

**Challenges to modern peacekeeping  
and its implications to Singapore  
and the role of the militaries  
in Asia-Pacific**

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## Preface

*“Peacekeeping can only be done by soldiers, but not all soldiers can be peacekeepers.” – Anonymous<sup>1</sup>*

In 2002 - 2003, I spent seven months in the then East Timor as a military peacekeeper under UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). I was deployed as a member of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Company Task Force which was the largest ever troop contribution by Singapore to UN peacekeeping mission. It was my first experience in combat peacekeeping mission and association with UN peace operations. Till date, it remains one of the most meaningful and insightful assignments I had undertaken in my military career.

In that short seven-month deployment, I had worked in the headquarters of a New Zealand Army Battalion, a Royal Thai Army Battalion, a Portuguese Army Battalion, and an Australian Army Sector Command. My course of work also afforded me the opportunities to interact with many military, police and civilian peacekeepers from regional countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines, Japan, Bangladesh,

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<sup>1</sup> A common maxim among military peacekeepers; origin is unknown.

China and Pakistan. It was through operating in multinational environment and those numerous cross-cultural interactions that I became aware of the key challenges faced by a few regional countries in peacekeeping training and troop-contribution to UN peacekeeping missions.

I was intrigued by the nature and mechanics of UN peace operations; by how military peacekeepers were trained for their assigned missions; and by the interoperability challenges faced due to the multinational composition and cultural diversity of peacekeeping force. The level of pre-deployment preparatory training differed significantly among the troop-contributing nations and this had direct impact on the differing level of competencies among the military peacekeepers. I was also convinced that conventional skill set of a soldier was not necessarily exact fit of the required traits of peacekeepers. On top of conventional military training, peacekeepers should undergo specialised training in areas such as gender and cultural awareness, legal dimensions in peace operations, inter-agencies cooperation, mediation skill and so on.

That particular overseas assignment of mine was part of the largest ever military contingent contributed by Singapore in UN

peacekeeping operation. Considering Singapore's limited resources and small land and population size, it was a daunting yet calibrated decision taken by Singapore to contribute such large sizable force for an overseas combat peacekeeping mission for an extended period. It was also first time where SAF regular force was augmented by conscripts and reserve forces. I came to appreciate the challenges faced by smaller nations in UN peace operations, especially in area of sustainability and training.

Therefore this research paper on challenges to modern peacekeeping and its implications to Singapore and the role of the militaries in Asia-Pacific was written with much influence of my personal experiences in UNMISSET. I believe that regional countries and Singapore alike can better contribute and fulfill our promise to the UN. The research was also driven by my conviction that military peacekeepers ought to be better trained because, as proclaimed by the preceding maxim, "*...not all soldiers can be peacekeepers*".

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# **Chapter 1**

## **Introduction**

### **Background and Problem**

The collapse of Somalia, brutalisation of Bosnia and genocide of Rwanda – and many others – are rude reminders of the failure of the United Nations (UN) in upholding peace. The changing nature of security and conflicts, from that of inter-state to intra-state, presents numerous challenges to the form and content of UN peace operations. Traditional peacekeepers, who are accustomed to conflict containment in ‘stand-off’ way of resolving conflicts between states, have become ineffective and irrelevant in modern peace operations.

The ‘Brahimi’ report, which was produced in the aftermath of the failed effort in Rwanda, has candidly called for transformational changes in the many aspects of peace operations, including doctrine, mandate, rules of engagement, rapid deployment force, training, command structure, and many others. Several Member States



acknowledged the need for change and have since worked in concert with United Nations Peacekeeping (UNPK) on this reformative effort.

Member States in Asia-Pacific are not spared from this calling for change. Many of its Member States have long history of volunteering troops for UN peacekeeping missions. Furthermore three of the largest UN peace operations have been undertaken in Asia-Pacific: in Cambodia, Kashmir and Timor Leste (formerly known as East Timor). To say that the challenges of modern peacekeeping may affect the region is a severe understatement.

Such emerging security trend with its corresponding challenges of peace operations has tremendous impact on the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) since Singapore has a history of troop contribution to peace operations.

This research seeks to study the challenges of modern peace operations in today's changing concept of security; to examine the impact of these challenges on role of militaries in Asia-Pacific; and to evaluate the impact of these challenges on Singapore's contributions to peacekeeping effort.

## **Objectives of Research**

The objectives of the research are as follows:

- To study and discuss the challenges faced by modern day peacekeeping in today's changing concept of security.
- To examine the impact of the aforementioned challenges on the role of militaries, with particular reference to regional organisations such as Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting – Plus (ADMM-Plus) and Asia Regional Forum (ARF), and specific countries in Asia-Pacific including Japan, India, Malaysia, Thailand and smaller nations.
- To evaluate the rationales of Singapore's participation in UN peace operations and the tensions faced by the SAF.
- To make recommendations for mitigating challenges of modern peacekeeping and possible areas of future participation by Singapore.

## **Scope of Research**

The scope of the research is as follows:

- Chapter 1 – This chapter set-the-stage of the research by introducing and describing the background of the research, research objectives, scope of research and research methodology. It also lists the delimitation and definition of words used in the research.
- Chapter 2 – This chapter reviews several key literatures related to the research.
- Chapter 3 – This chapter identifies key challenges faced by modern day peacekeeping in today's changing concept of security and the relevance of traditional peacekeeping.
- Chapter 4 – This chapter describes the impact on the role and effort of militaries in Asia-Pacific and regional organisations. This includes regional organisations such as ASEAN and ARF, and specific countries in Asia-Pacific including Japan, India, Malaysia, Thailand and smaller nations.

- Chapter 5 – This chapter describes Singapore's participation in UN peace operations, related interests of Singapore and the tensions faced by the Singapore Armed Forces in her participation in peacekeeping operations.
- Chapter 6 – This chapter makes conclusion and summaries the relevant recommendations from the study.

## **Methodology**

The research hypothesis is that the changing security landscape has and will continue to change the role of militaries in Asia-Pacific in peace operations. Specifically Singapore's existing structure, doctrines and training may be effective and efficient for conventional operations; it might not be adequate in preparing and supporting its future contribution to peacekeeping effort.

Broad areas of research are as follows:

- Training - Member state is primarily responsible to train and prepare their peacekeepers prior to deployment. Modern peace operations have demanded several non-traditional

proficiencies of military peacekeepers, such as gender awareness, interoperability, cultural and language skill, legal know-how and many others.

- Structure - Contributing troops at formation level for peace operations might not be ideal for some of the small nation in Asia-Pacific such as Singapore but it reduces the preparatory time for such deployment. This research attempts to address this dilemma.
- Doctrine - This research attempts to identify areas of improvement, inclusive of cooperation with regional institutions, to enhance the doctrine.

The research adopts the following approach:

- Study the changing concept of security and relevance of traditional peacekeeping – this entails exploring concepts and theories of relevant literature.
- Identify the need for change and challenges faced by modern peace operations with references to ‘Brahimi’ report – this is supported by personal peacekeeping experiences in Timor Leste.

- Examine the roles and challenges faced by regional organisations and arrangement.
- Examine the impact of changing concepts of security on militaries in Asia-Pacific and identify initiatives undertaken by the countries in addressing the challenges.
- Evaluate current Singapore's structure, doctrine and training for modern peace operations and describe their inadequacies.
- Identify initiatives and competencies that Singapore should acquire or develop in order to stay relevant and effective in future peacekeeping efforts.
- Derive recommendations for militaries of Member States and Singapore in preparing and supporting future contributions to peace operations.

## **Delimitation and Limitation**

The delimitations/ limitations for the research are as follows:

- Countries – Selected countries within Asia-Pacific, including Japan, India, Malaysia, Thailand and smaller nations, are

studied. The research deep-dives on Singapore and the Singapore Armed Forces.

- Regional Organisation – Association of Southeast Asia and Asia Regional Forum are studied.
- Period - Modern day peacekeeping is limited to era of post-Cold war.
- Nature of Operation – Research focuses on the military aspect of peacekeeping operations.

## **Research Utilisation**

Contributing to peacekeeping effort by militaries in Asia-Pacific will continue in foreseeable future. Singapore is no exception.

The key utilisation of the research are as follows:

- Readers will be cognisant of the challenges of modern peacekeeping. Such challenges, if not dealt with promptly and appropriately, can be the pitfall of future peace operations.
- Readers will gain insights on the impact of the aforementioned challenges on the role of militaries in Asia

Pacific, specifically regional organisations and specific countries such as Japan, India, Thailand, Malaysia and smaller nations.

- Readers can better appreciate the rationales and interests of Singapore's contribution to UN peace operations, and tensions faced by Singapore in her peacekeeping effort.
- The paper will attempt to recommend several initiatives and competencies that can be acquired or developed in order to stay relevant and effective in future peacekeeping efforts

## **Definition**

The term “peacekeeping” is used synonymously with what we understand as “peace operations” today. The definition of peace operations is not confined essentially to the conventional notions of deployment of peacekeeping forces in times of crisis. Instead, it is expanded to include the broader framework of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building. This is analogous to United Nations Peacekeeping (UNPK)'s definition of peace operation:



“... includes preventive deployments, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, diplomatic activities such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace building, as well as humanitarian assistance, good offices, fact-finding, electoral assistance.”

## **Chapter 2**

### **Literature Review**

#### **The ‘Brahimi’ Report<sup>1</sup>**

The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, which is commonly known as the ‘Brahimi’ report, was produced in the aftermath of failed UN’s effort in preventing genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and protecting the inhabitants of Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina) in 1995. The report was developed by a panel of 10 experts, which was convened by then UN Secretary-General (Sec-Gen) Kofi Annan, and named after the chairman of the commission that produced it, Lakhdar Brahimi. It was published in August 2000, ahead of the UN Millennium Summit and transmitted to the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council. UN Sec-Gen hailed the report as "essential to make the United Nations truly credible as a force for peace." The UN Security Council subsequently adopted several provisions relating to the recommendations made by the report in Resolution 1327 (2000).

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<sup>1</sup> Lakhdar Brahimi. “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations”. (New York: United Nations Document No. A/55/305. 2000).

Figure 2 - 1: Security Council welcomed the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations "Brahimi Report"



Source: UN Photo ([http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi\\_report.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi_report.shtml).)

The report candidly called for transformational changes in many aspects of UN peace and security operations, which included doctrine, mandate, rules of engagement, rapid deployment force, training, command structure, and many others. It also called for renewed political commitment of UN Member States and increase in financial resources to fund UN peace operations. Some of the key recommendations made by the report include (1) to enhance rapid deployment of peacekeeping operations; (2) to strengthen the relationship with Member States and legislative bodies; (3) to reform the culture of peacekeeping operations; (4) to reform the peacekeeping operations relationship with field missions;

and (5) to strengthen relationships with other United Nations bodies.<sup>2</sup> Of note, the report recommended that UN peacekeeping operations must be properly resourced and equipped, and operate under clear, credible and achievable mandates in order to be effective and successful. It also highlighted a critical weakness of UN peace operations which was that the troop contributions to UN peace missions were largely based on ad-hoc coalitions of willing Member States. It recommended for the UN to implement a standing UN military and/or police force which can be deployed in shorter notice. Correspondingly, it addressed the lack of commitment of Member States to make available standing forces and resources for peace operations. The report concluded by expressing a shared vision of a more effective UN in the future "extending a strong helping hand to a community, country or region to avert conflict or to end violence ... a United Nations that has not only the will, but also the ability, to fulfil its great promise, justifying the confidence and trust placed in it by the overwhelming majority of humankind."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p.54.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p.265-280.

## **UN Peace Operations and Asian Security<sup>4</sup>**

This book was a collection of selected works by various country scholars, mostly Asian, in peacekeeping and provided analyses on the state of UN peacekeeping missions and their corresponding impact on Asian security. There were ten scholars contributed to this collection and Caballero-Anthony<sup>5</sup>, the lead writer, wrote the introduction. The book examined the doctrinal and operational shifts in peace operations undertaken by the UN in recent years and the tripartite relationship between the UN, regional/ non-regional organisations and non-governmental stakeholders. Some of the questions that the book sought to address were: (1) How did Asian states perceive the new challenges and new doctrinal shifts in UN peace operations? (2) What had been the experiences of regional organisations in Asia in peace operations? And (3) Who were the new actors and players in peace operations and what were the implications on the region?<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Caballero-Anthony, Mely and Archarya, Amitav. "UN Peace Operations and Asian Security", UNISCI papers. No. 29 (2003).

<sup>5</sup> Mely Caballero-Anthony was Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p.xi-xii.

As most of the writers are Asian scholars, the book offered regional perspectives from Southeast, Northeast and South Asia. It analysed core security issues, which impacted on regional security of Asia, as a result of the changing nature of UN peacekeeping operations. It provided comprehensive and balanced perspectives on the Asian challenges, responses and experiences in complex field of UN peace operations. The book studied the emergence of new players in Asia, such as China and Japan, in UN peace operations. It also analysed the issues and impact of regional powers in peacekeeping operations. The book also deep-dived on the lessons learnt from UN peacekeeping in Cambodia and Timor Leste.

### **Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century<sup>7</sup>**

This report is the consolidated product of a series of seminar held over five years in nine countries around the world. The seminar, under the ambit of the Challenge Project, were attended by a wide range of highly experienced participants, including military peacekeepers, civilians and academics, from 230 organisations and 50 countries. The

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<sup>7</sup> Anna Lindh. Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. (Stockholm, Elanders Gotab, 2002). (Online). Available : <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a435186.pdf>.

foreword of this report was written by Anna Lindh, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden<sup>8</sup>.

The Challenge Project gathered collective knowledge and views of the participants on the challenges of peace operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It also fostered a culture of cross-professional cooperation and discussions through informal setting on the practice and theory of peace operations and practical issues of training and education. The report achieved in making practical recommendations in order to enhance international peacekeeping capabilities; highlighting current developments in contemporary peace operations; and contributing to enhancing the effectiveness of international peace operations.

The report deep-dived on the changing concept of security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It suggested that the attention given during the 1990s to aspects of the security of human life and dignity, and its corresponding effects, had complicated the general perception of security. This was made worse with international and transnational terrorism. Perceiving security to be as elusive as ever, the report focused on how to deal with

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<sup>8</sup> Anna Linda (1957 – 2003) was Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden and Chairman of the Council of the European Union. She was assassinated in 2003.

international and regional conflicts in their wider context, both historically and substantively. The report argued that the risk of interstate wars had diminished, modern conflicts were more likely to be of intra-state involving paramilitaries, warlord and other non-state actors, destroying normal societal life and local economies. It concluded that modern and future peace operations would face with multiple complexities including ending conflict termination, rebuilding societies, re-establishing institutions, promoting good governance, restoring infrastructure and economy and building sustainable peace.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p.35-48.



## **Chapter 3**

### **Challenges of Modern Peace Operations**

#### **Changing Concept of Security**

Traditional peacekeeping, which originated during the Cold War era, was intended to be a means to resolve conflicts between states. This is achieved by deploying unarmed or lightly armed military personnel from a number of countries, under UN command. These peacekeepers were not expected to fight fire with fire; their primary task generally required them to observe from afar and reported impartially on adherence to the ceasefire, troop withdrawal or other elements of the peace agreement.

Alas, it is no more.

The end of Cold War has allowed the world a fuller recognition of the danger consequential of intra-state conflict, and not just inter-state clashes that the traditional peacekeepers were accustomed to. International relations have experienced a profound shift; UN

peacekeeping has steadily undergone a resultant transformation in response to this changing world order. The changes in the nature of threats to security and conflicts, and the diversification of causes of conflicts, have extended characteristics of UN peacekeeping operations. Both form and content have changed from stand-off supervision to multiple levels and fields, including and not limiting to humanitarian assistance, election supervision, economic reconstruction and refugees management. Modern peacekeeping missions have become more complex. The missions often help implement comprehensive peace agreements between protagonists in intra-state conflicts, and involve more non-military elements to ensure sustainability. Unlike traditional peacekeeping, the risks involved in modern peacekeeping are much higher.

Some failed UN peacekeeping efforts — most notably the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda - led to a period of retrenchment and self-examination in UN peacekeeping. These setbacks have revealed the urgent need for more audacious peacekeeping strategies, more robust rules of engagement and realistic mandate. Once deployed, modern peacekeepers must be able to execute their duties and mandate professionally and effectively. This

entails more focused and specialised training for military units, to allow them to defend themselves, other peacekeeping contingents and the mission's mandate. Thus poses an unprecedented challenge on the training of modern peacekeepers.<sup>1</sup>

## **Challenges Of Modern Peace Operations**

### **Doctrine and Training**

One of the keys to success in conducting peace operations is the availability of a pool of competent peacekeepers, sufficient in numbers for speedy deployment. As such Member States are faced with the challenge of preparing their peacekeepers thoroughly for reasons of mission success, force protection and national pride. Peacekeeping training has always been a national responsibility and a national prerogative for the UN does not have its own military training facility. As each nation is free to provide its own training as it sees fit, thus disparities in skill sets, level of training and professional knowledge were not uncommon among troops contributing Member States.

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<sup>1</sup> Lakhdar Brahimi. "Executive Summary of the Brahimi Report", in Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. (New York: United Nations Document No. A/55/305. 2000).

Primary occupational training and proficiency as a soldier should be supplemented with training tailored specifically for peace operations. The complexity of modern peace operations demands a coherent and cohesive system that covers a full spectrum of training at all levels with participation not just the military but also the civilian and police peacekeepers. The broad-based conventional warfare military training undertaken by military peacekeepers is insufficient in modern day multi-dimensional peace operations. Training in some of the basic aspects like safety and force protection, gender awareness, comprehension of legal dimensions in peace operations and humanitarian and human rights law, inter-agencies cooperation and coordination; civil-military relationship; negotiation and mediation skills in conflict resolutions, dealing with media, and so on, must receive the attention of the troop-contributing Member States.<sup>2</sup>

Existing training standard varies from country to country; and it would be a daunting task to develop a global norm for peace operation training that is acceptable by all Member States yet comprehensive

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<sup>2</sup> Anna Lindh. "Executive Summary and conclusion", in Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. (Online). Available : <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a435186.pdf>, 2002. p.11-28.

enough to prepare peacekeepers to achieve operational success in the increasing volatile environment. But one cannot deny that common standards of preparation and training would enhance the cohesion and effectiveness of all peacekeepers. It would be a challenge yet ideal if personnel from one country can participate in the training programmes of other troop-contributing countries. In addition closer interactions and combined training between militaries, polices and civilian specialists of all participating Member States could result in more effective and robust cooperation when deployed together.

It has long been recognised that no two peace operations are alike, each is distinct and unique. This underlined the many different, and sometimes overlapping, opinions about doctrine for complex peace operations. Peace operations require complex and multilevel doctrine without being restrictive and dogmatic. The difficulties of achieving such a comprehensive document; implementing it for future peace operations and educating all participating Member States are extremely daunting. However post ‘Brahimi’ Report studies recommended that “there should be a multinational and inclusive effort to define the meaning and scope of doctrine applicable to UN peace operations; troop contributing countries

should take steps to build common doctrinal statements into their national doctrines.”<sup>3</sup>

### **Rapid Deployment Capacity**

One of the recommendations of the ‘Brahimi’ Report calls for the UN to establish “rapid and effective deployment capacity.” The initial period of approximately three months following a ceasefire is often most crucial for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers in the peace operations. Credibility and opportunities lost during this period are difficult to salvage. A credible and substantial sized rapid deployable foot-on-the-ground affords much needed initiative and flexibility to the initial phase of peace operation. The Report defines such capacity as “the ability to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within thirty days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing such an operation, and within ninety days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations.” It recommends the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) to include several coherent, multinational, brigade-size forces whose operational deployability in terms of training level and logistical readiness would be

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p.16-17.

assessed prior to deployment.<sup>4</sup> With such somewhat stringent requirement, many Member States, who have understanding with the UN for such military standby arrangement, might experience differing strain on their resources. The availability of the designated forces can be unpredictable. To be in the state of high readiness or capable of high intensity operation can be very challenging for many Member States.

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<sup>4</sup> Brahimi. op.cit., p.15-16.

## **Chapter 4**

# **Impact on the Role and Effort of Militaries in Asia-Pacific and Regional Organisations**

### **Roles of Regional Organisations and Arrangement**

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) involvement in peace operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) efforts in Africa have drawn attention to the role of regional organisations in peacekeeping operations. While the regional efforts at peace operations are becoming increasingly acceptable, there are issues on the degree of autonomy these regional organisations should possess in managing regional conflicts. But one cannot deny that cooperative arrangements with regional and other international security organisations have improved the international community's efforts to end conflicts in some areas and helped restore faith in UN peacekeeping corp. From this perspective, one remains hopeful that regional organisation and arrangement in Asia, such as Association of Southeast Asia (ASEAN) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), can assume significant role in



regional peace operations. Most analysts would agree that the ASEAN and ARF have played a critical role in decreasing the probability of war between its members and promoted confidence building in the region as multilateral forums for security discussion.<sup>1</sup>

However the inability of ASEAN and ARF to respond effectively to the crisis in Timor Leste presented their inadequacies as regional institutions. Both organisations do not have the capacity or the institutional abilities to respond to regional crisis needing concerted military intervention. Compared to NATO, neither has the peacekeeping forces that can be rapidly deployed.<sup>2</sup> Since majority of the Member States in both organisations have history of contributing troops to UN peacekeeping operations, there is a potential for collective troop contribution and peace effort. In addition, sharing of doctrine, experiences, information and combined training in area of peace operations can be made possible given that there are peacekeeping training centres established unilaterally among some Member States.

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<sup>1</sup> Mely Caballero-Anthony. "Asian Attitudes and Approaches to Peace Operations", UNISCI papers. No. 29, 2003, p.3-12.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p.5-7.

ARF attaches great importance in promoting dialogues, exchanges and cooperation on peacekeeping issues, thus established the Peacekeeping Experts' Meeting in 2007. This meeting series aims to gather peacekeeping experts of ARF Member States and dialogue partners to discuss specific ways to build confidence, synergy and interoperability among regional peacekeepers and to enhance regional peacekeeping capacity. Correspondingly, the inauguration of the Experts Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations (EWG-PKO) by the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) in 2010 saw one of the most relevant and practical efforts towards regional cooperations in peace operations. EWG-PKO is one of the seven EWGs undertaken by ADMM-Plus.<sup>3</sup> The key objectives of the EWG-PKO were to promote practical PKO-related cooperation among defence personnel and militaries of the ADMM-Plus Member States, and to explore ways to build upon and contributing to existing PKO initiatives.<sup>4</sup> One of the key achievements of the EWG-PKO was the conduct of Exercise FORCE 18, a multinational Humanitarian Mine Action and Peacekeeping Operations

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<sup>3</sup> There are seven ADMM-Plus Experts Working Groups, namely Peacekeeping Operations, Counter Terrorism, Maritime Security, Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief, Military Medicine, Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), and Cyber Security (CS). All EWGs were initiated in 2010 except HMA and CS, which were included in 2013 and 2016 respectively.

<sup>4</sup> ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting. "Attachment paper to ADMM-Plus Modalities and Procedure". (4<sup>th</sup> ADMM concept paper. 2010), p2.

Exercise, in Pune India in 2016. Such multinational exercise signifies concrete step towards building capacity and enhancing PKO related capabilities amongst the militaries of the ADMM-Plus member nations.

Figure 4 - 1: Exercise FORCE 18 – ADMM-Plus Humanitarian Mine Action and Peacekeeping Operations Exercise in 2016



Source: ASEAN Photo (<http://asean.org/asean-to-strengthen-effective-response-to-security-challenges/>.)

The idea of regional peacekeeping cooperations was first mooted in 1994 but it did not gain traction among ASEAN Member States. Probably one of the key reasons for the opposition was due to the ASEAN way of non-interference in domestic affairs of its Member States. However, this issue of ASEAN Peacekeeping Force has re-emerged in recent years with Malaysia as the main advocate. Member States are more receptive to this initiatives now due to the increasing

participation in international peace operations by individual Member States and the changing nature of global security challenges which necessitate multilateral effort.<sup>5</sup>

## **Japan**

One of the reasons for Japan's reluctance to play an overly active role in international security was its defeat in World War II. In the similar context, some neighbouring states still regard Japan's participation in UN-sponsored operations as opportunities for Japan's potential re-militarisation.<sup>6</sup> However escalated external pressure during and after Gulf War 1991 for increased involvement in UN peace operations led to the creation of Japanese PKO legislation. Since then, Japanese Self Defence Force (SDF) has contributed and participated actively in UN peace operations ranging from UNDOK in Golan Heights, UNTAET in Timor Leste to MINUSTAH in Haiti and UNMISS in South Sudan. A new security legislature with its corresponding amended

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<sup>5</sup> Victor Bernard. "Is It Time for a Peacekeeping Force in ASEAN?" The Asian Foundation. (Online). Available : <http://asiafoundation.org/2016/02/03/is-it-time-for-a-peacekeeping-force-for-asean/>, 3 February 2016.

<sup>6</sup> Katsumi Ishizuka. "The Evolution of Japan's Policy towards UN Peace Operations", in Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions. Alex J. Bellamy & Paul D. Williams, Ed. (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2013). p.397-414.

peacekeeping cooperation laws, passed in 2015, saw Japanese Self Defence Force taking on expanded roles in peace operations. With their expanded participation, the training system for Japanese peacekeepers remains primarily unaffected. Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Centre was set up under the Joint Staff College in 2010 to provide limited training for staff officers deploying for peace missions.<sup>7</sup> The bulk of the training is still being conducted in-house at the Prime Minister's office or the Defence Agency. Setting up a joint peacekeeping school, akin to those in operation in the Nordic States, Canada and Ireland, could provide exposure and interactions with peacekeepers of different nationalities for Japanese peacekeepers. In addition, such initiative would exemplify and provide assurance to neighbouring states that Japan's participation in peacekeeping operations is not motivated by re-militarisation objectives or re-imperialism.<sup>8</sup>

## **India**

India has consistently been one of the largest troop contributors to UN peace missions since 1950s, and Indian military peacekeepers had

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<sup>7</sup> Joint Staff College. "Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center". (Online). Available : <http://www.mod.go.jp/js/jsc/jpc/english/>.

<sup>8</sup> Caballero-Anthony. *op cit.*, p25-29.

seen action from UNITAF in Somalia and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone to MONUSCO in Congo and UNMIS in Sudan. India has in recent years seen participation in UN peacekeeping missions as an important stepping stone in the pursuit for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. India's growing military capabilities, supported by corresponding growing economy, and renewed awareness of its role as regional security provider are some impetuses for India's expanded participation in international peace operations in recent times and near future.<sup>9</sup>

As part of a holistic approach to train Indian peacekeepers, Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK) was established in New Delhi in 2000. The centre aims at providing integrated training for UN peace operations for Indian peacekeepers as well as personnel from selected foreign countries. Other key objectives of CUNPK include enhancing and updating doctrinal aspects of peacekeeping training, and facilitating multilateral intellectual exchanges. Indian Army recognises that the challenge of training peacekeepers corresponds directly with increasing complexity of peacekeeping. Their training philosophy takes into account the inherent strength of the Indian troops, their apparent

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<sup>9</sup> C. Raja Mohan. "India and International Peace Operations", SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security. No. 2013/3, April 2013.

inadequacies, analysis of existing peacekeeping environment and integration of future peacekeeping challenges into current training activities. Challenge of interoperability is one of the many inadequacies identified. CUNPK aims at training peacekeepers to be in consonance with the existing requirement of interoperability with other UN personnel and contingents hailing from different parts of the world.<sup>10</sup> CUNPK could better networked with region's various peacekeeping capabilities and training centres in order to minimise training inconsistencies and to benefit from others' practical experiences and lessons learnt. In addition, better networking would forge greater intraregional interoperability and cross-training in skills, doctrine and applicable laws.

## **Malaysia**

Malaysia has been involved in UN peace operations since 1960. In 1996, Malaysia signed the UNSAS Memorandum of Understanding with the UN whereby committing approximately up to one brigade size of military force for rapid deployment. In recent years, Malaysia is also an

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<sup>10</sup> Lt. Col. P. Purushothaman. "Challenges of Training the Military for Peacekeeping Operations in India", in Reforming Peace Operations: New Challenges for Peacekeeping Training. Monica Blagescu and Albrecht Schnable, Ed. (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2002). p.65-70.

advocate for establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Force comprising of personnel from all 10 ASEAN Member States to serve the UN. Being a relative small developing country, Malaysia does not have the capacity to involve in a prolonged peace operation. With their escalating participation in peace operations over the years, a Malaysian Peacekeeping Training Centre (MPTC) was established in Port Dickson in 1996 with the primary objective of enhancing the preparation and training of the peacekeepers prior to deployment. It was rebranded as Malaysian Peacekeeping Centre (MPC) in 2013 to provide training and capacity building on multi-dimensional peacekeeping for international militaries, police and civilian personnel. Although the setup and staffing of the centre is considerably small in comparison to well-established schools in Nordic and Canada, it aspires to be the Centre of Excellence for peacekeeping training for South East Asian (SEA) region. Notwithstanding the initial setup problems, MPC has provided the budding step for SEA to develop a regional capability and an arena for SEA to cooperate and collaborate in peacekeeping training.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Cdr. Ramzan Ahmad Johari. "Challenges of Training the Military (MILOBS) for Peacekeeping Operations in Malaysia", in Reforming Peace Operations: New Challenges for Peacekeeping Training. Monica Blagescu and Albrecht Schnable, Ed. (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2002). p.52-58.



## **Thailand**

Thailand started contributing forces to UN peace operations since 1958 with significant participations in UNAMIC and UNTAC in Cambodia, UNTAET in Timor Leste and UNAMID in Darfur. It has displayed preference to commit troops to peacekeeping missions in its region and viewed them as important contributions to regional security. It also became a member of the UN Standby Arrangement System in 1998. Providing peacekeepers is commonly seen as an opportunity for Thailand to play an active role on the world stage, shore up international and domestic support for its government as well as elevate its regional standing as a major power within ASEAN. Contributing military peacekeepers afforded the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) institutional legitimacy and it is a useful platform to expand military capacity and gain operational experiences.<sup>12</sup> Notwithstanding its peacekeeping interests, Thailand views UN peacekeeping of lower priority than domestic security situation. As such, the provision of training for peacekeeping remains largely ad-hoc and of lower priority. RTARF established Division of Operations for Peace under the

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<sup>12</sup> Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams. Providing Peacekeepers. The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2013). p.17-21.

supervision of the Directorate of Joint Operations in 2000, which serves as Supreme Command Operations Centre to oversee, coordinate and assist RTARF's participation in UN peace operations.<sup>13</sup> It also established the Peace Operations Center in 2006 to better manage and prepare Thai military peacekeepers for expanded peacekeeping operations. Expanding the scope and reach of the Peace Operations Center to include police and civilian participants will position it well to be the national institution for peacekeeping training. Intraregional interoperability can also be enhanced if more foreign participants are invited to the training courses and troop preparation for future peace missions.

## **Smaller Nations**

Stand-by rapid deployment force offers several distinct advantages and disadvantages to smaller nations, such as Singapore. On one hand, smaller nations find it difficult to contribute forces at formation level where there is a likelihood of an extended duration mission. The

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<sup>13</sup> Sorpong Peou. "Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Thailand" in *Providing for Peacekeeping*. (Online). Available : <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2015/03/30/peacekeeping-contributor-profile-thailand/>, 10 August 2016.

force structures of these nations' armed forces are often too small to deploy a force and yet possess a sufficient core in country to build a rotation unit of comparable size within the time before the deployed units will need to be rotated out. In addition, to contribute a formation-size unit for a short specified period of time as prescribed by the stand-by rapid deployment force requirement means that the remainder of the force can be left to carry out other national defence tasks without having to be diverted to prepare for deployment preparations and rotation.<sup>14</sup>

On the other hand, there are certain challenges which can drastically impact the employment of smaller nations' military force for rapid deployment force. Designated forces will have to maintain high state of operational readiness and alertness; and such posture can be comparatively expensive to maintain. The designated rapid deployment force will be unavailable at any time for other national tasking. This can be problematic for smaller nations where armed forces are trying to maximise the employment of their small number of military platforms. In addition, for most of the smaller nations, the strategy-resource equation frequently leaves logistic support largely unsupported. Often,

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<sup>14</sup> Cathy Downes. "Challenges for Smaller Nations in the New Era of UN and Multinational Operations", in Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future. Hugh Smith, Ed. (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1993).

assumptions and detailed coordinations are made for the lead nation in a contingency or other larger force-contributing nations to assist in the logistic support for smaller contributors, especially in areas of force projection, logistical transportation and medical support.<sup>15</sup> Such assumptions and dependency may be an issue in future because the national goals and timetable of the larger nations may vary; and many larger nations are currently experiencing wide-ranging downsizing of their military forces, inclusive of logistical capacity.<sup>16</sup>

Because of high probability of quick and short lead-time deployment and insertion into troubled theatre, the designated military force would need to be trained regularly with other elements of the coalition rapid deployment force. This will require the establishment of special training opportunities and facilities for all elements to conduct training together, thus places emphases on the need for comprehensive inter-agencies cooperations, intra-force security and shared intelligence. For smaller nations, such combined exercises provide several preparatory benefits. Forces from different countries are able to train together in

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<sup>15</sup> For example, SAF peacekeepers in Timor Leste sought the assistance of New Zealand Battalion to provide land transportation for logistics projection from seaport to the operating bases during UNTAET.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p.27-29.

realistic training environment. Military units from small nations can gain an understanding of where and how they fit into larger formation and scheme of operations.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Singapore's Participation in United Nations**

#### **Peace Operations**

##### **SAF's Participation in UN Peace Operations**

The Singapore Armed Forces' (SAF) first experience in UN peacekeeping operation was in 1989 when a contingent of officers was sent to Namibia under the umbrella of UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). Since then, the SAF has contributed to numerous UN peace operations such as deploying medical support teams to Iraq and Guatemala; military observers to Angola, Iraq-Kuwait border and Ethiopia-Eritrea border; election supervisors to Cambodia and South Africa; and inspection teams to Iraq.<sup>1</sup> SAF peacekeepers also participated in peacemaking mission in Afghanistan and array of peacekeeping missions in Timor Leste and Aceh. In comparison to other regional countries, Singapore may be a newcomer in UN peacekeeping

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<sup>1</sup> MINDEF Policy office. "The SAF's Contributions to UN Peacekeeping", in POINTER Supplement, Jul 1999.

operations; however that has not stopped her from contributing effectively and usefully to UN peace operations.

## **Rationalising SAF's Participation**

### **Singapore's Need for the United Nations**

*“Being a small country in a closely intertwined global world, we cannot be isolated from impacts arising from events that happen in places out of Singapore.... In a world that is increasingly interconnected in many ways, there is a need for a concerted effort amongst nations to maintain peace and international order.” - Dr Tony Tan, then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence<sup>2</sup>*

In her 50 over years of independence, Singapore has enjoyed prosperity, peace and stability. With no natural resources, Singapore depends heavily on human talents, export of technology and trade to the

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<sup>2</sup> Speech by Dr Tony Tan Keng Yam, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, at the SAF Overseas Service Medal/Certificate of Commendation presentation ceremony, held on 5 Aug 02 at 5.00PM at the MINDEF Auditorium. (Online). Available : [https://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press\\_room/official\\_releases/nr/2002/aug/05aug02\\_nr/05aug02\\_speech.html](https://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2002/aug/05aug02_nr/05aug02_speech.html).

international market and investments from international businesses. Such dependence is only viable if, and only if, the economy remains stable. Thus it is in Singapore's interest to maintain economic stability and peaceful resolution to any conflicts, both domestic and regional. Herein lies the reason for her support to the UN as its charter and principles represent sovereign equality, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of states and the promotion of the economic and social advancement.<sup>3</sup>

Then Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong underscored this commitment when he told the UN General Assembly in 1995 that: *"Singapore will continue to be deeply committed to the UN. Small countries like Singapore need the UN, and must play a constructive role in supporting it. We take the UN seriously ..."*<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> "Preamble." United Nations. (Online). Available : <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/preamble/>.

<sup>4</sup> Speech by Mr Goh Chok Tong, Prime Minister of Singapore, at the UN 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Special Commemorative Meeting on Tuesday, 24 October 1995 (New York time), at the General Assembly Hall, United Nations. (Online). Available : <http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/gct19951024.pdf>, 1995.



## **Operational Experience**

The enriching and invaluable experiences obtained from participation in UN peace operations have shaped and refined the SAF peacekeeping operating doctrine, especially for an armed forces that have yet to experience all-out war. The interactions with soldiers from other nations with different operational procedures and knowledge acquired from operating in a coalition environment provide ideas for refinement of doctrine and operating procedures. One example of such learning from others is the refinement of those complex procedures associated with protracted overseas projection and deployment.

These experiences of operating in a relatively uncertain and risky environment also build greater confidence in the soldiers at the individual level. Such environment, coupled with harsh living conditions, tests soldiering skills acquired during peacetime training. The exposures to the realities of conflict and its consequences have also made lasting impressions on the SAF peacekeepers. At the soldiers' level, the daily handling of live ammunitions, observing force protection measures, administrating and applying their trained profession and skills in realistic conditions, amongst others, are novel and difficult to come-by during

peacetime training. The SAF, as an organisation, can also benefit tremendously as more of its soldiers gain operational experience from participation in peace missions.

### **Demonstration of Competence**

*“[By] its reputation, the SAF has deterred potential aggressors from threatening Singapore’s sovereignty and territorial integrity... Although the SAF has fortunately never had to go to war, it has been quietly proving its mettle in other ways, for example through its participation in ... UN peacekeeping missions.” – Mr Lee Hsien Loong, then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry.<sup>5</sup>*

The coalition nature of UN peacekeeping missions offers good opportunities for the SAF peacekeepers to interact with soldiers from other troop-contributing nations. Through these interactions, SAF soldiers’ competencies are frequently assessed and scrutinised by others,

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<sup>5</sup> Speech by Mr Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry at the 41/00 Officer Cadet Course Commissioning Parade at SAFTI MI Sunday, 29 July 2001. (Online). Available : <http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/speeches/view-html?filename=2001072902.htm>, 2001.

for the SAF is, after all and relatively, a newcomer to peacekeeping operations and not “war-tested”.

It was therefore deliberate, though voluntary, to involve Operationally Ready National Servicemen (NSmen) and Full-time National Servicemen (NSFs), in addition to the regular service personnel, in several UN peacekeeping missions. The performances of the NSFs and NSmen, thus far, were exemplary - their abilities to integrate during the operation deployment and their competencies were not inferior to that of regulars. Acquitting themselves well in such missions can speak volumes for the professionalism, credibility and reputation of the SAF.

Public commendations of the SAF’s performance in UN peacekeeping missions; exemplified display of competencies and professionalism during missions, and demonstration of a credible integrated force of regulars, NSFs and NSmen serve to enhance the SAF’s reputation. Such impressions and demonstration of might are invaluable and UN peace missions remain a useful platform for harnessing and projecting such reputation.

## **Prevention of Regional Spillover**

As a small nation, Singapore's peace and prosperity are inextricably linked to the region's peace and stability. Developments in other areas of the globe, especially in region around her, will have a direct impact on the country's physical, economical and to some extent, social security. Globalisation, to a large extent, has contributed to this inter-connectivity. Any intra-state unrest, if not contained promptly, can affect, and at times aggravate, the regional security and well-being. Such spillover effect is undesirable since stability is crucial in Singapore's economic survival.

It was due to this need for stability and positive containment of spillover that the SAF participated in the UN-sanctioned International Force in Timor Leste (INTERFET) in 1999 and subsequent UN peacekeeping missions of UNTAET and UNMISSET.<sup>6</sup> The future of the troubled Timor Leste was perceived to be reciprocally linked to the stability of the region. An unsettled Timor Leste threatened the stability

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<sup>6</sup> UNPK took over the PKO in Timor Leste in 2000, marking the start of UN Transitional Administration in Timor Leste (UNTAET). After the independence of Timor Leste in 2002, UNTAET was changed to UN Mission of Support in Timor Leste (UNMISSET).

of the entire region, which would complicate the recovery effort from the 1997 Asian economic crisis. Hence, Singapore responded immediately to the international calling to step in for stabilising the situation in Timor Leste.<sup>7</sup>

One also can argue that the same consideration is applicable to SAF's participation in the European Union-ASEAN Aceh Monitoring Mission in 2005 – 2006. The 3-decade long conflict between the separatist group GAM (Free Aceh Movement) and Indonesian Government in Aceh, which is geographically situated 800km from Singapore, came to halt following the 2005 peace agreement. Singapore's participation level in this peacekeeping mission is of smaller scale than that in Timor Leste, comprising of primarily military and police observers. They were tasked to monitor the implementation of the peace plan, and disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration of GAM to the Acehnese society.

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<sup>7</sup> LTC (Ret) Deep Singh. "The SAF's Experience in Peace Support Operations", POINTER. Vol. 30, No.4, 2005. p.51-55.

## **Tensions**

SAF's participation in UN peace operations is seldom straightforward or without hitches. While the specified rationales provide the motivations for participation in UN peace operations, the policy-makers and the SAF often need to contend with several tensions before commitment of forces and assets.

## **National Defence versus Peacekeeping**

The SAF exists primarily to defend Singapore's national sovereignty and to enhance Singapore's peace and security. Participation in UN peace operations does not align with this SAF mission in exactness, especially in the eyes of the general public. Putting soldier lives at risk while restoring peace in faraway land does not sink in well as the prime responsibility. Furthermore, being a small nation with small standing military force, it is straining on resources to contribute large formation-sized force to UN peace missions yet maintain sufficient core in-country to carry out pertinent defence tasks. With the recent rise of asymmetric and terrorist threat, SAF's commitment for homeland

security has reached unprecedented level. How will the SAF able to justify its participation in UN peacekeeping missions if Singapore suffered attacks from transnational terrorists, akin to that of 2013 Boston bombing, 2015 Paris attack or 2016 Jakarta shooting? What if the attacks were repercussions of its role in certain UN peacekeeping mission? Consequently Singapore's impetus of supporting in UN peace effort presents a complicated conflict of interests with SAF's primary mission.

### **Small Nation versus Global Citizen**

As a small nation, Singapore will never amass the sort of overwhelming military might or economic power. There is limitation to the extent and scope of her contributions to UN peace effort. At worst, the constraint of a small standing military force and limited resources are hindrances in making significant and noteworthy contributions to the UN peace operations. On the other hand, participation in UN peace operation is an obvious and expeditious approach to fulfill Singapore's responsibility as a global citizen. UN peacekeeping provides an avenue for Singapore to project herself as an integrated and responsible member of the international community and contribute to the larger good of the international system. The portrayal of Singapore's resolve as a truly

global citizen demands magnanimous contributions and can be out of proportion with her capacities.

### **Rapid Deployment versus Domestic Security**

One of the recommendations of the ‘Brahimi’ Report calls for the UN to establish “rapid and effective deployment capacity.”<sup>8</sup> It recommends the UNSAS<sup>9</sup> to include several coherent, multinational, brigade-size forces whose operational deployability in terms of training level and logistical readiness would be assessed prior to deployment.<sup>10</sup> Singapore formalised subscription with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)<sup>11</sup> signed in 1997, making her the seventh country to sign the MOU on UNSAS then. However the calling for establishment of “Brigade size-force rapid and effective deployment capacity” has the potential of creating an unparalleled strain on the commitment of the

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<sup>8</sup> The Report defines such capacity as “the ability to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within thirty days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing such an operation, and within ninety days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations.”

<sup>9</sup> The UNSAS, first established in 1994, provides a framework to increase the readiness and facilitate timely deployment of essential force for a mission.

<sup>10</sup> Lakhdar Brahimi. “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations”. (New York: United Nations Document No. A/55/305. 2000). p.20-21.

<sup>11</sup> Under the obligation of the MOU signed in the ambit of UNSAS, Singapore is committed to provide planning officers, military observers, medical personnel and police officers on standby for the support of UN peacekeeping missions.



SAF's resources. To commit a substantial size force and subject them to high state of operational readiness can be comparatively expensive to maintain. The designated rapid deployment force will be unavailable at any time for other national tasking, hence creating an awkward tension with the obligation of domestic defence. In addition, it can be problematic to divert sufficient number of military platforms to support this expanded rapid deployment force. For a nation with small standing military force and small number of military platforms, this tension is intricate and must be addressed unambiguously.

### **Considerations for Participation**

Apart from the contention with the described tensions, there are several considerations that demand contemplation by the SAF before commitment of troop and assets to participate in UN peace operations. These considerations emerge from the rationales of SAF's participation in UN peace effort, tensions faced by the SAF and the challenges of modern peacekeeping.

## Value-adding

*“...As a small country, Singapore's participation in peacekeeping operations is constrained by our manpower resources. Singapore is not able to participate in every UN peacekeeping mission, and definitely not in large numbers. Nevertheless, Singapore has and will continue to participate in missions in which we can make a valuable and effective contribution to the maintenance of international peace and stability.” – Dr Tony Tan Keng Yam, then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence.<sup>12</sup>*

Given limited resources, Singapore is bounded in the extent of her contribution to UN peace operations. However that should not be a stumbling block to contribute effectively and significantly. Singapore has been and will remain selective in participation of UN peace missions. Troops and resources should be contributed to selected UN peace operations where they are capable of generating the most effects and

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<sup>12</sup> Speech by Dr Tony Tan Keng Yam, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, at the Send-off Ceremony for Operation Blue Torch 7 on Friday, 4 April 1997. (Online). Available : [https://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press\\_room/official\\_releases/sp/1997/04apr97\\_speech.html](https://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/sp/1997/04apr97_speech.html), 1997.

making significant differences. More importantly, they must value-add to the mission thereby create creating noteworthy impacts.

### **Sustainability**

Sustainability of contributions is a critical factor in deciding the level of participation in UN peace operations. With limited resources and small standing military force, the SAF will find it difficult to contribute substantial size forces where there is a likelihood of an extended duration mission. In such protracted mission, resources have to be allocated to support the deployed forces and assets yet diluted to support preparatory training for rotational troops; hence generating a considerable challenge on the sustainability.

Further, as mentioned in preceding chapter, the strategy-resource equation for small nation frequently neglects logistic support during operation deployment. Assumptions are made for lead nation or other larger force-contributing nations to assist in logistic support in areas such as force projection, logistical transportation and medical support. This was the case when SAF peacekeepers in Timor Leste sought the assistance of New Zealand Battalion to provide land transportation for

logistics projection from seaport to the operating bases during UNTAET. However, such dependency on larger force-contributing nations may not be sustainable and readily available. The national goals and timetable of these larger force-contributing nations may vary and change abruptly, and some may experience wide-ranging down-sizing of their military forces especially logistical capacity.<sup>13</sup>

### **Conscript Forces**

*"The only country we have sent our army to is East Timor, for peace keeping ... In East Timor, it was a volunteer effort. We called for volunteers and they volunteered. My guess is ... that parents would not be over-anxious to have their children do NS in Iraq." – Mr Lee Kuan Yew, then Minister Mentor.<sup>14</sup>*

Given that the bulk of the SAF personnel are NSF and NSmen, restoring peace in faraway foreign ground may not be palatable especially

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<sup>13</sup> Cathy Downes. "Challenges for Smaller Nations in the New Era of UN and Multinational Operations", in Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future. Hugh Smith, Ed. (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1993).

<sup>14</sup> Comments made by MM Lee on not contributing Singapore ground troops for Iraq on 21 Dec 2004. (Online). Available : <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/123341/1/.html>, 2004.

to the general public. The domestic political contention and rallying for support of the population to send non-regular troops to faraway land, especially on inherently risky missions, can be somewhat overwhelmingly difficult. Conversely, it will pose a considerable limitation in the level and degree of contribution to UN peace effort and be a burden to the small regular servicemen pool if NSF and NSmen are not considered for these deployments. Notwithstanding the necessary safety precautions and force protection measures established, the high operational risk of UN peace missions could put conscript soldiers' lives and military assets at risk. Till date, the SAF is fortunate not to have any devastating consequence during its participation in UN peacekeeping missions. One can only wonder if the nation is ready to handle death of conscript serviceman in such mission. Thus the challenges then may be on the extent and effectiveness of strategic communications and for the SAF to educate the public on the strategic gains of participating in these operations.

## **Training**

The SAF is faced with the challenge of preparing its peacekeepers thoroughly for reasons of force protection and national

pride. As mentioned in earlier chapter, peacekeeping training is a national responsibility and prerogative because the UN does not have its own military training facility. Primary military professional training has to be augmented by training tailored for geographical-specific peace operations. The complexity of modern peace operations as described in preceding Chapter 3 demands a coherent and comprehensive training system and methodology that covers a wide spectrum of training at all levels from commanders and headquarters staff to combat and service support military peacekeepers. Current conventional military training undertaken by SAF soldiers is insufficient in modern day multi-dimensional peace operations. Training of SAF peacekeepers ought to include basic aspects such as force protection, gender awareness, comprehension of legal dimensions in peace operations, humanitarian and human rights law, inter-agencies cooperation and coordination, civil-military relationship, negotiation and mediation skills in conflict resolutions and dealing with media.

## **Way Ahead**

Having deliberated the depicted considerations, there exist several possible courses that can be undertaken by the SAF to further its interests in participation in UN peace operations. This paper attempts to recommend two niche areas of contribution as well as specialised training necessary for the troops participating in future UN peace operations.

## **Contributions in Niche Areas**

The SAF can capitalise on its strengths and commit resources and expertise where they can value-add and create the most significant differences in a peacekeeping mission. One niche area in which SAF has built up considerably is the provision of medical support. The involvement of medical elements is one of the common features in the numerous SAF-participated UN peace operations. Their operational experiences range from Operation Desert Storm, operating alongside the British 205<sup>th</sup> General Hospital to Timor Leste, Guatemala and Afghanistan.<sup>15</sup> The invaluable experiences gained and lessons learnt in these operations, and the numerous humanitarian and disaster relief

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<sup>15</sup> Singh. *op.cit.*, p.54-55.

missions participated, have benefited the SAF Medical Corps enormously, making them one of the most operationally ready formations in the SAF.

Another niche area is the provision of strategic lift, both air and sea. C130, KC135, Super Pumas and UH1H helicopters from RSAF have undertaken airlift missions ranging from UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), UNMISET to Reconstruction effort of Iraq. Correspondingly RSN has seen actions with their Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs) deployed in UN effort for restoration of Iraq and INTERFET, and as part of TF151 in counter-piracy mission in Gulf of Aden. In addition, the SAF has provided strategic lift assets on numerous humanitarian and disaster relief missions, inclusive of Asian tsunami disaster relief mission in 2004, Hurricane Katrina relief mission in the U.S. in 2005 and Thailand flash flood relief mission in 2006. These operational experiences have enhanced the operational readiness of these squadrons. Coupled with their short deployment lead-time, these assets are suitable and capable of value-adding to future UN peace operations.



## **Specialised Training**

Conventional soldiering skill sets are not necessarily relevant and sufficient to that required of military peacekeepers, especially in modern peacekeeping. The SAF needs to recognise that the responsibility of training peacekeepers lies within the organisation and the success of the operation may heavily depend on the training peacekeepers received prior to deployment. The training philosophy of modern peacekeepers needs to take into account the inherent strengths and apparent inadequacies of the SAF troops, detailed analysis of existing peacekeeping environment and integration of future peacekeeping challenges into current training activities.

High educational level and cultural diversification are some of the inherent strengths of the SAF troops. The intellectual level of the SAF troops allows shorter pre-deployment training and wider scope and depth of knowledge to be imparted. Cultural diversification allows better tolerance and understanding of customs, culture and religious background of the indigenous populous and fellow peacekeepers from other nations. The second language background proved to be extremely beneficial in regional peace operations. The proficiency of conversing in Bahasa

Melayu by many SAF peacekeepers in Timor Leste resulted in warmer relationships with the local populous.

Probably one of the inadequacies of the SAF peacekeeping training is that of interoperability with larger peacekeeping force, and adjacent and supporting agencies which include militaries as well as civilian and police peacekeepers. The coalition nature of UN peace operations stresses on the importance of inter-agencies cooperation, the need to understand and comprehend differing operating procedures and doctrine, and team dynamics and team-building. However, opportunities are seldom created to train together; even if in existence, the frequency is usually limited. Such training should, if possible, be continuous and progressive between formations and individuals, and preferably done prior to mission deployment. This is much desired because of the likely quick and short lead-time deployment and insertion into troubled area of operations. For small nations, such combined, interoperability and inter-agencies training also provide a few preparatory benefits. Apart from facilitating peacekeepers from different countries and agencies to train together in realistic training environment, units from small nations can also gain an understanding of where and how they fit into larger formations and scheme of operations.

Another inadequacy is the lack of dedicated Civil-Military Relationship (CMR) skills among the SAF peacekeepers. Specialised training is required to prepare military peacekeepers to work and deal with the civilians. Apart from common CMR awareness, it is essential that designated forces are capable of conducting deliberate planning and coordinating CMR operations. This also entails co-ordinations with Non-Governmental and International Organisations to synergise CMR efforts. Due to the lack of formalised training prior to deployment to Timor Leste, the SAF peacekeepers had to rely on ‘on-the-job’ learning to conduct small-scaled CMR operations such as establishment of regular mobile clinic and teaching of English to local indigenous population. Although these operations achieved limited success, the desired outcome could be improved several folds if SAF peacekeepers were formally trained in CMR prior to deployment or assisted by specialised CMR outfits. Structured CMR services outfits in the SAF are relatively in their infant stage of establishment. However the experiences gained from past missions, such as 2004 Asian tsunami disaster relief and array of peacekeeping missions in Timor Leste have further operationalised and refined their operational structure, employment concepts and operating procedures. Thus their existence will necessitates formalised integrated

training with designated military peacekeepers in order to synergise overall CMR efforts in theatre.

It should be an imperative that every SAF peacekeeper is aware of the power and dominance of media and its significant implications to the mission. Keeping the public informed and projecting the right image and impression will anchor the pace and form of future peace operations. With the advance of communications and the speed, extent and content of media coverage nowadays, denying access of information from journalists is almost unviable. Journalists will relentlessly probe for media-worthy information and images, resulting in seemingly tactical errands to swell to that of strategic and operational significance. Such is the magnitude and scope of media coverage hence tactful management and skillful handling of media is much sought-after skills. Given that journalists are blind to the hierarchical system of the military, the action or inaction taken by lowest ranking soldier of the peacekeeping force in front of media people can undo all the goodwill effort performed over the entire span of mission deployment. Therefore soldiers should be provided with elementary media awareness training prior to deployment to augment the media management skill of the commanders. More

importantly, they should be educated not to shy away from the cameras and probing questions of the journalists.

## **Chapter 6**

### **Conclusion And Recommendations**

#### **Conclusion**

One cannot discount the fact that UN peace operations have changed in both form and content and have become increasingly complex over the years. Traditional peacekeeping can no longer cope with such complexities effectively without undertaking drastic systemic changes. The challenges faced by modern peacekeeping are wide-ranging. Specialised multi-level and multilateral training, augmenting primary occupational training, are becoming vital for military peacekeepers. The formation of rapid deployment force remains operational and strategically sound.

These challenges have profound impact on regional organisations and armed forces of several Member States of Asia. ASEAN and ARF can assume role of orchestrating and synergising peacekeeping effort and training in the region. India, Malaysia and Thailand have established peace training institutions to formalise and

revolutionise peacekeepers training, while Japan can benefit much if follows suit. Contribution to rapid deployment force challenges the resources, troops' competencies and commitment of smaller nations in the region.

Likewise, the challenges faced by modern peacekeeping have significant impact on the role of the SAF. Singapore's troop contributions to UN peace operations have been driven by the need for the UN to succeed as well as to expand the SAF's operational experiences. Through such participation the SAF demonstrates its competence and enhances its reputation while preventing trouble and unrest from regional countries to spillover such that Singapore's peace, prosperity and stability might be compromised. However, the SAF has to contend with several tensions before committing resources to UN peacekeeping missions which the nation has decided to partake. One is the dichotomy of defending national sovereignty and the impetus of contribution to UN peace effort. There is also a need to strike a balance between fulfilling responsibilities as a global citizen and optimising the limited resources of a small nation. The appeal for size increase of rapid deployment force presented the SAF a distinctive tension between satisfying the obligations of UNSAS and domestic defence requirements.

The challenges of modern peacekeeping, amalgamated with the rationales and tensions surfaced from SAF's participation in UN peace efforts, have also generated several critical considerations for the SAF. With limited resources and small military standing force, SAF's contribution must aim to value-add with noteworthy impacts. The SAF has to carefully consider the sustainability of its contributions as well as the limitations of conscript forces operating in high risk environment. In addition, SAF peacekeepers should be thoroughly prepared and trained for peace operations. Singapore has pledged her commitment to support the UN thus one can be certain that the SAF will continue to play a constructive role in future UN peace operations. By recognising the challenges faced by the SAF, the organisation should exploit the strengths and fill the identified gaps so that the nation can continue to make significant contributions in the global arena.

## **Summary of Recommendations**

Recommendations from this study are summarised below. These stated recommendations are not intended to be comprehensive; further details can be found in the preceding chapters of 4 and 5.



**ASEAN/ ARF**

- To share doctrine, experiences, information and combined training in area of peace operations through various peacekeeping training centres established unilaterally among Member States.
- To continue support to ARF Peacekeeping Experts' Meeting series and ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations in order to build capacity and enhance PKO related capabilities among Member States.
- To explore collective troop contribution and peace effort through the establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Force.

**Country-specific: Japan**

- To set up a joint peacekeeping school to provide exposure and interactions with peacekeepers of different nationalities for Japanese peacekeepers and afford assurance to

neighbouring countries of Japan's motivation in peacekeeping troop contributions.

### **Country-specific: India**

- To better networked, through CUNPK, with region's various peacekeeping capabilities and training centres in order to minimise training inconsistencies and to benefit from others' practical experiences and lessons learnt. In addition, better networking would forge greater intraregional interoperability and cross-training in skills, doctrine and applicable laws.

### **Country-specific: Malaysia**

- To continue pursuit to be the Centre of Excellence for peacekeeping training for South East Asia (SEA) region by Malaysian Peacekeeping Centre (MPC).

**Country-specific: Thailand**

- To expand the scope and reach of Peace Operations Center to train and prepare future peacekeepers from the militaries, police and civilian organisations in order to position as the national institution for peacekeeping training.
- To promote intraregional interoperability by actively inviting foreign participants to the training courses and troop preparation for future peace missions.

**Country-specific: Singapore**

- To contribute capabilities in niche areas, such as provision of medical support and strategic lift, both air and sea, which would value-add to the UN peace efforts.
- To study the strategy-resource equation for deployment of SAF peacekeepers. The assumption for lead nation or other larger force-contributing nations to assist in logistic support in areas such as force projection, logistical transportation and

medical support may not be sustainable and readily available.

- To continue involving NSFs and NSmen in UN peacekeeping missions in order to augment the small pool of regular service personnel and to demonstrate their competencies. This must be supported by effective strategic communications to educate the public on the strategic gains of participating in these missions.
- To enhance the training philosophy of modern SAF peacekeepers by taking into account the inherent strengths and apparent inadequacies of the SAF troops, detailed analysis of existing peacekeeping environment and integration of future peacekeeping challenges into current training activities. Some of inherent strengths of the SAF troops are high educational level and cultural diversification.
- To include basic aspects such as force protection, gender awareness, comprehension of legal dimensions in peace operations, humanitarian and human rights law, inter-agencies cooperation and coordination, and negotiation and

mediation skills in conflict resolutions into training of SAF peacekeepers.

- To enhance interoperability with larger peacekeeping force, and adjacent and supporting agencies which include militaries as well as civilian and police peacekeepers. The interoperability training should, if possible, be continuous and progressive between formations and individuals, and preferably done prior to mission deployment.
- To incorporate CMR training for SAF peacekeepers prior to peacekeeping mission deployment. The training should include common CMR awareness, deliberate planning and coordinating CMR operations, and integrated training with specialised CMR outfits.
- To provide SAF soldiers with elementary media awareness training prior to peace keeping mission deployment in order to augment the media management skill of the commanders.

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## **Biography**

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- Masters of Business Administration, University of South Florida, United States
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  - Grade Two Staff and Tactics Course, NZ
  - Battalion Tactics Course, Singapore
  - Singapore Armed Forces Military Freefall Course
  - Special Forces Operation Detachment Officer Qualification Course, USA
  - Singapore Armed Forces Ranger Course
  - Officer Cadet Course, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, UK
- Military  
Experience:**
- Strategic Planner, HQ US CENTCOM
  - Head General Staff Branch, HQ Commando
  - Commanding Officer, 1<sup>st</sup> Commando Battalion
  - Senior Planning Officer, General Staff (Operations) Department
  - Chief Instructor, School of Commando
  - Operation Officer, United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET)

## SUMMARY

**Field :** Strategy

**Title :** Challenges to modern peacekeeping and its implications to Singapore and the role of the militaries in Asia-Pacific

**Name :** Colonel POH, Boon Hock, Singapore

**Course :** NDC      **Class :** 59

### **Background and Importance of the Problem**

The collapse of Somalia, brutalisation of Bosnia and genocide of Rwanda – and many others – are rude reminders of the failure of the United Nations (UN) in upholding peace. The changing nature of security and conflicts, from that of inter-state to intra-state, presents numerous challenges to the form and content of UN peace operations. Traditional peacekeepers, who are accustomed to conflict containment in ‘stand-off’ way of resolving conflicts between states, have become ineffective and irrelevant in modern peace operations.

The ‘Brahimi’ report, which was produced in the aftermath of the failed effort in Rwanda, has candidly called for transformational changes in the many aspects of peace operations, including doctrine, mandate, rules of engagement, rapid deployment force, training, command structure, and many others. Several Member States acknowledged the need for change and have since worked in concert with United Nations Peacekeeping (UNPK) on this reformative effort.

Member States in Asia-Pacific are not spared from this calling for change. Many of its Member States have long history of volunteering troops for UN peacekeeping missions. Furthermore three of the largest UN peace operations have been undertaken in Asia-Pacific: in Cambodia, Kashmir and Timor Leste (formerly known as East Timor). To say that the challenges of modern peacekeeping may affect the region is a severe understatement.

Such emerging security trend with its corresponding challenges of peace operations has tremendous impact on the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) since Singapore has a history of troop contribution to peace operations.

This research seeks to study the challenges of modern peace operations in today’s changing concept of security; to examine the impact of these challenges on role of militaries in Asia-Pacific; and to evaluate the impact of these challenges on Singapore’s contributions to peacekeeping effort.

## **Objectives of the Research**

The objectives of the research are (1) To study and discuss the challenges faced by modern day peacekeeping in today's changing concept of security; (2) To examine the impact of the aforementioned challenges on the role of militaries, with particular reference to regional organisations such as Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting – Plus (ADMM-Plus) and Asia Regional Forum (ARF), and specific countries in Asia-Pacific including Japan, India, Malaysia, Thailand and smaller nations; (3) To evaluate the rationales of Singapore's participation in UN peace operations and the tensions faced by the SAF; and (4) To make recommendations for mitigating challenges of modern peacekeeping and possible areas of future participation by Singapore.

## **Scope of the Research**

The scope of the research is as follows:

- Chapter 1 – This chapter set-the-stage of the research by introducing and describing the background of the research, research objectives, scope of research and research methodology. It also lists the delimitation and definition of words used in the research.
- Chapter 2 – This chapter reviews several key literatures related to the research.
- Chapter 3 – This chapter identifies key challenges faced by modern day peacekeeping in today's changing concept of security and the relevance of traditional peacekeeping.
- Chapter 4 – This chapter describes the impact on the role and effort of militaries in Asia-Pacific and regional organisations. This includes regional organisations such as ASEAN and ARF, and specific countries in Asia-Pacific including Japan, India, Malaysia, Thailand and smaller nations.
- Chapter 5 – This chapter describes Singapore's participation in UN peace operations, related interests of Singapore and the tensions faced by the Singapore Armed Forces in her participation in peacekeeping operations.
- Chapter 6 – This chapter makes conclusion and summaries the relevant recommendations from the study.

## **Methodology**

The research hypothesis is that the changing security landscape has and will continue to change the role of militaries in Asia-Pacific in peace operations. Specifically Singapore's existing structure, doctrines and training may be effective and efficient for conventional operations; it might not be adequate in preparing and supporting its future contribution to peacekeeping effort.

Broad areas of research are as follows:

- Training - Member state is primarily responsible to train and prepare their peacekeepers prior to deployment. Modern peace operations have demanded several non-traditional proficiencies of military peacekeepers, such as gender awareness, interoperability, cultural and language skill, legal know-how and many others.
- Structure - Contributing troops at formation level for peace operations might not be ideal for some of the small nation in Asia-Pacific such as Singapore but it reduces the preparatory time for such deployment. This research attempts to address this dilemma.
- Doctrine - This research attempts to identify areas of improvement, inclusive of cooperation with regional institutions, to enhance the doctrine.

Key approach of the research adopted are (1) Study the changing concept of security and relevance of traditional peacekeeping – this entails exploring concepts and theories of relevant literature; (2) Identify the need for change and challenges faced by modern peace operations with references to ‘Brahimi’ report – this is supported by personal peacekeeping experiences in Timor Leste; (3) Examine the roles and challenges faced by regional organisations and arrangement; (4) Examine the impact of changing concepts of security on militaries in Asia-Pacific and identify initiatives undertaken by the countries in addressing the challenges; (5) Evaluate current Singapore’s structure, doctrine and training for modern peace operations and describe their inadequacies; (6) Identify initiatives and competencies that Singapore should acquire or develop in order to stay relevant and effective in future peacekeeping efforts; and (7) Derive recommendations for militaries of Member States and Singapore in preparing and supporting future contributions to peace operations.

## **Results**

### **Challenges Of Modern Peace Operations**

One cannot discount the fact that UN peace operations have changed in both form and content and have become increasingly complex over the years. Traditional peacekeeping can no longer cope with such complexities effectively without undertaking drastic systemic changes. The challenges faced by modern peacekeeping are wide-ranging. Member States are faced with the challenge of preparing their peacekeepers thoroughly for reasons of mission success, force protection and national pride. As each nation is free to provide its own training as it sees fit, thus disparities in skill sets, level of training and professional knowledge were common among peacekeepers from different nationalities. Further the broad-based conventional warfare military training undertook by military peacekeepers is insufficient in modern day multi-dimensional peace operations. Specialised multi-level and multilateral training, augmenting primary occupational training, are becoming vital for military peacekeepers. Another key

challenge is on the rapid deployment force. Under the ambit of the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) and as recommended by the 'Brahimi' Report, the rapid deployment force remains operational and strategically sound. However, Member States, who have understanding with the UN for military standby arrangement, have to contest with differing strain on their resources.

### **Impact on the Role and Effort Militaries in Asia-Pacific and Regional Organisations**

These challenges of modern peace operations have profound impact on regional organisations and armed forces of several Member States of Asia. Cooperative arrangements with regional organisations have improved the international community's efforts to end conflict in some areas and helped restore faith in peacekeeping corp. The inability of ASEAN and ARF to response effectively to the crisis in Timor Leste presented their inadequacies as regional institutions. Both do not have the capacity or the institutional abilities to respond to regional crisis needing concerted military intervention. However the recent effort on Peacekeeping Experts' Meeting series and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) Experts' Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations (EWG-PKO) have seen improved knowledge sharing and practical cooperations on peacekeeping operations among Member States. ASEAN and ARF can assume role of orchestrating and synergising peacekeeping effort and training in the region, and reconsider the issue of ASEAN Peacekeeping Force. In addition many countries in the region have increased participation in international peace operations in recent years and responded to the call for UNSAS. India, Malaysia and Thailand have established peace training institutions to formalise and revolutionise peacekeepers training, while Japan can benefit much if follows suit. Smaller nations often find it difficult to contribute forces at formation level for extended duration to conventional UN peace mission. Contribution to rapid deployment force seems to be better suited for small nations in the region, albeit the challenges posed on resources, troops' competencies and commitment of troop-contributing nations.

### **Singapore's Participation in United Nations Peace Operations**

Likewise, the challenges faced by modern peacekeeping have significant impact on the role of the SAF. Singapore's troop contributions to UN peace operations have been driven by the need for the UN to succeed as well as to expand the SAF's operational experiences. Through such participation the SAF demonstrates its competence and enhances its reputation while preventing trouble and unrest from regional countries to spillover such that Singapore's peace, prosperity and stability might be compromised. However, the SAF has to contend with several tensions before committing resources to UN peacekeeping missions which the nation has decided to partake. One is the dichotomy of defending national sovereignty and the impetus of contribution to UN peace effort. There is also a need to strike a balance between fulfilling responsibilities as a global citizen and optimising the limited resources of a small nation. The appeal for size increase of rapid deployment force presented the SAF a distinctive tension between satisfying the obligations of UNSAS and domestic defence requirements. The

challenges of modern peacekeeping, amalgamated with the rationales and tensions surfaced from SAF's participation in UN peace efforts, have also generated several critical considerations for the SAF. With limited resources and small military standing force, SAF's contribution must aim to value-add with noteworthy impacts. The SAF has to carefully consider the sustainability of its contributions as well as the limitations of conscript forces operating in high risk environment. In addition, SAF peacekeepers should be thoroughly prepared and trained for peace operations. Singapore has pledged her commitment to support the UN thus one can be certain that the SAF will continue to play a constructive role in future UN peace operations. By recognising the challenges faced by the SAF, the organisation should exploit the strengths and fill the identified gaps so that the nation can continue to make significant contributions in the global arena.

## **Recommendations**

### **ASEAN/ ARF**

- To share doctrine, experiences, information and combined training in area of peace operations through various peacekeeping training centres established unilaterally among Member States.
- To continue support to ARF Peacekeeping Experts' Meeting series and ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations in order to build capacity and enhance PKO related capabilities among Member States.
- To explore collective troop contribution and peace effort through the establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Force.

### **Country-specific: Japan**

- To set up a joint peacekeeping school to provide exposure and interactions with peacekeepers of different nationalities for Japanese peacekeepers and afford assurance to neighbouring countries of Japan's motivation in peacekeeping troop contributions.

### **Country-specific: India**

- To better networked, through CUNPK, with region's various peacekeeping capabilities and training centres in order to minimise training inconsistencies and to benefit from others' practical experiences and lessons learnt. In addition, better networking would forge greater intraregional interoperability and cross-training in skills, doctrine and applicable laws.

### **Country-specific: Malaysia**

- To continue pursuit to be the Centre of Excellence for peacekeeping training for South East Asia (SEA) region by Malaysian Peacekeeping Centre (MPC).

**Country-specific: Thailand**

- To expand the scope and reach of Peace Operations Center to train and prepare future peacekeepers from the militaries, police and civilian organisations in order to position as the national institution for peacekeeping training.
- To promote intraregional interoperability by actively inviting foreign participants to the training courses and troop preparation for future peace missions.

**Country-specific: Singapore**

- To contribute capabilities in niche areas, such as provision of medical support and strategic lift, both air and sea, which would value-add to the UN peace efforts.
- To study the strategy-resource equation for deployment of SAF peacekeepers. The assumption for lead nation or other larger force-contributing nations to assist in logistic support in areas such as force projection, logistical transportation and medical support may not be sustainable and readily available.
- To continue involving NSFs and NSmen in UN peacekeeping missions in order to augment the small pool of regular service personnel and to demonstrate their competencies. This must be supported by effective strategic communications to educate the public on the strategic gains of participating in these missions.
- To enhance the training philosophy of modern SAF peacekeepers by taking into account the inherent strengths and apparent inadequacies of the SAF troops, detailed analysis of existing peacekeeping environment and integration of future peacekeeping challenges into current training activities. Some of inherent strengths of the SAF troops are high educational level and cultural diversification.
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- To incorporate CMR training for SAF peacekeepers prior to peacekeeping mission deployment. The training should include common CMR awareness, deliberate planning and coordinating CMR operations, and integrated training with specialised CMR outfits.
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