

**The Internal Armed Conflicts in Myanmar and
Its Effects on National Political, Economic,
and Social Developments :
An Outlook and Policy**

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Certificate of Research Paper

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Abstract

Title : The Internal Armed Conflicts in Myanmar and Its Effects on National Political, Economic, and Social Developments : An Outlook and Policy

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The aim of writing this dissertation paper is to study and understand “Root cause of the Internal Armed Conflicts and Its Impact to National Political, Economic, and Social Developments” in the time of democratic transition of Myanmar and for the progress of Myanmar National Interest.

Myanmar is home to more than 135 different ethnic groups, all of which have unique cultures, history, languages and religions. Sixty percent to two-thirds of the country consists of Bamar. The remaining 30-40% of the country belongs to ethnic minorities; Shan, Karen (also known as Kayen), Chin, Kachin, Karenni (also known as Kayah) the Mon and Rakhine. For decades, ethnic conflicts have been occurring and it obviously affects the economic growth and development of Myanmar. One special thing is that there are 135 ethnicities and many ethnic armed groups some of which are with the strength of Armed Forces of some countries. Recently we are trying to stop internal armed conflicts which lasted for 60 years and build peace as well as putting effort for the change of political and economic sectors. However, a flurry of negotiations among Myanmar’s government, its military and ethnic armed groups belies deeper problems in the country’s moribund peace process.

Preface

The internal conflict in Myanmar is a series of primarily ethnic conflicts within Myanmar that began shortly after the country independent from the United Kingdom in 1948. The conflict is the world's longest ongoing civil war and still happening.

Several insurgent groups have negotiated ceasefires and peace agreements with successive governments, which until political reforms between 2011 and 2015 had largely fallen apart. Therefore, the researcher chooses this title so-called “Root cause of the Internal Armed Conflicts and Its Impact to National Political, Economic, and Social Developments”. The researcher, in this research, identifies the root causes of internal armed conflict which is very important to criticize the political, economic and social affairs of the country. More than that, the researcher proposed resolutions for the affected factors and some recommendations to obtain the sustainable political, economic and social development of the country in the nearest future.

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Contents

	Page
Abstract	i
Preface	ii
Acknowledgement	iii
Contents	iv
List of Abbreviations	vi
Chapter 1 Introduction	1
Background and Significance of Problem	1
Objectives of Research	6
Literature Review	6
Scope of Research	8
Methodology	8
Limitation and/or Delimitation	9
Research Results for Utilization	9
Chapter 2 Background Histories and Conflicts in Myanmar	10
Introduction	10
Background Histories and Sources of Various Conflicts	10
Key Factors of Conflicts	21
Conclusion	24
Conceptual Framework	24

Contents (cont.)

	Page
Chapter 3 The Factors of Internal Armed Conflicts that Affected Political, Economic and Social Development	25
Introduction	25
Factors Affect to Politic	25
Factors Affect to Economic Development	32
Factors Affect to Social Development	37
Chapter 4 Proposed Solutions for Affected Factors of the Internal Conflict	42
Introduction	42
Resolution for the Impacts of Political Development	42
Lack of Unified and Shared Goals in Fighting	50
Resolution for the Impacts of Economic Development	50
Resolution for the Impacts of Social Development	53
Chapter 5 Conclusion and Recommendations	61
Conclusion	61
Recommendations	64
Bibliography	68
Biography	72

List of Abbreviations

AA	Arakan Army
ABSDF	All Burma Students Democratic Front
ALA	Arakan Liberation Army
ARSA	Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BGF	Border Guard Force
BSP	Burmese Socialist Party
CMEC	China Myanmar Economic Corridor
CPB	Communist Party of Burma
EAO	Ethnic Armed Organization
EAG	Ethnic Armed Group
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FPNCC	Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmine
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
Jinpo	Kachin People
JMC	Joint Monitoring Committee on Ceasefire
KNU	Karen National Union
KIA	Kachin Independence Army
KIO	Kachin Independence Organisation
KNPP	Karenni National Progressive Party
MNDAA	Myanmar national Democratic Alliance Army

NCA	National Ceasefire Agreement
NCCT	Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team
NDF	National Democratic Front
NDUF	National Democratic United Front
NLD	National League for Democracy
NSAG	Non-state Armed Group
PMF	People’s Militia Force
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
SPDC	State Peace and Development Council
SSA-S	Shan State Army South
SSEs	State-owned Economic Enterprises
SSPP/SSA	Shan State Progress Party/ Shan State Army
TNLA	Ta’ang National Liberation Army
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UWSA	United Wa State Army

Chapter 1

Introduction

Background and Significance of Problem

Myanmar is home to more than 135 different ethnic groups, all of which have unique cultures, history, languages and religions. Sixty percent to two-thirds of the country consists of Bamar. The remaining 30-40% of the country belongs to ethnic minorities; Shan, Karen (also known as Kayen), Chin, Kachin, Karenni (also known as Kayah) the Mon and Rakhine.¹ The rest of the population belongs to splinter groups of these seven main groups or other ethnic minorities. However, Myanmar has faced ethnic division and conflicts since independence of British Colonial rule in 1948. Ethnic relations between the majority and minorities and the distribution of power and resources have been the most serious issues since independence.

Achieving mutual trust and a system of government agreeable to all the diverse people of Myanmar are the country's defining challenges. The 2010 election was an important step towards democratization by the army-led government in Myanmar, but there is still a long way to go before these reforms become real changes for ordinary people.

¹ Transnational Institute/Burma Centrum Netherland, "Access Denied: Land Rights and Ethnic Conflict in Burma", (May 2013). <https://www.myanmar-responsiblebusiness.org/pdf/SWIA/Oil-Gas/11-Ethnic-Minorities-Indigenous-Peoples.pdf>

The challenges for different ethnic groups and Myanmar Government are complex.

For decades, ethnic conflicts have been occurring and it obviously affects the economic growth and development of Myanmar. In 2011, foreign investments have grown a lot however Myanmar Economics and Business Development are slow-moving according to the ethnic conflicts.² Unlike many other ASEAN countries that approached economic and political reform separately, Myanmar try to develop both at the same time, while seeking national peace and reconciliation among the many armed ethnic groups. The economic destruction and disorganization brought according to ethnic conflicts and civil wars are major problems which disturb Myanmar Economic Development. Material wealth and resources are often destroyed during the war. Strategic Economic Targets are hard to develop and create according to the internal conflicts and wars. Moreover, the foreign investors might scare and took back their capital. In order to grow rapidly in economy, Myanmar needs to get higher foreign direct investment. So, this research will analyze the detailed information of cause of ethnic conflicts and civil wars and point out how to develop strategies to bring peace negotiation. Furthermore, this will provide the information to settle the related issues between the internal conflicts and economic development in Myanmar.

The conflict is usually divided into three parts: incidents during the post-independence period under parliament (1948-1962), incidents during the post-social government after 1962 under the leadership of

² Kristian Stokke, Roman Vakulchuk, Indra Øverland, Myanmar. "A Political Economy Analysis". (Online). Available : <https://www.reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-political-economy-analysis>

General Ne Win and his Burmese Socialist Party (1962-1988) and extraordinary events during the modern era of the Cold War; first under the military administration of the State Peace and Development Council (1988-2011) and now under the newly elected civilian government.³

After the independence of the United Kingdom, the two main opposition groups in Myanmar were communists, led by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and Karen nationalists, led by Karen's predecessor of the National Union.⁴ The first fought before independence with the British colonial government; during the last days of the Japanese occupation of Burma during the Second World War, both groups helped the British against the Japanese imperial army. Initially there was peace during the transition period after independence, but on April 2, 1948, the CPB became the first conflict of the conflict in Paukkongya, Pegu (the current Bago region).

During the post-independence period, the KNU preferred an independent state, managed by the Karen people. The proposed state would include the objectives of the state of Karen and the state of Karenni (now Kayin and Kayah) in the Lower Part of Myanmar. Since then, the KNU has focused on total independence from regional autonomy under a federal system with the balanced representation of Karen in the government.

³“Internal Conflicts in Myanmar”. (Online). Available : https://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internal_conflict_in_Myanmar

⁴ “Kayin Conflict in Myanmar”. (Online). Available : https://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karen_conflict

There are four major armed wings from different ethnic groups as follows : The Kachin people (or Jingpo) are a confederation of six ethnic groups whose homeland encompasses territory in the Kachin Hills of northern Myanmar, in southern China (Yunnan) and in northeastern India. Following Burmese independence from the United Kingdom, many ethnic minorities, including the Kachins, campaigned for self-determination and independence. The Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) was founded in 1960 by dissidents as a result of grievances between the majority-Bamar union government and the Kachin people. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) was established as its armed wing in 1961, acting as a private army with 27 members.⁵ In the early 1960s the KIA began expanding and increasing in numbers, especially after the 1962 Burmese coup d'état and its perceived threat by ethnic minorities.

The largest insurgent group in Kayah State (formerly Karenni State) is the Karenni Army, whose goal for the past few decades has been to obtain independence and self-determination for the Karenni people. The Karenni Army is currently led by General Bee Htoo, and consists of roughly between 500 and 1,500 soldiers.

The Karen people of Kayin State (formerly Karen State) in eastern Myanmar are the third largest ethnic group in Myanmar, consisting of roughly 7% of the country's total population. Karen insurgent groups have fought for independence and self-determination since 1949. Political grievances among Karen and other ethnic nationality communities, which

⁵ Kristian Stokke, Roman Vakulchuk, Indra Øverland, Myanmar. "A Political Economy Analysis". (Online). Available : <https://www.reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-political-economy-analysis>

have driven over half a century of armed conflict in Myanmar, remain unresolved. As the country enters a period of transition following the November 2010 elections and formation of a new government, the Karen political landscape is undergoing its most significant changes in a generation. There is a pressing need for Karen social and political actors to demonstrate their relevance to the new political and economic agendas in Myanmar, and in particular to articulate positions regarding the major economic and infrastructure development projects to be implemented in the coming years.

The Shan people are the largest ethnic group in Shan State and the second largest in Myanmar. In 1947, the Panglong Agreement was negotiated between General Aung San, a prominent founding father of Myanmar, and Shan leaders, which would have given the Shan the option to split from Myanmar a decade after independence if they were unsatisfied with the central government.

The internal conflict in Myanmar is a series of primarily ethnic conflicts within Myanmar that began shortly after the country became independent from the United Kingdom in 1948. The conflict is the world's longest ongoing civil war. The advantages of ethnic conflicts are occurring and it obviously affects the economic growth and development of Myanmar. Myanmar is trying to develop both national peace and reconciliation among the many armed ethnic groups whether some conflicts are occasionally happening. Among them, both ethnic conflicts and civil wars are favoring the economic destruction and disorganization of Economic Development of the country.

Objectives of Research

The purpose of this study is

1. To study the factors of internal ethnic armed conflict that affected political, economic, and social development
2. To propose a sustainable political, economic and social development framework that can benefit the majority of the population

Literatures Review

While there has been much research on political economy and economic reform of Myanmar, some researchers take civil wars and ethnic conflicts effects on Economic Development in Myanmar. The causal effect of a process of political change, namely, a recent constitutional referendum, on economic growth in Myanmar has been widely discussed in the “Recent Political Change in Myanmar and Its Impact on her Economic Growth” by (Nwe.K, Kawata.K, Yoshida.Y, 2018). Similar to those facts, the research paper “Economic reform and political change in Myanmar (Burma)” by (Cook.P and Minogue.M 1993) states that it is more illuminating to focus on the historical interaction of economic and political factors so as to construct a convincing “political economy” of Myanmar, than to argue for the current significance of political conditionality. Unlike to that previous research, this research may point out the other perspectives on economic development related to the ethnic conflicts and civil wars.

Aung, Su Mon Thazin (2016). *The Politics of Policymaking in Transitional Government : A Case Study of the Ethnic Peace Process in Myanmar*. In Nick Cheesman and Nicholas Farrelly (Eds.), *Conflict in*

Myanmar : War, Politics, Religion. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies also provides the case study and detailed information about the peace process with armed group.

As we are mentioning about the economic development of Myanmar, we will look up to the data from trusted sources like ADB (2017). Myanmar : Economy. Asian Development Bank (ADB). Available at: [https://www.adb.org/countries/ Myanmar/economy](https://www.adb.org/countries/Myanmar/economy), accessed 25 July 2017, Bissinger, Jared (2016). Local Economic Governance in Myanmar. Asia Foundation Report. Yangon: Asia Foundation.

In this research, the researcher will also analyses the natural resources from the conflict area as mentioned above. Bauer, A, Shortell, P and Delesgues, L. (2016). Sharing the Wealth : A Roadmap for Distributing Myanmar’s Natural Resource Revenues. London : Natural Resource Governance Institute (London) state that “Myanmar's Union government collects much of the trillions of kyat generated by oil, gas, gemstones and other minerals each year, primarily through its state-owned economic enterprises (SEEs). In the face of such centralized control over revenue, many ethnic groups have long asserted their right to make decisions over resource management in their states. Combatants in areas of active conflict and leaders from several ethnic minority parties—particularly those associated with Kachin, Rakhine and Shan states have openly called for greater resource revenue sharing”. This fact will also be discussed in this research.

The conference research journals like Burma News International (2016). Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process : A Reference Guide 2015. Chiang Mai : Burma News International. Burma News International (2017a). Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2016. Chiang

Mai: Burma News International will also provide the positive impact, peace plan, ongoing effort for long term peace, etc.,... So, this would provide this research to develop the strategies and peace-building process which will also help to find the roots of the causes.

Scope of Research

This research is focus on four states within the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. This research aims to include information to develop economic in Myanmar and provide the strategies which are lead to Myanmar's Peace Negotiation. The detailed information about the causes of civil wars and ethnic conflicts, the statistical data about Myanmar economy including GDP, foreign investment rate have to be collected. The collection of historical information and statistical information will be performed in order to get the related data.

Methodology

In this research, the pre-defining hypothesis will be developed and set the agenda according to the case study and literature review which are related. The qualitative research method will be used as this research will have unique in depth analysis plan on this research. In this research, the researcher will seek primary data from interviews of Myanmar people involved in Myanmar's internal armed conflict. Secondary data is collected from internet, libraries, government publications and/or policies, and newspapers.

Limitation and/or delimitation

This research is based on only four areas where there has conflicted in Myanmar and its work is focused on identifying the root cause of conflict that effect on the success and sustainable of economic development in Myanmar. It is worth to mention that the main reasons for these limitations are the time and resource shortages. The followings are the limitations of this research :

1. The research is limited to the governmental organizations, armed groups, and non-governmental organizations whom are implementing the peace process in Myanmar.

2. The development of the framework is based on only the questionnaire survey. The findings are limited to only one areas especially in Kayin State of Myanmar.

Research Results for Utilization

From this research, the root cause of civil wars and potential ethnic conflicts have been foreseen and help to implement strategies to prevent and manage the conflicts. Moreover, the research will also empower the development of economic framework which will benefit most of the population.

Chapter 2

Background Histories and Conflicts in Myanmar

Introduction

Chapter Two focus on background histories and sources of various conflicts in Myanmar. The background histories consist of major conflict area such as Kachin, Kayin, Kayah, Rakhine and Shan. These conflicts are related to the research topic and research objectives in Chapter One. In this section, the author explains the background histories of the conflicts and aspect of conflicts which impact tot the politic, economic and social development of the country.

Background Histories and Sources of Various Conflicts

1. Conflict and Its Sources in Kachin State

The Kachin people are a major ethnic minority in Myanmar who mainly inhabit the mountainous northern regions of the Kachin Hills in Kachin State. Kachin regular soldiers previously formed a significant part of the Myanmar military; however, after General Ne Win's regime seized power in 1962, many Kachin soldiers defected from the military and reorganized with already active Kachin insurgents to form the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), under the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO). Religious tensions have also been a source of conflict, as Kachin people have historically been predominantly Christian, while the majority Bamar people have been predominantly Buddhist. As in other ethnic areas, the predominance of Christianity among the Kachin was recognized by

the central state in the form of specific measures applied during the initial ceasefire agreement in 1994.¹

In 2012 alone, fighting between the KIA and the government resulted many casualties of both civilian and military. The violence resulted in the displacement of many civilians and the complete or partial abandonment of several villages.

Ceasefire agreements have been signed between the KIA and the government several times; most notably a ceasefire signed in 1994 that lasted for 17 years until June 2011. As a result of the ceasefire breakdown, Kachin State has faced waves of internal displacement, with over 90,000 internally displaced people spread across over 150 camps or camp-like settings as of April 2017.² Many Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps are located in non-government controlled areas with severely restricted access. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that in April and May 2018, over 14,000 people were displaced from fighting between the KIO/KIA and the Myanmar Army.³ Since June

¹ Crane Jaquet. “The Kachin Conflict: The Search for Common Narrative”. (Online). Available : https://www.themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/assessment_file_attachments/The_Kachin_Conflict_-_EU_2014.pdf

² “Internal Conflicts in Myanmar”. (Online). Available : https://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internal_conflict_in_Myanmar

³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. “Displacement Related to Conflict and Violence”. (Online). Available : <https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/GRID%202019%20-%20Conflict%20Figure%20Analysis%20-%20MYANMAR.pdf>

2011, there are over 1095 clashes between the Myanmar Army and KIA which cooperating with AA and ABSDF.⁴ In 2013, there are several tensions between Red Shan according to the force recruitment.⁵ In 2014, there are total 73 clashes between the Myanmar Army and KIA alone.⁶ In 2016, there are total 83 clashes between Myanmar Army and 2 clashes between BGF and PMF.⁷ In 2015, the major military incident happened between KIO and the Myanmar Army according to the illegal timber trading and jade mining. In August 2015, the Myanmar Army attacked the Gidon post.⁸

2. Conflicts and Its Sources in Kayah State

The largest insurgent group in Kayah State (formerly Karenni State) is the Karenni Army, whose goal for the past few decades has been to obtain independence and self-determination for the Karenni people. On 2 May 1957 the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)

⁴ Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process : A Reference Guide 2014". (Online). Available : <https://www.bnionline.net>, www.mmpeacemonitor.org

⁵ Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2013, p 7. www.bnionline.net www.mmpeacemonitor.org

⁶ Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2015, p 9. www.bnionline.net www.mmpeacemonitor.org

⁷ Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2016, p 4. www.bnionline.net www.mmpeacemonitor.org

⁸ Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2016, p 8.

was formally established by nationalists seeking to unify the Karenni cause.⁹

During 1963-64 the KNPP had taken part in the Yangon “Peace Parley” in a joint NDUF delegation that included the CPB. The first peace offer was made in 1989 to ethnic mutineers from the CPB. The KNPP agreed to a verbal ceasefire with the government in March 1995 in Loikaw.¹⁰ In 2013, the Myanmar Army and KNPP clashed more than 10 times in Mawchi Township.¹¹

3. Conflicts and Its Sources in Kayin State

The Karen people of Kayin State (formerly Karen State) in eastern Myanmar are the third largest ethnic group in Myanmar, consisting of roughly 7% of the country's total population.¹² Karen insurgent groups have fought for independence and self-determination since 1949. In 1949, the commander-in-chief of the Myanmar Army General Smith Dun, an ethnic Karen, was fired because of the rise of Karen opposition groups, which furthered ethnic tensions. He was replaced by General Ne Win. The Karen National Union declared war to the Burmese

⁹ Tom Cramer : From War to Peace in Kayah State, Transnational Institute. (Online). Available : https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/tni-2018_karenni_eng_web_def.pdf

¹⁰ Chit Min Tun, Government Suggests KNPP sign, UNOCHA, <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/govt-suggests-knpp-sign-ceasefire-fall>

¹¹ Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process: A Reference Guide (Online). Available : www.bnionline.net www.mmpeacemonitor.org

¹² Karen People, (Online). Available : https://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internal_conflict_in_Myanmar

government on 31 January 1949. Ever since the start the conflict has been characterized by seasonal dependent fighting, internal struggles within the KNU and atrocities being committed by both sides. The KNU/KNLA army has been divided into seven brigades. Occasionally a brigade Commander would act independently from the KNU leadership. Shortly after the outbreak of the conflict then KNU president Saw Ba U Gyi created the Four Principles.¹³

According to a report by legal firm DLA Piper, whose report was presented to the United Nations Security Council, these tactics against the Karen can be identified as ethnic cleansing. The government had however, denied these claims.

The initial aim of the largest Karen opposition group, the Karen National Union (KNU), and its armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), was to obtain independence for the Karen people. However, since 1976 they have instead called for a federal union with fair Karen representation and the self-determination of the Karen people. Nearly all of their demands and requests have been ignored or denied by successive governments, a contributing factor to failed peace talks until political reforms which begun in 2011 and ended in 2015.

In 1995, the main headquarters and operating bases of the KNU had mostly been destroyed or captured by the government, forcing the KNLA (the armed wing of the KNU) to instead operate in the jungles of Kayin State. In 2012, the Myanmar Army comprised of BGF clashed 6 times between KNLA in the Phapun, HlaingBwe and Beelin Township.¹⁴

¹³ Pedersen, D., Secret Genocide. Voices of the Karen of Burma. Maverick House Publisher : Dunboyne, Ireland, 2011, p.7

¹⁴ Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2013, p 9.

In 2014, the Myanmar Army clashed with KNU 5 times in Phapun and HlaingBwe Township.¹⁵ The KNU signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the government of Myanmar on 15 October 2015, along with seven other insurgent groups. The Myanmar Army entered the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO) headquarters territory of Oo Kray Kee Village in Waw Lay Sub-Township, Myawaddy District on 27 April 2016 and it happens minor tension to both sides.¹⁶ According to the territory dispute, the KNU had clashed with NMSP On 8 September 2016.¹⁷ In March 2018, the government of Myanmar sending their soldiers into KNU-held territory to build a road connecting two military bases it violated the agreement however the Myanmar Army agreed to “temporarily postpone” their road project and to withdraw troops from the area¹⁸. Armed clashes erupted between the KNU and the Myanmar Army in the Ler Mu Plaw area of Hpapun District. On 17 May 2018, the Myanmar Army agreed to “temporarily postpone” their road project and to withdraw troops from the area.¹⁹

¹⁵ Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2015, p 10.

¹⁶ Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2016, p 9.

¹⁷ Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2016, p 10.

¹⁸ Nyein, Nyein (17 May 2018). "Tatmadaw Agrees to Halt Contentious Road Project in Karen State" he Irrawaddy. Archived from the original on 3 June 2018. Retrieved 3 June 2018.

¹⁹ Burma Bulletin, Alternative ASEAN Network of Burma, Issue 137. (Online). Available : [http://www.altsean.org/bulletins/Burma Bulletin May2018.pdf](http://www.altsean.org/bulletins/Burma%20Bulletin%20May2018.pdf)

4. Conflicts and Its Sources in Rakhine State

Insurgent groups of the Rakhine ethnic minorities have fought against the government for self-determination in Rakhine State since the early 1950s.²⁰ The Rakhine ethnic insurgent groups, such as the Arakan Army and Arakan Liberation Army (ALA), continue to have hostilities towards the government, though major violence has been rare since political reforms and peace talks. The Arakan Army, founded in 2009, is currently the largest insurgent group in Rakhine State, with around 8,000 active fighters.²¹

Bengali Muslim insurgents have been fighting local government forces and other insurgent groups in northern Rakhine State since 1948, with ongoing religious violence between the predominantly Muslim Bengali and Buddhist Rakhines fueling the conflict.²² The legal and political rights of the Bengali people have been an underlying issue in the conflict, with spontaneous bouts of violence such as the 2012 Rakhine State riots and 2013 Myanmar anti-Muslim riots periodically occurring as a result. Despite making up majorities of the population in the three northern townships of Rakhine State, Bengali are often targets of religiously motivated attacks. Because the Bengali people wanted to become as an

²⁰ Martin Smith, Arakan (Rakhine State). “A Land in Conflict on Myanmar’s Western Frontier”. (Online). Available : https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/tni-2020_arakan_web.pdf

²¹ Arakan Army. (Online). Available : [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arakan_Armey_\(Kachin_State\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arakan_Armey_(Kachin_State))

²² “Northern State Clashes”. (Online). Available : https://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Rakhine_State_clashes

official ethnic group in Myanmar, Bengali cannot apply for citizenship and few laws exist to protect their rights.

On 9 October 2016, unidentified insurgents attacked three Myanmar border posts along Myanmar's border with Bangladesh, starting a new armed conflict in northern Rakhine State.²³ On 11 October 2016, in Maungdaw, the attackers looted several dozen firearms and ammunition from the border posts. A newly emerged insurgent group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), claimed responsibility a week later.

During the early hours of 25 August 2017, ARSA insurgents launched coordinated attacks on 24 police posts and the 552nd Light Infantry Battalion military base. In response, the Myanmar Army launched operations in northern Rakhine State. The government of Myanmar declared ARSA as terrorist group on 25 August 2017.²⁴ On 4 January 2019, around 300 Arakan Army insurgents launched pre-dawn attacks on four border police outposts—Kyaung Taung, Nga Myin Taw, Ka Htee La and Kone Myint—in northern Buthidaung Township. Following the attacks, the Office of the President of Myanmar held a high-level meeting on national security in the capital Naypyidaw on 7 January 2019, and instructed the Defense Ministry to increase troop deployments in the areas that were attacked. On 9 March 2019, around 60 AA insurgents

²³ Rohingya Conflict. (Online). Available : https://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rohingya_conflict

²⁴ ARSA Declared as Terrorist Group, The Global News Light of Myanmar, (Online). Available : <https://www.Globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/arakan-rohingya-salvation-army-arsa-declared-as-terroristgroup/>

launched an evening attack on Yoe-ta-yoke Police Station.²⁵ On the same day, AA insurgents managed to conquer the front line commanding post of Rakhine State's Gwa Township-based No. 563 Light Infantry Battalion under the supervision of Light Infantry Division No. 5. Subsequent clashes between the Myanmar Army and the Arakan Army were reported in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, Kyauktaw, Rathedaung and Ponnagyun Townships. Since 6 February 2020, Arakan Army attacked Meechaung Outpost of the Tatmadaw, which is located at the bank of Kaladan River, Paletwa Township, Chin State, in order to take control of the command post. On 21 June 2016, the AA conflicted two times with ALP in Palatwa Township, Chin State and Kyauk Taw Township, Rakhine State.²⁶

5. Conflicts and Its Resources in Shan State

The Shan people are the largest ethnic group in Shan State and the second largest in Myanmar. In 1947, the Panglong Agreement was negotiated between General Aung San, a prominent founding father of Myanmar, and Shan leaders, which would have given the Shan the option to split from Myanmar a decade after independence if they were unsatisfied with the central government. This was, however, not honoured by the post-independence government following Aung San's assassination. One of the largest Shan insurgent groups in Myanmar is the Shan State Army - South (SSA-S), which has around 6,000 to 8,000 soldiers, and

²⁵ Arakan Army. (Online). Available : [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arakan_Army_\(Kachin_State\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arakan_Army_(Kachin_State))

²⁶ Moe Myint, Spat Breaks Out Between Arakanese Armed Groups, Irrawaddy, 24 Jun 2016.

was led by Yawd Serk until his resignation on 2 February 2014.²⁷ The SSA-S maintains bases along the Myanmar–Thailand border, and signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on 2 December 2011.²⁸

The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) is a Kokang insurgent group active in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone in northern Shan State. The group signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in 1989, the same year it was founded, which lasted for two decades until 2009, when violence erupted between the group and government forces. Violence again erupted between the MNDAA and government forces in 2015 and 2017.

In 2013, the total 120 clashes happened between the Myanmar Army and TNLA in Northern Shan State.²⁹ In 2014, there are 118 clashes between the Myanmar Army and TNLA.³⁰ In late November 2016, the Northern Alliance which consists of four insurgent groups, the Arakan Army (AA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) attacked towns and border posts along the China–Myanmar border in Muse Township, northern Shan State. The

²⁷ Shan State Army-South. (Online). Available : https://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shan_State_Army_-_South

²⁸ Cho Cho Thwin, *Mindful Communication for Sustainable Development*, 2018, p 120.

²⁹ *Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2014*, p 8.

³⁰ *Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2015*, p 10.

Myanmar Army and MNDAA clashed in Koakang region in 2015.³¹ On 27 October 2015, the TNLA clashed between RCSS in Kyaukme, northern Shan State due to territorial dispute.³² The insurgents captured the town of Mong Ko on 25 November 2016 and maintained control of it until they withdrew from the town on 4 December 2016. On 15 August 2019, Northern Alliance insurgents attacked a military college and in Pyin Oo Lwin Township as well as Gotetwin in Naung Cho Township.³³

UWSA conflicted with NDAA in 2015 for their strategic plan.³⁴ Further clashes occurred in the following days, with Myanmar's military warning there could be a full-scale war if the Northern Alliance did not halt their attacks. There are 71 clashes in 2013 and 17 clashes between the Myanmar Army and SSPP in 2014. In 2015, SSPP/SSA clashed between the Myanmar many times for strategic positions along the Salween river near UWSA area and defending their headquarters.³⁵ Several insurgent groups have negotiated ceasefires and peace agreements with successive governments, which until political reforms between 2011 and 2015 had largely fallen apart. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was a landmark agreement signed between the government of

³¹ Transnational Institute “Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue: Consequences of the Kokang Crisis for Peace and Democracy in Myanmar”, Myanmar Policy Briefing Nr 15, July 2015; 2

³² The Myanmar Times (2016) Fighting flares in Shan State ahead of peace talks with NLD leader, 6 May 2016.

³³ Attacks of AA, MNDA and TNLA Armed Groups, The Global New Light of Myanmar, 17 August 2019, p 7.

³⁴ Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2016, p 10.

³⁵ Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2015, p 8.

Myanmar and eight insurgent groups on 15 October 2015; two other insurgent groups later joined on 13 February 2018.³⁶

Key Factors of Conflicts

1. Competition for Control of Strategic and Commercial Interests :

The armed conflict happened between the Myanmar Army and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) because the KIO had made illegal trading for teak and timber in Kachin State and Jade in Hpa-Kant mine where government law enforcement regions. Another factor is that the KIO were trying to expand to their control area/ strategic position near Laiza.³⁷ Jade mining is very economically important for the Government and for the KIA it is one of their main financial resources. Therefore the government must be brought under control to prevent illegal business.³⁸

In Northern Shan State, the Myanmar Army forces are tasked with protecting the Shweli hydropower dams, oil and gas pipelines to China and national highways from Muse on the Sino-Myanmar border in Shan State to Mandalay in central Myanmar.

The government forces attacked SSPP in Kehsi township in early October of 2015 and they finally captured a strategic hill on the west bank of the Salween River because they wanted to control the area in order to hinder the activities of the UWSA.

³⁶ Nationwide Ceased Fire Agreement. (Online). Available : https://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationwide_Ceasefire_Agreement

³⁷ Nyein Nyein, Govt Targets Kachin Rebels in Timber Takedown, Irrawaddy, 6 Jan 2015.

³⁸ Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2015, p 16.

The government forces attacked the MNDAA in the Kokang area and captured strategically important hills there because they wanted to sever liaison between the UWSA, the KIA and the TNLA. And the government is attempting to build big dams in conflict affected zones and this can cause further conflict with ethnic armed organization.

2. Ownership and Natural Resources Management

The ethnic armed organizations and ethnic communities view themselves as rightful owners where the government view natural resources as centrally owned by the national government. Therefore, this different perception of sovereignty has made conflicts.

3. Government's Attempt to Clamp Down on Economic Activities by EAOs :

The Myanmar Army entered NSAG areas to suppress illegal activities such as smuggling of timber to China : and they attacked NSAGs when they strayed beyond their designated areas. The government also said that the Myanmar Army must prevent illegal logging and timber export, which they claimed is protected by the KIA in return for a tax.

4. Distrust and Suspicion about Each Other

Army ordered the SSPP to remove from Tahpa Soung bridge in Kehsi Township in southern Shan State. The Myanmar Army accused RCSS soldiers of killing government Forestry Department officials in southern Shan State. Later, police arrested the real perpetrators, and the RCSS is seeking an apology.

The KNU's Brigade 5 rejected road-building and other mega projects in its control area in Hpa-pun township of Kayin State. They believe that Myanmar Army will use roads for military purposes in future assaults upon their positions. When travelling in Rakine State on 16 June

2014, in defiance of the ceasefire agreement between the State Government and the ALP, which permits the latter's soldiers to travel freely within the State, so long as they do not carry weapons.

5. Failure to Adhere to Agreements Over Control Areas

The Myanmar Army and NSAGs have not reached agreement over controlled areas, except in the case of the UWSA and the NDAA. Deployment of NSAG and government forces overlaps which can lead to complications. The NCCT and UPWC were unable to discuss military matters but they agreed to discuss a code of conduct and to form a joint monitoring committee within one month of the official signing of the NCA by top leaders.

6. Ineffective Liaison Offices

The government provided liaison offices for NSAG liaison officers however it was ineffective communication resulted from language problems, lack of ability, delays caused by excessive works, and lack of understanding of the procedures for communicating with local government and military affairs security officers.

7. Overlapping Territories

There is no clear demarcation line between the Myanmar Armed Forces and the ethnic armed forces. This is why the two sides frequently clash. The Government forces and NSAGs heap mutual blame on each other when armed conflict occurs.

8. Different Perspectives


The Myanmar Army views its operations as being in defence of the country's sovereignty. On the other hand, EAOs see themselves as countering aggression, occupation, and ethnic cleansing through cultural assimilation, by fighting a just war in defence of their rightful territories.

Conclusion

As a most ethnic diverse country, Myanmar, itself, still remaining to solve many problems and issues in accordance with internal conflicts between ethnic groups and minority. The author is trying to identify the historical background and key factors of the various conflicts which happened in Myanmar. The political and economy of the country damaged according to the internal conflict of the country because of long term tension, lack of negotiation, misunderstanding. However, the author strongly recommend to solve with the means of peace negotiation which is more better to utilize in this conflicted country.

Conceptual Framework

The following is the figure of Conceptual Framework :



Chapter 3

The Factors of the Internal Armed Conflicts that Affected Political, Economic, and Social Development

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the factors of internal armed conflicts that affected political, economic, and social development. The researcher will examine the factors which affected to the political, economic, and social development of the country. This chapter will compass more specifically of the affected factors according to the internal conflicts in Myanmar.

Factors Effect to Politic

1. Infrastructure Development

1.1 Myitsone Dam : The largest Chinese investment project in Myanmar, the controversial \$3.6 billion Myitsone Dam, is located in upper Kachin state. China's strategic oil and gas pipeline project, built by the China National Petroleum Co., passes through the Shan state, but is located close to the conflict zones in lower Kachin and upper Shan states. The prolonged Kachin conflict is a major obstacle to Myanmar's national reconciliation and a challenging test for the democratization process.

The KIO and the Myanmar government differ on the priority between the cease-fire and the political dialogue. Without addressing this difference, the nationwide peace accord proposed by the government

will most likely lack the KIO's participation. The disagreements on terms have hindered a formal cease-fire. In addition, the existing economic interest groups profiting from the armed conflict have further undermined the prospect for progress. China intervened in the Kachin negotiations in 2013 to protect its national interests. Promoting national peace and reconciliation is a pillar of the Myanmar government policy. The success of these investments is closely associated with the local stability and the endorsement by the local people. For example, the suspension of the Myitsone Dam has been partially attributed to the Kachin's opposition to the project and the government's concern for national reconciliation.¹

1.2 Dapein Dam: Dapein Dam was forced to shut down as a result of the Kachin conflict starting in June 2011 and operations were only resumed two years later. It was a smaller hydropower project that received investment by the Chinese Datang Group, the Dapein Dam, is also located in Kachin state but closer to the Chinese border.² In addition to the fear that the ongoing armed conflict in Kachin state might jeopardize the operation of the oil and gas pipeline, there have been concerns among Chinese analysts that armed groups in Myanmar might target the project in retaliation for China's cooperation with the central government.³

¹ "Yunnan Grid : Dapein hydropower resumes power transmission," [云南电网 : 缅甸太平江一级电站 恢复送电], China Southern Power Grid [南方电网报], May 11, 2013.

² Interviews with Chinese analysts, Yunnan and Beijing, Jul. 2011, Aug. 2012.

³ Press Conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jun. 16, 2011.

China has a long border with Myanmar's Kachin state with deep political, economic and social ties. The situation in the Kachin conflict directly affects China's border stability. In 2009, the Kokang conflict in neighboring Shan state sent approximately 37,000 refugees into China's Yunnan province and gravely threatened the local border security and social stability.⁴ Since then, border stability has been an issue constantly emphasized by Chinese leaders in meetings with their Myanmar counterparts.⁵ The Kachin conflict could also affect China's internal stability and Han-minority relations due to the Jingpo (Kachin population in China) sympathy and support of the KIO.⁶

⁴ Brian McCartan, "China, Myanmar border on a conflict," *Asia Times*, Sep. 10, 2009.

⁵The maintenance of border stability was emphasized by the following: then-Vice President Xi Jinping's visit of Myanmar in December 2009; then-Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Myanmar in June 2010; President U Thein Sein's visit to Beijing in May 2011; Speaker of the Lower House, U Shwe Mann's visit to Beijing in May 2012; PLA Chief-of-staff Qi Jianguo's meeting with President U Thein Sein in January 2013; President Xi Jinping's meeting with Tatmadaw commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing in Beijing in October 2013; Premier Li Keqiang's meeting with President U Thein Sein in Brunei in October 2013, etc.

⁶ "Jingpo people in Yunnan gather at the border, claiming to enter Myanmar and help the Kachin if there is no ceasefire," [云南景颇族人集结边境 称若不停火就赴缅帮克钦族], *New Beijing Daily*[*新京报*], Jan. 13, 2013.

The government requested the KIA to move their bases away from the Taping dam so they could protect their investment. Therefore it happened to the barrier for the peace talk of national reconciliation.⁷

1.3 Shwe Gas Pipeline: The SSPP/SSA, KIA and TNLA have been clashing with the Myanmar army in northern Shan state where the Shwe Gas pipeline is being built. The pipeline will connect China's Yunnan province to Kyaukphyu in Rakhine state, Myanmar.⁸ The KIA attacks on infrastructures such as communication towers, 1 electric power grid, 1 power plant in Kachin State happened to delay the peace talk of national reconciliation.⁹

1.4 Shwe Li 3 Dam Project : Currently, the Shwe Li 3 hydro power dam project, which located in Northern Shan State, is implementing in its development phase as of 31 October 2019. And also the dam project is situated in the conflict zone of ethnic armed groups and the Myanmar Army. Dozens of grassroots civil society organisations have called for a moratorium on dams and other major developments in ethnic states at the current time because of the link between large scale projects and ethnic armed conflicts which will prolong the conflicts and jeopardize the peace process.¹⁰

⁷ Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2013, p 34.

⁸ Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2013, p 18.

⁹ Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2013, p 110.

¹⁰ Shwe Li 3 Dam Project <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/myanmar-fears-of-more-conflicts-and-human-rights-abuses-around-french-energy-giant-edf%E2%80%99s-shweli-3-dam-project>

1.5 Salween Dam : According to construction of Salween Dam (Ywa Thit hydro-electric dam) in Kayah State, the KNPP refuses to deploy and provide the Myanmar Army forces for the security of the dam construction. Therefore, it allows one of the barriers for politic of national reconciliation.¹¹ The government refuses to discuss with SSPP for ongoing conflicts along the Shwe gas pipeline in northern Shan State and neither did the two sides talk about Ta Hsarm Pu dam over the Pang river - the Myanmar Army demanded the SSPP/SSA to withdraw from the area.¹²

1.6 Tasang Dam: The construction of Tasang hydropower dam in Shan State work has reportedly resumed and had been relocated to a site on the Salween River near Mongton town. The construction will affect the 123 villages to be forcibly relocated to make way for the US \$12-billion project, which is being funded by Chinese and Thai investors (20 Mar 2013). The dam will produce the massive 7,000-megawatt dam began in 2010, but was suspended due to the ongoing ethnic conflict in the area.¹³

1.7 The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, which jointly implemented by Myanmar and India, is expected to be completed by mid-2014 but is expected to be operational only by 2019-2020 as all components of the project, including Sittwe port and power, river dredging, Paletwa jetty, have been completed, except the under construction Zorinpui-Paletwaa road, construction of which commenced in April 2018 (December 2018 update).¹⁴ The project is an Indian

¹¹ Peace Process : A Reference Guide 2013, p 116.

¹² Peace Process : A Reference Guide 2013, p 161.

¹³ Peace Process : A Reference Guide 2014, p 66.

¹⁴ Road to Mandalay Indian Express, June 2018.

government initiative to provide India with trade and transport links to its northeastern states, which are otherwise inaccessible overland via India's rugged mountainous region.

The route of the project around Paletwa and along the Kaladan river is troubled with Chin conflict and militant groups such as Arakan Army and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA).^{15 16} Although India has awarded all the contract for 100 km 4-lane Aizawal-Zurinpui highway within India and 2 km Zorinpui-Kaletwa 2-lane highway within Myanmar, which will be completed by the 2019, the project has been facing the delays and issues because of conflict between Arakan Army and the Myanmar Army.¹⁷ Therefore, this leads to effect the political of the government and improvement of peace process.

1.8 The India–Myanmar–Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway (Friendship Highway) is a highway under construction that will connect Moreh, India with Mae Sot, Thailand via Myanmar.¹⁸ The road is expected to boost trade and commerce in the ASEAN–India Free Trade Area, as well as with the rest of Southeast Asia. Regarding to this project, it cannot be

¹⁵ Buddhist refugees in Mizoram begin journey back to Myanmar, but unconfirmed tales of horror keep them on edge, First Post.

¹⁶ NE Displaced people, The Wire.

¹⁷ Kaladan Transport Project (Online). Available : https://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaladan_Multi-Modal_Transit_Transport_Project

¹⁸ "All you want to know about Delhi to Bangkok Road Trip - Myths & Reality". Tripoto. 11 September 2015. Retrieved 20 September 2015.

achieve because they cannot implement if any conflict and clashes where the highway crossing area in Rakhine State and Kayin State as well.

1.9 Muse-Mandalay Railway Road: The project is part of Myanmar's cooperation in the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). The railway road, which will have 36 stations, about 60 tunnels and about 124 bridges, will cost about US\$7 billion. Electric trains will run on the railway, which will be about 414 kilometers long. The trip from Muse to Mandalay will take three hours, and the line will link with Kunming city in China, according to the railway. When completed, the line is expected to facilitate exports to China and ease traffic jams on roads used for border trade. It is also expected to create jobs and attract technical assistance.¹⁹

If built, these massive infrastructure projects are poised to radically transform Myanmar. The expansion of highways and railroads across the country will accelerate the flow of trade, labour and capital, tying Myanmar's future ever closer to China's. Yet the underlying questions remain: what kind of future is envisioned for the country, and who gets to decide that vision? If there will be not stable in as usual position along this railway road which will implement in Northern Shan state, there the political impact and damage will follow.

2. Lack of Unified and Shared Goals in Fighting

During the Military regime period a joint ethnic armed group comprising the KNU, the NMSP, the KNPP, the CPB, and the KIA and the Shan State Independence Army formed the National Democratic Front (NDF) in 1963. The goal was to unite all ethnic armed groups and

¹⁹ Kyaw Ko Ko. "The new Muse-Mandalay Railway Road, Myanmar Times". (Online). Available : <https://www.mmmtimes.com/news/route-new-muse-mandalay-express-railroad-selected.html>

assist one another fell apart with each fighting independently. Some ethnic armed groups signed separate ceasefire agreements with the military regime and equally they signed multiple peace agreements with various ethnic armed groups without deliberating on concrete steps and policies for dealing with problems—for example the BGF policy.

In addition, the SPDC paid ambivalent attention to ethnic parties that had not signed ceasefire agreements. According to Martin Smith (“Ethnic Participation and National Reconciliation in Myanmar: Challenges in a Transitional Landscape” in Trevor Wilson, *Myanmar's Long Road to National Reconciliation*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006, Chapter 3), most of the smaller splinter factions like the Wa-Kokang-Mongla groups were neglected, while major, more popular armed opposition groups like the members of the NDF such as the SSA, the KIO and the NMSP received greater attention. Thus the lack of cohesion, unity and shared goals amongst ethnic armed group and the ineffectiveness of the ceasefire policy had many disadvantages.²⁰

Factors Effect to Economic Development

1. Informal Agriculture

1.1 Sugar Cane, Watermelon and Banana Plantation:

Over the past two decades, Myanmar has become an important source of agricultural products for Chinese markets, making this sector a major focus for small and medium-sized Chinese investors. Plantation agriculture illustrates both the potential and the pitfalls of small-scale Chinese

²⁰ National Reconciliation in Myanmar. (Online). Available : https://www.jstor.org/stable/48531514?read-now=1&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

investment. Attracted by the availability of land, the lack of regulations and cheap labor, these businesses have heavily invested in vast plantations of cash crops, such as sugarcane, corn, watermelons and bananas.

These investments—and the associated trade in agricultural products—undoubtedly benefit the Myanmar economy and rural communities, through tax revenue, land rental fees and wages. But they are also largely unregulated and can be drivers of conflict. In the worst cases, investments fill the coffers of armed groups, either directly or indirectly, and reinforce the grievances that underpin conflict in northern Myanmar, particularly around land use.

Most Chinese investment in agriculture is informal and unrecorded due to the conflict setting, corruption and legal restrictions, particularly regarding foreign ownership and use of land. Often, this investment is in the form of contract farming or short-term land rental agreements. In other cases, however, Chinese investors have used Myanmar proxies, either individuals or companies, to secure long-term land leases, including in conflict areas. There is no reliable data on the size of the plantation sector, but informal Chinese investment in Myanmar's agriculture industry likely runs into hundreds of millions of dollars a year. Almost none of this money shows up in Myanmar's official investment statistics. The scale of the industry is partially reflected in trade data, however. Myanmar's official exports to China of the four products mentioned above stood at more than \$1.2 billion in 2017-2018.²¹

²¹ International Crisis Group, *Commerce and Conflict : Navigating Myanmar's China Relationship*, (Online). Available : <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/305-commerce-and-conflict-navigating-myanmars-china-relationship>

The informal nature of most Chinese investment has provided the agriculture sector with speed and agility, enabling it to respond quickly to market forces. It has also made the sector difficult to regulate, however – in terms of not just investment flows, but also labor rights, environmental rules, and the levying of taxes and duties. Much of the trade falls into a legal grey zone due to Chinese import restrictions and requirements, and exports are regularly disrupted by periodic crackdowns as well as conflict in northern Shan State. Plantations are also often located in conflict-affected areas of Kachin and Shan states, close to the shared border. In these areas in particular, plantation agriculture has animated anti-Chinese sentiment among affected communities, even though members of these same communities are often complicit, acting as partners, fronts or brokers for Chinese businesses.²²

1.2 Poppy Plantation: According to the UNODC survey report, the resulting estimate of potential dry opium production in 2019 was 508 metric tons.²³ The Government and the UNODC signed a landmark integrated country program for 2014-2017, in which they agreed to collaborate to strengthen the rule of law and address significant

²² Commerce and Conflict (Online). Available : <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/305-commerce-and-conflict-navigating-myanmars-china-relationship>

²³ UNODC, Myanmar Opium Survey 2019. (Online). Available :https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific//Publications/2020/Myanmar_Opium_Survey_2019.pdf

crime and drug issues.²⁴ Surveys from farmers in Golden Triangle poppy-growing villages show that money from poppy cultivation is essential for villagers suffering from food insecurity and poverty. The farm-gate value of opium is an important measure of the gross income of farmers generated by opium poppy cultivation and it was estimated to range between 61 to 107 million US\$ (mid-point 81 million US\$). In 2019 domestic consumption of 6 tons of heroin led to an income between 152 and 290 million US\$, whereas the export of heroin (23 - 52 tons) was deemed to be worth between 458 million and 1.04 billion US\$ for Myanmar traffickers.²⁵ The poppy plantations are mostly in conflicts area and are therefore it effected to the economic development of the country.

2. Economic Investment

The Kachin conflict has disrupted China's border security and jeopardized its economic investments in the region. The Kachin conflict has been a policy challenge for both China and its border tranquility and the protection of Chinese investments are the top considerations for all border regions. If the government of Myanmar, the Myanmar Army and KIA are maintaing the conflict in Kachin state there will be more impact to the economic investment of China, which will more impact to the economic development of the country.

²⁴ UNODC, Myanmar and UNODC sign landmark agreement to strengthen the rule of law and counter crime and drug threats, 18 Aug 2014, web

²⁵UNODC, Myanmar Opium Survey 2019, p 18-19.

The state-backed China-Myanmar Economic Corridor not only large-scale private Chinese investment in plantation agriculture but also investment of the Shwe Kokko “new city” development in Kayin State of the Myanmar-Thailand border.²⁶

2.1 Illegal Trading

The Myanmar Army and the KIA clashed in Namlinpa, Kawng Lwin and Mong Dainpa village in Mansi Township in Kachin state for illegal activities, especially smuggling of timber to China. The Myanmar Army was intended to stop illegal logging in the area and the government said that the Myanmar Army must prevent illegal logging and timber export, which they claimed is protected by the KIA in return for a tax.²⁷ But in recent years, the illegal logging trade between Myanmar’s Kachin State and China’s Yunnan Province has still been valued at \$600 million per year.²⁸ Therefore it is one of the effected factors to the economic development of the country.

2.2 Muse SEZ Attack

In mid-August 2019, the Northern Alliance(TNLA, AA and MNDAA) – a coalition of ethnic armed groups seeking autonomy – launched attacks that shut down the government-controlled Muse and Chinshwehaw trade routes with China. Millions of dollars’ worth of cargo

²⁶ Commerce and Conflict (Online). Available : <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/305-commerce-and-conflict-navigating-myanmars-china-relationship>

²⁷ Peace Process : A Reference Guide 2016, p 17.

²⁸ ASEAN Today, Illegal Timber Trade Continues Despite COVID 19. (Online). Available : <https://www.aseantoday.com/2020/05/myanmars-illegal-timber-trade-continues-despite-covid-19/>

was stranded on both sides of the border. In response, China convened peace talks between the Myanmar military and the Northern Alliance, but negotiations have yet to bear lasting results. The Ministry of Commerce said the activity at the Muse trading zone had fallen from more than US\$6 million per day before Aug. 15 to US\$700,000 after attack.²⁹

Factors Effect to Social Development

1. Banana and Rubber Plantation: According to civil society and government reports, Chinese-run banana plantations in Kachin state have increased dramatically, from 2,500 hectares in 2007 to over 40,500 hectares in 2018. The vast majority of the plantations are located in Waingmaw township, adjacent to the border with China. These rapidly expanding plantations grow tissue culture bananas, and the clonal genetic material and monoculture production require constant applications of chemical fertilizers and pesticides. These chemicals have poisoned local communities' water supplies and aquatic ecosystems. As tissue culture banana cultivation depletes the soil's fertility, agri-business owners constantly need to acquire more land for production. Some Chinese-backed plantations are now found on land used by Kachin farmers until they were displaced by fighting between the Kachin Independence Army and Myanmar's military. It is uncertain if the land will be returned to the original farmers, and they are wondering how to restore the soil. The excessive use of

²⁹ Myo Pa Pa San, China Traders Face Rising Prices After Myanmar Attack, The Irrawaddy, (Online). Available : <https://www.irrawaddy.com/business/china-traders-face-rising-prices-myanmar-attacks.html>

insecticides was widespread in remote villages and most workers suffering from illnesses.³⁰

2. Lack of Education in IDP Camps : According to UN reports, it is estimated that nearly 130,000 refugees fled their native place in Kachin State and Northern Shan State because of the armed conflict between the Myanmar Army and EAOs. In order other conflict-affected areas such as Kayin, Northern Shan State and Rakhine States, the number of displaced amounted to nearly 302,200 as of 31 December 2019.³¹ According to UNHCR and UNOCHA, over 87,000 Myanmar nationals have fled to Malaysia, 90,000 to Thailand.³² Therefore many IDPs children who are requiring the education such as primary, secondary and high school level in every internal displaced camps in the conflict areas.

3. Public Health in IDP Camps: According to the report 2017 of Ministry of Health and Sports, the government provided health care activities for 96 IDP camps in government controlled area, however, they also coordinated and provided technical support to UN, INGOs and

³⁰ Nyein Nyein, The Irrawaddy, Chinese Backed Banana Plantation in Myanmar. (Online). Available : <https://www.irrawaddy.com/features/chinese-backed-banana-plantations-myanmars-kachin-state-prompt-fear-environmental-damage-land-loss.html>

³¹ Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process : A Reference Guide 2017-2018, p 39-41.

³² Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process : A Reference Guide 2017-2018, p 43.

NGOs in non-government controlled area.³³ Out of 100,000 displaced persons in Kachin State more than 80,000 are located in non-government controlled area. Consequently, these displaced persons are facing difficulties in obtaining access to aid. It can assume that most of the IDPs in non-government controlled areas are receiving enough health care such as disease control, reproductive health and health awareness trainings.

In northern Shan State, on the other hand, numerous outbreaks of violence have occurred in 2018 and 2019, involving fighting between the Myanmar Army and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), as well as between EAOs, despite a unilateral ceasefire by the Myanmar Armed Forces between December 2018 and 21 September 2019. This has caused the temporary displacement of thousands of people and happened to be vulnerability of health assistance from both government and INGOs.

4. Safety and Security: Human trafficking, Recruitment Soldier: Reports of human trafficking are emerging from camps of internally displaced persons (IDPs), situated within KIA controlled territory along the Myanmar – China border, as some IDPs make the journey into China in search of employment to resolve their livelihood woes. The IDPs, who fall victim to human traffickers, make the risky journey into China driven by a lack of food rations within their IDP camp; in order to put their children through education; and to accumulate money for potential medical expenses, it is known. Usually, about five

³³ MOHS, Health care Activities in IDP Camps Kachin State. (Online). Available : <https://www.mohs.gov.mm/Main/content/publication/kachin-health-care-activites-in-idp-camps-kachin-state>

people are trafficked every year.³⁴ In Kayah State every second child is a child soldier; in Kayin State every fourth child is a child soldier.³⁵

A system of recruiting one member per family to the KIA is widely acknowledged by members of the Kachin community, however, it appears that information on the household lists are not used to establish if the recruit is underage. However, KIA recruiters may selectively target children who have dropped out of school.

5. Safety and Security : Landmines in various conflict-affected geographies : According to The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) Land Mine Monitor 2019, there are 4,623 casualties in 1999 to 2019.³⁶ Although many accidents occur as a result of landmines planted by government troops, there are significant proportion of accidents also occur with landmines planted by NSAGs or other local actors.³⁷ At least half of the accidents in the database for eastern

³⁴ Relief Web, Human traffickers Target IDP Camps in Laiza. (Online). Available : <https://www.reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/human-traffickers-target-idp-camps-laiza>

³⁵ Humanitarian Impact of Land Mines in Myanmar 2011, https://www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1FC34FCA40DCF668C1257824004FEA3C-Full_Report.pdf

³⁶ The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Land Mine Monitor 2019. (Online). Available : <http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3074086/Landmine-Monitor-2019-Report-Final.pdf>

³⁷ According to the CBO Database, which includes 293 victims from mine accidents in the period 2000-2008, in Kayin State, Thanintharyi Division and part of Bago Division and Mon State, 37% of these victims claim the accident was caused by a homemade mine, 25%

Myanmar affected civilians, the other half affected soldiers/combatants who had been involved in military activity at the time of the accident. The majority of mine victims are adult men who traditionally undertake activities that are more at risk in a mined environment, for example travelling to areas not known to them.³⁸

claim the accident was due to a factory-made mine, whereas the remaining 38% could not specify whether the accident was due to a factory-made or a homemade mine.

³⁸ Humanitarian Impact of Land Mines in Myanmar 2011. (Online). Available : https://www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1FC34FCA40DCF668C1257824004FEA3C-Full_Report.pdf

Chapter 4

Proposed Solutions for Affected Factors of the Internal Conflict

Introduction

In this chapter, the researcher will propose the potential solutions for affected factors which had been examined in the previous chapter. However, the solutions are not limited to the affected factors because the leadership's ability of the government, appetite of the new challenges to political, economic and social development of the country. The researcher consider the Myanmar's political stance, economic development, social stability and the smooth development of the economic with comprehensive ways to obtain practical solution not only satisfaction for the Myanmar but also for the neighboring countries and regional countries.

Resolution for the Impacts of Political Development

Propose Resolution for Infrastructure Development

1. Many dams are being built in Myanmar to supply water for agriculture, a major industry, and to improve the poor supply of electricity in urban areas. However, differently, the \$3.6 billion Myitsone dam with serious power shortages in Yunnan province bordering Myanmar, the Myitsone Dam began as a joint China-Myanmar project based on a memorandum of agreement between the governments of China and Myanmar for the joint development of hydroelectric power in

March 2009. In September 2011, amid protests over the Myitsone Dam's social and environmental costs, Myanmar's then-President U Thein Sein announced the suspension of the project, citing the "will of the people".¹

Naturally, since the end of President U Thein Sein's government in April 2016, China has been calling for Myanmar to resume construction of the dam.² In turn, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi visited China later that year in August and reserved her decision to resume construction pending a report from the investigation committee, but the interim report issued in November postponed the decision. The Myanmar public wants her to say no to the massive hydropower plan, but so far her statements on it have been vague.

The Myitsone project is expected to be one of the issues on the table for discussion. The government of China now acknowledges the China-funded Myitsone project in Kachin State is part of the BRI project, and they had recently stepped up pressure on Myanmar to accept the project. The Chinese ambassador, as well as other officials and representatives of China's State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC), have traveled to Kachin State to meet local groups in an effort to persuade them to say yes to the project. However, public emotion there is

¹ Burma Library "The Standoff over the Myitsone Dam Project in Myanmar : Advantage China". (Online). Available : <https://www.burmalibrary.org/en/the-standoff-over-the-myitsone-dam-project-in-myanmar-advantage-china>

² "2017年11月8日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会" (Online). Available : http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1508649.shtml] (Accessed January 16, 2018)

running high, and a sense of anger toward China is spreading to the rest of Myanmar.

The KIO has responded that to find a solution with the government, because the Myitsone project initially started in consultation with the government. They will follow the opinion of their people.

According to the following factors the Myitsone dam project should not construct :

1.1 People displacement and its impacts

1.2 Environmental Impacts

1.3 Safety Concern

1.4 Cultural submerge

1.5 Health risks

The abrupt suspension of such a significant project has blurred political trust between China and Myanmar, whether the issue could be addressed properly concerns the Myanmar government's credibility and its capability to provide a sound environment for foreign investors amid challenges.

On 12 January 2019, the Embassy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Myanmar issued a statement warning Myanmar that if it failed to resolve the dispute over the stalled Myitsone Hydropower Dam project in Myanmar's northern state of Kachin, "confidence of Chinese entrepreneurs in investing in Myanmar" would be "seriously hurt" (Global Times, February 21).

Both China and Myanmar need to negotiate to obtain the positive outcome and progress that satisfies the basic interests. Therefore, in this regards, the researcher would like to propose two options such as downsizing the dam, moving to a different location or offering the

operator an alternative project instead of the construction of the Myitsone dam in Kachin state.

The NLD government said the final decision would have to be politically, socially, economically and environmentally sound and sustainable. And they also said their government should not abolish a project approved by a previous government just because it did not comply with the current administration's policies. However, Myitsone is now a sovereignty issue and the majority of Myanmar people won't accept the dam. Any government or any political leader, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who seeks a compromise that would allow the Myitsone Dam project to proceed will surely face the public's wrath.³ The NLD government formed a committee to evaluate the impact of the construction of the dam but they announced that it will not publish findings unless approves such a release.⁴

³ The Irrawaddy, Myitsone Dam, (Online). Available : <https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/commentary/myitsone-dam-now-sovereignty-issue.html>

⁴ The Report Myanmar 2017, Oxford Business Group, (Online). Available : https://www.books.google.com.mm/books?id=SV5uDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA107&dq=proposed+solution+for+dapein+dam+project+and+its+impact+to+myanmar&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwilvJrX_JTqAhV38HMBHdr9CigQ6AEwAHoECAMQAg#v=onepage&q=proposed%20solution%20for%20dapein%20dam%20project%20and%20its%20impact%20to%20myanmar&f=false

2. Dapein dam : It was fighting broke out between the Myanmar Army and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) on 9 June 2011 at Dapein No. 1 and 2 dams, which are being constructed by China's state-owned Datang Company, breaking a 17-year ceasefire. Generally, The situation of clashes between the Myanmar Army and KIA is concerning to the government who wanted to control the region that most Chinese hydropower investments located. Therefore, the researcher would like to propose this issue is that there is no way to solve by political means – that is including tripartite parties such as Myanmar, KIO, and including China because it was not only concerning between the government and EAO but also China who invested the dam which located near the border.

3. Shwe Gas Pipeline: The oil and natural gas pipelines run in parallel and start near Kyaukphyu on Made island port on the Bay of Bengal in Myanmar, run under the sea for 5.3 KM to mainland and then run through Mandalay, Pyin Oo Lwin, and Muse in Myanmar before entering China at the border city of Ruili in Yunnan province.⁵ The oil pipeline, which eventually terminates in Kunming, capital of Yunnan province, is 771 kilometres (479 mi) long. The oil and gas pipeline, actually, passed through northern Shan State where Naung Cho, Hsipaw, Kutkai and Muse townships are located, and there was no intentionally attack to this pipeline. The KIO, however, reminded the Myanmar Army not to follow the pipeline into their territory – which means there has

⁵ "Construction of Sino-Myanmar oil-and-gas pipelines to begin in Sept". Global Times. 2009-06-17. Retrieved 2009-06-17.

potential fighting that may be damage the pipeline. So that, the researcher would like to propose that to provide specific agreements when the Myanmar government and KIO make peace talk whether it require more time to negotiate in the future.

4. Shwe Li 3 Dam, Salween Dam, Tasang Dam Project :

At the current time, this dams are located in ethnic states, where ethnic armed conflicts are happening which will prolong the conflicts and jeopardize the peace process. Therefore, the researcher would like to propose that there is an only specific negotiation before peace talk with several EAOs and the Myanmar government.

5. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project :

This project will connect the eastern Indian seaport of Kolkata with Sittwe seaport in Rakhine State, Myanmar by sea. In Myanmar, it will then link Sittwe seaport to Paletwa, Chin State via the Kaladan river boat route, and then from Paletwa by road to Mizoram state in Northeast India. Originally, the project was scheduled to be completed by 2014, but now is delayed according to the conflict between the Myanmar Army and Arakan Army (AA) in Paletwa. Rakhine State is the location for India's multimodal Kaladan project, which is critical for India's Act East policy. The multi-million dollar project has two aspects – a waterway component of 158 km on Kaladan River and development of Sittwe port, as well as a, road component of 109 km from the Indian border.⁶

⁶ The Wire. "Ethnic Armed Group on Rakhine State". (Online). Available : <https://www.thewire.in/south-asia/ethnic-armed-group-in-rakhine-wants-india-to-pay-taxes-for-kaladan-project>

The Arakan Army (AA) was founded in 2009 and conflicted with the Myanmar Armed forces since 2015 in Kyauktaw Township of Rakhine State and Paletwa Township of Chin State. The AA's operations are bringing "negative impacts" on civilians, particularly after a series of kidnappings and thus the Myanmar government declared the Arakan Army (AA) ethnic armed organization to be a terrorist group and an unlawful association on 23 March 2020, saying the AA's actions pose risks to the public and disrupt law and order, peace and the stability of the country.

Firstly, therefore, the researcher would like to propose that the government of Myanmar reconsider the political situation with India and China to attack Arakan Army (AA) who were moving to those borders. The AA who did not signed the peace negotiation with the government of Myanmar whilst they are supported by the China via KIA. On the other hand, the AA wanted the tax for this project from India government.

According to the geographic of Sittwe where located far north of the Kyauk Phyu deep sea port, where strategic energy transit of the China. Therefore, secondly, the government of Myanmar must lure the AA to participate in peace talk by negotiation via China and KIA. However, both India and China should respect the Myanmar government who has sovereign right of a country should not be intruded but rather be respected. Whether the AAs are fighting against with the government of Myanmar, it is not an effective way to obtain their desire but discussion on table. In this regards, the negotiation should not be prolong – which means to create win-win-win solution in the short proper period.

6. Muse-Mandalay Railway Road : The government of Myanmar signed MoU on 22 October 2018.⁷ The preliminary work for this project is among the projects under China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and will not start yet. The China Railway Eryuan Engineering Co (CREEC) was submitted feasible study and the route is nearly confirmed, however the environmental assessment is still under way, and the government will survey residents' opinions along the line.⁸⁹

The researcher would like to propose that before the government of Myanmar are going to implement this project they should reconsider not only the technical, environmental but also the social impact and especially the response of EAOs who are residing in this conflict area where it will passing through Patheingyi, Pyin Oo Lwin, Nawngcho, Thibaw, Lashio, Theinni, Kutkai, Nam Hpet Kar and Muse.

⁷ The Global New Light of Myanmar. "China-Myanmar Economic Corridor Forum". (Online). Available : <https://www.globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/talks-highlight-yunnan-mandalay-railway-and-other-topics-at-china-myanmar-economic-corridor-forum/>

⁸ Myanmar Time. "Initial Technical Report on Muse-Mandalay Railway Project". (Online). Available : <https://www.mmtimes.com/news/initial-technical-report-muse-mandalay-railway-project-submitted.html>

⁹ Myanmar Time. "Route of New Muse-Mandalay Railway Road Selected". (Online). Available : <https://www.mmtimes.com/news/route-new-muse-mandalay-express-railroad-selected.html>

Lack of Unified and Shared Goals in Fighting

In this regard, the Myanmar government and the Military more focus not only on the more popular armed opposition groups but also non-ceased fire EAOs that paves the way peace-building and national dialogue. Thus, the government can express the cohesion, unity and shared goals amongst ethnic armed group and the effectiveness of the ceasefire policy had many advantages.

Resolution for the Impacts of Economic Development

1. Informal Agriculture

1.1 Cane, Watermelon and Banana Plantation : In this regards, the plantations are undoubtedly benefit the Myanmar economy and rural communities, through tax revenue, land rental fees and wages, on the other hand Chinese investors are also benefit from their investments at cheap labor wages, cheapest tax and land rental fees. Therefore, the researcher would like to propose that the government of Myanmar should provide the proper land law or regulations to obtain more mutual benefit for both countries. However, the alternative way is that the government can revise the foreign direct investment (FDI) law to endorse this occasion.

1.2 Poppy Plantation : The poppy plantation produces the opium and then it favors to become inequality of income. The Myanmar's economic development without opium poppy cultivation requires good governance and security, which also are linked to developments in the ongoing peace process. Therefore, the propose resolution is that the government of Myanmar strengthen the institution of governance which

can help to reduce opium poppy cultivation, as well as promoting the support to the rule of law. The cooperation of the NSGA and EAOs is the eradication of opium production in conflict areas. Another factor worth exploring as an alternative development strategy is the provision of land property rights to farmers, while continued support to alternative activities such as cultivating licit crops, earning daily wages, and raising livestock (any combination of the three). And petty trades, relying on remittances or rental of land or equipment were only indicated as a replacement will also help to curb opium poppy cultivation. The presence of the rule of law and law enforcement were conducive to decreases in opium poppy plantation.

Currently, a company has planted more than 200 acres of opium as a substitute opium project, aiming to reach overseas markets, a senate said as an example. According to this submission, the motion was approved at a parliamentary meeting on 17 May 2019; it called on the government to invite private entrepreneurs to work in opium-producing areas in Myanmar's most poppy-growing areas.

The Myanmar government is cooperating with many neighboring countries and regional countries as well as it is being implemented the five-year drug eradication plan from 2014-16 to 2018-19.¹⁰ The Myanmar government also cooperate with UNODC, RCSS and its military aims to develop the trust between all parties. In contrast to the stalled cooperation efforts by the RCSS with the government, combatant groups KIA and TNLA have been active in conducting anti-opium

¹⁰ Kyaw Myo. “The Irrawady, Parliament Approves Proposed Opium Replacement Project”. (Online). Available : <https://www.burma.irrawaddy.com/news/2019/05/18/191667.html>

production campaigns unilaterally, even without a ceasefire with the government.¹¹

2. Economic Investment

Currently, China is Myanmar's second-largest source of foreign investment and its top trade partner. From 1988 to June 30, 2019, approved Chinese investment amounted to more than \$20 billion—nearly 26 percent of total FDI in the country.¹² Since Myanmar's new government took office, the economic investment of China has maintained a friendly cooperation as a whole, especially on May 27, 2011, when joint statement about a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership was signed by China, which marked a new phase for bilateral relations.

However, the suspension of the Myitsone dam was generally considered as the turning point in the economic relations of Myanmar-China. Although this does not reflect the real situation for current bilateral relations, it is true that the investment of China in Myanmar is facing many challenges. As most of the investment of China are situated in the conflict areas such as Northern Shan state, Kachin state and Kayin state, the governments of both sides need to make the required negotiations. Without noticing of environmental impacts and social impacts the dam construction was suspended and its consequence to the

¹¹ Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2014, p 58-59.

¹² Nan Lwin. "The Irrawaddy, China Lead Investment in Myanmar" (Online). Available : <https://www.irrawaddy.com/business/china-leads-investment-yangon.html#:~:text=Currently%20China%20is%20Myanmar's%20second,country%20according%20to%20the%20MIC.>

investment impact and profit impact to both China and the Myanmar government.

Therefore, the researcher would like to propose that both Myanmar and China government are requiring to seek the proper solution which is conducting the assessment of environmental impacts and social impacts. On the other hand, the Myanmar government requires to seek the economical remedies which damaged to the losses of profit. More than that the government considers and solve the liquidated damage due on the country if there has liability in the contract which did not declare in the past.

Resolution for the Impacts of Social Development

1. Banana Plantation : According to the government report, the banana plantation covered about 170,000 acres(70,000 hectors) in 2019.¹³ The excessive use of pesticides and chemicals not only harms the health of the workers, but also damages the land and the environment. The excessive use of insecticides was widespread in remote villages and most workers suffering from illnesses.¹⁴ The health effects of exposure to such large amounts of chemicals don't appear immediately. Five or six

¹³ Lwin Mar Tun. "The Irrawaddy, The Impact of Illegal Banana Plantation". (Online). Available : <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/photos-reveal-impact-illegal-banana-plantations-workers-land-myanmars-kachin-state.html>

¹⁴ Nyein Nyein. "The Irrawaddy, Chinese Backed Banana Plantation in Myanmar". (Online). Available : <https://www.irrawaddy.com/features/chinese-backed-banana-plantations-myanmars-kachin-state-prompt-fear-environmental-damage-land-loss.html>

months after starting to work on the plantations, a number of laborers began to vomit blood and some pregnant women lost their babies. Most of the banana plantation companies did not provide the safety equipment such as glove, mask and safety shoes. Some tissue-culture banana plantation land owners were moved to IDP camps due to the armed conflict and they are fear of loss for their land which rent for long term agreement.

In this regard, the researcher would like to propose the solution is that the government of Myanmar should revise the land law which consistent to current situation. The government and government executing ministries are also requiring to participate inclusively in the revision of the law, regulations and other related guidelines. And the government should negotiate for this issues with KIO whilst they are conducting in peace talk.

2. IDP Camps and Related Social Issues :

2.1 Education Development : According to government figures, there are nearly 43,000 displaced people living in 106 camps under state control, and more than 80,000 living in KIA-controlled camps. Although, the education is a top government priority in Net Enrollment in Primary Education, 2011 view of the low levels of provision and the importance of investment in education for inclusive growth. Net enrolment in education for Myanmar is low compared to other ASEAN countries and the quality of education at all levels is generally poor.

Access for the UN and international organizations to the IDPs in the areas beyond Government control has improved but remains limited. After the NLD government assumed office according to UNOCHA, the number of IDPs increased to 218,000 in Kachin, Shan and Rakhine states in 2017. In 2018, the number of displaced remained at a similar level of 230,000.¹⁵ In other conflict-affected areas such as Kayah, Northern Shan State and Rakhine States, the number of displaced amounted to nearly 302,200 as of 31 December 2019.¹⁶ According to the humanitarian response plan of UNOCHA, there are totally 116,369 kids are needed the education support such as pre-primary/ primary learning opportunities.¹⁷ In areas where crisis-affected children are unable to enroll in services run by Ministry of Education or other service providers.

People in many conflict-affected areas depend on education services provided by local non-state actors. These include community-based and religious organizations as well as the education departments of some EAOs. Their services are often tied closely to ethno-national aspirations for the promotion and preservation of local languages, culture, and history, and are often well adapted to the challenge of providing consistent services in remote or inaccessible areas.

¹⁵ Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process : A Reference Guide 2017-2018, p 43.

¹⁶ Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process : A Reference Guide 2017-2018, p 39-41.

¹⁷ UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan Myanmar, (Online). Available : https://www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MMR_HRP_2020_FINAL_131219.pdf

The government's Ministry of Education has recently begun to support mother-tongue based education, but the scale remains small.¹⁸

Therefore, the government of Myanmar should provide the education service to the children from IDP camps where these camps are located out of government controlled areas. However, the cooperation of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, INGOs and UN organizations are not limited to identify durable and sustainable solutions to ensure that all crisis-affected children in Myanmar have access to inclusive education.

As an executing agency of the Myanmar government, the ministry of education primarily provided education plan which will support to the displaced and other crisis-affected children to enroll in accessible and safe education services. For areas beyond Government control, this support will target services provided by ethnic or community-based education systems.¹⁹

The government has committed to increasing expenditure on education in the coming years, in absolute terms as well as a proportion of the total government budget. The government is also

¹⁸ The Asia Foundation. "The Contested Area of Myanmar". (Online). Available : file:///C:/Users/MAC/Desktop/Translation% 20Files /Co1% 20Moe% 20Min% 20Thein(Thai% 20NDC)/Chapt% 203/ContestedA reasMyanmarReport.pdf

¹⁹ UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan Myanmar, December 2019, p 35.

planning to undertake an overarching education sector reform that includes expanding both the quality as well as extent of education.²⁰

3. Health Provision : The IDPs in non-government controlled areas are not receiving enough health care such as disease control, reproductive health and health awareness trainings. Health indicators in Myanmar currently compare poorly to those of neighboring countries and the government has doubled its commitment to improving health care services and public financing in the healthcare sector.

So that, the researcher would like to propose that the government of Myanmar should draw the strategic healthcare plan not only in controlled area but also in non-controlled areas. Among them, the government and the Myanmar Army should cooperate by welcoming the EAOs in healthcare activities.

The government has begun increasing the level of government expenditure on healthcare and will focus on a number of innovative measures to improve accessibility to healthcare among the rural population, including strengthening township-level health financing and greater cooperation with development partners.²¹

²⁰ KPMG Report 2013. “Infrastructure in Myanmar” (Online). Available : [www. file:///C:/Users/MAC/Desktop/Translation%20Files/Col%20Moe%20Min%20Thein\(Thai%20NDC\)/Chapt%203/Infrastructure-in-Myanmar-KPMG-Report-2013.pdf](file:///C:/Users/MAC/Desktop/Translation%20Files/Col%20Moe%20Min%20Thein(Thai%20NDC)/Chapt%203/Infrastructure-in-Myanmar-KPMG-Report-2013.pdf)

²¹ Ministry of Health. “Three Year Achievements”. (Online). Available : <https://www.mohs.gov.mm/Main/content/publication/mohs-3-years-achievement>

The National Health Network, established in 2013 by the National League for Democracy (NLD), has recognized and collaborated with ethnic and community based health organizations for a number of years, and has included them in the development of the Ministry of Health's National Health Plan.²² Elsewhere, in northern Shan State, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) has maintained informal cooperation with the government, allowing for health services to be provided in townships with Ta'ang ethnic villages despite active armed conflict and no ceasefire in place. The TNLA, and other EAOs, also train backpack health worker teams to deliver primary health services in remote areas.²³

4. Human trafficking, Recruitment Soldier : In Myanmar, the internal armed conflict is the one of the factors of human trafficking. The country's human trafficking cases in 2018 were found to be 75.24 per cent in forced marriages, forced prostitution 13.59 per cent, forced labor 8.74 per cent, surrogacy 1.94 per cent, and illegal adoption 0.49 per cent.²⁴

The government of Myanmar should consider for the people who are temporarily staying in several IDP camps when they draw the law and regulations. And the government should welcome the cooperation of EAOs for anti-human trafficking and child soldier recruitment.

²² The Asia Foundation. "The Contested Area of Myanmar". p 33.

²³ As Above.

²⁴ The President Office. "Myanmar observes 7th Anti-Trafficking in Persons Day". (Online). Available : <https://www.president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=briefing-room/news/2019/09/16/id-9552>

The plans for the 2005 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law are underway together with adopting its bylaw. The Central Body for Suppression and Prevention of Trafficking in Person and its working units have been reformed, while the Anti-Trafficking in Person Division of Myanmar Police Force has been expanding its units for effective works. Myanmar was also a participant in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The country was also taking part in other UN conventions of child rights, various forms of discrimination against women, forced labour, and anti-corruption.²⁵

Since June 2012, when the Myanmar government signed a Joint Action Plan with the United Nations to prevent recruitment and use of children in the Myanmar Army, 956 children and young people have been released by the army.²⁶ On 31 August 2018, the Government of Myanmar released 75 children and young people who were recruited and used by the Myanmar Army.²⁷ On 31 March 2019, the Government of Myanmar released seven children and 25 young people who were

²⁵ As Above.

²⁶ UNICEF. “Thirty-two Children and Young People Released by the Myanmar Armed Force”. (Online). Available : <https://www.unicef.org/eap/press-releases/thirty-two-children-and-young-people-released-myanmar-armed-forces>

²⁷ UNICEF. “Seventy-five Children and Young People Released by the Myanmar Armed Force”. (Online). Available : <https://www.unicef.org/eap/press-releases/seventy-five-children-and-young-people-released-myanmar-armed-forces>

recruited under the age of 18 by the Myanmar Army at No (1) Military Transit Center in Yangon.²⁸

5. Landmines Issues : Since 1999, many NSAs have used antipersonnel mines in Myanmar. Several villagers and civilians were killed and injured by landmines in Shan state, Kayin state and Rakhine state. People in IDP camps and host communities in conflict affected areas have raised concerns on the threat of landmines, which has negatively impacted on their livelihood activities and hampered opportunities for return to their villages of origin. Therefore, the researcher would like to propose that the government should provide more improve data and information system because landmine awareness can significantly prevent accidents and reduce lifelong impacts. Nevertheless, the government of Myanmar can prioritize the peace process which requires disarmament matters.

As a key stakeholders of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), the government of Myanmar and Myanmar Army was not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty because of they are focusing on peace process negotiation with EAOs – which means the government will consider joining the treaty after the successful implementation of a nationwide ceasefire agreement by all parties.²⁹

²⁸ UNICEF. “Thirty-two Children and Young People Released by the Myanmar Armed Force”. (Online). Available : <https://www.unicef.org/eap/press-releases/thirty-two-children-and-young-people-released-myanmar-armed-forces>

²⁹ The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Landmine Monitor Myanmar Report. (Online). Available : https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/2019-11-00-Landmine-Monitor_Myanmar-en-red.pdf

Chapter 5

Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

In conclusion, this research had attained the main objectives which are “to study the factors of internal ethnic armed conflict that affected political, economic, and social development and “to propose a sustainable political, economic and social development framework that can benefit the majority of the population”. The three questions of affected factors for political, economic and social development are identified and examined in this study.

On the other hand, the following key factors of the internal armed conflicts are supported and it affected to the political, economic and social development of the country :

1. Competition for Control of Strategic and Commercial Interests
2. Ownership and Natural Resources Management
3. Government’s Attempt to Clamp Down on Economic Activities by EAOs
4. Distrust and Suspicion About Each Other
5. Failure to Adhere to Agreements Over Control Areas
6. Ineffective Liaison Offices
7. Overlapping Territories
8. Different Perspectives

Besides that, resolutions for the factors which effected to the political, economic and social development are proposed and proved in comprehensive ways. Therefore, this research will formulate the strategies to retain the good fundamentals to improve national unity, governance, peace and stability, and several developments in economic and social sectors. More than that, it will obtain the improvement of the continuing the processes of getting national reconciliation and forever peace. A flurry of negotiations among Myanmar's government, its military and ethnic armed groups belies deeper problems in the country's moribund peace process.

Myanmar is a highly heterogeneous country (e.g., ethnicity and languages; distribution of natural resources; geography, land types, and climate), and so is particularly suitable for many governance functions to be handled by subnational levels of government. However, despite some recent limited decentralization in Myanmar, governance here remains far more centralized than in most other countries and there is a clear need for further decentralization of many governance functions.

Myanmar itself, still require transforming its governance strategy among ethnic minorities in terms of several conflicts within the country which will impact to the development of the economic growth and political improvement. Although, there are numerous tension between EAO during the COVID-19 pandemic in the country, Myanmar Army has announced a nearly four-month unilateral ceasefire to allow the conflict-torn nation to fight Covid-19, but it excludes areas where the Arakan Army operates. Therefore, all peace process such as bilateral talks and negotiation meetings between the government and EAOs are delaying in present condition whether they are willing to obtain the peace.

When U Thein Sein government introduced the peace process, some ethnic armed groups were still under negotiation in current NLD government and some had not accepted the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement as yet. For those ethnic armed organizations in non-signatory groups, the government has been calling them for involvement and looks forward to initiate peace negotiations.

The NCA is meant to serve as the foundation for a nationwide peace process, but was signed before any nationwide agreement had been reached. Eight ethnic armed groups signed the NCA in October, 2015; the New Mon State Party and Lahu Democratic Union signed the NCA on 13 February, 2018. Some of the Ethnic Armed Organizations-EAOs are accepted the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreements-NCA however they do not sign regardless of the basic principles of NCA and their organizational interests. In this context, UWSA has been firmly opposed to some terms of the NCA, as well as the political framework agreements.

In 2017, the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee-FPNCC formed with UWSA and KIO/KIA taking the leadership including northern ethnic armed organizations such as AA, MNDAA, TNLA, NDAA, MNDAA, and SSPP/SSA. As members of FPNCC, most ethnic armed groups were proposing to a bilateral ceasefire agreement to end the clashes whilst they do not have a common stand on signing the NCA. Basically, they wanted federal system that guarantees self-administration and equal chance. In the peace process, they welcomed the assistance of China who has made informal meetings with peace commission with them.

At the time of writing this research paper, the government does not invite the AA, declared as a terrorist group, to attend the NCA. On the other hand, EAOs of northern allies declared they will not attend the NCA without AA. Therefore, the response of the EAOs, who are not sign the NCA, allowing deadlock of the peace talk as a political development of the country. Similarly, it allows impediment to the economic development and social development of the respective areas.

In the end, the conflict between ceasefire groups and the Government links into the process of conflict resolution and guarantees for ethnic group rights in the political system, and so it is mostly an issue of combating the motives for violence. Eventually, at all times making clear that the only way to achieve lasting peace is through a common commitment to justice, compromise, mutual respect, and equal rights and equal protection for all of Myanmar's diverse people.

Recommendations

As of today, there are ten of twenty-three ethnic armed groups are signed the multilateral Nationwide Ceasefire Agreements.¹ Therefore, the Myanmar government requires negotiating the remaining eleven ethnic groups through that peace process.

Many of the groups that have signed the NCA are from Myanmar's eastern and western borders with Thailand, India, or Bangladesh. Most of the non-signatory groups are from the northern border with China, in particular Kachin and northern Shan states. China has had both direct and indirect influence on conflict and peace dynamics in northern

¹ Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process : A Reference Guide 2017-2018, p 118.

Myanmar. However, China has actively pressured EAOs to engage in dialogue with the government.

Therefore, the government of Myanmar should exploit the China as a peace broker to obtain irreversible peace agreement with EAOs. Moreover, the government should not omit to consider the contribution and collaboration of the international communities and international organizations.

The government of Myanmar should provide more on social infrastructure such as education and health sectors because of their low budget which is lower than other regional countries.

The NLD-led government could hold only four 21st Century Panglong peace conferences in their first four years of the government term, whereby a 50-points Union Accord could reach. However, the agreements on fundamental federal principles still need to be acquired.

The Myanmar government still requires to cure the fragile of foreign direct investment projects which are located in the conflict-affected parts of the country and have equally contribute to complication and issues given the business practices in these geographic.

In January 19, 2019, NLD government proposed an urgent parliamentary session to discuss the initiation of the process of constitutional amendment in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw(Union Parliament). However, when NLD proposed to amend the constitution the loses the motion by vote.

Therefore, it is to be reconsidered, whether the motion by NLD to amend the constitution has impact on the current peace process for NLD.

In the current peace process focused on the completion of the NCA it is challenging to overcome the hardships faced as a result of the distrust and the lack of willingness of a diversion from certain political standpoints. In May 2019, the NCA has been faced a backlash, when the two NCA-S EAOs, KNU and RCSS/SSA, officially withdraw from certain parts of the peace process. The NLD government and the Myanmar Army should find the suitable solution regardless of this EAOs' withdrawal by cooperating together.

Although some issues need to solve on the table, both the military and NLD government aware how to handle problems peacefully to avoid unstable situation. They speak of a pragmatic approach in dealing with this new power sharing arrangement. Whether both military and NLD government may have disagreement on some other issues they are trying to find the best answer for the sake of the people.

The NCA's Union Accord to fundamentally lack of fundamental principles for the building of federal union have been expressed. Therefore, the government requires seeking the fundamental principles for the federal union.

Although JMC mechanism for ceasefire monitoring is working together with NCA signatory EAOs, only accessing records of civilian casualties and engagements between the Myanmar Army and EAOs addressed. The incident verification process and take action of binding forces is still weak. Furthermore, JMC mechanism cannot to cover monitoring and protecting IDPs, civilians in NCA-N EAO areas, event there have bilateral agreements between the Government and each EAOs.

Thus the government of Myanmar should consider their mechanisms to be covered the IDPs.

The government, although, has been successful in negotiating ceasefires with ethnic groups by granting them some limited economic rights. This has especially been the case with groups such the KIO in Kachin State and several others in Shan and Kayah States following the 1990 elections. After the 2010 elections, the government is once again offering economic and business incentives, both inside and outside of ceasefires, to convince armed groups to enter the legal fold. However, the local population responses are resulting negative impact to the development projects.

So that, the researcher would strongly suggest that the government should seek the comprehensive strategies for the peace process.

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Biography

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- 3. Age – 52 YEARS (20.6.1968)**
- 4. Platoon Commander- 26.10.1990 > 25.10.1991**
- 5. Company Commander – 26.10.1991 > 13.3.1996**
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- 7. General Staff Officer (2) – 7.5.1999 > 17.8.2003**
- 9. Second in Command – 18.8.2003 > 14.10.2005**
- 10. Regiment Commander – 15.10.2005 > 28.3.2010**
- 11. General Staff Officer (1) – 29.3.2010 > 6.4.2013**
- 12. Tactical Operation Commander – 7.4.2013 > 2.4.2016**
- 13. Commander of Basic Military Training Depot – 3.9.2016 > Present**