

**An Analysis of Military Operations
Other Than War (MOOTW)
Under the Context of Geo-Strategic
Situation in the 21st Century**

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Preface

The research showed that despite armed forces being one of the most powerful state instruments, there is a lack of understanding by governments in committing these forces to deal with the emerging non-traditional security threats confronting states today. From the academic perspective, it was revealed that components of MOOTW are addressed but the concept of MOOTW as a whole has not been well recognised. The research argued that a better understanding of MOOTW needs to be achieved among the government, military and academia.

The research suggested that MOOTW can be replaced with the term of “military peripheral operations” or “MPO”. Finally, the research argued for the need for a holistic theoretical approach to MPO to recognise its importance in the new evolving security scenarios.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Background

Up till the end of the Cold War, wars, or the threat of war between states, were the most common instances of conflict as countries sought to expand their territories, gain access to resources, spread their ideology or increase their international prestige. As a result, a state's armed forces was organised and structured to defeat that of another state in a conventional war. In the twentieth century, the world went to war twice and for forty years since the end of the Second World War; the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation devoted itself to confronting the Soviet Union in the Cold War. However, when the Cold War ended in 1989, many states were faced with an uncertain strategic environment.

In *The Art of War in the Modern World*, Gen Rupert Smith suggests that inter state wars no longer exists and that the paradigm is shifting towards non-industrial war against non-state opponents¹. Indeed, according to scholars of global conflict, the incidence and magnitude of warfare, especially societal warfare that which is primarily internal to states climbed more or less steadily from the mid 1960s through to the early 1990s, until the end of the Cold War, when it began to decline. What is pertinent is that since the 1990s, the international community has been increasingly involved in rebuilding war torn states and societies, a role that, in this century, has included temporary governance of territory that has suffered large scale and violent human rights violations.² The United Nations (UN) activated just 13 peace operations in the 40 years between 1948 and 1988. In the subsequent 10 years, the UN activated or endorsed 51 such operations, including a number of peace enforcement operations.³

Just as the international community is noted to be increasingly involved in rebuilding war torn states and societies, it is also increasingly involved in providing assistance for disaster relief. In Asia, the December 2004 Tsunami, along the coasts of most landmasses

¹ Gen (Ret) R. Smith. *The Utility of Force – The Art of War in the Modern World*. (New York: Random House, 2007). p 5.

² W. Durch. *Twenty First Century Peace Operations*. (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006). p. xvii.

³ United Nations Peacekeeping. United Nations Website. (Online). Available: <https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/>, 2017.

bordering the Indian Ocean, killed more than 225,000 people in 11 countries, and flooding coastal communities with waves up to 30 meters high. With a magnitude of between 9.1 and 9.3, it is the second largest earthquake ever recorded.⁴ What followed was what the United Nations termed the largest ever relief operation it has undertaken. In Aceh, Indonesia, the relief operation saw international military forces working alongside the Indonesian Military (TNI) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in bringing relief and providing security to the victims of the tsunami.

Humanitarian disasters like the Indian Ocean tsunami are arguably not new, but what is significant is that such disasters have gained more prominence in light of the increasingly intertwined world that we live in, brought on by the information revolution and globalisation. As with peace operations, the international community seems to be increasingly aware and consequently increasingly involved in such relief efforts. Even in intra state disasters, a new prominence is being given to the relief efforts by the armed forces, possibly implying an increased acceptance of the state's use of the armed forces in such operations. Examples such as the Tsunami in Phuket and the Bukit Antarabangsa landslide in Kuala Lumpur all saw a significant armed forces' involvement in providing relief to the civilian population.

What the above describes is a small slice of what is known as military operations other than war or "MOOTW". It describes all operations undertaken by an armed forces that falls outside of war and ranges from peacekeeping operations to operations in support of other civil agencies to humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

Problem Statement

The problem of this research is multi-level. The first is of the understanding of the term MOOTW itself. It is argued here that the term MOOTW is not precise enough as MOOTW defines what it *is not*, rather than what it is. That is, the fact that it is defined as military operations that are not war can thus be taken to mean any military operation conducted by the armed forces outside of a formal declaration of war by the state. The second issue stemming from the lack of a proper understanding of MOOTW then is three fold; first, many armed forces run into problems

⁴ M. Walton. "Sumatra Quake Longest Ever Recorded". (Online). Available: <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/TECH/science/05/19/sumatra.quake/index.html>, 2017.

interpreting precisely the organisational and operational requirements of MOOTW.

Furthermore, armed forces can be said to be still primarily structured for conventional war or inter state war meaning that as armed forces conduct more MOOTW, there is a balancing act going on by the armed forces as to how much to focus on MOOTW or war. Next, governments, strategists and policy makers may not fully understand the impact of committing their armed forces to MOOTW. The armed forces is arguably the most powerful state apparatus at the disposal of the government and its commitment can have a severe impact on the state, its citizens and on the state's relations with its neighbours. Lastly, a holistic theoretical treatment of MOOTW by the academics is still non-existent without which there is no basis for a proper consensus of MOOTW between the government, military and academics.

With the need to understand more precisely the concept of MOOTW as well as the organisational and operational requirements of MOOTW, then the following pertinent follow on questions come to mind. Is MOOTW indeed the new reality in the post Cold War era? What exactly is MOOTW and is there a more suitable term encompassing such operations that can be more appropriately used by the armed forces? Is there any other organisation within the state's apparatus suitable for or even capable of conducting such operations other than the armed forces? If the armed forces were required to conduct MOOTW, then what would be the ideal balance in commitment by the armed forces to organising, equipping and training for war versus MOOTW?

Objectives of Research

- * To examine the geostrategic realities driving the states' use of armed forces for MOOTW.

- * To examine the relevant concepts and the specific intervening variables affecting states in confronting the non-traditional security threats.

- * To examine the MOOTW concept itself and attempt to define it from the government and military perspectives to see its relevance to state and armed forces.

* To examine the different approaches to MOOTW by various armed forces including the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) and Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF).

Literature Review

Since the end of the Cold War, literary resource on new wars, wars amongst peoples, UN missions, humanitarian interventions, disaster relief and other types of MOOTW are plentiful. It must be acknowledged that such MOOTW are not actually new, but newly prominent. This possibly came about with the consequent shift of attention by the international community from Cold War security issues to humanitarian issues. Where humanitarian intervention was previously rare and considered illegitimate, the UN has sponsored and organised numerous large scale peace operations since the end of the Cold War.⁵

The literature available on MOOTW can be broadly classified into two main areas of focus: firstly, the theoretical approaches that ties in the international system to the geopolitical realities demanding the military's involvement in MOOTW, and secondly the current trends in the development of capabilities, towards participating in MOOTW.

The literature on the theoretical approaches all tend to provide and support the context for a change in the focus of military operations, from that of a predominance of inter state war or conventional war, towards MOOTW. Paul Hirst in his book *War and Power in the 21st Century* considers the forces that will drive change in military organisations, the sources of conflict and the power of states and the international organisation.⁶ Among these forces, he considers changes in the global environment and technological change as the key drivers to the future developments in war, armed conflict and international relations. Gen Rupert Smith also suggests the shift in attention of conflicts from inter state war to non-industrial war against non-state opponents. In his book, *The Utility of Force – The Art of War in the Modern World*, he expounds on the need for geostrategic comprehension leading to a precise use of force in today's conflicts.

⁵ T. Farrel. "Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations", in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, C. S. Gray, E. Cohen, (Eds). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). p.314.

⁶ P. Hirst. *War and Power in the 21st Century*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007). p.1-5.

James Wirtz in *A New Agenda for Security and Strategy* points to the increase in attention to issues arising from low politics, that is, issues on the environment, management of resources and population growth as taking on more prominence in national security agendas.⁷ This was despite the reemergence of security issues from high politics since the events of 9/11⁸. This leads to the conclusion that the national security agendas will be dominated by security issues of both high politics and low politics and the securitisation of issues arising from low politics can lead to the use of military force as a solution. Clearly the issues of high politics can still lead to conventional wars recurring and indeed none of the authors above have discounted the possibility of inter state wars recurring.

John Hillen in *Blue Helmets – The Strategy of the United Nations Military Operations* highlights the UN's increasing operational spectrum and the increasing emphasis on what he terms second generation peacekeeping, which involves ambitious, multi-function operations in dangerous environments.⁹ In Carment and Rudner's *Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries*, the ideas of international anarchy, civil society and ethics provide the context for the complexities in which peacekeeping operations find themselves in¹⁰.

Bonn and Baker in the *Guide to Military Operations Other Than War* besides highlighting the US Army's Principles of MOOTW, also expounds on several specific concepts that work towards achieving a MOOTW capability. These are interagency cooperation, media interaction and populace and resource control¹¹. All these capabilities are not what military traditionalists would term essential military capabilities up till recently. Such concepts are now recognised to be essential to the success of MOOTW, which consequently impacts further the need to restructure militaries to address these concepts. Hillen in *The Strategy of the United Nations Military Operations* specifies the need to protect humanitarian aid, including the NGOs in theatre as such organisations

⁷ J. Wirtz. "A New Agenda for Security and Strategy", in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, C. S. Gray, E. Cohen, (Eds). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). p.338.

⁸ 9/11 refers to the events of 11 September 2001 when the Al Qaeda attacked the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington.

⁹ J. Hillen. *Blue Helmets – The Strategy of the United Nations Military Operations*. (Virginia: Brassey's, 1998). p.140-141.

¹⁰ D. Carment. M. Rudner. *Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries*. (New York: Routledge, 2006). p.2-4,6.

¹¹ Lt Col (Ret.) K. E. Bonn, Msg (Ret.) A. E. Baker. *Guide to Military Operations Other Than War – Tactics, Techniques & Procedures for Stability & Support Operations*. (Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2000). p.1-11,30-35,195-197.

have become integral to such operations given the scale of the humanitarian crisis of such operations¹².

Carment and Rudner in *Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries*, further raise pertinent military concepts in support of peacekeeping operations and intelligence. These are the use of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance¹³ and the effects based planning concept as key enablers to peacekeeping operations¹⁴.

Rinaldo in his article *Warfighting and Peace Ops: Do Real Soldiers do MOOTW?* seeks to clarify the contrast between the applicability of the principles of war towards MOOTW versus the principles of MOOTW¹⁵. He clearly argues that there is a convergence between the two and that the two need not be viewed in isolation. He also argues for the simultaneous application of all instruments of national or international power in order to increase the impact of the military's involvement in MOOTW¹⁶.

The theories and concepts of the review of the initial sources seem to suggest the following: firstly, there has been, and will continue to be, a shift in emphasis in military operations from conventional wars between states towards MOOTW. Secondly, even in UN operations or other similar humanitarian intervention operations, there continues to be increasing calls for a wider form of peacekeeping to be applied in finding a resolution to the conflict. Third, the political, economic and civil factors continue to increase in impact, and even influence such military operations, and lastly, technological advances like network centric warfare have provided key new capabilities in conducting MOOTW. However, all agree on not dismissing the possibility of another conventional war between states occurring thus putting pressure on the strategic planners and the armed forces on which to focus on MOOTW or war.

¹² J. Hillen. Blue Helmets – the Strategy of the United Nations Military Operations. (New York: Potomac Books, 2000). p.172-174.

¹³ Also known by the term C4ISR.

¹⁴ R. Grossman-Vernas. "A Bridge Too Far? – The Theory and Practice of the Effects Based Concept and the Multinational Inter-agency Role", in Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries. (London: Routledge, 2007). p.188-206.

¹⁵ The principles of war are: objective, offensive, simplicity, mass, manoeuvre, security, surprise, unity of command and economy of force, while the principles of MOOTW are objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint and security.

¹⁶ R. J. Rinaldo. Warfighting and Peace Ops: Do Real Soldiers do MOOTW? (Washington: Joint Force Quarterly, 1997). p.111. And yes, Rinaldo concludes that real soldiers do MOOTW.

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework of this study parallels the literature review, highlighting the reasons for the commitment of armed forces to conduct MOOTW. Of the main concepts gathered from the literature review, the emerging geostrategic situation as a result of the end of the Cold War is possibly the most pertinent independent variable that is driving the increasing use of the armed forces for MOOTW.


Even in Southeast Asia, since the end of Cold War, the majority of operational experiences by the respective armed forces have been in internal wars and MOOTW as evidenced by the lack of inter state wars and contrasted to the increasing execution of MOOTW. However, this is not saying that these armed forces are neglecting their responsibilities towards preparing for war. Indeed, despite the mechanism of ASEAN, the member states are observed to still harbour realist notions of state security and sovereignty.

The continued pertinence of neo realism conflicting with constructivist or liberalist thoughts driving states' behaviours towards such non-traditional security threats also needs further examination,¹⁷ and this will be dealt with in the research together with comparing and contrasting the competing theories relevant to the new geostrategic security situation.

By applying the concepts gathered from the literature review to the existing international relations theories, Figure 1-1 reflects the proposed conceptual framework of the study, where the post Cold War geostrategic situation is the main independent variable. This is in turn influenced by realist views for the need to maintain state security and sovereignty. Indeed, insofar as the literature review has shown, the writers agree that while inter state wars have decreased, the threat has not vanished completely, and will not vanish as long as the international system is organised around states and their respective national interests.

¹⁷ Many Third World armies are in fact organised and structured to fight small wars or even internal wars, e.g. suppressing insurgencies or rebellions. However, such operations can be considered war operations for the armies or armed forces concerned.

Figure 1.1 Proposed Conceptual Framework on MOOTW



Basic Assumption

It is assumed that most, if not all of today's armed forces still maintain its primary mission of being prepared to fight a conventional war in defence of the sovereignty of that armed force's state. This draws a significant amount of the state's resources in terms of monetary, human, material and even training resources to maintain a standing armed forces ready for war. However, the new post Cold War geostrategic realities have led to an increased emphasis on MOOTW. There are many reasons why some states direct their armed forces to conduct MOOTW, although arguably all would be consistent with the respective state's national interests. Such MOOTW demands a slice of resources, putting a strain on the priorities of the state and the focus of its armed forces.

It is also assumed that MOOTW demands a different set of operating principles and doctrine from that of the principles of war. Armed forces are largely organised around the state's security needs and requirements, for example, to be a defensive force, a deterrent force, or an intervention force capable of projection. As such, the organisation, doctrine, equipping, and training are possibly at odds with those of MOOTW. In fact the term armed forces is already at odds with MOOTW as apart from PKOs, there is arguably no need to be armed to conduct other MOOTW such as flood relief operations or civilian evacuation operations. Even in the later phases of a PKO, the police and other civil agencies may play a more central role than the military.

Lastly, MOOTW can be addressed theoretically as a concept and can find itself especially within the contemporary theories on security such as Constructivism, the Copenhagen School and the Frankfurt School. As it stands, subsets of MOOTW are already extensively studied within this new security environment and thus advancing these ideas into a holistic concept worthy of theoretical study can be done.

Methodology

This research will be adopting a qualitative methodology, with data collection and analysis on MOOTW and the range of operations within the ambit of MOOTW undertaken by relevant armed forces including the RTARF and MAF. This will be gathered from secondary data sources from academic writings relevant to the subject. Data sources will be supplemented with primary data from interviews with key personnels such as RTARF commanders involved in 2004 Tsunami relief efforts and MAF commanders in UNIFIL.

Delimitation

The initial readings would suggest that MOOTW is in fact all encompassing and consist of many types of operations ranging from peacekeeping to humanitarian operations to even counter terrorist operations. However, this research will seek to limit itself to Chapter VI and VII types of peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian and disaster relief operations. This is purely for the purposes of pretheoretical processing of the idea of MOOTW¹⁸.

MOOTW is not a new reality, but newly prominent especially with respect to the end of the Cold War and therefore this research will focus on this period because the milestone is consistent with the new geostrategic realities that are facing states and their armed forces today. This research will also be limiting the case studies to armed forces centering Thailand and Malaysia but including relevant examples to help support the analyses. This is so as to draw the lessons on challenges and prospects of MOOTW to the respective armed forces that are relevant to the time and place of this research.

¹⁸ In so doing, this research will steer clear of the grey areas leaving that instead for the doctoral students with less constraint on word count!

Expected Research Results for Utilisation

* Provide an analysis and recommendations on addressing the balance of commitment between MOOTW and war, thus would be extremely useful to policy makers, military planners as well as students of security studies.

* An alternative perspective of how to study the concept of MOOTW within the contemporary theories addressing the new security paradigm thus is seen as an area of study that requires more focus.

* Offer military planners with prospects arising out of the experience gained, when planning, training, equipping and conducting MOOTW.

Organisation of Chapters

The First Chapter provided the introduction to the research. It includes the problem statement, objectives, and delimitations of the study and the preliminary assumptions on the topic. It also includes the literature review, the proposed theoretical framework and the research methodology adopted for the study.

The Second Chapter will then analyse the global and regional security context in which state governments are increasingly seen to be committing their armed forces for MOOTW but yet, at the same time continue to organise, equip and train them for war. This chapter will also examine the new security paradigm, the increasing impact of non-security threats and its impact on the armed forces. Lastly, the chapter will examine the organisation of a typical armed forces and the increasing impact of technology on military operations.

The Third Chapter will continue the analysis but at a more focused level by seeking to define MOOTW in the state and military context as well as to define the elements of each type of operation under MOOTW. The classification of MOOTW, and will also examine the differences between MOOTW and war. This chapter will also seek to examine the factors affecting the conduct of MOOTW and the challenges facing the militaries today when planning, training, equipping and conducting MOOTW. It will also examine the civil military cooperation

required of MOOTW including cooperation with other government agencies, the police, NGOs and media. Lastly, this chapter will examine the alternatives to the armed forces in countering non-traditional security threats.

The Fourth Chapter will highlight two case studies focusing mainly on the humanitarian and disaster relief operations in Thailand and UN peacekeeping mission¹⁹. The chapter will examine the various challenges confronting the armed forces as well as the prospects arising out of the experience gained when prosecuting MOOTW. With data gathered from interviews with RTARF and MAF commanders who had participated in humanitarian and disaster relief operations in Thailand and UN mission, together with secondary sources of data from related literature, the chapter will show the effectiveness in which the armed forces had conducted these missions and at the same time highlight the challenges confronting them in such missions.

The Fifth and concluding chapter will assess the approaches to MOOTW by the various armed forces, analysing the main differences in approaches to MOOTW in light of the current global and regional security framework. The conclusion will attempt to zero the approaches to MOOTW with the theories and concepts as developed in the second and third chapters and in so doing, provide an analysis that is consistent with the regional and international context that armed forces today find themselves in.

It will also provide some recommendations for addressing the balance of commitment between MOOTW and war and also to propose an alternative perspective of how to study the concept of MOOTW within the contemporary theories addressing the new security paradigm

¹⁹ Two case studies limited to the experiences of the RTARF and MAF were chosen as the interviews can provide an insight and relevance that cannot be gained through secondary information.

Chapter 2

The New Global Security Context

The Decline of Inter State Wars?

It can be quite convincingly argued that the end of the Cold War was the most impactful event to affect the global security landscape in the 21st Century. Indeed, nation states had been engaged in increasingly violent and destructive inter state conflict from the first and second world wars, the Korean War, Vietnam War and the Cold War.¹ What was typical of the trends in inter state wars up to 1989 was first the increasingly violent way in which wars were prosecuted. This was especially the case in the first and second world wars, which culminated in the dropping of two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, leading to the surrender of Japan. The next trend in inter state wars was the increasingly sophisticated levels of technology applied to weapons and equipment. This resulted in the increasing speed and sophistication in which military force was applied in war to defeat the enemy. Of course the ultimate in a military conflict is the nuclear weapon. This was developed to devastating effect on both sides of the iron curtain and resulted in up to five megaton warheads that if used in total war between the US and USSR would have resulted in what some have predicted to be a doomsday event.

Perhaps it was the realisation that inter state war had become an impractical proposition with the invention of the atomic bomb. The possibility of escalation into full scale nuclear attacks by both sides and thereby annihilating any way of life as we know it made the prospect of war, even proxy wars a dangerous game played by the superpowers. Therefore, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, for a variety of reasons that are beyond the scope of this research, the end of the Cold War thus gave way to a new security paradigm.

However, before proceeding to discuss the new paradigm, this research must qualify two pertinent issues on inter state wars; first, inter state wars can really be classified into total war and limited war.

¹ According to Gen Rupert Smith, the Cold War was technically not a war but more an extended confrontation between the two superpowers, as there was no formal declaration of war nor was there any direct military engagement between the US and Soviet Union.

The First and Second World Wars are regarded as total wars in which all of a states or group of states' resources are brought to bear into the conflict.² Limited wars unlike total wars have limited objectives, that is, they do not seek the complete annihilation or unconditional surrender of the enemy. The Korean and Vietnam Wars can be considered in this category insofar as the US as one of the warring parties is concerned, but it could also be regarded as total war for the Koreans and Vietnamese from their perspectives. According to Korb and Bergmann, as democratic movements spread across the globe and new technologies enable greater worldwide interconnection, modern states have increasingly little incentive to wage inter state wars,³ in this case especially total war. However, the same cannot be said of inter state limited wars like the gulf war in 1991 which was sanctioned by the UN.

The New Security Paradigm

Insofar as the West is concerned, the end of the Cold War has lifted the heavy burden from the threat of conventional and or nuclear war with the Warsaw Pact. It has also lifted the burden of the many proxy wars of ideology that were fought on the sidelines of the Cold War. But suprisingly, defence acquisitions and defence spending has been at record high since the end of the Cold War with the US military accounting for almost half of the world total defence spending and has reached Cold War levels after a brief period of decline between 1991 and 1999.⁴ There are many reasons for this, the high price of technology being one of the main drivers. In fact, as many modern militaries seek transformation, precision technologies continue to exact a very high price on defence budgets of these armed forces. Other drivers for the increased spending include a shift from conscription to maintaining a more expensive professional armed force and the declining value of money brought on by inflation. The bottom line however is that while states recognise the declining risk of inter state wars, it cannot be completely written off.

The end of the Cold War has brought about a rethinking of security strategies, not departing very far from the Cold War paradigm in that it tries to address security issues more comprehensively. What this

² The encyclopaedic definition of total war is a war that is unrestricted in terms of the weapons used, the territory or combatants involved, or the objectives pursued. (Online) Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_war, 2017.

³ L. J. Korb, M. A. Bergmann. Restructuring the Military in Issues in Science and Technology. (Washington: 2008). p.35.

⁴ List of countries by military expenditures. Wikipedia. (Online). Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures, 2017.

means is that the end of the Cold war has freed the government and security planners to focus on non-traditional security threats as it can be argued that with the decreased risk of inter state wars, it is such non-traditional issues that now pose a larger threat to a state's security.

The definition of non-traditional security threats is vague, given that it defines what it is not, that is, threats that are not traditional, in this case usually threats to national sovereignty. Some scholars would rather use the term human security issues to define such threats⁵ and in so doing, define what it is. However, for the purposes of consistency, this research will continue to use the term non-traditional security threats to avoid confusion. These threats or issues include the perception of threats to regional or global security, threats from natural disasters, threats from diseases including pandemics, threats to the environment and the threat from terrorism. Indeed, as Carla Koppell from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars states, conflict and instability are increasingly driven by non-traditional factors like failures in governance, health crises and environmental degradation. Globalisation and technological change are increasing interdependence and interconnectedness in ways that magnify the security related impact of developmental challenges around the world.⁶ The following paragraphs will examine a range of non-traditional security issues that are gaining prominence in the new security paradigm.

Humanitarian Interventions

Since the end of the Cold War, many nations' armed forces have had to shift their institutional emphasis from fighting to maintain stability to stabilising to prevent fighting.⁷ According to Farrell, humanitarian intervention is directed towards providing emergency assistance and protecting fundamental human rights.⁸ Holzgrefe defines humanitarian intervention as the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread

⁵ Wikipedia. (Online). Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_security, 2017.

⁶ C. Koppell. Preventing the Next Wave of Conflict: Understanding Non-Traditional Threats to Global Stability. (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Institute for Scholars, 2003). p.1.

⁷ Lt Col (Ret.) K. E. Bonn, Msg (Ret.) A. E. Baker. Guide to Military Operations Other than War – Tactics, Techniques & Procedures for Stability & Support Operations. (Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2000). p. 2.

⁸ T. Farrell. "Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations", in Strategy in the Contemporary World. J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, C.S. Gray, E. Cohen, (Eds). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). p.314.

and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.⁹ What is interesting to note is that where humanitarian intervention was previously rare and considered illegitimate, the UN has sponsored and organised numerous large scale peace operations since the end of the Cold War.¹⁰ For now, it is suffice to conclude that the end of the Cold War had indeed freed the US and the UN to actually take action and intervene in another state on the grounds of humanitarian issues.

The numbers of intervention operations mounted by the UN since the end of the Cold War clearly supports this. Between 1993 and 1998 alone, 20 new peacekeeping missions were established. The reasons for this are many. Firstly, the end of the Cold War was accompanied by a number of regional peace agreements, for example in Afghanistan, Angola, Namibia and Cambodia, and these demanded peacekeeping forces to supervise the respective peace processes. Next, the end of the Cold War also saw a surplus in military capability which could then be diverted to peacekeeping. Lastly and by no means the least, with the end of the threat of a major war with the Soviet Union, democratic governments began to be besieged by demands from their citizens to take action to free the suffering from such intra state wars. Part of the reason for this last point can also be attributed to the increasingly sophisticated media which are increasingly able to push horrifying images of genocide and suffering into the living rooms at real time speeds and thereby energising the citizens and their governments.

Disaster Relief Operations

With the end of the Cold War, growing awareness of global warming and the impact of new media have combined to increase the awareness of natural disasters. Some scholars have attributed the apparent rise in disasters to climate change and global warming, making the incidences of weather related disasters more frequent and more devastating. According to Dr. Ute Collier, head of the WWF's Climate Change Program, climate change is clearly having an impact on the

⁹ J. L. Holzgrefe. "The Humanitarian Intervention Debate", in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas. J. L. Holzgrefe, R. O. Keohane, (Eds). (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). p.18.

¹⁰ T. Farrel. "Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations", in Strategy in the Contemporary World. J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, C. S. Gray, E. Cohen, (Eds). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). p.314.

frequency and intensity of natural disasters.¹¹ In the Economist in September 2009, it was reported that in 1981-85, fewer than 500 million people required international disaster assistance; in 2001-05, the number reached 1.5 billion,¹² a three-fold increase in less than 20 years. However, scientists are still reluctant to make a direct connection between natural disasters and climate change. Others have simply attributed this to the fact that with an increasingly intertwined global community, the impact of such natural disasters is much greater given the speed and clarity of images of the disaster invading the homes of viewers, their politicians and NGOs all over the world.

In the current media age, the visual impact of disasters has huge outcomes on how or when armed forces are deployed for such operations. Clearly, there are multiple challenges confronting governments and their militaries in executing disaster relief operations. These range from the amount of relief as in the case of the US National Guard involvement in hurricane Katrina relief efforts to encountering political blockage by the ruling Junta as in the case of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar.¹³ However, positive outcomes for the armed forces can be gained if such operations are conducted well. These include the Japanese Self Defence Force's efforts in providing relief to its own citizens during and after hurricanes that besiege Japan, or the MAF's own flood relief operations which usually occur during the northeast monsoon season at the end of the year. In these instances, public opinion on the armed forces is largely positive adding to the citizen support for the armed forces, which can be considered critical in democracies.

Inter State Wars - Down But Not Out

The above clearly shows that the new security paradigm seems fraught with non-traditional security issues, including those of terrorism, transborder crime, human and drugs trafficking, cyber crime *et cetera* and that the decline in inter state wars continues to be captured by security analysts and commentators. However, many scholars agree that while inter state wars have decreased, the threat has not vanished completely, and will not vanish as long as the international system is organised around states and their respective national interests. This is

¹¹ Regency Foundation Network. (Online). Available: <http://www.regency.org/2008-news/october-2008/242-climate-change-causing-jump-in-natural-disasters>, 2017.

¹² "A Bad Climate for Development", *The Economist*, 19th September 2009. p. 65.

¹³ A. Spaeth, R. Horn, S. Elegant, J. Tedjasukmana, D. Waller. "When Aid Breeds Suspicion", *Time Magazine*, 18 January 2005.

exemplified by the earlier observation that defence spending after the Cold War is indeed at an all time high. Indeed, a number of scholars have highlighted several potential flashpoints in which inter state war may occur in the near future. These include the rise of China, a remilitarisation of Japan, the Middle East with the Israel Palestinian issue as the tipping point, the Korean peninsula, and the rerise of Russia just to state a few. To borrow Nassim Taleb's round trip fallacy,¹⁴ if there is no evidence of impending war, it does not mean that there is evidence of no impending war. Like Taleb's black swan hypothesis,¹⁵ inter state wars, whether total or limited, can occur in the near future, especially given the increasing concerns of food and energy shortages, climate change as well as a potential challenger to US global hegemony. Insofar as inter state wars are concerned, it can be concluded that armed forces still need to be organised and prepared for war. The question really is what to do with the very expensive to maintain armed forces in the meantime.

The Impact On The State

As mentioned earlier, the new security paradigm has caused the consequent shift of attention by the international community from Cold War security issues to the non-traditional security issues. James Wirtz highlights that neo institutionalists advocating transnational management are increasingly important in world affairs. This was borne out from the fact that international governmental organisations are playing increasingly prominent roles in tackling tough issues that transcend international boundaries.¹⁶ Especially with regard to the UN, the post Cold War scenario liberated both political capacity and military capability. This has resulted in the international community finding the will and resources to do something about weak and failed states where the majority of human security issues occur. Indeed, Freedman admits that the business of states, once almost completely bound up with security, now involves a range of economic, social and environmental issues and hence the course and character of all conflicts, and the role to be played by armed force must be reappraised.¹⁷ This leads to the next issue: the

¹⁴ N. N. Taleb. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. (London: Penguin, 2007). p.52.

¹⁵ According to Taleb, Black Swans are events of rarity, extreme impact, and retrospective predictability.

¹⁶ J. Wirtz. "A New Agenda for Security and Strategy", in Strategy in the Contemporary World. J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, C. S. Gray, E. Cohen, (Eds), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). p.338.

¹⁷ L. Freedman. "The Future of Strategic Studies", in Strategy in the Contemporary World. J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, C. S. Gray, E. Cohen, (Eds). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). p.366.

involvement of the armed forces and the other state security apparatus in dealing with the new security paradigm.

State Security Apparatus

State security remains in the high politics arena of a state's agenda despite the relative notions of peace today. To this end, states have developed, and continue to develop various security apparatus aimed at providing security for the state against external and internal threats. The extent of development of the various security apparatus however are dependent on a range of factors, including the state's threat perception, its political system, resources, extent of technological development, culture and many others. Examples of apparatus, organisations or agencies to deal primarily with external threats include the armed forces and paramilitaries.

Other organisations to deal with internal threats and also to provide emergency services include the police, civil defence, border forces, coast guard, fire service and other emergency services. Traditionally, these are divided into departments or ministries of defence to deal with external threats and home or homeland security to deal with internal threats. It is common today to find an organisations where members of both ministries or departments sit on similar committees as the security issues today typically includes both. An example is the way Malaysia organises security for Langkawi International Maritime and Airshow or LIMA.¹⁸ The lead agency providing the security for the event is the Royal Malaysia Police Force (RMP), while the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) provided surveillance and counter terrorist forces. Clearly, this required numerous inter ministry meetings and coordination as well as inter service exercises to test issues on communications and interoperability.

The new security paradigm has clearly affected such military and security organisations, especially in the need to deal with non-traditional security threats. For the purposes of this research however, the focus will mainly be on the armed forces as the subject of MOOTW is clearly linked to it, although alternatives to the armed forces will be considered in the next chapter.

¹⁸ LIMA is one of the largest maritime and aerospace exhibitions in the Asia Pacific region that takes place once every two years in Langkawi, Malaysia. (Online). Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langkawi_International_Maritime_and_Aerospace_Exhibition 2017.

Impact on Military Organisations

James Wirtz in *A New Agenda for Security and Strategy* points to the increase in attention to issues arising from low politics, that is, issues on the environment, management of resources and population growth as taking on more prominence in national security agendas.¹⁹ This was despite the reemergence of security issues from high politics since the events of 9/11. This leads to the conclusion that the national security agendas will be dominated by security issues of both high politics and low politics and the securitisation of issues arising from low politics can lead to the use of military force as a solution. Clearly the issues of high politics can still lead to conventional wars recurring. What has resulted from this is the increasing need for armed forces to be equipped and trained for full spectrum operations.

Chapter I described the problem for armed forces to have to deal with both war and operations other than war. The answer that some armed forces have to do this is to develop what is described above as full spectrum operations or full spectrum capabilities. In the military sense, a full spectrum capability means the ability to conduct operations from peace to war. This is not an alien concept to armed forces, especially those from the more developed states. However, in today's context, a full spectrum operational capability literally means the ability to conduct operations during peace, limited war, general war and post war periods. Clearly, the operational and tactical capabilities required of an armed force to be full spectrum capable is daunting in the training and equipment required as well as in a whole slew of new capabilities required such as inter agency cooperation, media engagement, civil military cooperation *et cetera*, most of which would fall into the peace and post war periods of military operations. Indeed, the notion of a full spectrum capability may just be the answer to the dilemma of balancing between war and MOOTW and this will be revisited in the concluding chapter after the analyses of the case studies.

Structure of A Typical Armed Forces

A typical armed forces today would consist of a joint headquarters with a land force (army), navy and air force. A quick look at major armed forces the world over would reveal a preponderance for an

¹⁹ J. Wirtz. "A New Agenda For Security And Strategy", in *Strategy In The Contemporary World*. J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, C. S. Gray, E. Cohen, (Eds). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). p.338.

organisation for war. The US, UK, French, Russian and Chinese militaries all have offensively organised forces capable of prosecuting conventional or nuclear war. Closer to home, the armed forces in ASEAN all have offensive or defensive capabilities or a combination of both. A quick look at the inventories would reveal the focus on acquiring weapons and equipment for the purpose of war.²⁰ And yet, with the exception of Vietnam, all ASEAN countries have never experienced inter state wars since the end of the Second World War. Conflicts such as Konfrontasi and Malaysia's insurgency technically fall into either limited war or counter insurgency operations.

Peace Securing Organisation?

Despite the obvious organisations for war, many of the armed forces above have had to adapt their organisations to securing peace and provide humanitarian and disaster relief. While Rinaldo concludes that the applications of the principles of war and the principles of MOOTW need not be viewed in isolation. He argues that the simultaneous application of all the instruments of national or international power will increase the impact of the military's involvement in MOOTW.²¹ However, Farrell states that peace operations often breach the four main principles of war and that peace forces must maintain a balance between avoiding the overuse of force to maintain consent for their operations versus the need to be prepared to take robust action against peace spoilers.²²

What is clear here is that there is no consensus on whether the current model of armed forces can be used to effectively conduct MOOTW. The key word here is adapt. From the writer's own experience as a commander in a peacekeeping in Lebanon, a significant amount of adaptation of tactics, equipment and drills needed to be done before it can be optimised for the peacekeeping operation, bearing in mind that the MAF, has always been equipped and trained for conventional war. A further example of this is the existence of peacekeeping training centres such as the MAF's training centre in Port Dickson. Clearly there is a need for specialised training for officers and soldiers before they are deployed for peacekeeping operations. Adapting becomes even more pertinent

²⁰ The Military Balance 2017. (London: IISS 14 February 2017).

²¹ R. J. Rinaldo. Warfighting and Peace Ops: Do Real Soldiers Do MOOTW? (Washington: Joint Force Quarterly 1996-97). p.116.

²² T. Farrell. "Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations", in Strategy in The Contemporary World. J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, C. S. Gray, E. Cohen, (Eds), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). p.326-327.

when armed forces are deployed for disaster relief operations where no arms are required and there is a need for much inter-agency and civil-military cooperation.

The Democratic Military

In a civilian controlled military, development is dependent on the politicians. It is also dependent on perceived threats to the nation, with current threats including the increasing non-traditional threats like terrorism. In cases where there are little or no perceived threats, the military may be downsized, for example the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). Some armed forces exist because of participation in UN operations, and the participation actually helps to fund the armed forces itself. Others get rerolled or reimaged to maintain relevance or gain a wider acceptance among the people. The Japan Self Defence Force (JSDF) has been gradually reinvented to project a softer image to its own citizens largely to overcome the stigma of past wartime atrocities.²³ What is clear is that modern militaries, especially professional forces are extremely expensive to maintain. Military budgets are under constant scrutiny by political masters to ensure money is not wasted and yet armed forces still need to be prepared for that improbable yet devastating war should it occur.

Technological Impact on Modern Armed Forces

Modern weapons systems, command, control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), precision weapons, space systems all increase an armed force's lethality and effectiveness. As exemplified in the last Gulf War, Ops Iraqi Freedom, devastating firepower can be brought to bear on an enemy in an effective and precise manner. But such systems require immense budgets to acquire and sustain as well as immense effort in training to proficiency. Trouble is, in today's security context, it is possible that some armed forces may acquire and train to proficiency on such systems, never to use them until they are rendered obsolete to be replaced with newer more effective systems. Can such systems be used for operations other than war? Can the armed force justify to the public the need for funds for such systems only to prepare for, what if that will in all probability never come? Can returns from the mere deterrence effect of such weapons be

²³ Amit Jain. "Japanese Armed Forces Get Image Makeover", in PR Week. (Online). Available: <http://www.prweek.com/article/1324203/japanese-armed-forces-image-makeover>, 2017.

justified?²⁴ And if, as mentioned earlier, armed forces are increasingly called to perform MOOTW, then can inputs be effectively channelled into acquiring and training for systems that can be used in MOOTW? How much of existing systems can be used in MOOTW? For that matter, how much of military doctrine can be applied to MOOTW. This will be addressed in the next chapter.

Conclusion

In this chapter it was assessed that the end of the Cold War was possibly the single most important event driving the changes to the new security paradigm. It also examined this new security paradigm and highlighted the main variables contributing to this paradigm. These included increased incidences of humanitarian interventions, increased awareness of natural and man-made disasters, but also concluded that despite this shift in focus by the international community from inter state wars to such non-traditional security issues, the threat of inter state wars was still present, albeit low.

Next, the chapter highlighted how this new security paradigm affected the international community, states, and governments and armed forces, which resulted in the need to focus on non-traditional issues while keeping an eye on the traditional threats to state security. Lastly, this chapter concluded that the new realities confronting many modern armed forces today was the need to develop and maintain a full spectrum capability, which is easier said than done. The next chapter will thus critically examine the concept of MOOTW and highlight the main issues confronting armed forces in developing, maintaining and applying this capability in the interests of state security.

²⁴ Judging from the US experience in the Cold War, gambling on deterrence was justified when it won the war with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus the intangibles from such inputs can never be properly quantified.

Chapter 3

Trends and Specific Approaches

Defining MOOTW

In recent years, the American military's approach to conflict placed a clear distinction between war and peace while grouping everything else as Military Operations Other Than War or MOOTW. War was thought of in terms of major theatres and campaigns as experienced in the Second World War and planned for the Cold War. Insofar as the US military is concerned, and indeed for many other modern armed forces looking to the US as an example, this leaves MOOTW, in a broad expanse below the extreme of war. This however does not take into account the operations that armed forces do conduct during peacetime, such as disaster relief operations and operations in support of other civil agencies, which by and large can also happen during war.

Before beginning to analyse the concept of MOOTW, it is necessary to review the term military operations other than war. Firstly and most importantly, MOOTW is about military operations. Military operations are the coordinated military actions of a state's armed forces in response to a developing situation. These actions are designed as a military plan to resolve the situation in the state's favour. Operations may be of combat or non-combat types, and are referred to by code names for the purpose of security. Military operations are often known for their more generally accepted common usage names than by their actual operational or strategic objectives. For example, a peacekeeping operation reflects just what type of operation it is, that is, to keep the peace in a given theatre of operation. But the strategic and operational objectives for various peacekeeping operations differ widely from theatre to theatre. Even within the same theatre, the objectives evolve over the duration of the mission.

The Definition of War

A contemporary definition of war according to the Merriam Webster dictionary is a state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or nations or a period of such armed conflict or a state of hostility, conflict; or a struggle or competition between opposing

forces or for a particular end.¹ Here, the state seems to have leeway to securitise an issue to make it a war as in the war against disease or the war on terror. However, this research will limit its discussion on war to the traditionalist idea of war and eventually link this to how armed forces deal with such operations and those that fall outside its definition.

Clausewitz defines war as an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. He further states that war is a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed, that is the only way in which it differs from other conflicts and that essentially war is fighting, for fighting is the only principle in the manifold activities generally designated as war.² However, it would be useful to define here that intra state wars involve only the primary parties or belligerents, for example the government versus the rebels or the different racial or religious militants involved in the conflict. It should not be considered a war for the interventionist forces, for example the UN peace enforcement or peacekeeping forces as they are considered secondary parties to the conflict. In other words, armed forces do not go to war when they are deployed for peace enforcement operations under the ambit of UN Chapter VII type of operations as they are intervening in someone else's war, although many soldiers may argue that some of these operations come very close to the actual conditions of war in the physical and psychological threat to the peacekeepers or peace enforcers themselves.

Referencing Clausewitz, in UN Chapter VII operations where peace enforcers are actually fighting one or more sides in an intra state war, his notions of war actually become applicable to the context of fighting. It is thus important to consider the objectives or in the case of a UN operation, the mandates of the operation. In inter state war, it is clearly to achieve a national objective. In intra state war, again there is a clear aim to achieve a governmental, group or factional objective, which in arguably all cases, is to win. This is not the case for the secondary parties in a PKO as they are clearly not there to win. Their mandates usually revolve around the cessation of hostilities and the need for self-defence if one or more of the conflicting sides decide to target the interveners. War should also not be confused with combat. War is an act between states while combat is an act between people.³ Combat does

¹ "Definition of War" in Merriam Webster Dictionary. (Online). Available: <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/war>, 2017.

² C. Von Clausewitz. On War. (New York: Random House, 1993). p.83-84.

³ Lt Col (Ret.) K. E. Bonn, Msg (Ret.) A. E. Baker. Guide to Military Operations Other than War – Tactics, Techniques & Procedures for Stability & Support Operations. (Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2003). p. 3.

occur in MOOTW, especially in PKO as witnessed in Mogadishu in October 1993 between US, Pakistani and Malaysian forces against the Somali rebels.

The Principles of War

In order to complete the understanding of war, it is necessary also to examine the principles of war. Just as in the notion of war itself, there are many interpretations on the principles of war. Many are contextual, that is they are based on the national strategies and even the capabilities of the armed forces themselves. Nevertheless it is still important as this chapter will later examine the contemporary principles of MOOTW and in so doing, compare and contrast the two sets of principles. As military capabilities advanced over time, the principles themselves have evolved to reflect the increased capabilities as well as to adapt to national cultures. A contemporary outline of the US principles of war according to the US Army Field Manual lists the following:

- * **Objective** – Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective. The ultimate military purpose of war is the destruction of the enemy's ability to fight.

- * **Offensive** – Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined common objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results.

- * **Mass** – Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time. Synchronising all the elements of combat power where they will have decisive effect on an enemy force in a short period of time is to achieve mass.

- * **Economy of Force** – Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. No part of the force should ever be left without purpose.

- * **Manoeuvre** – Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Manoeuvre is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to gain

positional advantage. Effective manoeuvre keeps the enemy off balance and protects the force.

* **Unity of Command** – For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort. At all levels of war, employment of military forces in a manner that masses combat power toward a common objective requires unity of command and unity of effort under one responsible commander.

* **Security** – Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by a commander to protect his forces.

* **Surprise** – Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Surprise can decisively shift the balance of combat power. By seeking surprise, forces can achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended.

* **Simplicity** – Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. It is commonly regarded that simplicity contributes to successful operations where simple plans and clear, concise orders minimise misunderstanding and confusion.⁴

Along with other variations of the principles of war, what is important to note is that the principles of war are primarily a guide in the manner in which a state, or head of state and its military applies itself in the geostrategic context to win wars. The question is if armed forces are organised around these principles, or more accurately, can these principles be applied to MOOTW in an effective manner?

Definition of MOOTW

The term military operations other than war is seen to be formulated by the rule of contraries, stressing their specifics as opposed to conventional military operations.⁵ Returning to the concept of MOOTW, if it works in an exclusionary fashion to encompass all forms of military operations other than war, then clearly it would include an extremely

⁴ “Principle of War”. US Army Field Manual FM 3-0. (Washington: Department of Army, 2008).

⁵ K. J. Michael. Peace Operations: Tackling the Military, Legal and Policy Challenges. (Canberra: Government Publishing Service, 1997). p.36.

wide range of military operations. MOOTW are more sensitive to political considerations and often the military may not be the primary player. More restrictive rules of engagement and a hierarchy of national objectives are followed. MOOTW encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These operations can be applied to complementary combination of the other instruments of national power.⁶

Insofar as the range of operations within MOOTW, it can be defined here that so long as the armed force is executing operations outside a formal declaration of war, or without formally declared war objectives, it can be classified as MOOTW. In MOOTW, political considerations influence all levels and the armed forces may not be the lead player, resulting in highly restrictive rules of engagement.⁷ War on the other hand, will usually see the armed forces taking the lead role in achieving the national objectives. Thus for MOOTW, it is critical for all levels of command to understand the political objectives of the mission, junior commander are expected to make decisions that can have a strategic or political impact. Conversely, since the situation in MOOTW can be very fluid, state leaders must also be aware, and be constantly updated on the operational situation as such changes may affect the political objectives. This can be seen in the way UN operations in Timor Leste evolved over time, from INTERFET or Intervention Force East Timor, to UNPROFOR or UN Protection Force, to UNMISSET or UN Mission in Support of East Timor.

Types of MOOTW

From the above, MOOTW can thus be classified into either operations conducted in country (domestic) and operations conducted abroad (international), for example local flood relief efforts and overseas peacekeeping operations respectively. Alternatively, MOOTW can also be classified into combat and non-combat types of MOOTW. The second mode of classifying MOOTW does provide a more generic view of MOOTW as conducted by various modern armed forces, although many of these armed forces, less the US, do not conduct international MOOTW to any significant degree. Thus, for the purposes of this study, the typology of combat and non-combat MOOTW shall be used.

⁶ Joint Publication 3-07. Military Operations Other Than War. (Washington DC: Pentagon, 1995). p.8.

⁷ Lt Col (Ret.) K. E. Bonn, Msg (Ret.) A. E. Baker. Guide to Military Operations Other than War – Tactics, Techniques & Procedures for Stability & Support Operations. (Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2003). p.5.

Combat MOOTW

* **Peacekeeping Operations and Peace Support Operations** – these are military operations conducted within the mandate of the UN. According to Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, such operations are undertaken with the consent of all major parties to the dispute. Military operations here are designed to monitor or facilitate the implementation of a ceasefire or truce.

* **Military Intervention Operations or Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO)** – these involve the use or threat of use of military force, usually with international authorisation such as Chapter 7 type of operations in the UN Charter. These operations are undertaken to restore order, enforce sanctions, forcibly separate warring parties for the purpose of creating conditions suitable for a ceasefire or truce. Unlike the earlier described PKO, PEOs do not require the consent of the parties involved in the dispute.

* **Counter Terrorism Operations** – these are actions taken by the military or other state security agencies to oppose terrorism. Since the events of 9/11, counter terrorism has evolved into a comprehensive discipline on its own and encompasses a wide range of military and non-military actions such as the securing of installations, crisis management and response, tactical actions against terrorists which can include preemption, response and mitigation as well as follow on actions against terrorists.

* **Border Security Operations** – in some cases, the armed forces are called upon to supplement or complement the customs and immigration in securing the country's borders. The MAF for instance has formed a Border Regiment to guard the northern borders with Thailand and to secure the Eastern border with Indonesia in Sabah and Sarawak. At the same time, the MAF also mounts specific operations along its borders to detect illegal immigrants and other trans border crimes.

* **Counter-Drug Operations** – with the exception of the US. Most countries' counter drug operations are closely tied to border security operations and involve the supplement of police and immigration agencies in the stopping of drugs from entering the country. The US conducts counter drug operations in many cases outside of the US and is focused primarily in the countries of origin of the drugs.

* **Counter Insurgency Operations** – these are operations mounted by the military and other security agencies like the police against insurgencies threatening the internal security of a country. In many cases however, such operations may be considered war operations as a counter insurgency may be considered an intra state war. This depends on how the government of the day chooses to define the conflict. MAF fought the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) until they lay arm on 2nd December 1989.

* **Operations in Support of Insurgencies.** The US has conducted such operations in support of insurgents seeking to overthrow regimes deemed to be threatening US security interests. For example, the type of clandestine activities under the National Security Council directive included: propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.⁸

* **Show of Force Operations** – these are mounted by the US to demonstrate resolve against threats to its national interests. It should be noted that while initially considered MOOTW, such shows of force may lead to war if the deterrent effect fails.

* **Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)** – these are mounted to evacuate threatened civilians from a hostile foreign environment. Such operations involve a swift insertion of military forces to evacuate civilians, usually own citizens with the aid of embassy staff incountry. In Operation Pyramid, hundreds of Malaysians was airlifted to safety from the Egyptian cities of Cairo and Alexandria amid the chaos of a country on the brink of civil war.⁹

⁸Nathaniel L. Smith (Ed). “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XV, Central America”. (Online). Available: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4777.htm>, 2017.

⁹“Malaysian military operations that made headline news in the past 10 days”. (Online). Available: <http://kementah.blogspot.com/2011/02/malaysian-military-operations-make.html>, 2017.

Non-Combat MOOTW

* **Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations** – these seek to reduce the effects of natural or man-made disasters, ranging from collapsed buildings to hurricanes and earthquakes. When such operations are conducted in foreign territory, they become very complex operations that require a significant amount of interagency cooperation. Such operations are directed from the strategic level, coordinated and managed at the operational level, and conducted at the tactical level.¹⁰ An example of a foreign HADR is Typhoon Pablo relief efforts in Mindanao, where the MAF was activated to assist the Philippine Government.

* **Domestic and Civil Support Operations** – these are a wide range of support operations for the state’s civil authorities, usually as complementary to the civil authorities or agencies, although the armed forces can play the lead role in certain cases. Examples of operations conducted as complementary to civil agencies when they are overtaxed and require temporary support include the reinforcement of civil air traffic controllers, reinforcement of security for key installations vulnerable to civilian unrest or terrorist attacks, and military assistance to civilian law and order agencies during civil disturbances such as the MAF’s protection of public order operations.

Principles of MOOTW

MOOTW as a military concept has only been recently formalised and as such there currently exists no formal declaration of the principles of MOOTW less those generated by the US Army. The following will examine the US military’s principles of MOOTW and analyse the convergence with the principles of war, if any. The US Army principles of MOOTW as observed from Rinaldo’s *Do Real Soldiers Do MOOTW?* are as follows:

* **Objective** – As with all military operations, MOOTW will also require a clearly defined and attainable objective. This is usually reflected in the assigned force’s mission statement. Both political and military leaders must be aware of what constitutes the attainment of the objectives as well as the potential spoilers.

¹⁰ “Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Planning Guide”, Civil Affairs GTA 41-01-003. (Washington: US Army, 2005).

* **Unity of Effort** – this is closely related to unity of command and can be considered relevant to the first principle of objective. It emphasises the need to concentrate all means towards a common purpose.¹¹ Command arrangements within a military force are critical to the effectiveness of that force in executing its mission.

* **Legitimacy** – this is based on the perception of a specific audience as to the legality, morality or rightness of a set of actions. The specific audiences can refer to the host country or to the country of the armed forces conducting the MOOTW.¹² This is not new to the realm of military operations as military analysts have long subscribed to the notions of just cause for war and, the conduct of just war. Both serve to reinforce the legitimacy of the particular war. In that respect, legitimacy in MOOTW serves the same purpose, as arguably it is even more pertinent in the MOOTW's acceptance in a foreign country.

* **Perseverance** – forces participating in MOOTW must be prepared for measured and protracted application of military capability to achieve the mission's objectives. Some may require years to achieve the desired results. The ongoing UN Mission in Cyprus has lasted some 45 years and still show no sign of ending.¹³ UNIFIL in Lebanon was set up in 1978. 39 years have passed and the conflict is still not any closer to being resolved.

* **Restraint** – as a single reckless act can derail the success of a mission. This requires the careful balance of the need for security, the conduct of operations and the attainment of national objectives. Especially in the case of PKO, excessive force tends to affect the conflicting parties and consequently affect the legitimacy or acceptance of the force conducting MOOTW.

* **Security** – this ensures freedom of action by the assigned force by reducing the vulnerability to hostile acts. It can be argued that this also needs to be extended beyond such acts by hostile parties to also include incidences from natural events like the effects from

¹¹ Lt Col (Ret.) K. E. Bonn, Msg (Ret.) A. E. Baker. Guide to Military Operations Other Than War: Tactics, Techniques & Procedures for Stability & Support Operations. (Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2003). p. 8.

¹² Ibid., p.11.

¹³ United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). (Online). Available: <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/un-efforts-cyprus-and-role-religious-leaders-acknowledged>, 2017.

weather. That is to say, forces conducting MOOTW need to be secured from potential disruptions in order to effectively execute their missions.

From the above, there are clearly complementary principles between those of MOOTW and the principles of war as outlined earlier. It can be argued that since both were generated by the US Army, that there obviously would be synergy between the two. While Rinaldo, in his article *Do Real Soldiers Do MOOTW?* argues for a convergence between the two sets of principles, highlighting the commonalities, it should also be noted that there are many principles of war that are not applicable to MOOTW. These are offensive, mass and surprise. There are also distinctions that can be observed even among common principles like objective for example, where in MOOTW, the principle of objective is tied in very closely to all the other principles. In terms of security, the other glaring commonality between the two sets of principles, peace forces must maintain a balance between avoiding the overuse of force to maintain consent for their operations versus the need to be prepared to take robust action against peace spoilers.¹⁴

Clearly there is a close intertwining of principles within MOOTW as the use of force to provide security may impact the principle of restraint, which also affects the legitimacy of the mission. There is no such limitation in war. Therefore, following this line of reasoning, armed forces need to maintain two separate sets of principles governing the training and conduct of both types of operations. The bigger challenge is in the training and preparation of the force in executing one or the other, which leads back to this research's problem statement, which is one of finding the correct balance between war and MOOTW or finding a solution within a full spectrum force that can operate in a continuum of principles from MOOTW to war and back.

Factors Affecting MOOTW

Like war operations, MOOTW are also subject to the influence of many factors. As highlighted in the literature review, MOOTW are particularly sensitive to issues like the CNN Effect, which when effectively used by the media, can lead to the early abandonment of

¹⁴ T, Farrell. "Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations", in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, C. S. Gray, E. Cohen, (Eds). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). p.317.

the mission. Technological advances in the realm of C4ISR and NCW,¹⁵ while affecting the revolution in military affairs, also finds its application in MOOTW. The following will examine the contemporary issues affecting MOOTW.

Technology

Modern armed forces today continue to acquire modern technology as enablers and force multipliers in an effort to increase their battle effectiveness. C4ISR, NCW, precision technology and unmanned technology represent new capabilities in the warfighting arsenals of many modern armed forces. *Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries*, argues for the use of C4ISR and the effects based planning concept enabled by NCW as key enablers to peacekeeping operations.¹⁶ Indeed, as highlighted earlier in comparing the principles of war to the principles of MOOTW, there are clear applications of war capabilities to MOOTW. C4ISR can aid in providing effective command and control of peacekeeping forces that are usually dispersed throughout the area of responsibility (AOR).

At the same time, C4ISR can also provide early warning of impending hostile actions on the peacekeeping force (PKF). However, while Korb and Bergmann in an article titled *Restructuring the Military* agree on the impact on advancing technology towards war fighting but cautions on the over reliance on technology, as enemies and opponents in irregular scenarios often find ways and means to overcome technological advantages.¹⁷ These irregular scenarios will often be the case in PKO and especially PEO, where hostile forces seek to repel the interference of the PKF. Here, forces hostile to the foreign PKF are likely to possess only backward military capability and are thus likely to resort to asymmetric means to overcome the PKF's technological advantages.

Media

The mass media, like the military, have benefited from advances in technology. News today is no more sensational than the news of fifty years ago. What is different however is the impact of technology

¹⁵ Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, and Network Centric Warfare respectively.

¹⁶ D. Carment, M. Rudner. *Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries*. (New York: Routledge, 2006). p.58-63, 188-205.

¹⁷ L. J. Korb, M. A. Bergmann. "Restructuring the Military", in *Issues in Science and Technology*, Volume XXV Issue 1, Fall 2008. p.35.

on the speed in which news can reach out to audiences worldwide. The effect of the mass media was clearly felt during the first Gulf War in 1991. The mass media has gained an enormous impact on public opinion which can have far greater influence on the conduct of MOOTW where arguably the public's stomach for casualties is much lower than that for war. This consequently shapes the way in which a peacekeeping operation must approach public relations. Here, military information campaigns, peacekeeping intelligence and political communications all play a significant role in any military operation in the way in which military information is sought to be conveyed in as positive a manner so as to influence international opinion.¹⁸

Inter Agency and Civil Cooperation

Bonn and Baker in the *Guide to Military Operations Other Than War* expounds on several specific concepts that work towards achieving a MOOTW capability. These are interagency cooperation, media interaction, and populace and resource control.¹⁹ What is pertinent here is that all these capabilities are not what military traditionalists would term essential military capabilities. Recalling the principles of objective and unity of effort in MOOTW, then clearly there is a need for such cooperation in order to ensure that all means, both military and civilian, are directed towards achieving the mission's objectives.

MOOTW, less certain instances like show of force operations, also functions somewhat outside the realm of the military, and hence inevitably there is the need to cooperate with agencies outside of the military. PKO for example requires the peacekeeping force (PKF) in many instances to operate together with other agencies like NGOs as well as police forces like UN Police or UNPOL. Hillen in *The Strategy of the United Nations Military Operations* specifies the need to protect humanitarian aid, including the NGOs in theatre as such organisations have become integral to such operations given the scale of the humanitarian crisis of such operations.²⁰ This is even more apparent in

¹⁸ "How political and military information is sought to be conveyed in a positive manner in order to influence international opinion". International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF). (Online). Available: <http://www.nato.int/isaf/>, 2017.

¹⁹ Lt Col (Ret.) K. E. Bonn, Msg (Ret.) A. E. Baker. *Guide to Military Operations Other than War – Tactics, Techniques & Procedures for Stability & Support Operations*. (Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2003). p.1-11,30-35,195-197.

²⁰ J. Hillen. *Blue Helmets The Strategy of the United Nations Military Operations*. (Virginia: Brassey's, 1998). pp.172-174.

non-combat MOOTW as these exist further outside the realm of the military.

However, there are many instances when the civilians would rather not cooperate with the military. In Afghanistan some aid organisations (NGOs) flatly refused to work with US soldiers, saying that the military's aid efforts undermined the principle of neutrality that allowed aid groups to keep working in Afghanistan even during the toughest years under the Taliban.²¹ This clearly affects the MOOTW principles of unity of effort and legitimacy, highlighting the inherent difficulties in MOOTW with the presence of civilian agencies. Complete success can only be achieved through close liaison and integration and, to achieve synergy, it is important for military leaders to understand the culture, capabilities, and limitations of NGOs.²² It is thus left to the respective militaries to understand and develop a working relationship with such organisations under the larger ambit of civil military cooperation.

Intelligence

It can be argued that the principle of legitimacy is the prerequisite of all MOOTW, for without it, MOOTW cannot be conducted. However, it is the creeping issue of intelligence in MOOTW, especially PKO that is attacking the very legitimacy of the mission. Historically, UN missions avoided intelligence capabilities as the UN is considered neutral and hence intelligence systems were not accepted as part of a UN mandated PKO. The Brahimi Panel Report in 2000 recommended that UN peace operations required a more robust and realistic mandate to achieve their objectives. One of the results was the establishment of an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat to collect and manage strategic information, which is an acceptable means for intelligence. Since there can be no effective operations without effective intelligence, it is best to conclude that intelligence, is becoming increasingly important to MOOTW, especially PKO and PEO.

In the case of non-combat MOOTW, the use of intelligence is arguably even more sensitive but no less pertinent. In the case of HADR efforts in Aceh Tsunami 2004, relief troops on the ground needed

²¹ S. B. Glasser. "Soldiers in Civilian Clothing", Washington Post, 28 March 2002, p.20.

²² U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-08 and 3-07.3 (Volume I), 2012. p.1, 15.

vital intelligence on infrastructure, especially imagery on roads leading to towns that were affected by the tsunami.

Alternatives to Armed Forces in Conducting MOOTW

In the literature review, it was revealed that there may be other agencies capable of conducting MOOTW in lieu of the military. But if we are to consider non-military forces to conduct MOOTW, then clearly the concept of MOOTW itself is at odds with the term non-military as MOOTW is defined as a military operation. Nonetheless, the purpose of this research is to examine and analyse MOOTW, meaning how and why an armed force conducts operations other than what it was organised to do. The study therefore of non-military forces' suitability in conducting such operations simply means that the range and scope of MOOTW can be further refined to exclude such operations in which a non-military force is found more suitable. The following will examine the range of governmental, non-governmental and private organisations that can possibly achieve the objectives of MOOTW.

Civil Defence Forces (CDFs)

Such forces were created by countries like Singapore and Malaysia to respond to in country natural or man made disasters both in peacetime and war. The Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) for example, has developed and modernised to an extent that enables it to function even in biologically or chemically hostile environments. In fact, in countries like the United Kingdom (UK), there are increasing calls to set up a dedicated organisation, separate from the military and the existing voluntary responders, to deal with national emergencies such as the nationwide flooding crisis in 2007. Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, Shadow Security Minister and leader of a Conservative Party policy group on how the UK should deal with national emergencies has said that at present the country is ill prepared, and that it needs a dedicated organisation to deal with such events.²³ Indeed, the key to CDFs are that they function separately from the military and hence would also be on hand to deal with local emergencies.

Clearly, the CDF is optimised to deal especially with non-combat types of MOOTW, especially HADR type operations and can even be considered for such deployments outside the country. In fact, the

²³ J. Cole. "The Need for a UK Civil Defence Force?" RUSI. (Online). Available: <http://www.rusi.org/research/hsr/intro/commentary/rss/ref:C46AD9E1302254/>, 2017.

Singapore CDF did deploy two contingents to Aceh and Phuket to assist in search and rescue efforts in the tsunami hit areas on 29 Dec 2004.²⁴ The limitations on the use of CDFs apply mainly to overseas deployments. Being an unarmed force, CDFs can only be deployed in friendly environments as they have no means for self protection. CDFs also do not possess adequate C4ISR capabilities and as such will be limited in their ability to navigate in foreign terrain or to plan their approaches to the disaster areas, relying instead on their local liaison to provide such information. Lastly, CDFs cannot be deployed in large numbers overseas as their primary mission arguably is to respond to emergencies at home, which leads to a dilemma similar to the military's dilemma with MOOTW.

Police / Law Enforcement

Police work is fundamentally different from military functions. In certain cases, the police force would be more appropriate, especially where law and order issues are concerned. The deployment of UNPOL in UN missions is based on this requirement as law and order functions is critical to any society striving to return to normalcy after a conflict. It would thus be a mistake to use the military for police functions except in very critical circumstances where the police cannot be deployed. Here, proper preparation and training may serve to reduced the potential problems but not the fundamental problem of the public perception of a potential abuse of powers by the armed forces. Additionally, where PKFs need to function with UNPOL within the same mission, the principle of unity of effort must be applied to ensure proper interagency cooperation to ensure that both the military and police complement each other in theatre.

Private Military Companies

A private military company (PMC) provides specialised expertise or services of a military nature, sometimes called or classified as mercenary (soldiers for hire).²⁵ Services provided by PMCs usually mirror those of the military or police but on a much smaller scale. Although considered a relatively new concept, today's PMCs are equated

²⁴ "Singapore Civil Defence Force Milestones 2003-2004", (Online). Available: http://internet-stg.scdf.gov.sg/General/About_Us/Milestones/2003_2004.html, 2017.

²⁵ P. W. Singer, "Outsourcing War: Understanding the Private Military Industry", (Online). Available: http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2005/0301usdepartmentofdefense_singer.aspx, 2017.

by many to the mercenaries of long ago. There are inherent advantages to using PMCs like Blackwater. For one, PMC personnel are possibly highly trained and very professional in their approach to military matters. Next, a PMC's involvement in a conflict is voluntary, motivated mainly by financial incentives, and hence casualties sustained during that conflict would be deemed acceptable by the general public. Disadvantages include the relatively bad reputation of PMCs, especially in light of the mixed record of such PMCs in Iraq.²⁶

There are uncertainties in the PMC's involvement in conflicts, and these range from their actual agenda in the conflict to their commitment to the mission. PMCs can also be considered as unlawful combatants, thereby referring the concept being implicitly mentioned in the Geneva Convention and specified by the Military Commissions Act.²⁷ This last point is highly controversial as PMCs are outside of the military chain of command and hence can suspend operations at any time should the conditions become unfavourable. Nevertheless, PMCs can still be usefully involved in small scale sub-operations within a MOOTW, such as providing personal security to very important persons involved in the MOOTW or to provide security for high value installations.

Summary of Alternatives

From the above mentioned, it is safe to conclude that there are instances when a non-military agency can conduct a non-combat MOOTW instead of the military but in many other instances, these other agencies are required to function in complement to the military. Especially in the case of PMCs, which do not have the required mass to carry out more than small scale activities like reconnaissance or personal security. For HADR operations where the expertise of civil defence type forces are more suitable, the armed forces may still be called in to supplement the civil defence should more manpower be required. Also, for such operations conducted in foreign environments that may be hostile, then the armed forces may be more suitable as the primary instrument or may be deployed in the secondary role of protecting the civil defence forces. Whichever the case, it is also safe to assume that the armed forces will remain the primary instrument of the state in conducting MOOTW, especially foreign, combat type MOOTW.

²⁶ *Ibid.*,

²⁷ J. E. Barnes, "America's Own Unlawful Combatants? - Using Private Guards in Iraq could expose the U.S. to accusations of treaty violations", *Los Angeles Times*. (Online). Available: <http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/front/la-na-blackwater15oct15,1,6804674,full.story?coll=la-headlines-frontpage&ctrack=2&cset=true>, 2017.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the concept of MOOTW was examined by deconstructing the term into its fundamental elements, namely military operations, and un-war. Next, both the principles of war and the principles of MOOTW were examined and analysed and there is sufficiency to conclude that while there are convergences between the two sets of principles, more often than not, there are greater differences, that if not clearly understood and executed, can lead to disastrous results in MOOTW. From here, it can be concluded that MOOTW can be divided into domestic and foreign MOOTW or combat and non-combat types of MOOTW. This research chooses to go with the latter classification as it is deemed more relevant to this study. Indeed, insofar as the types of MOOTW is concerned, armed forces have traditionally conducted combat types of MOOTW, like PKO and PEO, but it is the non-combat types that have gained prominence in recent years, especially for armed forces in Southeast Asia. The Asian Tsunami, floods in Thailand and Malaysia, earthquakes in Indonesia, typhoon in Philippines were all recent natural disasters that have seen the armed forces as the first responders to the scene with the provision of humanitarian relief to the affected areas. But despite this recognition of the increasing importance of MOOTW, it still does not detract from the dilemma facing the armed forces today.

A strategic assessment by the US National Defence University highlights where the statistics indicate a course change is with the increase in MOOTW, “the number of small scale conflicts, humanitarian emergencies, and other similar contingencies rapidly grew in number, from 16 during the Cold War period to 45 from 1989 to 1997.”²⁸ This increase in frequency as reflected in the US military’s involvement in MOOTW alone surely indicates the toll that MOOTW is taking on the armed forces. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that taking part in MOOTW by the armed forces is not the main issue, but rather how the governments, strategists and policy makers address MOOTW that is the bigger concern.

As has been observed, the reality of peace operations is that they are the consequence of decisions by powerful outsiders to intervene in the

²⁸ Strategic Assessment: “Engaging Power for Peace”, National Defence University, Institute for National Strategic Studies. (Online). Available: <http://ndu.edu/inss/sa98>, 2017.

affairs of less capable local governments, groups, and factions.²⁹ This perhaps points to the underlying national interests of governments in committing their armed forces to especially foreign MOOTW like peacekeeping operations and the potential impact when these decisions go wrong. This also points to the importance of a holistic theoretical processing of MOOTW given the potential impact on international relations. The next chapter will examine two case studies on a range of MOOTW conducted by the armed forces highlighting both the challenges and prospects of such operations.

The Centre and the Periphery, and MPO

For many authors, peripherality can be defined in geographical terms, resulting mainly from the lack of accessibility and or economic and political importance when compared to the centre (however this is defined). On the other hand, various studies also point to spatial factors – human and social factors, the quality of institutions, governance et *cetera* – in trying to define how a region can become successful or how to pinpoint where development will be concentrated.³⁰ Other authors claim that the centre and periphery are not theoretical concepts but are true sources of strategic action.³¹ Whichever the case, there is a strong argument for applying this concept to the issue of war and MOOTW, where clearly war remains at the core or centre while MOOTW arguably is at the periphery of an armed forces strategic formulations.

Also, the key for organisations at both the centre and periphery is to calculate the costs of bridging the distance between the two poles. Strategy thus requires regular visits to the periphery to explore and learn.³² This can also be applied to the dilemma of the armed forces on finding the balance between building the capability for MOOTW versus maintaining its war capabilities. Indeed, the world cannot always be clearly divided into centre and periphery. Strategy is a continuous movement between centre and periphery³³ and herein lies the argument for building the full spectrum force in order to bridge the gap between the centre and periphery.

²⁹ Col R. C. Owen, USAF, “Aerospace Power and Land Power in Peace Operations”, Aerospace Power Journal, Fall 1999, p.1.

³⁰ J. Gren. “Reaching the Peripheral Regional Growth Centres”, European Journal of Spatial Development, Jan 2003. p.5.

³¹ B. V. Oetinger. “Center and Periphery”, Boston Consulting Group, 2007. p.1.

³² Ibid., p.2.

³³ Ibid., p.3.

Hence, a possible new nomenclature for MOOTW could be Military Peripheral Operations (MPO), to better reflect the peripherality of the types of operations that the military conducts outside of war, with war remaining the centre. The goal of virtually all studies concerning the centre periphery paradigm has been to assess whether there is convergence or divergence in development between the centre and the periphery, and what are the factors associated with the success of core regions or the atypical success stories in the peripheral areas.³⁴ Again, this clearly describes what is happening to many armed forces today with regard to MOOTW, or MPO, some scholars describe a convergence especially vis-a-vis the principles of war and principles of MOOTW like Rinaldo in *Do Real Soldiers Do MOOTW*, while some argue for a distinction between the two like Farrell in *Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations*. Lastly, with respect to the full spectrum of operations, peripheral operations can and do circumvent operations during war, for example, media engagement operations and support operations for NGOs in theatre. The issue of MPO, both the combat and non-combat-types, will be revisited in the concluding chapter after examining the various case studies in the next chapter to determine its further usefulness as a substitute for MOOTW.

³⁴ J. Gren. "Reaching the Peripheral Regional Growth Centres", European Journal of Spatial Development, Jan 2003. p.1.

Chapter 4

Case Studies

Introduction

MOOTW itself encompasses a wide range of operations that armed forces undertake while not waging war. The two case studies are assessed to still be able to provide a reasonable coverage of the issues confronting MOOTW. The Indian Ocean Tsunami was the biggest natural disaster in this region since the Krakatau eruption in Indonesia in 1883. In fact, the 2004 tsunamis killed more people than any other tsunami ever recorded.¹ The HADR operation saw the RTARF descending on the troubled Phuket to provide relief for thousands affected by the monstrous waves brought on by the earthquake in the Indian Ocean.

What was significant in this case was the ability of the Local Authority and Non-Governmental Organisations, working in conjunction with the RTARF in providing relief from the effects of a natural disaster that was unlike the usual earthquakes or typhoons. Thus, this posed some new and unique challenges to the forces on the ground. And, UNIFIL in Lebanon will provide a good overview of a UN mandated peace operation and is also especially relevant as it is a current operation undertaken by the MAF.

The relevance of the above case studies involving the RTARF and MAF are chosen as this writer is a Malaysian and studying in Thailand, hence it is hoped that the case studies will be of academic or even operational value to the potential readers of this research. Next, the selected case studies represent a fair cross section of the MOOTW range of operations, which as discussed earlier, was extremely wide ranging and can involve operations that may not be relevant to this region.

It must be acknowledged that there are other forms of MOOTW that may warrant closer examination, but some like counter terrorism operations lie in a grey area where such operations may be construed as a war on terror, while others like border security operations are somewhat permanent in nature and not temporary type operations that tend to catch the armed forces off guard if they are unprepared.

¹“Tsunami”. (Online). Available: <http://www.answers.com/topic/how-do-the-2004-southeast-asia-tsunamis-rank-among-natural-disasters>, 2017.

Case Study 1 - Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations in Thailand (Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004)

In Asia, the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami, also known as the Indian Ocean Tsunami along the coasts of most landmasses bordering the Indian Ocean, killed more than 225,000 people in 11 countries, and flooding coastal communities with waves up to 30 meters (100 feet) high. It was one of the deadliest natural disasters in recorded history. Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and Thailand were hardest hit.² What followed was what the United Nations termed the largest ever relief operation it has undertaken. Included in this relief operation, were international military forces, government agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in bringing relief and providing security to the victims of the tsunami.

Aftermath of the Tsunami in Thailand

The Thai government reported 4,812 confirmed deaths, 8,457 injuries, and 4,499 missing after the country was hit by a tsunami caused by the Indian Ocean earthquake on the 26 of December 2004.³ The Thai authorities estimate that at least 8,150 are likely to have died compared to 225,000 to 280,000 that died in Aceh, Indonesia.

The first location where the tsunami was noticed was on the Similan Islands, a famous diving site located about 70 km from Phang Nga town in Pha Nga province or 13 km from central Khao Lak. The sea around these islands when the tsunami struck was reported to have strong currents and divers underwater felt as though they were in a washing machine. Some flooding also occurred inland, though no casualties were reported. The popular tourist resort of Phuket was badly hit. Some 250 people were reported dead, including tourists. The tsunami struck the west coast of Phuket island, flooding and causing damage to almost all the major beaches such as Patong, Karon, Kamala, and Kata beach.

The smaller but increasingly popular resort area of Khao Lak some 80 km north of Phuket was hit far worse with 3,950 confirmed deaths, however, the death toll in Khao Lak may have exceeded 4,500. The severity of the situation in Khao Lak is probably explained by the fact, that unlike the high rise hotels of Phuket, the village of Khao Lak

² “2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami” Wikipedia. (Online). Available: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_Indian_Ocean_earthquake, 2017.

³ Ibid.

only had low built bungalows instead of high rise concrete hotels. There was no warning of the first wave so people had no idea it was coming.

The RTARF get approval to deploy forces into Phuket on the same day (26 December 2004) after the Thai Government declared state of emergency.⁴ All military units in vicinity of Phuket and Khao Lak were immediately tasked to move in, especially the 4th Army Region that is stationed in southern Thailand. By 5 January 2005, the RTARF had delivered enormous amount of medical and relief supplies to Phuket, including Red Cross staffs and personnel from the Centre for Disease Control and the World Health Organisation (WHO). Overall the RTARF had a division (minus) size of personnel on the ground, including medical teams, combat engineer team, liaison teams, and doctors and nurses from Bangkok. The other important contributions by RTARF were the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) ships stationed off the coast of Phuket, and a communication team to provide and enhance communication for all RTARF units on the ground.

Observations and Analysis

The success of the RTARF's mission, was that the RTARF is the most prepared organisation in Thailand⁵ at the time and was able to respond at short notice, said Col Jensit. He also remarked during an interview by this writer that the RTARF was the best agency to carry out the relief operation in Phuket. When queried on the challenges he faced in theatre, he replied that despite being a drawer plan on a HADR mission that was consistently updated over time; the team was still not prepared for what was to confront them in Phuket. As observed by Major General Nared, this was further worsened by inter agency competition, duplication, inappropriate aid, bureaucratic slowness, lack of information and unrealistic expectations.⁶

The devastation of infrastructure and the knowledge of the countless dead and injured was enough to demoralise the strongest of men, but luckily the training and mentality of the RTARF⁷ saw that once

⁴ Colonel Jensit Konsin, Deputy Director of Operations Division J3, RTARF HQ. Interview. 2nd June 2017.

⁵ *Ibid.*,

⁶ Major General Nared Wongsuwan, Director of Operations J3, RTARF HQ. Interview. 2nd June 2017.

⁷ Colonel Yottunut Puluang, Assistant Director of Operations Division J3, RTARF HQ. Interview. 2nd June 2017.

over the initial shock, all soldiers got down to work, adapting the systems to the problems on the ground.

Clearly what an academic and Maj Gen Nared reflected on was similar, that natural disasters naturally inhibit the relief process simply by the devastation to the infrastructure and that the relief effort will need to overcome friction of a different sort in order to achieve the mission.

Satellite imager as well as air reconnaissance via helicopters was used extensively to provide up to date information on the extent of the damage on the ground as well as to aid in the decision of when and where to send troops and equipment.⁸ This was to answer to commanders' needs for more robust intelligence requirements for the operations.

In the literature review, Carment and Rudner's *Peacekeeping Intelligence* highlighted the need for more robust intelligence capabilities in Chapter 6.5 Peacekeeping and Chapter 7 type of operations. The same can be said for HADR operations. The devastation to the infrastructure also necessitated some form of reconnaissance capability to provide commanders on the ground with information on the condition of the area of operations before committing forces and equipment into a particular location.

Another interesting observation on the participation of the RTARF in Phuket was the relationship it had with the Local Authority. The senior officer interviewed remarked, he is getting the cooperation from the Governor during the deployment. Overall, the operation was considered a success for the RTARF, in its ability to pull off the largest HADR operation thus far and at short notice. More significantly was the reflections of the servicemen and women that returned from the mission, with the overwhelming response that they were just glad to be of help.⁹

Case Study 2 - The Malaysian Armed Forces In United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL)

In the literature review, there were numerous resources on the issues of peacekeeping. Besides counter terror operations, a peacekeeping operation is arguably the single operation in MOOTW that

⁸ Colonel Jensit Konsin, Deputy Director of Operations J3, RTARF HQ. Interview. 2nd June 2017.

⁹ Ibid.,

most occupies the attention of the international security community. John Hillen in *Blue Helmets – The Strategy of the United Nations Military Operations* highlights the UN's increasing operational spectrum and the increasing emphasis on second generation peacekeeping, which involves ambitious, multi-function operations in dangerous environments.¹⁰ This draws a parallel with Farrell's argument on wider peacekeeping in Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations in which he terms Chapter 6.5 type operations where the mandate of the peacekeeping force encompasses more mission essential tasks than just monitoring ceasefires.¹¹

The nature of peacekeeping has changed with the changing global security paradigm, with the end of the Cold War as one of the main drivers for this change. Peacekeeping is impacted by numerous changes affecting its conduct. These include external drivers such as the increased awareness of civil society to internal drivers like the impact of new military technologies that can be applied to peacekeeping. In the same way, the MAF is noted to have gradually transformed its peacekeeping capabilities, going so far as to set up a regional peacekeeping training centre in Port Dickson, that is recognised by the UN and subscribed to by numerous other armed forces in the Asia Pacific region.

Lebanon

In the early 1970s, tension along the Israel Lebanon border increased, especially after the relocation of Palestinian armed elements from Jordan to Lebanon. Palestinian commando operations against Israel resulted in Israeli reprisals against Palestinian bases in Lebanon. On 11 March 1978, a commando attack in Israel resulted in many dead and wounded among the Israeli population, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) claimed responsibility for that raid. In response, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon on the night of 14/15 March, and in a few days occupied the entire southern part of the country except for the city of Tyre and its surrounding area.

Subsequently on 19 March, the Security Council adopted resolutions 425 and 426, in which it called upon Israel immediately to cease its military action and withdraw its forces from all Lebanese

¹⁰ J. Hillen. *Blue Helmets – The Strategy of the United Nations Military Operations*. (Virginia: Brassey's 1998). p.25-29.

¹¹ T. Farrell, "Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations", in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, C. S. Gray, E. Cohen, (Eds), (Oxford: University Press, 2007). p.315-318.

territory. It also decided on the immediate establishment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The first UNIFIL troops arrived in the area on 23 March 1978.

New hostilities on the Israeli Lebanese border started on 12 July 2006 when Hezbollah launched several rockets from Lebanese territory across the Blue Line towards Israeli Defence Force (IDF) positions near the coast. In parallel, Hezbollah fighters crossed the Blue Line into Israel, attacked an Israeli patrol and captured two Israeli soldiers, killed three others and wounded two more. The captured soldiers were taken into Lebanon. The IDF retaliated by ground, air and sea attacks. Despite being severely impeded by ongoing violence, UNIFIL peacekeepers were observed to have continued to conduct military observations, assist in humanitarian efforts and provide medical assistance. The intense fighting in July and August of 2006 resulted in five dead and 16 injured from the UN staff.

On 11 August 2006, the Security Council passed Resolution 1701 calling for a full cessation of hostilities in the month long war based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hezbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations in Lebanon. Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long term solution to the conflict, the Security Council created a buffer zone free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL between the United Nations drawn Blue Line in southern Lebanon and the Litani river, and called for both Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and comprehensive solution to the crisis.¹²

Expanded Force - Malaysian Involvement

The first elements of the expanded force were deployed with record breaking speed for any peacekeeping operation of such complexity, with battalions from France, Italy and Spain arriving to the area of operation by 15 September, and joining the contingents already in place from Ghana and India. The MAF contributed an initial number of 360 soldiers as part of its first contingent to UNIFIL in early 2007, although this was resisted by Israel earlier on the grounds that Malaysia had no diplomatic relations with Israel. Then Malaysian Defence Minister, Najib Tun Razak said that the peacekeepers were from 4th

¹² “The History of UNIFIL.” United Nations Website. (Online). Available: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/background.html>, 2017.

Mechanised Brigade and included personnel from all three services. The contingent was also led by a Colonel.¹³

In 2008, the MAF Contingent (MALCON) increased its presence in Lebanon with a further 225 troops replacing the Qatari contingent. Former MAF Joint Force Commander Lt General Datuk Allatif Mohamed Noor¹⁴ said the contingent served on the Israel Lebanon border and added that, it has undergone integration training at Sungala Camp, Port Dickson. Allatif also mentioned, MALCON West was deployed at the western part of the Israel Lebanon border at At Tiri which is about four kilometres from the border compared to MALCON II which was eight kilometres from the border. MALCON II, which also had 20 women personnel, began their UNIFIL duties on 29 Oct 2007 and ended them on 29 July 2008.¹⁵

In 2009, the MAF again increased the involvement in Lebanon by sustaining a UN sponsored peacekeeping force there. The now 850 member Malaysian Battalion (MALBATT) is playing a more prominent role in Lebanon. This includes a bigger area to monitor in Lebanon, expanding from 40 square kilometres to 93 square kilometres. UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander Major General Alberto Asarta Cuevas of Spain, said MALBATT play an important role in the peacekeeping mission at the Israel border because Lebanese locals were not intimidated by their presence.¹⁶

Observations and Analysis

Malaysia has included the phrase consent and cooperation by locals and belligerents into her peacekeeping policy.¹⁷ While this may indicate that the MAF prefers Chapter 6 operations, it clearly does not preclude operations of wider peacekeeping. UNIFIL is clearly a Chapter 6.5 type of peacekeeping operation as evidenced by the continuing hostilities between Israel and Lebanon as well as instances of deliberate targeting of UN personnel. The potential arms smuggling into Lebanon

¹³ Bernama. "200 Soldiers to play role as UNIFIL Administrators". (Online) Available: http://www.bernama.com.my/bernama/v3/news_lite.php?id=220972, 2017.

¹⁴ Lt General (Ret) Datuk Allatif Mohamad Noor, former MAF Joint Force Commander, Interview. 10th April 2017.

¹⁵ Bernama. "MALCON West troops to replace Qatari Forces in Lebanon". (Online) Available: http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v3/news_lite.php?id=350798, 2017.

¹⁶ Global Security Org. (Online) Available: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/malaysia/maf.htm>, 2017.

¹⁷ Malaysian Armed Forces Headquarters Website. (Online) Available: <http://www.maf.mod.gov.my/english/atm/pengaman>, 2017.

via the Syrian border, which is not monitored by UNIFIL is further compounding the strategic challenges of the mission.¹⁸ Another potential sticky issue is the perception of Israel on UNIFIL. Apparently, Israel views UNIFIL as a strategic failure and considers the presence of UNIFIL to have assisted the Hezbollah in rearming and regrouping and even goes so far as to point out that soldiers from hostile Muslim countries such as Malaysia are stationed on Israel's northern border.¹⁹

The MAF's continually increasing presence in Lebanon, while serving to enhance its reputation within the UN, will undoubtedly pose more challenges to the soldiers on the ground as well as the policy makers. At the time of writing, MALCON and subsequently MALBATT had performed credibly in theatre and have so far managed to avoid any fatalities, less two, from any combat actions on the ground.²⁰ As stated earlier by UNIFIL Commander that the MAF peacekeepers on the ground had no problems integrating with the locals, possibly being largely Muslim, this would serve to win the confidence of the locals which in turn contributes to its own force protection.

In an interview with a former Commander of MALBATT 5,²¹ he remarked that the IDF still continued to fire artillery into the UNIFIL area of operations in response to rocket fire from the "Hezbollah". He clarified that in many of these instances, the Hezbollah were noted to have not fired the rockets but rather other unidentified groups were firing similar rockets into Israel from Southern Lebanon, invoking IDF responses. This potentially puts UNIFIL troops in danger although the IDF is deemed to have sufficient intelligence to ensure that no UNIFIL forces are within the target area. Nevertheless, this shows that both sides are still breaching the UNSC's latest resolutions, sometimes on a daily basis. This also reinforces Farrell's arguments on the potential spoilers to UN operations.

A problem confronting many peacekeepers is not the physical preparation for the mission as the MAF, being a regular outfit is arguably well trained and thus prepared for such deployments. Added to

¹⁸ UN Security Council Report. "Middle East Lebanon" (Online) Available: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.3041211/k.536/August_2007BRLebanon.htm, 2017.

¹⁹ I. Harel, "Strategic Failures", (Online) Available: <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/812130.html>, 2007.

²⁰ The MAF casualties was due to a non-combat incident.

²¹ Brig Gen Zainal Abidin Mohd Said, former Commander of MALBATT 5. Interview. 8th April 2017.

this is the presence of the MAF Peacekeeping Centre in Port Dickson.

This is a UN approved training centre and is regarded as a leading edge training centre that has garnered the lessons learnt and experiences from the MAF's long history in peacekeeping missions. According to the Commandant of the Peacekeeping Centre, the main challenges faced by the MAF tended to be just as much psychological as physical. From the social perspective, this makes sense as Asian families tended to be emotional and the absence of the father or husband from the family due to such missions, which tended to last at least six months to a year, affected the families and consequently the soldier himself.

Another issue highlighted by the Peacekeeping Centre was the change in nature of operations, from purely Chapter 6 type of operations to Chapter 6.5. This involved the need to critically review the training syllabus to make sure every soldier was prepared physically and mentally. The Commandant of the Peacekeeping Centre also mentioned that there was consequently a need for thinking soldiers to be able to deal with the more varied range of threats confronting today's peacekeepers, as exemplified in the situation in Lebanon.²²

To this end, the training syllabus in the Peacekeeping Centre has been continually reviewed to cater to this need. The MALCON commander agrees with this, highlighting the need for at least two months in theatre to fully acclimatise the troops to the terrain, weather, and the UN mode of operations before being fully proficient. This was in addition to the three months of force integration training conducted in Malaysia by the Peacekeeping Centre. Of course the advantages of participating in such missions, taking into account the risks involved, was the ability to gain real operational experience as well as developing the ability to interoperate with other armed forces and learn from them.

UNIFIL continues to remain unresolved as far as the conflicting parties are concerned at the time of writing. However, with its attendant risks of an increased role in Lebanon, the MALBATT continues to serve its mission well in Lebanon, cutting its teeth in a real military operation, albeit two that is other than war. Nevertheless, the MAF continues to gain valuable experiences from the deployment while the Malaysian government continues to reinforce its standing in the UN for its contributions towards peace in the Middle East.

²² Colonel Fazal Abdul Rahman, Commandant of the Malaysian Peacekeeping Centre (MPC). Interview. 13th April 2017.

Analysis of MOOTW Factors - Personal Experiences

MALBATT's tour of duty in Lebanon has garnered much praise from UNFIL HQ as well as the UN, which saw the MAF's involvement being expanded, is also considered a successful MOOTW. These two case studies highlight the very different circumstances of MOOTW and the very different skill set required of the soldiers in order to carry out their duties effectively. UN peacekeeping operations arguably are quite close to the soldier's own capabilities although there are many other considerations in a peacekeeping operation that constrains or inhibits the soldiers' natural instincts. Interestingly, Maj Gen Nared also added that they had to deal with the unknown-unknowns in their missions. This is the nature of MOOTW, since it is in itself so wide ranging that preparing for every possible contingency would be unrealistic, what more the need to balance this with the need to maintain proficiency for war.

Writing from personal experience, living a peacekeeping operation is a combination of the need to be alert, be considerate, guard against boredom, and deal with the constant feeling of fear. Here's why. Peacekeeping operations will usually be a long deployment period, between six months to a year. As explained earlier, today's peacekeeping environment is not as benign as in the past. There is a constant threat of violence between the belligerents or even between a belligerent and the peacekeeping force. As the statistics from UNIFIL show, the casualties among the peacekeepers indicate that even in Lebanon, force protection is at risk, what more a mission in the more violent environment of Africa? Hence the need to be alert 24/7 throughout the deployment. The peacekeepers will also need to be very considerate, to the locals, peacekeepers from other contingents, UN civilian staff, NGOs *et cetera*.

Unlike the normal training that a typical soldier undergoes, thrusting him or her into a peacekeeping environment invariably places the stress of this extra need. In any long deployment, especially when there is little or no fighting, boredom usually sets in. The peacekeeper needs to find ways and means to remain alert. As a Commander in a peacekeeping mission, this feeling of fear accompanies all the operational patrols that the peacekeeper undertakes because of the worry of casualties. Truth be told, civilians are less tolerant of casualties from a peacekeeping mission than from war, the obvious reason being the peacekeeping mission is someone else's war.

Any peacekeeping operation does contribute to operational experiences gained by the armed forces and this can be important for the strategists and policy makers as this operational experience serves to keep the military's edge in an environment where the threat of inter state war is decreasing.

As can be seen, the above case studies were also chosen because of this writer's own experiences with MOOTW. As a professional soldier, this writer was not trained in any of the formal courses in MOOTW. It is possibly the same in other armed forces, although as far as peacekeeping operations are concerned, there are quite significant inroads made for the training of peacekeepers, the MAF's Peacekeeping Training Centre. This writer has spent a significant amount of time training for war and yet has also gained practically operational experiences from MOOTW. Again the conflict of MOOTW versus conventional war capabilities is called into question together with the need to balance between the two.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The concluding chapter will thus sum up the issues raised in the preceding chapters and look at the issue of MOOTW from three different perspectives. These are from the perspectives of the state, the armed forces and lastly, academia. The state's perspective is important as it is the state that controls the armed forces and uses it according to its national objectives at any particular point in time. The second perspective, that of the armed forces is also important to consider as military affairs have arguably occupied the high politics and is usually at the centre of a state's priorities. The armed forces also draw significant resources from the state and are able to influence public opinion to a large extent whether waging war as witnessed in the Vietnam War, or conducting MOOTW.

Today, armed forces are increasingly highlighted in the international media, whether conducting operations in Afghanistan and Syria, or providing relief to victims of the Tsunami and hence may also impact international opinions together with their own respective domestic opinions. The last perspective concerns academia, which is currently quite non-existent insofar as MOOTW as a subject is concerned. As this research has highlighted, the conduct of MOOTW has and will continue to increase with potentially far reaching effects on the global security environment. A more holistic approach to the study of MOOTW, would thus be extremely useful to policy makers, military personnel as well as students of security studies.

The State's Perspective

The armed forces can be likened to a guard dog, where its presence was for a purpose that may or may not happen. Arguably, the fiercer the dog, the less likelihood of a burglary and the same applies to the deterrent effect of the armed forces. But what if the likelihood of burglaries are decreased, owing perhaps to an increased police presence in the neighbourhood, the capture of the burglars or the formation of an effective neighbourhood watch?

Many modern armed forces do not exist solely for the purpose of war, as war in today's context remains low in probability.¹ However, war remains the primary responsibility of armed forces as the consequences of failure can be catastrophic for the state. As exemplified in the preceding case studies, the success of the armed forces in MOOTW showcases a few pertinent points.

First, the armed forces is a highly capable organisation, possessing very professional personnel organised around an effective system and supported by a highly effective command and control organisation. This is not an accident. Through centuries of warfare, the military has learned either through firsthand experience or through the experiences of others, and have sought to develop capabilities that it thinks can win wars, wars of the future. In the same vein, a family that believes it needs a guard dog will clearly acquire a breed for that purpose, hence a Doberman or a German Shepherd instead of a Poodle.

Secondly, in today's security paradigm, it is less likely for the armed forces to be committed to defend its state in an inter state war. Similarly, if the family's neighbourhood becomes safer, then the guard dog is unlikely to be needed to actually defend the house against an actual breakin.

Lastly, in such a benign situation, the armed forces will represent a significant untapped resource. Armed forces draw significant amounts of human resource, financial resource and material from the state. In the case of the RTARF and MAF, the defence budget draws some 1 to 2% of gross domestic product every year, which is not an insignificant amount. So if it is not going to be used for war why not use it for something else. The guard dog similarly draws large resources from the household, consuming large amounts of food and requiring many other products like medicines, vitamins, shampoo, leashes and collars *et cetera*, not to mention numerous trips to the vet, whose fees are usually more than that of a paediatrician.

This is the state's perspective, that is, how to continue to justify the maintenance of the armed forces despite the reduced threat to a state's sovereignty. In fact, some states have reduced their armed forces in light of the new security paradigm. The New Zealand Defence Force

¹ The Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) has take part in peacekeeping missions, is also heavily involved in HADR missions, having had a big role in providing assistance to the victims of earthquake in Yunnan Province.

(NZDF) has significantly reduced its strength and even its capability. The New Zealand Air Force for example ceases to maintain fighter aircraft squadrons. The NZDF today arguably focuses more on MOOTW like peacekeeping operations than on training for a war that will probably never reach its shores. Otherwise, the commitment of the armed forces to MOOTW does offer the government a useful alternative rather than to leave it unused. It should be noted here that the armed forces is typically one of the most effective organisations within the state's various instruments and as described in the case studies, the armed forces can be adapted to effectively support the organisation of civilian events and activities albeit with certain risks that has been highlighted.

The Armed Forces' Perspective

Soldiers also complain that humanitarian operations, peacekeeping duties, or conducting border patrols, divert resources and training away from their primary duty, which is to prepare for conventional combat and win the nation's wars.² This issue was raised in Chapter 1, it was further highlighted in the literature review, which revealed issues ranging from the policy making, doctrinal to the operational. In Chapter 3, it was concluded that in order for an armed forces to effectively balance between preparation for war and the conduct of MOOTW, it will need to be configured as a full spectrum force. It was also described in Chapter 3 that even in war, it is very unlikely to start and end as clinically as it did in the World Wars, Vietnam War or even the Falklands War for that matter. As experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a whole range of operations that need to be conducted in the peace-to-war-to-peace continuum. So how can a full spectrum force be described?

The full spectrum force can be likened to the Swiss Army Knife. The main blade of the Swiss Army Knife is the central tool, but there are many other useful peripheral tools. Similarly the central focus of the full spectrum force remains its preparations for war but it is equally adept at conducting other operations at no real harm to its primary focus. What this means is that war remains central to an armed force's aim, while it creates the capacity to conduct operations outside war. Such operations should span the entire peace-to-war-to-peace continuum.


² J. Wirtz. "A New Agenda for Security and Strategy?", in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, C.S. Gray, E. Cohen, Eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007 Second Edition). p.340.

What is also clear is that the Swiss Army knife is more expensive than the pocket knife, owing to the materials used, and the design and manufacturing process required to pack so many functions into a single tool. Designing and building a full spectrum force will also bear substantial costs. The training and equipping of such a force needs to be carefully considered within the realm of operations, from war to other operations. Of course the amount to be spent on equipment can be calibrated according to the required capability of that force. The tougher issue is the one on training. Military planners need to develop or modify the existing doctrine to ensure that the armed forces can transit from peace to war and back to peacetime operations. This is no easy task and is beyond the scope of this research. Suffice to say that already scarce training time needs to be allocated to the maintenance of war capabilities as well as to develop and practice new capabilities, especially within the command and control system in such diverse operations as humanitarian and disaster relief operations, peacekeeping operations and civil support activities. Likened to the development of the Swiss Army Knife, clearly the development costs of such a tool will outweigh that of a simple pocket knife. The same is thus true of a full spectrum force.

The Centre versus the Periphery

In Chapter 3, it was referred that the term MOOTW was weak and lent itself to greater confusion within the realm of strategy, strategists and military force. MOOTW by virtue of its exclusionary, either or definition, of what are operations in war versus operations other than war sought to rebalance the focus of many armed forces involved in MOOTW. But achieving a balance of capabilities as some scholars have suggested may not be the correct answer. With a clear understanding of war and MOOTW, armed forces instead need to develop a range of capabilities as described above by the analogy of the Swiss Army Knife. Balancing suggests an either or approach, whereas this research is suggesting an all encompassing approach to military operations, that is the ability to effectively and proficiently prosecute military operations from peacetime to war and back to peacetime. Hence this research suggests that MOOTW as a concept is a necessary paradigm facing armed forces today although the terminology is flawed, resulting in potential confusion by the military, policy planners and academics alike. Replacing MOOTW with MPO within the spectrum of military operations will look like Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1 Proposed Alternative to MOOTW



A redefinition of MOOTW to MPO thus synchronises the concept with the issue of the full spectrum force. Armed forces need not find a balance but instead seek to build capabilities that allow it to function throughout the peace-to-war-to-peace continuum. This may imply that new units with new capabilities be created to complement the existing capability. MPO as a concept will also fit neatly into contemporary security issues such as the widening of security studies and the emergence of non-traditional security threats and whether armed forces can be used as a response. This will be tackled in the third perspective, that of academia.

The Academic Perspective

So how does MPO fit into the study of international relations? If MPO is the seat of a stool, it needs at least three legs to be stable. As in the three legged stool, a consensus on MPO cannot be reached by the military alone, it needs the perspective of the academics to become stable as a subject of security studies. War has been an integral, some say pivotal part of international relations. It can be argued that the wars of the 17th century, more or less shaped the world that we live in today. MOOTW, by virtue of its exclusionary description of all military operations that are not war can thus be easily dismissed as a significant study in international relations.

However, this is not true. As described in Chapter 2, the new security paradigm is indeed seen to be shifting from inter state wars to wars among peoples and at the same time, there is an increasing focus on humanitarian aid and disaster relief. Consequently, the increasing

deployment of armed forces to take part in such combat and non-combat MPOs can thus be seen as an area of study that requires more focus. It is observed that some components of MPO are already a significant part of contemporary security studies. These include the aforementioned UN peace operations of which is subsumed the Chapter 6 peacekeeping operations and the Chapter 7 peace enforcement operations as described by Farrell in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*.³

Other areas of MPO confronting even the government policy makers are those of humanitarian and disaster relief and even the traditional border security operations undertaken by many armed forces. In such border operations, while not war and thus subsumed under MPO, it can be argued that such operations are key to securing a state's own sovereignty, again a key issue in the study of international relations. In fact, in the aforementioned textbook, Freedman argues that the business of states, once almost completely bound up in security, now involves a range of economic, social and environmental issues. The course and character of conflicts, and the role to be played by armed forces, must be reappraised.⁴ Freedman thus reinforces the need for strategic studies to remain a subject that focuses on the role of armed forces both in peacetime and war.⁵ Taking this argument a step further, it would imply that strategic studies need to look at the armed forces in the peace-to-war-to peace continuum, that is MPO, and remaining cognisant of the impact of the armed forces when conducting such operations.

In Part III of *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, James Wirtz argues that non-traditional security threats to national security exists, but that it was difficult to distinguish how military formations, strategy, or strategists can respond constructively to these issues.⁶ From the case studies in the previous chapter, it was observed that military forces do possess the logistical capabilities, effective command and control system, and a disciplined workforce needed to cope with the aftermath of a natural or humanitarian disaster, but a potential downside is that the introduction of armed forces risks making things worse, for

³ T. Farrell. "Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations," in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, C.S. Gray, E. Cohen. Eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007 Second Edition). pp.313-332.

⁴ L. Freedman. "The Future of Strategic Studies", in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, C.S. Gray, E. Cohen. Eds. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007 Second Edition). p.366.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 368.

⁶ J. Wirtz. *A New Agenda for Security and Strategy*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007 Second Edition). p.340.

example, the UN intervention in Somalia that degenerated into a particularly nasty form of urban combat.

Whichever the case, given the potential issues that armed forces can have on non-traditional security threats, especially when brought on by MPO, then the inclusion of MPO in this new agenda that Wirtz is proposing would seem a worthwhile exercise. Wirtz concludes that there is indeed a new agenda for security and strategy, especially if strategy, strategists, or military force can address a specific problem, can be the cause of the specific problem, or can be forced to change in response to some transnational trend.⁷

In the area of theoretical approaches to security studies, Alan Collins suggests to a deepening and broadening that has taken place in security studies. Security studies invariably must consider military security as it is the home or turf of our traditional understanding of what constitutes security.⁸ Clearly the securitisation and constructivist approach to studying what constitutes military security has its applications in the study of MPO. Securitisation thus can be considered a necessary process for states to employ armed forces in response to the varied non-traditional security threats. The constructivist approach also lends some weight to the issue of military response to non-traditional security threats. Governments and policy makers need to weigh the ends versus the means to justify the use of armed force in response to such threats.


It can be seen from here that components of MPO have been addressed individually in varying degrees of coverage and weight in contemporary security and strategic studies. However, it has not been studied as a holistic concept, whether owing to the subjectively operational nature of the concept or to the confusing nature of the term MOOTW to begin with. The diagram below revisits the conceptual framework in the introductory chapter and shows where a possible theoretical approach can be applied to the subject of MPO. Indeed, both Freedman and Wirtz have reinforced this research's view that MPO should be a subject to be considered within the future of strategic studies. Contemporary texts on security also give leeway to the inclusion of MPO as a concept. It is thus a proposal of this research to recommend that MPO be recognised as an area of study in international relations as well

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 341.

⁸ A. Collins. "Introduction: What is Security Studies", in *Contemporary Security Studies*. A. Collins. Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). p.6.

as contemporary security and strategic studies, of which the subject of MPO should reside comfortably in. It can be concluded here that only with the academic perspective can the three-legged stool stand. See Figure 5.2

Figure 5.2 Theoretical Approach to the Study of MPO



Recommendations

In an age of the unipolarity and US hegemony, global security, while not threatened by nuclear Armageddon, seems to deteriorate with the rise of intra-state wars and other asymmetric wars that even the US seems to have trouble winning. While many scholars have noted the lower risk of inter-state wars, all have also not dismissed the possibility of one occurring in the near future. This is wise. Strategy, strategists and military force have now to contend with a wider and deeper range of security issues confronting the state. Commonly known as non-traditional security threats, the varied responses to such threats more often than not still involves the armed forces together with the other security related agencies like the coast guard, police and even private security companies.

At the same time, in this age of decreasing risk of inter state wars, governments are finding it easier to commit the armed forces for MPO, such as peacekeeping duties and civil support operations. This has resulted in some militaries having problem with the issue of finding a balance between their primary responsibility, the preparation for war, and all the peripheral operations that they now find themselves conducting.

For The State's

* **Governments, strategists and policy makers must exercise wisdom and take an extra precaution on committing their armed forces to MOOTW.** The armed forces is arguably the most powerful state apparatus at the disposal of the government and its commitment can have a severe impact on the state, its citizens and on the state's relations with its neighbours.

* As exemplified in the preceding case studies, the success of the armed forces in MOOTW showcases a few pertinent points. The commitment of the armed forces to **MOOTW offer the government a useful alternative rather than to leave it unused.**

* It should be noted that the armed forces is typically one of the most effective organisations within the state's various instruments and as described in the case studies, **the armed forces can be adapted to effectively support the organisation of civilian events and activities albeit with certain risks that has been highlighted.**

For The Armed Forces'

* No consensus on whether the current model of armed forces can be used to effectively conduct MOOTW. **The key word here is adapt.** A significant amount of adaptation of tactics, equipment and drills needed to be done before it can be optimised for MOOTW, bearing in mind most of the armed forces, has always been equipped and trained for conventional war.

* A redefinition of MOOTW to MPO thus synchronises the concept with the issue of the full spectrum force. **Armed forces need not find a balance but instead seek to build capabilities that allow it to function throughout the peace-to-war-to-peace continuum.** This may imply that new units with new capabilities be created to complement the existing capability.

* **The central focus of the full spectrum force remains its preparations for war** but it is equally adept at conducting other operations at no real harm to its primary focus.

* The training and equipping of such a force needs to be carefully considered within the realm of operations, from war to other operations. Of course **the amount to be spent on equipment can be calibrated according to the required capability of that force.**

* The critical issue is the one on training. **Military planners need to develop or modify the existing doctrine to ensure that the armed forces can transit from peace to war and back to peacetime operations.**

* **The armed forces have the option of the status quo or to restructure towards a full spectrum force.** This would depend on the wisdom of the government and military leadership as well as the resources available.

For Academic

* MPO, like any other subject in security studies has its own specific problems. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, data on MOOTW or MPO is in a pre-processed state where components of it are dealt with individually and not as a whole. **Recognising that MPO has become prominent as a military affair and hence has an impact on military security, security and strategic studies can begin to address this concept more holistically.**

* **MPO can be addressed in contemporary strategic and security studies, both disciplines of international relations.**

* For the reasons of the broadening and deepening of security studies within the current security paradigm of decreasing inter-state wars but increasing wars among peoples, **the study of MPO as a potential response to such non-traditional security threats would serve to bridge the divide between academics and the executives.**

* Clearly there are benefits and hazards to the application of military force and this is where **a consensus between the academics and executives will result in a potential enhancement to international security within the current security paradigm.**

Lastly, this research has also pre-supposed the applicability of MPO in the current fields of security studies, that is, those of the broadening and deepening of security studies and at the same time proposing the more inclusive term of military peripheral operations as a platform to launch further theoretical study into the subject. The consensus between the three perspectives of government, armed forces, and academia can be achieved and it is hoped that this research has provided that first step.

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Biography



- Full Name** : Brigadier General Badrul Hisham Muhammad
- Date of Birth** : 12 December 1960
- Education Background** : Master in Social Science - Defence Studies (National University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur - 2006)
- Military Course** : Malaysian Armed Forces Defence College (Kuala Lumpur - 2006)
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- Military Experience** : Commanding Officer 14th Infantry Battalion (2002)
- Chief of Staff 11th Infantry Brigade (Selangor - 2007)
- Chief of Staff International Monitoring Team 4 (Mindanao, Philippines – 2008)
- Principal Staff Officer to the Chief of Defence Forces (2009)
- Chief of Staff 2nd Infantry Division (Penang - 2010)
- Commander Malaysian Battalion 4 UNIFIL (Lebanon - 2011)
- Commandant Malaysian Peacekeeping Centre (Port Dickson – 2012)
- Commander 11th Infantry Brigade (Selangor - 2015)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Field: Strategy

Title: An Analysis of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Under the Context of Geo-Strategic Situation in the 21st Century

Name: Brig Gen Badrul Hisham Muhammad Course NDC Class 59

Position: Student (Malaysia)

Background and Importance of the Problem

Just as the international community is noted to be increasingly involved in rebuilding war torn states and societies, it is also increasingly involved in providing assistance for disaster relief. Humanitarian disasters like the Indian Ocean tsunami are arguably not new, but what is significant is that such disasters have gained more prominence in light of the increasingly intertwined world that we live in, brought on by the information revolution and globalisation.

As with peace operations, the international community seems to be increasingly aware and consequently increasingly involved in such relief efforts. Even in intra state disasters, a new prominence is being given to the relief efforts by the armed forces, possibly implying an increased acceptance of the state's use of the armed forces in such operations. Examples such as the Tsunami in Phuket, the Bukit Antarabangsa landslide in Kuala Lumpur and Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, all saw a significant armed forces' involvement in providing relief to the civilian population.

What the above describes is a small slice of what is known as military operations other than war or "MOOTW". It describes all operations undertaken by an armed forces that falls outside of war and ranges from peacekeeping operations to operations in support of other civil agencies to humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

The importance of this research is multi-level. The first is of the understanding of the term MOOTW itself. It is argued here that the term MOOTW is not precise enough as MOOTW defines what it *is not*, rather than what it is. That is, the fact that it is defined as military operations that are not war can thus be taken to mean any military operation conducted by the armed forces outside of a formal declaration of war by the state. The second issue stemming from the lack of a proper understanding of MOOTW then is three fold; first, many armed forces run into problems interpreting precisely the organisational and operational requirements of MOOTW.

Furthermore, armed forces can be said to be still primarily structured for conventional war or inter state war meaning that as armed forces conduct more MOOTW, there is a balancing act going on by the armed forces as to how much to focus on MOOTW or war. Next, governments, strategists and policy makers may not fully understand the impact of committing their armed forces to MOOTW. The armed forces is arguably the most powerful state apparatus at the disposal of the government and its commitment can have a severe impact on the state, its citizens and on the state's relations with its neighbours. Lastly, a holistic theoretical treatment of MOOTW by the academics is still non-existent without which there is no basis for a proper consensus of MOOTW between the government, armed forces and academics.

With the need to understand more precisely the concept of MOOTW as well as the organisational and operational requirements of MOOTW, then the following pertinent follow on questions come to mind. Is MOOTW indeed the new reality in the post-Cold War era? What exactly is MOOTW and is there a more suitable term encompassing such operations that can be more appropriately used by the armed forces? Is there any other organisation within the state's apparatus suitable for or even capable of conducting such operations other than the armed forces? If the armed forces were required to conduct MOOTW, then what would be the ideal balance in commitment by the armed forces to organising, equipping and training for war versus MOOTW?

Objectives of Research

* To examine the geo-strategic realities driving the states' use of armed forces for MOOTW.

* To examine the relevant concepts and the specific intervening variables affecting states in confronting the non-traditional security threats.

* To examine the MOOTW concept itself and attempt to define it from the government, armed forces and academics perspectives to see its relevance to state and armed forces.

* To examine the different approaches to MOOTW by various armed forces including the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) and Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF).

Scope of Research

The literature review suggest that MOOTW is in fact all encompassing and consist of many types of operations ranging from peacekeeping to humanitarian operations to even counter terrorist operations. However, this research will seek to limit itself to **Chapter VI and VII types of peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian and disaster relief operations.** This is for the purposes of pre-theoretical processing of the idea of MOOTW.

MOOTW is not a new reality, but newly prominent especially with respect to the end of the Cold War and therefore this research will focus on this period, **the 21st Century**, because the milestone is consistent with the new geo-strategic realities that are facing states and their armed forces today. This research will also be **limiting the case studies to armed forces centering Thailand and Malaysia** but including relevant examples to help support the analyses. This is so as to draw the lessons on challenges and prospects of MOOTW to the

respective armed forces that are relevant to the time and place of this research.

Methodology

This research is adopting a qualitative methodology, with data collection and analysis on MOOTW and the range of operations within the ambit of MOOTW undertaken by relevant armed forces including the RTARF and MAF. This is gathered from secondary data sources from academic writings relevant to the subject. Data sources are supplemented with primary data from interviews with key personnel's of RTARF commanders involved in 2004 Tsunami relief efforts and MAF commanders in UNIFIL.

Results

* Both the principles of war and the principles of MOOTW were examined and analysed and there is sufficiency to conclude that while there are convergences between the two sets of principles, more often than not, there are greater differences, that if not clearly understood and executed, can lead to disastrous results in MOOTW. It is concluded that **MOOTW can be divided into domestic and foreign MOOTW or combat and non-combat types of MOOTW.**

* Insofar as the types of MOOTW is concerned, armed forces have traditionally conducted combat types of MOOTW, like Peacekeeping Operations and Peace Enforcement Operations, but it is **the non-combat types that have gained prominence in recent years**, especially for armed forces in Southeast Asia.

* It is also conclude that there are instances when a **non-military agency can conduct a non-combat MOOTW** instead of the military but in many other instances, these other agencies are required to function in complement to the military.

* Whichever the case, it is also safe to assume that the **armed forces will remain the primary instrument of the state** in conducting MOOTW, especially foreign, combat type MOOTW.

* Armed forces do not exist solely for the purpose of war, as war in today's context remains low in probability. However, **war remains the primary responsibility of armed forces** as the consequences of failure can be catastrophic for the state.

* The **success of the armed forces in MOOTW** showcases a few pertinent points. First, the armed forces is a highly capable organisation, possessing very professional personnel organised around an effective system and supported by a highly effective command and control organisation. Secondly, in today's security paradigm, it is less likely for the armed forces to be committed to defend its state in an inter state war. Lastly, in such a benign situation, the armed forces will represent a significant untapped resource. Its draw significant amounts of human resource, financial resource and material from the state.

Recommendations

For The State's

* **Governments, strategists and policy makers must exercise wisdom and take an extra precaution on committing their armed forces to MOOTW.** The armed forces is arguably the most powerful state apparatus at the disposal of the government and its commitment can have a severe impact on the state, its citizens and on the state's relations with its neighbours.

* As exemplified in the preceding case studies, the success of the armed forces in MOOTW showcases a few pertinent points. The commitment of the armed forces to **MOOTW offer the government a useful alternative rather than to leave it unused.**

* It should be noted that the armed forces is typically one of the most effective organisations within the state's various instruments and as described in the case studies, **the armed forces**

can be adapted to effectively support the organisation of civilian events and activities albeit with certain risks that has been highlighted.

For The Armed Forces'

* No consensus on whether the current model of armed forces can be used to effectively conduct MOOTW. **The key word here is adapt.** A significant amount of adaptation of tactics, equipment and drills needed to be done before it can be optimised for MOOTW, bearing in mind most of the armed forces, has always been equipped and trained for conventional war.

* A redefinition of MOOTW to MPO thus synchronises the concept with the issue of the full spectrum force. **Armed forces need not find a balance but instead seek to build capabilities that allow it to function throughout the peace-to-war-to-peace continuum.** This may imply that new units with new capabilities be created to complement the existing capability.

* **The central focus of the full spectrum force remains its preparations for war** but it is equally adept at conducting other operations at no real harm to its primary focus.

* The training and equipping of such a force needs to be carefully considered within the realm of operations, from war to other operations. Of course **the amount to be spent on equipment can be calibrated according to the required capability of that force.**

* The critical issue is the one on training. **Military planners need to develop or modify the existing doctrine to ensure that the armed forces can transit from peace to war and back to peacetime operations.**

* **The armed forces have the option of the status quo or to restructure towards a full spectrum force.** This would depend on the wisdom of the government and military leadership as well as the resources available.

For Academic

* MPO, like any other subject in security studies has its own specific problems. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, data on MOOTW or MPO is in a pre-processed state where components of it are dealt with individually and not as a whole. **Recognising that MPO has become prominent as a military affair and hence has an impact on military security, security and strategic studies can begin to address this concept more holistically.**

* **MPO can be addressed in contemporary strategic and security studies, both disciplines of international relations.**

* For the reasons of the broadening and deepening of security studies within the current security paradigm of decreasing inter-state wars but increasing wars among peoples, **the study of MPO as a potential response to such non-traditional security threats would serve to bridge the divide between academics and the executives.**

* Clearly there are benefits and hazards to the application of military force and this is where **a consensus between the academics and executives will result in a potential enhancement to international security within the current security paradigm.**