is beyond India's primary maritime sphere of interest. India should push for a maritime division space among the Quad countries, followed by allocation of resources and capability to areas and zones where each has an advantage. It is not recommended for India support any joint Quad FONOPS in the South China Sea.

2.6 Join the Blue Dot Network. India should join the Blue Dot Network as it will create growth opportunities and the platform can be used to facilitate land and maritime connectivity between Northeast India, Bangladesh and Southeast Asia.

2.7 Improve Delivery in Infrastructure Development Projects. India is involved in various international connectivity projects. There is a need for India to improve its delivery with better planning and greater involvement of the private sector.

3. Recommendations for ASEAN

ASEAN has adopted the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The document highlights ASEAN's cautious and neutral approach while stressing ASEAN centrality through ASEAN-led mechanisms, dialogue and cooperation to promote peaceful cooperation, a rule-based framework, and the pursuit of an open and inclusive regional order that does not close the door to any state. The recommendations for ASEAN are aligned with the AOIP.

3.1 Increase Understanding on Quad. To increase understanding on the Quad and develop a nuanced view it is proposed that ASEAN countries have more debates and seminars on the Quad.

3.2 Maintain Neutrality and Diversify Engagements. The ASEAN should avoid being pulled into the US-China rivalry and engage with both as per their terms. ASEAN should enhance engagements with Japan, Australia, India and the EU in the security realm to balance its relations.

3.3 Confirm Transparency in Infrastructure Projects. ASEAN member states should be careful in not compromising sovereignty at the expense of foreign investment. The planned infrastructure and

connectivity projects should be transparent and meet international standards.

3.4 Keep South China Sea Conflict Free. As a neutral regional organisation ASEAN is best suited as a mediator and facilitator in the Indo-Pacific region. It should ensure negotiation at equal terms for a comprehensive South China Sea Code of Conduct.

3.5 Focus on ASEAN Unity and Consensus Building. ASEAN should present a unified voice based on its enunciated principles. A priority for ASEAN countries, regardless of differences in perception and national approaches, is to make certain that the ASEAN and its institution continue to assume leadership in regional affairs.

4. Recommendations for Further Study.

The following topics related to Quad are recommended for future study at NDC, Thailand.

4.1 Implications on ASEAN Centrality with the revival of the Quad.

4.2 Blue Dot Network and/or BRI - Future of Infrastructure Development in Southeast Asia.

4.3 Synthesis between ASEAN led security mechanisms and the Quad.

4.4 Congruence between ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and the Free, Open, Inclusive and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Vision of the Quad.