

**Conceptual Framework - Constituents
and Spectrum of Traditional and
Non – Traditional (Hybrid)
Warfare in the Context
of South Asia &
South –East
Asia**

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Abstract

Title : Conceptual Framework – Constituents and Spectrum of Traditional and Non – Traditional (Hybrid) Warfare in the Context of South Asia & South –East Asia

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1. For a few decades now, a vivid scholarly discussion centered on new forms of conflict has been developing. Military historians and political scientists entered into debates building consistent pro and counter-arguments about whether armed conflict at the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century features novel aspects. Several concepts have been coined in order to describe the nature and dynamic of warfare in a post-clausewitzian/post-conventional era, such as new wars, Fourth and Fifth Generation Warfare, compound wars and last, but not least, *Hybrid Warfare*.

2. This paper will briefly present the core of each category and will stress hybrid warfare as most recent development of such intellectual categories. ¹The main argument defended here is that hybrid wars are a contemporary feature of global politics, mostly associated with non-state actors (such as terrorist groups), Trans-National Crimes and recently with Russia's strategies in eastern Ukraine, but also that they are a form of asymmetric conflict. The paper is mainly focused on Hybrid

¹ HYBRID WARFARE – A FORM OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT Laura-Maria HERȚA “Babeș-Bolyai” University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania laura.herta@euro.ubbcluj.ro

Warfare in the context of South and South East Asia with special emphasis on the environment of Pakistan and Thailand.

Preface

1. Ideas and technologies have been forging change throughout the history and changing ways of waging war have been no exception. Modern military development comprises various distinct generations. The generations of warfare began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which established state's monopoly on war while previously, many different entities not just armies and navies had fought wars – families, tribes, religions, cities, business enterprises².

2. The First-Generation Warfare runs roughly from 1648 to 1680. It was characterized by dispositioning of forces in line or column, forming mass armed forces. Second Generation Warfare was mainly affirmed as a result of technological improvements, which led to the increase in the fire power and the development of communications. 1st World War represented the most eloquent expression of the Second-Generation Warfare and consisted in the broad use of attrition. Third Generation Warfare was characterized by the increase in fire power on the battlefield and increased capacity of maneuver which led to the innovative strategy of Blitzkrieg.³

3. Traditional Warfare i.e Fourth Generation Warfare evolved in the 70s of the past century, after the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan and its stress was mainly on the way in which one could exploit the changes in the political, economic and social environment. Colin Gray contends in

² Khurshid Khan and Afifa Kiran, "Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare and its Relevance to Pakistan" *the IPRI Journal*, XII, no.2 (Summer 2012):89

³ *Ibid.*, p.90.

‘Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare’ that “the character of warfare in a period is shaped, even driven, much more by the political, social and strategic contexts than it is by changes integral to military science”. This contention is true more specifically to the Fourth Generation Warfare. The Concept still continues to evolve but in its simplest definition would be any war in which one of the major participants is not a state but a violent ideological network. It is characterized by blurring the lines between war and politics, soldiers and civilians, conflict and peace, battlefield and safety. It is conducted in an increasingly decentralized manner where there are no defined battlefields rather it is simultaneously conducted in population centers, rural areas and virtual networks. In this warfare, while motives could be different but goal is to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.

4. While Traditional Warfare is still considered evolving, contours of future war i.e. the Fifth Generation Warfare (**Hybrid Warfare**) have started emerging. Currently, there is no widely accepted definition for the latest Generation Hybrid Warfare. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui define Hybrid Warfare as “**the use of all means whatsoever, means that involve the force of arms and means that do not involve the use of arms, means that entail casualties and means that do not entail casualties-to force the enemy to serve one’s own interest**”.⁴ It is a generation warfare wherein war would appear without boundaries between public and private,

⁴ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing, PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999)

combatants and non-combatants. This warfare remains non-Trinitarian; from People, Government and Armed Forces to between state and non-state entities organized as networks, supra combinations, along social economic, criminal, terrorist, gang, special interest, or ethnic or tribal lines. War objectives are transforming from erstwhile (attrition, dislocation and disintegration) to the attrition of the political and public will. This has made the hybrid warfare superior to mechanism of annihilation, maneuver, or attrition of resources. Hybrid Warfare seems the continued shift of political and social loyalties to causes rather than nations, thus includes the appearance of super-empowered individuals and groups, with access to modern knowledge, technology and means to conduct asymmetric attacks in furtherance of their individual or group interests against individual, groups or states. South Asia faces conventional threat; it is engaged in 4GW and faces an increasing range of Hybrid Warfare means being applied against it. Thus, it remains imperative to understand the changing nature of threat.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Background and Significance of Problem

1. Ideas and technologies have been forging change throughout the history and changing ways of waging war have been no exception. Modern military development comprises various distinct generations broadly Traditional and Non-Traditional. The generations of warfare began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which established state's monopoly on war while previously, many different entities not just armies and navies had fought wars rather families, tribes, religions, cities, business enterprises too waged wars.

2. In the Traditional category, the First-Generation Warfare runs roughly from 1648 to 1680. It was characterized by dispositioning of forces in line or column, forming mass armed forces. Second Generation Warfare was mainly affirmed as a result of technological improvements, which led to the increase in the fire power and the development of communications. 1st World War represented the most eloquent expression of the Second Generation Warfare and consisted in the broad use of attrition. Third Generation Warfare was characterized by the increase in fire power on the battlefield and increased capacity of maneuver which led to the innovative strategy of Blitzkrieg.

3. In the Non-Traditional category, Fourth Generation Warfare evolved in the 70s of the past century, after the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan and its stress was mainly on the way in which one could

exploit the changes in the political, economic and social environment. Colin Gray contends in 'Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare' that "the character of warfare in a period is shaped, even driven, much more by the political, social and strategic contexts than it is by changes integral to military science". This contention is true more specifically to the Fourth Generation Warfare. The Concept still continues to evolve but in its simplest definition would be any war in which one of the major participants is not a state but a violent ideological network. It is characterized by blurring the lines between war and politics, soldiers and civilians, conflict and peace, battlefield and safety. It is conducted in an increasingly decentralized manner where there are no defined battlefields rather it is simultaneously conducted in population centers, rural areas and virtual networks. In this warfare, while motives could be different but goal is to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.

4. While Fourth Generation Warfare is still considered evolving, contours of future Non-Traditional war i.e. the **Fifth Generation Warfare or Hybrid Warfare** have started emerging. Currently, there is no widely accepted definition for the latest Generation Warfare. Qiao Liang and Wang Jiansu define Fifth Generation Warfare or Hybrid Warfare as "**the use of all means whatsoever, means that involve the force of arms and means that do not involve the use of arms, means that entail casualties and means that do not entail casualties-to force the enemy to serve one's own interest**". It is a generation warfare wherein war would appear without boundaries between public and private, combatants and non-combatants.

This warfare remains non-Trinitarian; from People , Government and Armed Forces to between state and non-state entities organized as networks, supra combinations ,along social economic, criminal, terrorist, gang, special interest, or ethnic or tribal lines. War objectives are transforming from erstwhile (attrition, dislocation and disintegration) to the attrition of the political and public will. This has made the fifth generation superior to mechanism of annihilation , maneuver or attrition of resources. Fifth-generation warfare seems the continued shift of political and social loyalties to causes rather than nations, thus includes the appearance of super-empowered individuals and groups, with access to modern knowledge, technology and means to conduct asymmetric attacks in furtherance of their individual or group interests against individual, groups or states. South Asia and South East Asia face conventional threats within their strategic domains; both regions are engaged in 4GW and face an increasing range of 5GW means being applied against many states of the regions. Thus, it remains imperative to understand the changing nature of threat.

Objectives of Research

5. To carryout appraisal of Traditional and Non – Traditional (Hybrid) Warfare spectrum with a view to proffer crystallizing contours of response.

Literature Review

6. All available literature on the subject will be utilized to the maximum. Earlier work done on the subject is region specific like South Asia or Gulf. This research will differ from the previous work done as it would incorporate both South Asia and South-East Asia in the context of Hybrid Warfare with special emphasis on Pakistan and Thailand.

Scope of Research

7. The study will be limited to the context of South and South East Asia. The data need to be collected will include traditional warfare in Retrospect, Non –Traditional (Hybrid) and its evolving nature and spectrum and traditional and non-traditional warfare in South and South East Asian Context.

8. Methods of data collection will include previous work done or related work done on the subject, consultation with mentors and / or intellectuals on the subject, open source internet and interviews / discussions with the specialists on the subject. A qualitative and comparative evaluation and analysis of the data will be carried out to establish facts through logical confirmation.

Conceptual Framework

9. The conceptual perimeters laid down by NDC Thailand will be utilized as research design to seek answers to key research questions.

Basic Assumptions

10. No assumptions have been chalked out yet; nonetheless, in the process of research if the need arises, the required assumptions will be notified to the advisor.

Research Hypothesis

11. To carryout appraisal of Traditional and Non-traditional (Hybrid) Warfare spectrum with a view to proffer crystallizing contours of response in the context of South and South-East Asia.

Methodology

12. The research design will be primarily qualitative in nature by carrying out qualitative / systematic literature review of the earlier related work done on the subject. Provided with the opportunity, some quantitative techniques in the form of interviews and surveys will be incorporated in the research to double check certain facts and queries. More research details / theories about future war will be incorporated. Structure of relationship between the war and application of war will be crystalized. How future wars will be waged with winning / loosing implications will be amply covered and evaluated in the context of regions. The threat of Cyber Operations in future scenario will also be dealt in the research. An out of the box methodology may be resorted if required in the course of research. Parameters of war in countries / regions will be established. Fault lines contributing to future war will be identified and accordingly benchmarks for application of warfare will be established.

Limitations

13. The finding of South Asian perspective might differ from that of South East Asian perspective and even within the regional context, few findings may not be generalized to the larger population.

Delimitation

14. Following are few de-limitations during the research: -
- a. The research will be limited to South and South East Asian states with special emphasis on Pakistan and Thailand.
 - b. Indian and Myanmar based literature will be consulted but only for evaluation; as both countries have exaggerated and negative literature about Pakistan and Thailand respectively.
 - c. The focus of research is limited to the population of South and South East Asia due to inherent geo strategic interests of Pakistan and Thailand being part of these regions. The population of other regions will not be studied being out of context.

Research Utilization

15. The paper will enable Pakistan and Thailand to crystallize contours of response with regards to future threat of Hybrid Warfare in the global context in general and regional context in particular. A

qualitative and systematic data with logic based manifestations will be put forth to readers to answer their questions in a convincing and appealing way, duly supported with rationale, facts and cases in point coupled with vision into the future manifestation of Hybrid Warfare threat.

Definitions

16. No new definitions or key words have been contemplated to be coined in the research paper. However, during the course of research, if deemed necessary, new definitions and coining of related key words will be notified to the advisor before incorporating the same in research paper.

Chapter 2

Constituents and Spectrum of Traditional Warfare

Genesis of Generational Warfare

1. While military development is a continuous evolutionary process, the modern era has witnessed three watersheds in which change has been dialectically qualitative. Consequently, modern military development comprises three distinct generations. The generations of warfare began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which established state's monopoly on war while previously; many different entities had fought wars for the causes of families, tribes, religions, cities, business enterprises, using many different means, not just armies and navies.

2. **1st Generation Warfare.** The first generation of war (1648 – 1860) thus grew not just from the invention of gunpowder but also from the political, economic, and social structures that developed as Europe transitioned from a feudal system to a system of nation-states ruled by monarchs. The transition from the 'chivalry' of feudal knights to the armies of Napoleon required centuries. This time was required not only to develop reliable firearms but, more important, to develop the political system, the

wealth-generating national economies, the social structures, and the technologies capable of sustaining the mass armies of the Napoleonic era.¹

3. **2nd Generation Warfare.** Like the first generation of war, the second generation of war (1860 – 1915) did not grow just from improvements in weaponry. It, too, required changes across the spectrum of human activity. Although the political structure of the nation-state was essentially in place at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the state's power to tax and enforce taxes increased dramatically during the hundred years between Waterloo and the Battle of the Marne. A great deal of this increase in wealth can be attributed to the rapid industrialization of Western Europe and North America. Second-generation war required the wealth generated by an industrial society, transportation means, good communications in the shape of telegraph system and the sheer volume of weapons and ammunition as industrial output that only such a society can produce. Another challenge was to develop logistically effective general staffs to launch these mass armies against the nation's enemies. Finally, second-generation war was not possible without complete participation of the nations.

4. **3rd Generation Warfare.** Third generation warfare or manoeuvre warfare really started in 1915 and came to maturity in 1940. The political and social atmospheres of the opposing sides were critical to the difference in development. While people in France and Britain blamed their government and armed forces for losses in First World War, armed forces were respected in Germany despite losses. German losses were seen more as a result of civilian rather than military incompetence. In this environment,

¹ Khurshid Khan and Afifa Kiran, *op. cit.* p.90.

Hitler was able to develop German Armed forces based on lessons of First World War while allies never got serious about it. Mission type orders were instituted and manoeuvre warfare was applied to focus on destruction of the enemy's command and control and logistics as the fastest way to destroy his will.²

5. **4th Generation Warfare (4GW)**. The term 4GW was first coined in 1989. It uses all the shifts from a mechanical to an information/electronic society, the blurring of lines between war and politics, peace and conflict, battlefield and safety and combatants and non-combatants while assuming that the state is now more accountable to international system and is thus losing its monopoly on violence and thus ability to conduct war.

6. **Contemporary Forms of Warfare vis-a-vis 4GW (Traditional Warfare)**. Before understanding 4GW concept we need to see how the world looks at other forms of warfare theoretically: -

- a. **Irregular Warfare**. It is a warfare in which one or more combatants are irregular military rather than regular forces. Guerrilla warfare is a form of irregular warfare, and so is asymmetric warfare. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric warfare approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's

² Ibid.p.90.

power, influence, and will. It is inherently a protracted struggle that will test the resolve of a state and its strategic partners. Concepts associated with irregular warfare are older than the term itself. Afghan civil war is presented as an example of irregular warfare.

- b. **Low Intensity Conflict (LIC).** LIC is the use of military forces applied selectively and with restraint to enforce compliance with the policies or objectives of the political body controlling the military force. The term can be used to describe conflicts where at least one or both of the opposing parties operate along such lines. LIC is a military term for the deployment and use of troops and/or assets in situations other than war. Generally these operations are against non-state actors and are given terms like counter-insurgency, anti-subversion, and peacekeeping.
- c. **People's War.** Also called **Protracted People's War** is a military-political strategy first developed by the Chinese Marxist-Leninist revolutionary and political leader Mao Zedong (1893-1976). The basic concept behind People's War is to maintain the support of the population and draw the enemy deep into the interior where the population will

bleed them dry through a mix of Mobile Warfare and Guerrilla Warfare. The term is used by Maoists for their strategy of long-term armed revolutionary struggle. The strategy of people's war was used heavily by the Viet Cong in the Vietnam War. However protracted war should not be confused with the "foco" theory employed by Che Guevara and Fidel Castro in the Cuban Revolution.

- d. **Non-Kinetic Warfare.** Kinetic actions are those taken through physical, material actions like bombs, bullets, rockets and other munitions. Non kinetic actions are logical, electromagnetic or behavioral such as a computer network attack on an enemy system or psychological operation aimed at enemy troops. While non-kinetic actions have a physical component, the effects they impose are mainly indirect – functional, systemic, psychological or behavioral.

7. **Differences of 4GW from Other Forms of Warfare.**

4GW has similarities like employment of indirect means, protracted in nature and enemy's will is the main objective. However, there are differences as well: -

Warfare	Apch	Context	Aim	Means	Trinity	Tech
4 GW	Indirect	Weak vs strong	En's Will	Kinetic and Non-Kinetic	Non-Applicable	High
Irregular Warfare	Indirect	Weak vs strong and strong vs strong	“	Kinetic and Non-Kinetic	Applicable	Medium
Low Intensity Conflict	Indirect	Weak vs strong and strong vs strong	“	Primarily Kinetic, sustenance through Non-Kinetic	Applicable	Low
People's War	Indirect	Weak vs strong	“	War of ideas, Primarily Non-Kinetic, Selected Kinetic	Applicable	Low
NKW	Indirect	Weak vs strong and strong vs strong	“	Non-Kinetic	Non-Applicable	High

Emergence of 4GW (Traditional Warfare)

8. **General.** William Lind and Colonel Thomas Hammes were the primary proponents of 4GW and theory was first time given in 1989. The environment at the time when this theory was given that USSR had withdrawn from Afghanistan, fall of Berlin wall and collapse of USSR were evident and by implication USA was emerging as the sole super power. A lot of confusion already ensued in the academic circles to define new wars like the one USA lost in Vietnam. In this backdrop, proponent of theory first defined warfare into three neat and distinct generations throughout modern history as a result of social and political changes to justify emergence of a new generation of warfare. They also overstressed on the new generation by asserting that this last generation builds on first three but clearly differs in its intent, motivations, and approach. The four elements that proponents believe carry over into 4GW from the earlier generations are: --³

- a. *Mission orders* that enable small groups of combatants to operate within the commander's intent, yet retain a necessary level of flexibility. Local flexibility directed by general guidance is essential to 4GW, which is mostly fought in a dispersed manner throughout the whole of the enemy's society.

³ William Lind, Col. Keith Nightengale, Capt. John Schmitt, Col. Joseph Sutton, Lt Col. Gary Wilson, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 1989): 22, Hammes Thomas, *The Sling and The Stone, On war in the 21st Century*, Manas Publications, New Dehli, 2006.N

- b. *A decreasing dependence on centralized logistics* that facilitates the more dispersed conflict and higher tempo. 4GW warriors must be able to fend for themselves in whatever environment they operate.
- c. *More emphasis on maneuver over firepower* that negates the traditional requirement of massing of soldiers and weapons. Instead, 4GW relies on employing “small, highly maneuverable, agile forces” that can blend into their environment and avoid being targeted. *Collapsing the enemy internally rather than destroying him physically* requires that 4GW leaders have a keen ability to identify and target their enemy’s centers of gravity.

9. **Definition.** Traditional Warfare i.e 4GW is an umbrella term used to describe conflicts at the end of the 20th century. It is characterized by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, soldier and civilian, conflict and peace, battlefield and safety. It includes all forms of conflict where the other side refuses to stand up and give fair fight. 4GW is distinguished from earlier generations typically as at least one side is something other than an organized military force, operating under the control of a national government and that often transcends national boundaries.

10. **Drivers of GW Traditional Warfare).** Fourth-generation wars are lengthy-measured in decades rather than months or

years.⁴ As per Colonel Hammes, the rise of 4GW is both a product and a driver of the following: -

- a. The loss of the nation-state's monopoly on violence.
- b. The rise of cultural, ethnic and religious conflict.
- c. Globalization (via technological integration).

11. **Developments in 4GW.** As per Marine Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, following major developments in 4GW establish its place as distinct generation of warfare⁵: -

- a. **Strategic Shift.** Rise of mass Media has allowed it to become new weapon of the weak and insurgent campaigns are shifting away from military campaigns supported by information operations to strategic communications (defined as, *a systematic series of sustained and coherent activities, conducted across strategic, operational and tactical levels, that enables understanding of target audiences, identifies effective conduits and develops and promotes ideas and opinions through those conduits to promote and sustain particular types of behavior*) campaigns supported by guerrilla and terrorist operations. The key concept in this definition is that 4GW opponents will attempt to directly attack the minds of enemy decision

⁴ X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004),2

⁵ Thomas X Hammes, "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges." *Military Review* (May – June 2007): 15 -16

makers as the only medium that can change a person's mind is information. Use of social media during current wave of unrest in Arab countries which galvanized the dissident networks and use of media by Al Qaeda and ISIS to spread its message are two examples from recent past.

- b. **Organizational Shift.** The emergence of civil war as a part of insurgency is based on the major organizational shift that has occurred. Civil wars were already in place before this concept arrived. The proponents further contend that rise of USA as sole super power has forced an organizational shift on its enemies and allies alike. While the world is witnessing continuous, worldwide shift of insurgencies from hierarchical to networked organizations and coalitions of the willing. The rise of networked coalitions is in keeping with the fact that both the societies in conflict and the dominant business organizations like MNCs and global financial institutions are adapting and dispersing into networks to survive in the face of powerful monopolies.
- c. **Shift in Type of Participants.** A change in who is fighting and why is essential to understand that, even within a single country, highly diverse armed

groups that make up a modern insurgency have widely differing motivations. Studying the motivation of a group gives us a strong indication of how that group will fight and what limits, if any, it will impose on its use of force.

- d. **Operational Shift.** Physical or kinetic operations no longer accrue the benefits as in earlier generations of warfare but it is now non kinetic actions which provide more dividends. Centre of gravity has shifted from the most mobile elements to popular will. Time and space now favor the counter insurgent and insurgent is not defeated till the time he has lost but counter insurgent loses till the time he has not won. All of this is challengeable as history suggests many other alternatives which will be discussed later.

12. **4GW Operations.** 4GW, according to William S. Lind, is a war between a country and non-state actor. The shape can vary, ranging from the movement of terrorists, drug cartels, the mafia gang, transnational crime syndicate, rebels, etc. who do the 'struggle' against the forces of a country, including its people while also maintaining that the 4GW tactics are not necessarily new. They are similar to standard guerrilla and terrorist tactics, but carried out with modern technology at the operational and strategic level. The 4th generation war is fought on the tactical level via: rear area operations - 4GW warriors do not confront a nation-state's military but

rather its society through psychological operations, use of terror and ad-hoc innovation in order use the strength of enemy against himself: -

a. **Instruments**

- (1) Diplomatic weaknesses of target state.
- (2) International and local state media to their advantage.
- (3) Avoid strengths of target state armed forces and make the most of their inherent weaknesses.
- (4) Economy of target state.

b. **Dimensions.** Physically appear to hit always soft targets and makes maximum through propaganda / informational tools.

c. **Target.** Political will of target state is the main objective by weakening the resolve and morale of population.

13. **Threat Strategy.** Salients of the strategy normally being pursued by 4GW warriors are as under: -

- a. Decentralized and loose knit cells of self-generating action groups with strong ideological convictions.
- b. Adaptive and agile transnational actors operating across traditional nation state boundaries; thriving along the seams in ungoverned spaces both in physical and virtual domains
- c. Pursuing total war, i.e. **fighting for hearts and minds and seeking paralysis.**

- d. Distinction between combatant, criminal opportunist and civilian has blurred and distinction between crime and war is steadily blurring.
- e. Source of friction is non-national or transnational ... ideology, religion, and ethnicity.
- f. Use media as “terrain” and info as a main line of operations. Target political will through asymmetric means and achieving victory in psychological realm, more about perception, will, and attitudes, than firepower, mass, maneuver or capture of territory.
- g. Capitalize on weak/failed states inability to ex sovereignty and control actions. Access to funding, facilities, sanctuary, weapons.
- h. Ad-hoc innovation such as using enemy’s strengths against itself will remain thrust line. Purpose of such innovations would be to destroy the enemy internally rather than to destroy the enemy physically through stress on political, moral and financial support to the forces opposing them. A cultural attack against all institutions of government, infrastructure and institutions.
- i. Generate disproportionate effects- kinetic and non-kinetic.

- j. Tremendous liberty of action as operations are conducted not on orders but in accordance with background knowledge of Commander's Intent only.
- k. Non-hierarchical network structure with no rigid organization; working on the concept of 'system, not organization'.
- l. Use of terror remains the weapon of choice. Violence is caused at destroying social order, damaging individual's confidence in his society and tear the social fabric.
- m. Operations in rear areas differ from operations in forward areas, but there exists no defined battlefield in 4GW.

14. **Manifestation 4th GW (Traditional Warfare).** We today live in a world of 4GW, where nation-states confront criminal enterprises, fanatical opportunists, terrorists whose gang-like networks transcend national boundaries. These are stateless and formless, capable to hit anytime, anywhere anything and anyone. Once it comes to fighting such a threat, the nature of conflict is very different, as it is virtually impossible to distinguish a combatant from a non-combatant. It is a conflict, where war fighting is just one element of it. The troops are required to shoot and kill on one hand; simultaneously they are to ensure developmental works in the same area, and still they are also expected to feed the same vicinity. Forces are also expected to build economy, develop infrastructure and build the political system of community where they are being shot at and killed. In short, these are not simple conflicts, these are culture wars, and ironically

troops are expected to fight in a cultural environment, culture of which, they don't understand. Take the case of ongoing ops in Iraq and more importantly Afghanistan and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. This is the manifestation of Generation 4GW, **where the tactics of the weak confound the tactics of the strong**. For a state fighting the war within, the problem is further compounded as they combat a threat in their own country and therefore remain seriously constrained to combat it militarily.

15. **Efficacy of Traditional Security Apparatus.** Let us evaluate impact of changes in warfare as 4GW over traditional security apparatus: -

- a. Current military forces are trained and equipped to combat conventional conflict against a nation state and prefer conventional combat where better equipment and technology has an advantage.
- b. Changes in warfare making traditional security apparatus less relevant - War today is no longer a monopoly of the state.
- c. Those fighting this conflict don't come in formations neither they are equipped with any standard equipment. Tools of today's warrior are box cutters and ceramic knives, mobile phones are their weapon system and internet as the means of communication.
- d. Distinction between combatant, criminal opportunist and civilian has blurred. Urban guerrilla may be a

religious zealot, a child for hire (with an RPG or a suicide belt) or a woman; just as capable as men for inflicting damage (female suicide bombers).

- e. The main strength of extremists is not technology or equipment but willingness to die for a cause. Thus one man's terrorist is another culture's legitimate freedom fighter.
- f. Traditional forces have an inherent shortcoming to effective combat the nature of conflict. With rigid organizations and binding hierarchies the force structure remains constrained to fight a network, as "It takes networks to fight networks". While the extremists operate on a systems approach with a network, the security forces organized in rigid hierarchies remains slow and reactive. Effective military counterterrorism must adopt a network approach that is optimally decentralized to achieve rapid and coordinated reactions. This does not mean, however, that military need to mirror extremist organization, but must rather, "draw on the same design principles of network forms."

Chapter 3

Constituents and Spectrum of Non-Traditional (Hybrid) Warfare

General

1. Non-Traditional or Hybrid Warfare has been more speculative, as each higher generation of war looks less like “traditional” war than the generation before it. It has been argued that 5GW will not even appear to be a “war” at all”. It is assumed that as each generation of modern warfare “goes deeper” into the enemy’s social thinking, Hybrid will go even deeper yet. Currently, no commonly accepted definition exists for Hybrid. However, given the rate at which change in warfare is accelerating, it is reasonable to accept that Hybrid is already making its appearance. It took hundreds of years from the development of the musket and cannon for First Generation (formation) Warfare (1GW) warfare to evolve. Second Generation (trench) Warfare (2GW) evolved and peaked in the 100 years between Waterloo and Verdun. Third Generation (maneuver) Warfare (3GW) came to maturity in less than 25 years. Fourth Generation (insurgent) Warfare (4GW) came to fore seventy-five years ago. 5GW i.e Hybrid is, as a whole other kettle of fish. In 5GW, the goal is not to seize the levers of power so much as it is to weaken or hollow out state control, in order to fill the ensuing vacuum. The actors are not necessarily political movements, or even recognized groups. Their motivation is as likely to be micro-economic as ideological, and may be social or—most likely—some blend of the above.

To conflate these under any label, be it jihadists, losers and dead-enders or militias is to misunderstand them completely. Much of the body of this new theory of warfare relies not upon the technological innovations but rather the patterns of use and shifting of behaviors, enabled by these objects and capabilities. 5GW would hence be a war of ideas propagated through media having wider acceptability. The skill sets, required to piece together these behaviours and the exploitable weaknesses therein particularly under the time and operational constraints found in the field, are often fundamentally different than those currently taught by the methodologists or the structured analysis proponents that currently dominate the discipline of warfare.

Definitions

2. The concept is still evolving, however, it can be defined as: -⁶
 - a. *The use of all means whatsoever that involve the force of arms and means that do not involve the force of arms, the means that involve military power and means that do not involve military power, the means that entail casualties, and means that do not entail casualties, to force the enemy to serve one's own interest.*
 - b. *It is about not being physically violent but it's culturally, socially, and economically violent. And*

⁶ 5th Generation Warfare Institute, Definition of 5GW, <http://5gwinstitute.com/web-files/whatis/>

its ultimate goal is that of any war: political defeat. It is network against network, market against market, community against community.

- c. *If traditional war cantered on an enemy's physical strength, and 4GW on his moral strength, the 5th Generation of War i.e Hybrid War would focus on his intellectual strength.*

Concept and Manifestation

3. **Concept.** The concept revolves around; to have the target believe that he is acting entirely under his own free will, while not realizing that another has influenced him to act in a particular way. Some kind of mind war in which general sentiment may be exploited, to gain certain ends, could be sponsored by a leader or could even be leaderless. Ultimately, a cascading series of acts committed by multiple targets, perhaps in collusion or in confrontation will lead to a paradigmatic shift in views, which are constantly being shaped by acts of manipulation and influence, in order to define and shape outcomes and effects. It embodies an overwhelming focus on positional manipulation and shaping of the environment so that when kinetic action or the threat of kinetic action occurs, the outcome is essentially pre-determined. The opponent is, as a result, without resistance (because the response is by the target's own choice or follows a previously established pattern, that is familiar to the target) in a subtle way.

4. **Manifestation.**⁷ 5GW includes the appearance of super-empowered individuals and groups, with access to modern knowledge, technology, and means, to conduct asymmetric attacks in furtherance of their individual and group interests against individuals, groups or state. Arguably, its first identifiable manifestations occurred in the US during the anthrax attacks of 2001. Attack required specialized knowledge including attacks upon federal government offices and facilities, succeeded in disrupting governmental processes, and created widespread fear in the public. Salient features of Hybrid Warfare actions are: -

- a. It will soundlessly and formlessly lead its enemy to, where he wants him to be. The loser will never know that he has lost.
- b. Selective information creation will be the 5GW force's modus operandi, and the goal is to have the target act on that information i.e., it involves, unwittingly individuals attacking individuals.
- c. A victim may sense his illness, but with 5GW attacking his observation capacity, the victim's response will probably make his situation worse.
- d. It is going to involve seemingly spontaneous and anonymous attacks against random citizens and/ or law enforcement professionals with no more goal in the mind of the terrorist than to cause chaos, confusion and fear where as purpose of terrorism is to cause terror.

⁷ Wang, Baocun, The New Global Revolution in Military Affairs, April 1999, Principles of 5GW: Hands in the Field, <http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2009/06>.

- e. 5GW will make us doubt the security of our own country and will be overlaid with the propaganda material encouraging us to doubt our leadership at all levels.
- f. It may utilize all the previous forms of warfare, in whatever combinations are appropriate to given situations. This does not mean that the 5GW force will necessarily bomb the hell out of people or engage in guerrilla warfare; instead, it means that the 5GW force will be manipulating 4GW, 3GW, 2GW, 1GW forces. The 5GW force might even slip into direct 4GW activity, in order to frame other parties, but very carefully, so as not to be discovered.

Characteristics of Hybrid Warfare

- 5. The salient characteristics of 5 GW are as following: -
 - a. **Conflict Dimension.** Conflict mainly contested in non-kinetic domain with expansion to physical, information, cognitive & social spheres. These domains are manipulated, created and shared to make collaborative decisions.
 - b. **Difference.** The concept of People, Government and Armed Forces is transiting to Non-Trinitarian as between state and non-state entities organized as networks, supra combinations, along social economic, criminal, terrorist, gang, special interest, or ethnic or tribal lines. War is becoming


without boundaries between public and private, combatants and non-combatants.

- c. **Unrestricted Warfare.** Unrestricted warfare with non-state actors is gaining enormous power. It has no defined centre of gravity, supra empowered individuals, no leadership, no hierarchy, a constellation rather than an organization. The dimension of battlefield has become omni with super empowered individuals capable of attacking the state.
- d. **Nature of Force.** 4th generation political can defeat military (superior), however, in the Fifth Generation the battlefield has expanded to include Kinetic and Non-Kinetic domains apparently creating an effect of being non-existent. The focus is to concede to the adversary's will through generation and application of force; it is the outcome and the changes in the information age.
- e. **Sub-Processes.** Leadership development, alliance building, public and ideological outreach, acquisition of funding, material, shelter, support, recruitment, organization of efforts, indoctrination and training of personnel, planning and targeting, movement and operations, communications and

exploitations of results - attack can mean military or nonmilitary, lethal or non-lethal.

- f. **War Objectives.** From attrition, dislocation and disintegration, the war objective will focus on defeat mechanism annihilation, attrition of resources, maneuver, attrition of will and implosion. Aim is the attrition of the political and public will. This has made the fifth generation superior to mechanism of annihilation, maneuver, or attrition of resources and will. The complex nature of supra – individuals. Defeat is through implosion.

Figure 3 – 1: A Generational Typology of War and Conflict



Source: Typologies of Terrorism and Political Violence Authored by: Sarah V. Marsden, Alex P. Schmid , The Routledge Handbook of

Terrorism Research Print publication date: February 2011 Online publication date: February 2011

Hybrid Warfare in Contemporary Environment⁸

6. The contemporary environment has witnessed the development of the most modern military means ever built. However, their existence is also an impediment to their use, mainly due to lethality which provides a strategic choice to rely on indirect means. Emerging features of globalization include information, diplomacy, societal values and overarching facet of economic interdependence. This has diffused states beyond internationally recognized borders, increasing their reach farther, deeper and cheaper. This phenomenon has increased the financial stakes of individuals and states, amplifying the cost of damage to unacceptable limit. Therefore, in order to secure national interest, transition of priorities has put 5GW under the spot light with its manifestation in contemporary world as following: -

a. Employment of New Theories

- (1) **Creative Chaos Theory.** According to this theory, this existing chaos is either exacerbated or chaos is deliberately created to force major changes in the state structures. Libya and Egypt (Arab Spring) are pertinent examples. Overtaking established governments/ societal systems without bloodshed as seen in Egypt as a result of face book message by an individual, resulting into

⁸ The 11th Annual *Mad Scientist*, Future Technology Seminar, January 20 – 23, 2010. http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2010/03/final-ms10-exsum1.pdf.

massing of hundreds of thousands in Al-Tahrir Square against regime of Hosni Mubarak is also a case in point. Since Hosni Mubarak regime did not take into account this threat, hence tried using force, which ultimately led to hardening of the positions and subsequent removal from power of the regime.

(2) **Shock Doctrine / Disaster Capitalism.** This theory asserts that states deliberately profit from public disorientation, following man-made or natural disasters. Following examples reflect at the same: -

- (a) Contracting the oilfields in Iraq to Western Oil Companies is a clear manifestation of these machinations.
- (b) Neutralizing or destroying systems through creation of chaos with a view to create new ones through some god like actions may have merits, e.g., Katrina-like natural disasters, which entirely obsess or mesmerize the target of those disasters. Whether such an approach is used by a 5GW force, may depend upon the sophistication of the target: Will the target have the forensic capabilities and organization, which will allow it to ultimately trace back the effects to the cause, should the 5GW force directly create major disasters? Generally, the ideas that all effects are observable and being

physical, or a matter of physics, they are traceable, means that direct kinetic activities by 5GW forces are quite dangerous for them, although given the sophistication or lack thereof of the target, such activities may have some use within 5GW. Alternatively, 5GW forces may try to frame other parties when creating major disasters, to throw off pursuit and also set up conflict between two other parties. Preferably, these other parties who are framed will be usual suspects and yet, they will want to claim responsibility for disasters even if they had nothing to do with those disasters. Again, however, this approach may be dangerous for 5GW actors, not only because of the potential for incriminating forensic evidence but also because the framed parties may reject claims of responsibility. However, either of the above possibilities may work even if the cause is traced back to the 5GW force, if time-lag between the original disaster/ attack and the discovery of ploy is great enough, to have left the targets in a downward spiral from which they cannot escape or in a position of extreme weakness.

b. **Capitalizing on Technology Driven Environment**

- (1) **Network Centric Warfare.** Network Centric Warfare is defined as an information superiority-enabled concept of operations that generate increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters through real time communications to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization. In essence, NCW translates information superiority into combat power by effectively linking knowledgeable entities in the battle space.
- (2) **Nanotechnology.** Nanotechnology also called Nanotech is the manipulation of matter on an atomic, molecular and supramolecular scale. Nanotechnology, sometimes called molecular manufacturing, describes engineered Nano systems operating on the molecular scale. It is a prefix used to describe "one billionth" of something, or 0.000000001, nanometer (nm). This technology has given new dimensions to the development in various fields.
- (3) **Biotechnology.** The blending of emerging biological technology with ordinary human delivery methods, especially in the hands of Non-State Actors (NSA), has the greatest potential to catch the Army unprepared in the

short term. Bioengineering will allow adversaries to modify diseases and tailor organisms to produce pathogens, against which there is no existing defence or treatment.

(4) **Cyber Warfare**

(a) Attacks in this domain can disable official websites and networks, disrupt or disable essential services, steal or alter classified data and cripple financial systems & electricity grids, among other possibilities. A few examples of this kind of warfare are: -

- i. Attack on Iranian Natanz nuclear enrichment facility by Stuxnet virus.
- ii. Indian and Pakistan hackers defacing and hacking each other's websites.
- iii. There is even talk of US predator drones' command & control systems becoming a victim of cyber warfare.
- iv. Russia and China employ armies of cyber experts for hacking, while raising of a US Cyber Command and declaration by US to consider a cyber-attack as an act of war, speaks volumes of its current and future importance.

- (b) The increasing difficulty in protecting information, when merged with the cyber capabilities of super empowered individuals, could re-define adversary's targeting methods; shifting toward a focus on disrupting transportation, banking, and government infrastructure. Increasing dependence on social networking systems blended with significant improvements in immersive 3-D technologies are likely to change the definition of force protection and redefine the meaning of area of operations. Social networking could make the family and friends of soldiers' real targets, subsequently requiring increased protection.
- (5) **Information Operations (Perception Management).** Another example was of the use of media by groups asking for change in Iran and gaining sympathy by showing videos of the re-reported oppression by the regime. A hue and cry was raised about the role of state, thus resulting into more sanctions and an increasing talk of humanitarian intervention. All of the above resulted in loss of significant ground by the Iranians in their negotiations with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
- (6) **Robotic Warfare.** Robotic technologies are developing at faster pace and advanced robotic systems will be

available to potential adversaries, state and non-state actors alike. Use of rudimentary drone by Hezbollah into Israeli air space speak of the proliferation ahead and with its impact on security.

c. **Disruptive Technologies**

- (1) **High Frequency Active Auroral Research Programme (HAARP).** It proposes tampering of ionosphere & geophysical domain for purposeful military and civilian application. Visible signs of its manifestation exist in terms of weather and geo-physical manipulations. HAARP is a scientific endeavor aimed at studying the properties and behavior of the ionosphere, with particular emphasis on being able to understand and use it to enhance communications and surveillance systems for both civilian and defense purposes. The High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) is an ionospheric research program jointly funded by the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Navy, the University of Alaska, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
- (2) **Mind Control Sciences.** This theory revolves around making a deliberate attempt to manage public's perception on a subject through sensitization. Although

in its early stages of development, it is a potent threat for the future.

- (3) **Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) and Directed Energy Weapons.** ELF uses radio waves as a weapon to create incapacity and disruption without resorting to destruction, whereas, ‘Directed Energy’ weapons are the newest in the range of destructive weapons but with tremendous potential and range of utility. Applications in this domain are presently experimental in nature but fast reaching operational status.
- d. **Private Military Companies.** Private Military Companies (PMC), Private Military or Security Companies provide military and security services. These companies were commonly known as mercenaries but modern-day PMC’s prefer to be known as security contractors, private military contractors or private security contractors, and often refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers or military service providers. Pertinent example ‘Balck Water’ which provided diplomatic security and PMC services in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq to the United States Government on a contractual basis. Salients of PMCs are:-
- (1) **Missions.** Private military companies carry out many different missions and jobs. These include things such as supplying bodyguards to the political leadership and


piloting reconnaissance airplanes and helicopters. They are also licensed by the US Department of State; they are contracting with national governments, training soldiers and reorganizing militaries in Nigeria, Bulgaria, Taiwan and Equatorial Guinea. The PMC industry is now worth over \$100 billion a year as it operates in over 50 different countries. China has also preferred similar arrangement in Angola for protection of oil related facilities.

- (2) **Legal Implications.** UN study of October 2007 revealed that although hired as "security guards", private contractors are performing military duties. The report considered use of contractors such as Blackwater was a "new form of mercenary activity" and illegal under International Law. Many countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, are not signatories to the 1989 United Nations Mercenary Convention banning the use of mercenaries.

7. **Ultimate Goal of Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Warfare.**

Imposing the will on to the adversary is the ultimate goal using kinetic or non-kinetic means; this is the essence of Hybrid Warfare where kinetic actions would appear in the backseat.

Figure 3 – 2: Comparison of Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Warfare



Chapter 4
Traditional and Non-Traditional
Warfare (Hybrid Warfare)
In the Context of
South & South
East Asia

General

1. Possibility of a conventional war in South Asia region appears remote due to emerging trends at global level, presence of nuclear deterrence and prohibitive cost of war in economic terms, resulting in shifting of focus more indirect methods. Liddle Hart observes *“Campaigns of this kind are more likely to continue because it is the only kind of war that fits the conditions of the modern age, while at the same time, is suited to take advantage of social discontent, racial ferment and nationalist fervors”*. Liddle Hart assertion seems South Asia specific as intra state conflicts are rising due to lack of political dispensation, discontent, violence, ethnic problems, religious intolerance, and other multifaceted socio-economic dynamics. South Asia region provides a fertile ground for 4GW where not only the challenges of violent non-state actors but also states are involved in pursuit of their interests through a complex matrix of co-sponsored internal strifes.

Traditional War in South Asia

2. **Afghanistan.** In 2001, the United States persuaded a rapid overthrow of the Taliban regime in response to the 9/11 attacks. This victory was quickly followed by the emergence of a violent insurgency, with the Taliban initiating 4GW. US had planned drawdown after a decade of warfare. Post drawdown situation remains uncertain and believes to be continued Taliban insurgency, having impact on Pakistan as well. Success of Taliban 4GW in Afghanistan indirectly also gave a fillip to TTP's (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan) ideology based warfare.

3. **Bangladesh.** Chittagong Hill Tracts have been witnessing ethnicity driven unrest in the past as the area abodes Buddhism in Bangladesh. During the 1970s and 80s, there were attempts by the government to resettle the area with ethnic Bengalis, whereas, These attempts were resisted by the tribal, who, with the latent support of neighboring India, formed a guerrilla force called Shanti Bahini. As a result of the tribal resistance movement, successive governments turned the Hill Tracts into a militarized zone. The 1997 Peace Treaty (known as Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord) signed between the then Sheikh Hasina Government and the Shanti Bahini still holds good in theory. On ground allegations of human rights violations and extra judicial executions are reported allegedly perpetrated by settlers and Bangladeshi Army. Following years of unrest, an agreement was formed between the government of Bangladesh and the tribal leaders which granted a limited level of autonomy to the elected council of the hill districts.

4. **Indian Experience.** India has experienced separatist challenges from a variety of ethnic and religious minorities since its independence.

- a. **Nagaland.** The first real armed challenge to the State came from the North East⁹. Naga insurgency is the oldest, most mature and termed as “mother of insurgencies”.¹⁰ It is a nationalist movement¹¹ to establish an independent land for the Nagas, began before Indian Independence. The idea of independent Nagaland is based on the premise that Nagas have been historically independent, conquered by none and therefore India has no right to subjugate them. The movement enjoyed the popular support in the conflict zone; however the support was diluted due to formulation of various factions. The government enjoyed overall support in the country. The political guidance set agenda for the application of different organs of states. To minimize the use of force and maximize the use of political compromise, government attempted to respond to Naga desired

⁹ The State Strikes Back: India and Naga Insurgency by Charles Chasie and Sanjay Hazarkia – <http://www.eastwestcentre.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/ps052.pdf>

¹⁰ Durga Madhab (John), Mitra , Army War College(US) strategic studies Institute.

¹¹ Col Anil Athale, *Counter Insurgency and Quest for Peace* (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2012), P 44.

autonomy short of succession by first granting autonomous areas in 1957 and later full statehood within India in 1963. The government conveyed the impression both to civilians and insurgents that it is committed to the conflict for the duration. The application was legally¹² covered through appropriate legislation¹³. National media presented the State's view and local media was censored. Military was applied after Police failed to control the situation. The military had undertaken two key interventions in 1953 and 1972. Armed with adequate legal framework and effective diplomacy, enabling environment was created for other elements of national power to handle the situation. In 1997, the government entered into a ceasefire agreement and since then held more than sixty rounds of dialogue until 2011. The ceasefire agreements have been periodically extended.

b. **Kashmir.** Kashmiri uprising received a fillip after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Freedom Fighters flocked on to Kashmir in order to liberate the

¹² Special parliamentary legislations like Assam Maintenance of Public Order Act 1953, Assam Disturbed Area Act 1955, Armed Forces Special Power Act 1958, Maintenance of Internal Security Act and Unlawful Activities Prevention Act 1967 gave security forces more powers and protected them from normal violation of law

¹³ Col Anil Athale, Counter Insurgency and Quest for Peace (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2012), P 193.

same from India's clutches. India amassed troops to the tune of **750,000 to 1 Million** in its occupied Kashmir to suppress the insurgency. State media remained under strict censorship, however, gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity were often reported. The guerilla tactics adopted by Freedom Fighters had unnerved the Indian military machine. In 2001, however, the international environment completely got changed and Freedom Fighters were then branded as terrorists. They could no longer continue their struggle with intensity. India is using its development and military strategy to the utmost but Kashmir Freedom Movement continues to be a perpetual challenge for the Indian Military and puppet administration in the state of Indian occupied Kashmir.

- c. **Red Corridor / Naxalite Movement.** Naxalites are a group of far-left radical communists, supportive of Maoist political sentiment and ideology. Their origin can be traced to the splitting in 1967 of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), leading to the formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist). Initially the movement had its center in West Bengal. In 2007, it was estimated that Naxalites were active across "half of the India's 28 states" who

account for about 40 percent of India's geographical area known as the "**Red Corridor**". In July 2011, the number of Naxal affected areas was reduced to 83 districts across nine states. The Maoists have killed a number of political leaders and personnel belonging to security forces and election authorities. Almost 13000 people in total have been killed in the continued insurgency.

5. **Nepal.** The Nepalese Civil War (labeled the People's War by the Maoists) was an armed conflict between government forces and Maoist fighters in Nepal which lasted from 1996 until 2006. The war was launched by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) with the aim of overthrowing the Nepalese monarchy and establishing a 'People's Republic'. It ended with the Comprehensive Peace Accord signed on 21 November 2006. More than 15000 people were killed (10,500 civilians by Government and 3000 maoists by the government) and an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 people were internally displaced as a result of the conflict.

6. **Sri Lanka.** Conflict in Sri Lanka was primarily an ethnic war which divided the nation in to two groups¹⁴. **The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE)** enjoyed considerable support among Tamil population in the conflict zone, government of Tamil Nadu State of India in particular and Government of India in general were blamed for the support of LTTE.

¹⁴ Col Anil Athale, Counter Insurgency and Quest for Peace (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2012), P 48.

Tamil Diaspora was alleged for financial assistance of terrorist activities. The government enjoyed support of majority Sinhalese and Muslims. The military operations continued for almost three decades at varying intensity.

- a. LTTE introduced and pioneered suicide bombing as new and most dreaded mean of spreading terror in very effective ways. To counter the menace, a comprehensive national strategy was formulated harnessing national power and warding off international pressure. The un-wavered political resolve gave clear mandate¹⁵ to armed forces supported by appropriate legal provisions. National media was state controlled, however international media highlighted the human rights violations during military operations. A national security media center (NSMC) was established for public awareness regarding ongoing operations. The media center played an important role in perception management. Intelligence was used for severing the financial support and creation of differences among Tamil leadership.
- b. Military executed high attrition campaign along with choking of external support resulted into

¹⁵ David Lewis, "Counter Insurgency in Sri Lanka", in *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, ed. Paul B Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn(New York:Routledge,2012), P 320.

strangulation of LTTE. It created space for other organs of the state to play their role. Special emphasis was laid on avoiding collateral damage by designated safety zones.

- c. The killing of the organization leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and his son Charles Anthony marked the end of 26 years long insurgency which killed more than 100,000 individuals.
- d. Destruction of LTTE in a small South Asian nation may provide lessons to state armed forces combating 4GW around the world although it had different environment.

Pakistan

7. **Nature of Non Traditional Security Threats.** Pakistan has been subjected to multifaceted non-traditional threats in the realm of 4GW as under:-

- a. **Use of Ideological, Political, and Violent Means.** Miscreants use ideological and political means to attack the legitimacy of the state. They are using a distorted interpretation of religion to undermine the ideological foundations of the state and generate an atmosphere of mistrust and discord.

The aim is to sever the moral bonds that bind people to the state and its institutions.

- c. **Alliances of Convenience and Informal Networks.** The informal common fronts are operating on the principal that the “enemy of my enemy” is my friend. Emphasis is on creating diverse mixes of enemies that are difficult to attack.
- d. **Use of Media for Intelligence, Communication and information Warfare.** The terrorists target in the psychological domain and try to subvert the hearts and minds of the target population. The phenomenal growth and diffusion of information technology enables them to use all forms of media for intelligence, communication as well as to capture maximum exposure.
- e. **Confuse the Identity of the Attacker and Exploit Conspiracy Theories.** In 4GW, mix of silence, multiple claims by various attackers, new names for attacking organizations, and uncertain levels of affiliation make it harder to respond.
- f. **Exploiting Facilities of Religious, Cultural and Political Sensitivity.** The aim is to raise the media profile and create a defensive deterrent. This tactic is usually exploited to make the security forces

seem anti-Islamic or to be attacking a culture and not a movement.

- g. **Attack on Lines of Communications, Rear Areas, and Support Infrastructure.** Dispersed attacks on logistics and support forces often offer a higher chance of success than attacks on combat forces and defended sites, and makes 4GW based on “deep support” rather than “deep strikes”.

8. **Manifestation**

- a. **FATA.** In 1980s, after the defeat of USSR in Afghanistan, terrorists from Afghanistan fled to Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. It disturbed the tribal culture, threatened the role of tribal control through Maliks who have been traditionally the authority there and added to religious Mullah’s influence who took the center stage. FATA remained the principle boiling point and a source of urban terrorism besides militancy in the hinterlands but Pakistan Armed Forces and LEAs successfully eliminated terrorists, controlled the area and brought it to normalcy. *Moreover, Pakistan has recently erected fence all along Pak-Afghan border to arrest influx of fleeing terrorists from Afghanistan through porous Pak-*

Afghan border, which is a manifestation of Pakistan's efforts in War against Terror.

- b. **Balochistan.** Balochistan has different dynamics of militancy with tribal and sub-nationalist undertones. There are hosts of foreign players supporting instability in the province due to its resource potential and geostrategic importance along future energy route.
- c. **Urban Areas/Karachi.** The economic capital of Pakistan continued to be scene of persistent insecurity with a dangerous mix of urban militancy, target killings, sectarian violence, street crimes, and kidnapping for ransom etc. The deteriorating law and order situation resulted in crippling economic losses with negative effects on economic activities across the country. The problems of Karachi were basically processional, religious and agitation politics. Thus Karachi needed a different kind of response with focus on law and order improvement by LEAs. Pakistan Armed forces and LEAs have improved the situation in Karachi to an encouraging extent and the city has returned to peace and tranquility.

Traditional and Non-Traditional Warfare in Pakistan's Environment

9. While Pakistan remains involved in Traditional Warfare, along with a persistent threat of conventional warfare from the east, range of Hybrid Warfare means applied against Pakistan by global, regional and domestic actors to include the US, India, Afghanistan and Non State Actors (NSAs) are as follow:-

a. **The US Application.** Important non kinetic means applied by the US, in various facets of Non Kinetic Warfare (NKW) are appended below:-

(1) **Diplomatic Coercion.** Diplomatic coercion to meet their policy ends is used vehemently. Statements like 'bombing to the stone age, Mantra of 'do more', diplomatic expressions like Pakistan is a part of the problem, AfPak-Strategy de-hyphened Pakistan from India, thus sidelining Kashmir issue, Mr Panetta's statement upon Osama Bin Laden + implying incompetence or complicity, Admiral Mullen's accusations and President Obama's stance to undertake operations against Terrorists and actions taken by the US government, recent intimidations by

Trump administration to coerce Pakistan in the form of different statements are apt examples of diplomatic coercion.

- (2) **Economic Coercion.** Promoting dependence on aid has been the way of ensuring her leverage with Pakistan. US conveniently employed legal rubric and its democratic maze to keep our economic concessions to the minimum. Pertinent examples include using International Financial Institutions leverage, withholding and delay in provision of coalition support fund, stoppage of \$ 700 Million, withholding of our already paid amount for F-16 aircrafts, built in legal barriers within Kerry Lugar Bill and recent stoppage of already promised funds for the war against terror are cases in point.
- (3) **Information Operations.** Goal of perception development has been pursued through dissemination of incriminating narratives to coerce our national will and cohesion, while means include media tools like TV, public messaging, talk shows and coercive statements, primarily airing of

USAID transmissions and Voice of America (VoA) programmes on private TV channels during prime air time.

(4) **Miscellaneous**

- (a) **Espionage / Clandestine Activities.** CIA operatives/ contractors, Black Water representatives identified with ample proofs, brought to fore, ingress of anti-state elements in the society, who can cause serious damage to national pride and sovereignty.
- (b) **Effect Based Operations.** Violations of Pakistan's Air Space challenged sovereignty of the country, thus creating negative effects at national morale.
- (c) **Winning Hearts and Minds (WHAM).** WHAM is pursued as was seen during Earthquake of 2005 and Floods of 2010.
- (d) **Use of Drones.** Drones have been used on Pakistan's soil against the established rules and violation of sovereignty of the country. These have been by and large

counterproductive and created resentment in the masses.

b. **Indian Application.** Indian policy objectives focus on degradation of ideology of Pakistan, weaken Pakistan politically and economically, keep our armed forces embroiled through engagement in FATA and weaken inner front through ‘**Creative Chaos Theory**’. Means applied in various domains by India in various facets of Hybrid Warfare are as follow:-

(1) **Exterior Manoeuvre**

- (a) Diplomatic onslaught, to malign Pakistan in post 9/ 11 environment.
- (b) Exploitation of Mumbai incident, to freeze the composite dialogue process as a pressure tactics to have maximum mileage.
- (c) Utilization of Indian Diaspora for lobbying in international arena.

(2) **Clandestine Activities.** Fueling of sub-nationalist movement in Balochistan and support for terrorism in Pakistan in general and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), in particular.

- (3) **Information Operations.** India continues to project and exploit negative perception about Pakistan, through a strong and effective campaign, to project Pakistan as an epicenter of terrorism with an extremist society. As part of the well thought out strategy, Indian mass media, information and IT experts have made inroads into the international media power houses. Capitalizing on its progress in the IT field, Indian domestic media, film industry and substantial international outreach, India is actively propagating anti-Pakistan themes. The trend of leadership bashing, military bashing, clergy's bashing and creating feelings of uncertainty/ hopelessness at media point towards implosion effects of Hybrid Warfare waged on to the country.
- (4) **Cyber Domain.** Pakistan has been subjected to cyber attacks and will continue to be prone to such threats. India has embarked on producing thousands of cyber IT experts to support their efforts in cyber domain. Such attacks will enhance in decades ahead.

- (5) **Soft Power.** India also endeavors to change perceptions through projection of its soft image and enhance acceptability. ‘**Aman Ki Aasha**’, to propagate soft image within the middle and lower middle classes of society, cultural invasion through Bollywood Film Industry, to project attractive life, while having acceptability in the west as well. Acceptability of Indian cultural blitz, has led to implications on public attitude as follow:-
- (a) India projected as friendly to Pakistan.
 - (b) Increasing acceptability of cultural similarities with India.
 - (c) Demand to increase trade and commerce.
- (6) **Economic Domain.** Effort to keep Pakistan economically unbalanced has been manifested through manipulation of Indus Water Treaty, to deny Pakistan its rightful share of water. Blocking of Pakistan’s request for membership of ASEAN, through Indian Diaspora in Singapore is again a clear example.

- (7) **WHAM/ Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan.** Development, construction of roads and training of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) in Afghanistan, to increase her influence. Investment and development in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK), with a view to empower people and reduce affinity towards Pakistan.
- c. **Afghanistan Application.** Afghanistan may seem a new comer in this game. They are following the objectives of containing Pakistan's influence and securing political space through allegations of promoting cross border terrorism. Salient are:-
- (1) **Information Domain.** Information 'Duplicity in Policy' giving slogans like 'We are brothers' while simultaneously accusing and defaming Pakistan.
 - (2) **Use of Proxies**
 - (a) Allow refuge and bases to Terrorists and other splinter groups.
 - (b) Afghan National Army's deliberate violations on Pak-Afghan border.
 - (c) Harboring dissident elements.
 - (3) **Economic Domain.** Misuse of ATTA and non-willingness to effectively control cross

border movement thus allowing rampant smuggling.

d. **Non-state Actors.** Non-state actors with various agenda have been involved in kinetic and non-kinetic domain. Salients are:-

(1) **Terrorist Organizations**

(a) **Kinetic Actions**

- i. Use of explosives, IEDs and vehicle borne, suicide bombers, assassinations remain phenomenon of their kinetic actions.
- ii. Selection and engagement of high value India specific mil assets of Pakistan.

(b) **Non-kinetic Actions.** These violent non-state actors also understand the importance of non-kinetic operations. Salient are:-

- i. Brand Pakistan's government as infidels for supporting US War in Afghanistan and claim that the fight against Pakistan Army is a Jihad.

- ii. Exploit poverty and lack of governmental control to transform youth into hardcore militants / suicide bombers. Resulting into huge recruitment.
- iii. Using '**Chaos as Strategy**' to induce fear and to undermine the credibility of the state.
- iv. Use of illicitly earned money for recruitment and running of banned organizations.
- v. Exploit religious sentiments and garner support of masses. NSAs created a standoff between India and Pakistan, by perpetrating Bombay incident.

(2) **Religious Welfare Trusts.** These exploit capacity gaps in Governance in providing social services, especially within the largely poor and uneducated segments for:-

- (a) Expanding religious and sectarian divide.

- (b) Local NGOs & charity organizations with links to banned outfits keep fulfilling foreign agenda.
- (3) **Foreign NGOs.** Various NGOs continue promoting western and at times, anti-state influences and also indulging in specific data and intelligence gathering for external players.

Traditional War in the Context of South East Asia (ASEAN)

Figure 4-1: Map of South East Asia



10. Intra-state conflict, inter-state conflict and terrorism and trans-national threat has become new political and security challenges for ASEAN. Since its formulation in 1967, ASEAN has been familiar with security related issues in its region. During the heat of Cold War, ASEAN was to cope with traditional threat such as inter-state conflict. Even up until today, some ASEAN countries has border dispute with their ASEAN partner, both land and maritime border dispute. For example, **Indonesia-**

Malaysia maritime border dispute and **Thailand-Cambodia land border dispute**. Such dispute is anomaly regarding ASEAN resolve to create ASEAN Political and Security Community referred to Bali Concord II. The dispute has been brought those countries in the brink of open war, but fortunately they can restrain their self before crisis goes worse. Another dispute that involving ASEAN countries is **South China Sea**, which also involving **China and Taiwan**. Overlap maritime dispute in the South China Sea has been made skirmish between ASEAN country and China in recent year. **Philippine and Vietnam** are the most claimants who dare to stand their claim against assertive Chinese claim. ASEAN has always been encouraging and promoting peace solution through dialogue forum on overlapping in the South China Sea¹⁶, but has not succeeded yet. Since 1993, ASEAN has supported Indonesia effort to hold regular workshop on South China Sea which is categorized as second track dialogue involving all claimant country. In 2003, ASEAN and China has signed on Declaration on Conduct (DoC) on the South China Sea in order to prevent crisis there.¹⁷ Last but not least, ASEAN since a few years ago has proposed the draft of Code of Conduct (CoC) to China for discussion before get an agreement on that. South China Sea issue is challenging issue for ASEAN and whole region, one because it's also involving extra regional power interest. United States through the then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has stated that "United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access

¹⁶, James Hardy, "Analysis: ASEAN finds voice over South China Sea dispute", Jane's Defence Weekly online, 15 August 2014

¹⁷. http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2, accessed on 2 February 2018

to Asia's maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea".¹⁸ Japan also paid concern and attention on the development on South China Sea, since its related to China rise from Japan's interest. Although Permanent Court Arbitration in its ruling in the case Philippines v China (PCA case number 2013-19) on 12 July 2016 that "there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the 'nine-dash line'",¹⁹ China abruptly reject that ruling. China assertiveness on the South China Sea has been a stumbling block for ASEAN to find a solution which referred to international law such as UNCLOS 1982. Since 2011, China unilaterally has been building artificial islands on the South China Sea through reclamation on some features.²⁰ According to satellite images available on the market, China has set up military facility there like airstrip²¹ and installing air defense radar.²² ASEAN leaders expressed their concern at reclamation activities in the disputed Spratly Islands,²³ but at fall on China's deaf ears.

11. **Non-Traditional Threats.** Other than traditional

¹⁸. Mark Landler, "Offering to Aids talks, U.S challenges China on disputed Island", <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo.html>, accessed on 2 February 2018

¹⁹. Permanent Court of Arbitration, Press Release: The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v The People's Republic of China), page 1-2.

²⁰. James Hardy, "China building artificial island in South China Sea", Jane's Defence Weekly online, 16 May 2014

²¹. James Hardy, "China building airstrip-capable island on Fiery Cross Reef", Jane's Defence Weekly online, 21 November 2014


²². Gabriel Dominguez, "Beijing building new shelters, radar facilities on South China Sea islands, says research group", Jane's Defence Weekly online, 30 June 2017

²³. Dzirhan Mahadzir, "ASEAN leaders express 'concern' over South China Sea island building", Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 April 2015

threat, it's a matter of fact that ASEAN also have to cope with non-traditional security threat. In general, the Non-Traditional Threats in South East Asia can be classified as below: -

- a. Terrorism.
- b. Environmental degradation including climate security.
- c. Economic crisis and poverty.
- d. Diseases and pandemics.
- e. Energy, water and food resources.
- f. Natural disaster.
- g. **Trans – National Crimes**
 - (1) Provision of illicit goods such as drug trafficking, stolen properties, weapon trafficking and smuggling.
 - (2) Provision of illicit services such as commercial sex and human trafficking.
 - (3) Infiltration of commercial business and government such as fraud, racketeering, money laundering and corruption.
 - (4) Piracy.
 - (5) Kidnap for ransom.

Fig 4-2: Statistics of Non-Traditional Threat



Source: Statistics of 3 months compiled by International Students of NDC-60 Thailand, Bangkok

12. **ASEAN Security Challenges.** Following are the ASEAN Security challenges:-

- a. Old and new insurgencies - southern Philippines, southern Thailand, Myanmar, West Papua.
- b. Political uncertainty and instability - Myanmar, Thailand.
- c. Inter-state disputes and tensions - Thai-Cambodia border, South China Sea conflict.
- d. Power shift and great power rivalry - China/US, China-India and China-Japan.
- e. Transnational/Non-traditional security threats – terrorism, transboundary haze, maritime piracy, pandemics, transnational crime, drug trafficking,

people smuggling, natural disasters).

13. Challenges for The Future.

- a. Rise of China and India, a multipolar world.
- b. Increasing burden: scope of issues, and membership, and partnerships.
- c. Sovereignty and non-Interference in an age of globalization and transnational challenges.

14. Key Questions for The Future.

- a. Can ASEAN's centrality in Asian regional architecture be assured for next 20 years?
- b. ASEAN 2030: "Wise counsel of Asia or marginalized relic of the past"?

Traditional and Non-Traditional Warfare in Thailand's Environment

15. Being²⁴ situated at the heart of Southeast Asia, Thailand knows its strategic value very well. Without it, ASEAN would not have the kind of bargaining power with the Dialogue Partners the grouping has enjoyed. At present, ASEAN is under huge pressure from major powers wanting to spread their influence at the expense of others. Therefore, the grouping must assert itself and take up a leadership role to prevent

²⁴ Positioning the ASEAN Community in an Emerging Asia : Thai Perspectives by Kavi Chongkittavorn ,Termsak Chalermpanupap ,Suthad Setboonsarng and Apichai Sunchindah: Compiled by the Department of ASEAN Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand

confrontation among them. *ASEAN is now caught between two security frameworks—one is American-centric and the other is Chinese-centric.* Of course, the US has long been associated with security in the region after World War II. The American military presence has guaranteed peace and stability for over half a century. In the case of China, its rise was fast and quite extensive. Beijing moves quickly in all avenues especially when other powers are facing domestic hurdles both in terms of politics and economics. China has thus seized the opportunity to offer the region all sorts of economic links and cooperation. China has a clear strategic view of the region in the future. Beijing hopes it can assert its influence and be recognized by the US power in the region. At the moment, China has been able to put money where its mouth is. The overwhelming support of the AIIB was unprecedented. It serves as a testimony of how China can win big in the global stage with sensible ideas. However, as a key member of ASEAN, Thailand feels that ASEAN has to take the lead and balance its relations with both the US and China. ASEAN is the only acceptable balancing wheel for the two major powers. As such, Thailand's non-paper titled "ASEAN's Centrality and Strategic Approach to the Future of Regional Architecture" was well received because it came at the right time. The paper recommends that ASEAN needs to maintain internal centrality with better thinking and decision before engaging with the outside world. ASEAN that can timely make a collective decision on key global issues would serve as a reminder of the leadership role of ASEAN. The grouping will use the recommendations in the Thai non-paper as part of ongoing efforts to strengthen ASEAN centrality in all ASEAN fora. Indeed, the ideas

of the paper, as incorporated in ASEAN's Revised Work Plan on Maintaining and Enhancing ASEAN Centrality, have been endorsed by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers in 2015. The only way for ASEAN to cope with the intensification of US-China rivalry is to promote ASEAN centrality. ***The security outlook of the Asia-Pacific region in the coming years is heading into uncharted waters as the US is determined to promote and sustain its global leadership.*** Today, the US is not only up against Russia, the all-time adversary, but also a rising China, the all-weather player. This emerging strategic chess game provides both challenges and opportunities for ASEAN to reflect deeply on its strengths and weaknesses in engaging major powers. At the global level, the US will continue to advance a rules-based international order that promotes peace and security through strong alliances and partnerships, forge diverse coalitions, and take the lead in UN-related and other multilateral organizations. The latest US strategic thinking is directly in response to China's assertive economic and security policies under President Xi Jinping, which have suddenly shaken existing regional and international orders. The establishment of the 57-member AIIB, with unusually strong backing from the West, is indicative of the current state of China vis-à-vis US economic influence throughout the world. It is a work in progress. It remains to be seen how the ongoing US-China competition, euphorically known as the new type of major powers' relations, will play out in the security and strategic realms in the future. ***Make no mistake, the Asia-Pacific region would be the laboratory of their fierce contestation.*** Diplomatically speaking, the US Government has often reiterated its support for China's peaceful rise and also encouraged the country to become a

partner in development and the broader global community. But at the same time, Washington also came out with strong rhetoric against Beijing, especially on its claims in the South China Sea of being “inconsistent with international laws.” With major powers upping their ante toward each other, it is a good opportunity for ASEAN to maintain its centrality to ascertain that these deep-rooted threat perceptions would not at any time break into open conflicts or harm the grouping’s community building. For ASEAN, the stake is high as it exists as an ASEAN Community in the post-2015 period. Any rupture between US-China relations would impact its community-building process and economic integration. From the ASEAN perspectives, from now on their mutual mistrust would be further deepened as the pattern of confrontation and collaboration continues and diversifies but without opting for open conflicts. Their cooperation at the regional and international levels would be high on rhetoric but limited on actions due to their different approaches and value systems. At this point, with stronger US-China rivalry, ASEAN is moving quickly to consolidate its consultative process and structure as well as forge a common regional security agenda at the highest level. The ASEAN senior officials have agreed that it is now the time to sharpen its role and focus on strategic matters at the EAS. In previous engagements, ASEAN Leaders were left very much to themselves to speak on issues of their concern. The lack of coordination and consultation among ASEAN Member States on key regional issues has weakened ASEAN centrality—with or without common voices. So far, several recommendations have been made to improve ASEAN centrality in the EAS including the setting up of a Sherpa system to coordinate views and set

agenda among ASEAN Leaders and their Dialogue Partners. A longer session focusing on exchange of views among Leaders is being considered in addition to an informal retreat. Officially, they meet for three hours average and break out for bilateral summits. The EAS Chair will have a stronger mandate to speak for ASEAN as a whole. The ongoing efforts to review the EAS and promote ASEAN centrality show that the grouping is more active and creative. It is clear—only ASEAN centrality that is stronger and strictly non-partisan can have far-reaching mitigating impacts on superpowers’ rivalries. ASEAN can stay united and ahead of the curve or be pushed down into the alley as pawns in the power struggle for influence and supremacy.

16. **Thailand’s Responsibility.** In order to effectively take up the role of bridge-builder (which is an important element in Thailand’s campaign to become a member of the United Nations Security Council for the year 2017-2018), Thailand must urgently reexamine its traditional diplomatic practices of “*blending with the wind*”²⁵ and “**strategic ambiguity**”. For over a century, Thailand, then known as *Siam*, used these combined strategies to stay independent and escape colonization and subjugation by Western powers. Today, the country continues to deploy the very same strategies as if the international environment remains static. However, what proved to be successful in the past might not be suitable for

²⁵ Positioning the ASEAN Community in an Emerging Asia : Thai Perspectives by Kavi Chongkittavorn ,Termsak Chalermphanupap ,Suthad Setboonsarng and Apichai Sunchindah: Compiled by the Department of ASEAN Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand

the current circumstance. Being a bridge-builder, it is essential for Thailand to be clear about its positions and policies regarding transnational issues. In two cases—the South China Sea disputes and what some have called the Rohingyas crisis—Thailand’s positions are clear and well understood without the exercise of deliberated ambiguities. Thailand hopes that through the conclusion of a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, ASEAN and China would be able to work together for mutual benefits in joint development projects. Later on, when both sides reach the comfort level to tackle sensitive issues such as sovereignty, ASEAN as a whole must render its full support to engage the disputing parties in resolving their differences peacefully. Thailand views the Rohingya displaced persons as a regional challenge, requiring regional cooperation in searching for a solution—without blaming one single country. Other ASEAN colleagues perceive it quite differently—as a domestic problem with regional implications. The naming and shaming promptly caused recalcitrance from Myanmar and other key players. As the only country in the region without the experience of being colonized, Thailand has the propensity to stay in the middle ground by taking into consideration interests of all stakeholders. In response to the new strategic environment, Thailand should adopt clear positions on priority challenges that the country and ASEAN colleagues have identified under their various blueprints and various ASEAN-led security fora. Given its unique geographical location, Thailand naturally can serve as the hub of ASEAN connectivity, linking South Asia and Northeast Asia as well as continental and maritime Southeast Asia. Thailand cannot remain vague and non-committal on key transnational issues as a timely response and policy

coordination would better serve the country's and ASEAN's interest.

Chapter 5

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

1. Relevant conclusions of chapter 2 are as under: -
 - a. Nature of war essentially remains constant, while character of warfare is evolving towards more synergy, resulting into more dispersion and lethality depending on objectives, nature of opponents and availability of technology.
 - b. Traditional military conflicts between nation states owing to their destructive lethality are becoming largely improbable, however, these cannot be totally ruled out, and hence conventional forces will persist.
 - c. Changes in the political, economic, social and technical spheres are making possible for small groups to develop into networked fighting machines challenging nation-states. Military forces largely prepared to fight 2nd and 3rd generation wars by compulsion will have to thus transform into hi-tech, lean, agile and precision engagement setups as well revisit concepts.

- d. 4 GW is still evolving while 5th GW (Hybrid) is also making appearance. Unlike the other generations of warfare, one cannot precisely set a demarcation line or a certain way that represents the transition from 4 to 5 GW. Hence, specific response to the emerging blend of warfare would remain evolving in years ahead, making response wanting.
2. Relevant conclusions of chapter 3 are as under: -
 - a. Operations in future warfare will occur across the entire spectrum of conflict, leading to a form of hybrid war where adversaries attempt to simultaneously employ traditional, disruptive, catastrophic and/or irregular capabilities to attain their objectives. 4 GW requires a comprehensive-government response whereas the 5GW as it evolves requires a comprehensive-society response, thus demanding better fusion of all elements of national power in the nation's strategic plans and actions.
 - b. Population shall remain the center of gravity, although the struggle among the belligerents will essentially go beyond the physical elements of conflict to integration of information operations

using media and cyber space as weapon systems.

Thus: -

- (1) winning the population will decide the outcome of the conflict.
 - (2) Battle of narratives will be led by disenfranchised and economically disadvantaged youth, actively seeking change, are being empowered by technological progress and influential non-state leaders.
- c. Forces will no longer operate strategically under the planning assumption of a known threat. 4/5GW fighters with different capabilities and divergent purposes (separatists, nationalists, extremists / religious radicals, criminal groups) gain their strength from the deprived urbanized society, thus resulting modern urban warfare a challenge.
- d. Hybrid War fighters would fight for religious convictions, ethnic / cultural reasons and social ideologies. Violence purposely would be directed at civilians, particularly, selected segments of the population, becoming battlefield and the objective of the conflict. This phenomenon would tend to make wars more prolonged.

- e. Emergence / development of various technologies like Cyber Space, Nano, Bio and Mind Control Sciences will add to the reach and lethality of next generation fighters. This will dictate investment and prowess for meeting these challenges.
3. Following are few relevant conclusions from chapter 4:-
- a. State power is being shared by all kinds of non-state actors whether violent or non-violent actors transcending beyond the borders. Spread of technology and ubiquitous information has further resulted in diminishing this power. Complex security environment calls for building partnerships and enabling partners for optimum response.
 - b. States and international organizations have come up legal response in the shape of laws and implementation measures to fight the 4th Generation warfare. Spread of technology and information availability is compelling future warriors to adopt non-hierarchical network structures with no rigid organization, on the principle of 'system-not organization'. Use of varying technologies and techniques by groups will necessitate continuous formulation and updating of laws.

- c. *Increased access to all forms of technology and weapons whether kinetic or non-kinetic* enhances the potential of Hybrid fighters for catastrophic attacks. Given the destabilizing impact vis-à-vis scope of damage, national leaders may likely sanction pre-emptive or even preventive military actions / operations to avert dangers of such attacks.
- d. Law Enforcing Agencies lack capacity and capability to confront the challenge of Non-Traditional Warfare. Performance in future challenges demands a compatibly equipped and knowledgeable force.
- e. The tendency of ASEAN inter- state disputes matter turning into conflict or crisis is very slim; however, Non- Tradition threats i.e. the Trans-National Crimes appears to be the problem and failing to address the issues effectively might eventually jeopardize each respective ASEAN member states national security, sovereignty and towards the extent may lead to conflicts between nations.
- f. *ASEAN is now caught between two security frameworks—one is American-centric and the other is Chinese-centric.* It remains to be seen

how the ongoing US-China competition, euphorically known as the new type of major powers' relations, will play out in the security and strategic realms in the future. *Make no mistake, the Asia-Pacific region would be the laboratory of their fierce contestation* in next decades.

Recommendations

1. **National Level**
 - a. **Clear Strategic Direction**
 - (1) **Comprehending the Future War.**

Attempts to understand the new environment through the lens of *Old War* will impair the strategist's ability to address the realities of today's globalized world. Defense planners can only create strategies for new wars if they comprehend how different these struggles are from previous conflicts. Focus of our military remains on outdated distinctions between types of warfare whereas emerging fusion of war cannot be handled with a single approach to defense planning. Understanding the nature of future warfare, termed as Non-Traditional (Hybrid) warfare or a different name, can

help in crystallizing the response. Research Projects need to be undertaken at various levels. *Challenge of confronting Non-Traditional (Hybrid) warfare calls for changing the narrative from direct to indirect, short term to long term measures and external to integral. It would not be handled alone rather:-*

(d) Integrated interagency approach to projecting national / military power in conflict management.

(e)

(f) Effects based employment of elements of national power.

- (2) **Strategic Vision.** Given the complex threat paradigm, adoption of a comprehensive approach to national security appears the only way forward as it would lay down the theoretical framework for 'Defence of Nation and its People'. Availability of Comprehensive National Security Policy Document and implementation of the vision therein would synergize the response. Institutionalization of the process of

implementation and periodical review will keep stipulated goals in focus.

(3) **Political Ownership of the Conflict.**

Conflicts vis-à-vis their dynamics underpin their political ownership as conflicts need whole of nation approach. Trinity of people, government and Armed Forces shall remain critical in fighting future conflicts, hence role of political government in mobilizing the masses in the required direction.

b. **External Front / Interstate Relations.** Future warriors are likely to exploit voids in international law on one hand and on the other to geographic and capacity vulnerabilities of a nation to operate beyond national boundaries. The challenge calls for integrating efforts at regional as well as globally to:-

- (1) Deter conflicts through statecraft while developing and maintaining a robust military capacity for defending vital national interests.
- (2) Develop partnerships and engagements to shape, influence and stabilize the regional / global environment for isolating the threat.

c. **Human Security.** Human sufferings, fear and instability are the favorite weapons of Hybrid Warriors as underdeveloped societies with poor socio-economic conditions continue to be breeding grounds for nurturing future threats. Following areas need priority focus:-

- (1) **Economy.** Stabilization of economy creates positive effects for all elements of national power. It can contribute tremendously towards mitigating the threats to national security, whether generated by groups or individuals. Strengthening of economy should remain a foremost priority.
- (2) **Governance.** Alleviation of legitimate grievances of all disgruntled / alienated individuals and segments of society will add to the national security. Improving governance will bring synergy in the efforts to confront the challenges we face. Devolution of power through functioning of democratic institutions built from grass roots level and ensuring rule of the law remain the principal measures in promoting good governance.

(3) **Education.** Education is important driver of change as the educated societies can effectively challenge the narratives of future warriors. Curriculum should enhance awareness on the security threats / challenges as well as tolerance within the society.

d. **Role of National Security Advisor in Strengthening National Security Management System.** Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) does exist at the topmost level of national security management system, however, it needs to be strengthened through establishment of the Office and Secretariat of the National Security Advisor. Office and Secretariat of the National Security Advisor will work under Prime Minister with the purpose of integrating the national security efforts:-

- (1) Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance and Interior should work in consonance with National Security Advisor Secretariat to synergize national response in kinetic and non-kinetic domains.
- (2) National Security Advisor would also address the non-military aspects of conflict

through improving the interagency planning and integration process by coordinating military efforts with appropriate civilian agencies as well as by engaging expertise in the private sector, including non-governmental organizations and academia.

- (3) Intelligence has emerged as force multiplier in meeting security challenges. National Security Advisor's Secretariat can act as hub for interagency coordination through fusing information received from a wider variety of sources and share intelligence across the government stakeholders, services and with partners.
- (4) Role of think tanks, strategic practitioners and intelligentsia may be institutionalized through the office of National Security Advisor. Synergized effort will lead to incessant and in-depth review of comprehensive security situation / threats.

- e. **Harnessing Information Domain.** Comprehensive Information Policy involving cooperation and synergy among all stake holders (public and private). Information policy should

harmonize Cyber, media, intelligence, IT, academia and diplomatic efforts with focus on:-

- (1) **Use of Media for Winning the Battle of Narratives.** The future wars are likely to be long drawn as it would take a long time to understand the weaknesses of narratives and financing patterns and then develop counter narratives. Population might not be able to make up their minds so quickly to see the contradictions in insurgents / adversaries themes and actions. Resilience thus might have to be developed in the societies through media negating hostile narratives to build positive perceptions.
 - (2) **Role of Intelligencia.** Success lies in psychological domain. Moderate voices, intellectuals, scholars and media have substantial role in eroding the ideological appeal for violent extremist ideology.
- f. **Cyber Warfare.** Attacks in this domain can disable official websites and networks, disrupt or disable essential service, steal or alter classified data and cripple financial systems and electricity grids. Developing national capacity by integrating

human and technical elements to protect vital services against hacking remains vital to fight future warfare. Creating cyber command at national level be pursued as an essential requirement.

- g. **Research and Development for Meeting the Challenges of Disruptive Technologies.** States are arming themselves with new technologies like HAARP, Mind Control Sciences, ELF (Extended Low Frequency and Directed Energy Weapons) nano, Bio and robotic. Attaining expertise by individuals or violent non-state actors / groups in these technologies will result in multifarious dangers. Therefore, on one hand, there is a need to control the proliferation of these technologies and on the other; research has to be done for a response. Initiation of research and development measures at early stage will pay dividends in decades ahead.
- h. **Revamping Legal Systems to Confront the Threat.** Terrorists use a free society's freedom and openness as its greatest strengths against the former. They use our basic human and democratic rights not only to penetrate but also to defend them. If we treat them within our laws, they gain

many protections on the pretext of human rights. Extra ordinary threats demand extra ordinary laws, particularly in laws of pre-emptive actions, evidence, prosecutors and witnesses as well as judges protection. Periodic reviews of Laws for improvement shall remain precedence; more so in the case of cyber crimes and emerging technologies related crimes.

- i. **Role of Diaspora in Promoting National Interests.** Diaspora not only contributes towards economic recovery but also promoting national interests abroad. Availability of sizeable Diaspora is a huge plus and its role can be more meaningful with trust and direction.
- j. **Arrayed and well trained Hybrid Warfare LEAs,** with adequate force protection, projection and appropriate employment cap, to be able to locate the sources of disturbances and subsequently contain or eliminate them for successful stability efforts. Crystallizing of developmental strategy for dealing the threat / challenge is must at this stage.

2. **Armed Forces Level**

- a. **Role.** Military will be one of the elements of national power on a supporting role, as solution to

such issues has never been through predominant use of military and any desire of more vigorous military action will only complicate the matters.

- b. **Refining War Fighting Concepts.** Existing national strategies, war fighting concepts and force structures are ill suited for this emerging blend of warfare. The nation and military seem intellectually and institutionally unprepared for the ensuing warfare.
- (1) War fighting concepts need revision / redefining to meet the challenges of changing character of warfare. Incorporate more elements of national power into its operations vis-à-vis traditional, disruptive, catastrophic and /or irregular threats.
 - (2) In conjunction with reviewing and adjusting the nation's strategies, war fighting concepts, and capabilities, the defense community must reevaluate the force structure needed for future conflicts. It must transform its industrial-era organizational structures into more agile, information and knowledge based enterprises.
 - (3) The three classical levels of war - strategic, operational and tactical; still exist in

Traditional and Non-Traditional war. But these are affected and to some extent changed by the Fourth Generation. In the first three generations, strategy was the province of Generals, the Fourth Generation empowers junior leadership as role of an NCO may be strategic. Similarly, all three levels may be local as success at tactical level can easily be seen counter-productive at the operational and strategic levels. This phenomenon reflects at the need of doctrine for 4th GW.

- c. **Capability of Performing Across the Spectrum Military Operations.** Conventional forces based on 3rd Generation Warfare are still relevant. However, conventional forces will have to be more capable of performing across the spectrum military operations. To do so, the force needs a command and control structure that is net-centric with built-in redundancies. This would call for larger investment in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, particularly human intelligence capabilities, aerial mobility / assault capability and precision engagement.

d. **Versatile Force vis-à-vis Single Purpose Force.**

Future wars will demand a versatile force instead of single mission force. Versatility calls for:-

- (1) Accelerating the growth of special operations forces and the transformation of conventional forces to a professional, more agile, “multi-purpose” force with flexibility and credible combat power, able to conduct conventional, irregular, reconstruction, stabilization, disaster relief and peacekeeping assignments. This force must be capable of operating independently at increasingly lower echelons.
- (2) Military instrument would be expected to support nation’s efforts in promoting better governance, economic development, and efforts to address grievances among the discontented.

e. **Use of Mass Media as Force Multiplier**

- (1) **Strategic Communication.** Strategic Communication is regarded as a means of changing behaviour and suggests a challenge in both devising means to accomplish it and measures of its success. Strategists often consider concepts in terms

of 'ends, ways and means'. Strategic Communication is a 'way' to change behaviour – which is a desired 'end'. Strategic Communication employs multiple 'means' in that process. The means should be restricted only by the requirement to achieve the desired effect on the target audience. This is relevant to understand that Strategic Communication is a cross governmental, strategic activity in which the military is but one participant. It should however be an intrinsic part of the overall campaign plan. It typically over-arches traditional civilian public diplomacy activities and traditional military effects.

- (2) **Information Operations.** These aim at collection of capabilities brought together and focused to contribute to three broad purposes; firstly, to win the psychological contest with real and potential enemies, secondly to keep the trust and confidence of home and allied publics, and lastly to win strategic, operational, cognitive and technical “Info Age Applications” contest. Successful information campaign calls for

development of wholesome Information Action objectives and themes. These would focus on:-

- (a) Swarming the networks like mobile networks, face book, twitter etcetera against any biased comments and building a case in own favour.
- (b) **Influence the Perceptions.** Influence actions fight the enemy with words, symbols and ideas. They have the primary purpose of influencing the perceptions, and hence the will, attitudes, and, ultimately, the behaviour of target audiences. As antagonist's messages will be principally directed at the uncommitted, disadvantaged minorities, political factions which may be persuaded, vulnerable elements of the opposing force and the media. Consequently, the armed forces must have the capabilities and capacity to strengthen the support of the loyal, gain support of the uncommitted and undermine an

enemy's will to fight - the ability to accurately tell its story while being able to discredit the lies and propaganda of its enemies.

- (3) **Countering Propaganda.** Countering propaganda actions attack and erode the enemy's will to fight, diminish their understanding of the situation and their ability to make timely and effective decisions. Counter actions are aimed at deceiving, disabling or destroying enemy commanders; disrupting, degrading, denying or destroying the communication systems and thus the information enemy commanders rely upon; and destroying enemy commanders' faith and confidence in those systems and the information they contain.

f. **Population as a Centre of Gravity**

- (1) **Protection.** Military operations will be conducted in many cases once the existing order has been challenged. Thus, initially military will be required to assume a few roles normally associated with law enforcement agencies. Failure to do this

may create a security vacuum that could be exploited by a variety of interest groups that may or may not be parties to the conflict. Therefore, Population Protection operations / actions need to be anticipated at planning and training stages. Population Protection is achieved through the conduct of synchronised actions following spheres:-

- (a) **Security Actions.** These actions seek to minimise fear and harm through the execution of immediate protective actions contributing to public safety and protection of property.
- (b) **Population Control Actions.** These actions seek to establish and maintain control over a population's residence, movement and identity, while remaining cognizant of a population's own perceptions of safety and protection needs.
- (c) **Policing Actions.** These actions policing as well as strengthening capabilities of police structures, collection of criminal intelligence, evidence preservation, investigations,

judicial support and detention management.

- (d) **Disarmament, Disbandment and Reintegration.** These actions seek to disarm and disband adversarial groups and unwanted elements of the pre-existing security apparatus identified as being suitable for reintegration into society. These actions, by their nature need to be closely coordinated with Policing and Security Actions for long term stability of the system.
- (2) **Soft Power.** Increasing reliance on ‘soft power’ and kinetic means restricted to surgical strikes only. It must offer hope to the people - hope for peace, jobs and better lives. Accelerated reconstruction and economic development will contribute towards the winning of the battle.
- (3) **WHAM Operations.** Winning the hearts and minds of the people is even more important than killing or capturing insurgents.

(4) **Ruthless Elimination of Collateral Damage.** One of the reason that the British won in Northern Ireland was the fact that they suffered more casualties than inflicted. Collateral damage will have to be curbed.

g. **Force Protection.** The contemporary and future battle space is visualized to be characterized by a lack of identifiable fronts, flanks or rear areas. Besides, Force Protection assumes significant importance due to proliferation of lethal weapons, presence of a variety of combatant groups - each with their own capabilities and the need for the armed forces to establish a persistent and proportionate presence in population centres. This presence is to be maintained once variety of adversaries in that battle space seeking nothing more at the tactical level than to impose a steady trickle of casualties resulting in creating a large and complex force protection problem. Force Protection should now be sought to both conserve the force and contribute to the achievement of the mission. 3rd GW Force Protection is highly disadvantages as it seeks security by isolating troops from the surrounding population.

Effectiveness against 4th /5th GW opponents demands integration with the local populace.

h. Leadership Training

- (1) Military leaders must have grasp of the profession of arms and its relationship to strategy and policy remains crucial. In facing the challenge of preparing for conflicts that are uncertain in form, location, level of commitment and nature of the enemy, military planning will have to be more adaptive and responsive to the strategic context.
- (2) Leaders need a stronger intellectual education to confront the ensuing challenges of war. Education and training must extend beyond traditional military schools / institutions thrust lines to include the study of history, anthropology, economics, geopolitics, culture, law, military diplomacy and strategic communications.
- (3) Future challenges either direct or indirect, need professionals at all levels that can perform in decentralized, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous circumstances. Military leaders must also understand that

human dimensions matter more than any other factors in war as technology remains important, it is rarely decisive.

- (4) Awareness and respect of local customs, traditions and cultural sensitivities is fundamental.
- i. **Preparing for Cyber Warfare.** Cyber warfare is the war of tomorrow. Success will lie in developing anti-hacking skills, so as to ensure security of own networks and at the same time denying the same to other side. Services will have to have structures in line with the guidelines from the cyber command.
- j. **Preventative Operations.** Preventative operations will become a necessity than option. Conduct of intelligence based preventative operations will call for authority, capability and expertise for monitoring / surveillance of huge data on cyber domain and mobile phones.
- k. **Strengthening Internal Systems.** Streamlining infrastructure and internal systems, so that they become less available as potential targets and / or potential weapons. Therefore, remove opportunities, rather than focusing only on the individuals.

Conclusion

Changes in the political, social, and technical spheres are making it possible for small groups bound together by a cause to use new technologies for change. What is certain is that the nature of warfare is changing, blending the Traditional and Non-Traditional Warfare while increasingly shifting to later wherein reliance upon cyber networks, robotics and electronic media, use of new technologies to achieve desired effects. Limited resources, financial or otherwise, make it increasingly difficult for a nation to manage 21st century warfare. Challenges of understanding the different facets of evolving warfare and endeavoring to develop solutions lie ahead. Future threats are complex and alarming thus asking us to shun old mind-sets and develop competencies to deal with them more effectively. Sun Tzu advised centuries back saying, “constant formation, water has no constant shape: the ability to gain victory by changing and adapting according to the opponent is called genius”. Let his wisdom guide us.

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Appendix

Survey – Background Knowledge

Background

1. This survey is being conducted by Col Khan Zakir Ullah (Pakistan Army) presently attending NDC-60 Thailand. The survey is in connection with fulfilment of Individual Research Paper “Conceptual Framework - Constituents and Spectrum of Traditional and Non - Traditional (Hybrid) Warfare in the Context of South & South-East Asia”.

Aim

2. The survey is aimed at obtaining your valuable input about few key questions that shall contribute to the paper indeed.

Definition of Hybrid Warfare

3. While Traditional Warfare is still considered evolving, contours of future war i.e. the Fifth Generation Warfare (**Hybrid Warfare**) has started emerging. Currently, there is no widely accepted definition for the latest Generation i.e Hybrid Warfare. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui define Hybrid Warfare as “**the use of all means whatsoever, means that involve the force of arms and means that do not involve the use of arms, means that entail casualties and means that do not entail casualties-to force the enemy to serve one’s own interest**”.

Explanation

4. It is a generation of warfare wherein war would appear without boundaries between public and private, combatants and non-combatants. This warfare remains Non-Trinitarian; from People, Government and Armed Forces to between state and non-state entities

organized as networks, supra combinations, along social economic, criminal, terrorist, gang, special interest, or ethnic or tribal lines. War objectives are transforming from erstwhile (attrition, dislocation and disintegration) to the attrition of the political and public will. This has made the hybrid warfare superior to mechanism of annihilation, maneuver, or attrition of resources. Hybrid Warfare seems the continued shift of political and social loyalties to causes rather than nations, thus includes the appearance of super-empowered individuals and groups, with access to modern knowledge, technology and means to conduct asymmetric attacks in furtherance of their individual or group interests against individual, groups or states. South Asia faces conventional threat; it is engaged in Non-Traditional Warfare and faces an increasing range of Hybrid Warfare means being applied against it. Thus, it remains imperative to understand the changing nature of threat.

Definition / Explanation of Trans-National Crimes

5. Transnational crimes are crimes that have actual or potential effect across national borders and crimes that are intrastate but offend fundamental values of the international community. The term is commonly used in the law enforcement and academic communities. Transnational organized crime (TOC) refers specifically to transnational crime carried out by crime organizations. The word transnational describes crimes that are not only international (that is, crimes that cross borders between countries), but crimes that by their nature involve cross-border transference as an essential part of the criminal activity. Transnational crimes also include crimes that take place in one country, but their

consequences significantly affect another country and transit countries may also be involved. Examples of transnational crimes include:

- (1) Provision of illicit goods such as drug trafficking, stolen properties, weapon trafficking and smuggling.
- (2) Provision of illicit services such as commercial sex and human trafficking.
- (3) Infiltration of commercial business and government such as fraud, racketeering, money laundering and corruption.
- (4) Piracy.
- (5) Kidnap for ransom.

SURVEY – QUESTIONNAIRE


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Key Questions

Ser	Question	Yes	No	To some extent
1.	Is Hybrid Warfare a challenge for South Asia?			
2.	Is Hybrid Warfare a challenge for ASEAN countries with manifesting probability?			
3.	Are Trans-National crimes an emerging challenge for ASEAN states?			
4.	The Pacific region is caught between two security frame works. One China centric and the other is US centric. The region will witness intense contestation of the 2 camps in future. Do you agree or otherwise?			
5.	Thailand needs to re-evaluate its strategy; as the old strategy of blending with the wind will no longer work in the coming opportunities and challenges. Do you agree or otherwise?			
6.	Will ASEAN maintain its centrality in future or will be a relic of the past?			
7.	Any other / special comments.			


SURVEY – RESULT

Figure 5 – 1: Feedback on Question 1




Source: Survey conducted by researcher

Figure 5 – 2: Feedback on Question 2




Source: Survey conducted by researcher

Figure 5 – 3: Feedback on Question 3




Source: Survey conducted by researcher

Figure 5 – 4: Feedback on Question 4




Source: Survey conducted by researcher

Figure 5 – 5: Feedback on Question 5




Source: Survey conducted by researcher

Figure 5 – 6: Feedback on Question 6



Source: Survey conducted by researcher

Figure 5 – 7: Overall Statistical Graph of Survey

Biography

Full Name:	Colonel Khan Zakir Ullah
Date of Birth:	8 April 1973
Eductaion Background:	Bachelor of Computer Sciences Master in Sciences and Arts of Warfare
Military Courses:	Command and Staff Course (Pakistan) UN Staff Course – Command and Staff College Germany Civil Military Relations Course – Swedint Sweden Certified Training Professional Course – ARTDO INTL – Malaysia Counter Terrorism Course- USA
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