



**TRACK II NETWORK OF ASEAN DEFENCE
AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS (NADI)**

Workshop on

**12th Annual Meeting on “ASEAN Defence Security
Foresighting in the Next 2 Decades”
and Retreat**

**During 25th Feb 3rd Mar 2019
at Holiday Inn Chiangmai Hotel, Chiangmai, Thailand**



National Library of Thailand Cataloging in Publication Data

Academic Paper: Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI)
12th Annual Meeting on “ASEAN defence security foresighting in the next
2 decades” and Retreat

at Holiday Inn Chiangmai Hotel, Chiang Mai, Thailand

Published by: Regional Studies Division, Strategic Studies Center (SSC)
National Defence Studies Institute (NDSI), RTARFHQ

Years : 2019, 136 Pages.

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E-mail: rsd.ssc2559@gmail.com, Tel./Fax: +66 2275 5716,
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FOREWORD

The current global security situation become more complex and challenges such as the problems of terrorism, poverty, human migration, environment and climate change, disaster, or even trade war which effecting many regions including ASEAN.

ASEAN have to faces many issues of security challenges such as International politics, domestic politics, trend of economic depression, extremist groups, security situations on the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea.

Foresighting will helps ASEAN to realize what is likely to happen in the future and to take appropriate action. On the event that delegates from the Track II NADI have a chance to discuss and exchange idea and information about “ASEAN defence security foresighting in the next 2 decades” in this meeting will be very useful which can bring the results of discussion to the related parties in order to acknowledge and bring into practice.

The Strategic Studies Center (SSC), National Defence Studies Institute (NDSI), realized the importance of such aforementioned issues, therefore, the SSC hold an academic meeting, under the Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI), 12th Annual Meeting on “ASEAN defence security foresighting in the next 2 decades” and Retreat, During 25th Feb - 3rd Mar 2019, at Holiday Inn Chiangmai Hotel, Chiang Mai, Thailand. The results are then passed to ASEAN Defence Senior’s Official Meeting (ADSOM), consequently, submitting to the ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting (ADMM) for considerations.

Strategic Studies Center
March 30th, 2019



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Keynote Speaker :
Foresight Framework





Foresight Framework

*General Jerdwut Kraprayoon
Special Advisor
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Kingdom of Thailand*

Difference between forecasting and foresighting. Forecasting means predicting the future, which can move the mindset to a specific direction and dominate the analysis, while foresighting studies trends in each interval, how they occur, what causes the shift, and how it will affect ASEAN in the future. Foresighting looks for future threats and looks at ASEAN weaknesses so that it is better prepared. To maintain initiative, ASEAN needs mental agility and must think ahead.

There are many tools for future analysis. If AMS think together, they will have a common understanding about the process to conduct future analysis. Thailand ensures comprehensive security by applying STEEPM (Social, Technological, Environmental, Economic, Politic and Military) framework. Incorporating security into national strategy, the country focuses on foresighting and scenario analysis to predict future threats. As a result, the Ministry of Defence works with other ministries depending on what scenario it foresees and Thailand restructures the management system to handle the threats. ASEAN should consider a common strategic foresighting outlook. In the future, it will be beneficial if NADI can consider some common framework.

There are many ways to implement foresighting framework and scenario planning depending on what the objectives are. In the dynamic world, ASEAN should think about how the change in one factor will affect others. It must train analysts and identify a list of experts in high-priority areas. Moreover, it should do detailed or specific scenarios in relevant areas such as South China Sea and cyber security issue because these scenarios help make sense of complexity. The principles of scenario planning comprise using outside-in thinking, embracing diverse perspective, and taking the long view. Currently, ASEAN should enhance its capacity to do foresighting, intelligence and data analysis so that they can better adapt to uncertainties.

The meeting exchanged views on the possibilities for foresighting in ASEAN. The meeting noted that Thailand had enacted relevant laws for its own national strategy and long-term policies. The meeting further noted that each AMS has different ways of doing its own analysis and developing the relevant strategies for the future. Going forward, each AMS would need to design its own policies to serve its own needs.



For ASEAN as a whole, the need to do foresighting as a group requires more discussion and understanding on how the different national considerations can be converged. In this respect, the experiences of the Asian Productivity Organization (APO) would be instructive. APO has facilitated workshops to develop foresighting capability.

If there is sufficient support from the NADI discussions, a Track II workshop can be planned to bring more understanding on the value of foresighting and to encourage further study by the individual AMS before making appropriate recommendations to ADMM.



Foresight Framework

*Dr. Taworn Thunjai
Director of Fishing Control
and Surveillance Division
Agriculture and Cooperatives
Kingdom of Thailand*

Thailand's achievement in combating the Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU Fishing). Before 2015, Thailand had several gaps. For resources and fleet management, Thailand closed the gap of legal framework by enforcing the Royal Ordinance on Fisheries B.E. 2558 (2015) and Royal Ordinance on Thai Vessels B.E. 2561 (2018). The country controls fishing licensing by controlling fishing effort as well as size and number of fishing gears. It also controls fleet size by controlling vessel registrations and verifying vessel registrations. It solved the problem of national and international collaboration through joint workflow with other relevant partners and organizations (ASEAN Maritime Transport Working Group Meeting 36 or MTWG). This enhanced the collaboration between Marine Department (MD) and Department of Fishery (DOF). Furthermore, Thailand enhanced the effectiveness of operational systems by deploying electronic system and introducing an Electronic Monitoring (EM) system for locked vessels. To further improve the situation, Thailand formulated several future plans.

In terms of Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS), Thailand issued the Royal Ordinance on Fisheries B.E. 2558 (2015) to provide a comprehensive legal framework. It also set up the Command Center for Combatting Illegal Fishing (CCCIF) as a core MCS agency. To enhance MCS capability, the government invested 3.1 million USD in increasing manpower, training and operational assessment. Additionally, Thailand put MCS system and technology in place and introduced tool kits and technology to surveillance. For traceability issue, the country established traceability along the whole supply chain by enforcing the Royal Ordinance on Fisheries from both importation and Thai-flagged vessels to ensure comprehensive laws and regulations. It also developed and implemented various electronic systems. To control Thai flagged vessels fishing in waters of third countries, a comprehensive control system and various electronic systems were implemented along the whole supply chain.

From Thailand's experience, urged all AMS to cooperate in fostering sustainable fishing within the ASEAN framework and explore the possibility of establishing an ASEAN IUU Task Force as a part of an IUU-combat mechanism in the region.



Combatting IUU fishing is the responsibility of each AMS. For Thailand, since the previous legislation is outdated, Thailand had promulgated new laws to ensure effective MCS, including the reduction of fishing vessels to prevent over fishing and ensure the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). This year, marine resources is increasing in Gulf of Thailand and Andaman sea. This also impacts the whole region because fish migrate across ocean. If having law on this issue, all AMS can collaborate to give sustainable marine fishing in the region. Thailand can control Thai-flagged vessels that fish in other countries. Currently, only 12 vessels can do so but they must be equipped with electronic system that shows their locations.

The meeting noted the holistic efforts taken since 2015 by Thailand in combatting IUU fishing and recognizes its contribution to ensure sustainable marine fishing in the region.

**ASEAN defence security foresighting
in the next 2 decades**





Brunei Darussalam

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
Overview

In the past decade, ASEAN member states has faced tremendous challenges on its defence and security front. The inception of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) in 2006 and ADMM Plus in 2010 has improved and strengthened regional cooperation on a wide range of defence and security matters among ASEAN member states and its dialogue partners. The formation of Expert Working Groups (EWG) on Maritime Security, Counter-Terrorism, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, Peacekeeping Operations, Military Medicine, Cybersecurity and Humanitarian Mine Assistance is a testament of the regions' and plus members commitment to address the challenges in numerous ways varying from dialogues, confidence-building efforts to concrete practical activities. Despite all these, the rapidly changing strategic and defence security environment continues to test the effectiveness of the concerted efforts and cooperation by ASEAN member states and dialogue partners, in addressing the complex and dynamic security challenges, in the best way they can. This paper highlights three security issues that would dominate ASEAN defence and security environment and impact defence cooperation in the next two decades which are emerging technology, major power interplay in the South China Sea, region-based terrorism and climate change.

Foresighting in the next two decades

Emerging Technology

The 4IR technology in particular cuts cross many issues from economic, political, security and environment dimensions. The current new technology age is moving at a fast pace especially with the maturity of the third industrial revolution and advent on the fourth industrial revolution or Industry 4.0. The fourth industrial revolution is transforming how everyone operates especially with the emergence of Internet of Things (IoT), Big Data, Cloud Computing and Artificial Intelligence for example. Though the benefits brought by





technology is endless, it also poses a wide range of potential risks to nations and regional security. The IoT for example, will allow more users and devices to be connected; however, the more devices connect to the Internet, the greater physical damage attackers can bring on to the systems and nation.

In ASEAN itself, member states are going through a rapid technological development needed to support its high internet penetration and growing demand for technological applications such as AI, IoT and Nanotechnologies. As such, the digitalisation of the region's economy is inevitable.

On the positive note, technological advancement has transform how the economy works as business transactions (online retailing, purchase and banking) are easier and more efficient. The continuous progress to digitalise the economy present a big opportunity for ASEAN to boost its economy, to be economically integrated and in both competition and cooperation with one another. However, the variation in technological maturity among each of ASEAN member states might be a hurdle for them to further cooperate in addressing technology-security related issues.

The region's high internet penetration and progressive technological advancement is also not match with an equal technological capability needed to cope with the emerging technologies and security issues that comes with it. ASEAN member states for example, have only spent around \$1.9 billion collectively (with the exception of Singapore) making the member states' infrastructure vulnerable to be manipulated as platforms for cybercrimes and attacks.

The advent of the fourth industrial revolution and the emergence of the IoT, Big Data, Cloud Computing and Artificial Intelligence can be expected to widen the cyber threats in the next two decades. Coupled with the imminent operationalisation and commercialisation of 5G networks, it would create a next-generation threat landscape to the region's security. Most countries are currently still struggling to address the threats posed by today's technologies. Recent data breaches and spread of fake news through social media to influence political process/outcomes in a country has effected already state relations and heightened risks to international security. The prospects of ever more complex technological changes to regulate and control would be more daunting.

Major power interplay in the South China Sea

South China Sea (SCS) remains to be one of the region's continuous flashpoint and an all-time priority that still needs tremendous regional cooperation. There have been significant developments over recent years with the Permanent Court of Arbitration Tribunal judgement



in 2016, China's continuous land reclamation works and 'militarisation' on its claimed maritime features, and improved China-Philippines bilateral relations to name a few.

While ASEAN welcome the interests of dialogue partners and friends to work together in many areas including maritime security issues, ASEAN at times are placed in a predicament with the growing interests of countries outside the region keen on maintaining and showing presence in the South China Sea. The interests of these powers in the SCS is reflected with the undertaking of more military and security cooperation such as exercises, intelligence sharing, and capability building efforts. The increasing presence foreign defence forces through exercising its freedom of navigation from the US and UK as well as underlying support of Australia, France, Japan and India in FoNOPS adds on to the existing complexities as ASEAN deals with China related to the SCS. The upmost concern of ASEAN member states are heightened tensions and escalation of military incidences due to misinformation or miscalculation that could lead to unwanted accidents in the air and at sea.

Looking ahead, the strategic challenge would persist as major powers especially the US and China as both continue to aggressively compete and exert influence in the region. ASEAN would need to continue to manage tensions and at the same time ensure its processes within its cooperation framework with China runs smoothly. In moving forward, as ASEAN engages and address issues of mutual interest with the multiple foreign players through capacity building exercises and sharing of experiences and knowledge, this must be in accordance with the needs of ASEAN.

Terrorism

Since ISIS declared a caliphate back in 2014, more than 40,000 foreigners from about 110 nations including hundreds from ASEAN member states have joined Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). With the loss of ISIS caliphate territories in the Middle East in 2017 saw remaining ISIS militants were left on their own. Many have decided to fly back home including several hundred radicals from Southeast Asia. While countries like the US and UK have resorted to blocking returnees, ASEAN member states have strengthened national terrorism laws, and increase regional cooperation to counter-terrorism.

Terrorism presents a real threat to the peace and stability of the region and would likely remain a threat in the long term. In recent years, ASEAN experienced an increasing terrorist attacks including ISIS failed attempt to establish a mini state in Poso in 2015 and ISIS siege of Marawi in 2017. Despite ISIS losing its battle in the Middle East, their extremist narratives remain to be a huge problem, regionally and globally. In this regard, ASEAN member states is vulnerable to be exploited and influenced by extremist and radical



ideology. The instances of self-radicalisation through social media also remains a high threat in the region as there is still sympathisers who could act on behalf of radicalised individuals within the region. It is important to continue to counter negative narratives that showcase ASEAN member states and ASEAN as a whole that values cohesiveness and harmony based on a community that is tolerant and respectful of all cultures, languages and religions.

Climate Change

Countries in the region are also increasingly vulnerable to climate change and its impacts. While the UN predicted increases incidences of flooding through the year 2040 in the region; the Global Climate Risk Index reflected that four of the world’s ten countries most affected by climate change are located in the Southeast Asia such as Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. A study conducted by the Asian Development Bank further projected a 4.8 °C rise in annual temperature and a 70 cm rise in sea level by 2100 in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. This makes it important for ASEAN member states to mitigate against challenges of climate change as the region has large coastal communities.

The region is also one of the most disaster-prone areas globally; and the changing and uncertain weather extremes associated with global warming and climate change will likely increase climatic-related disasters in the region. Looking back at disasters in the past 15 years in the region, Southeast Asia has had numerous disastrous incidents including the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami affected 14 countries including Indonesia and Thailand. This was the third largest and strongest disaster recorded where more than 230,000 people killed, more than 600,000 people affected, and 141,000 houses destroyed. In 2008, cyclone Nargis affected numerous countries including Myanmar killing a total of 140,000 people and affected 3.4 million people region wide. The devastation of typhoon Haiyan in 2013 that swept through Northern Southeast Asia caused high death tolls (more than 6,000 people lost their lives) and damages on houses and constructions.



Last year, ASEAN experience numerous intense disasters including the Typhoon Mangkut in the Philippines in September 2018 affecting 2,634, 617 people; earthquake and tsunami in Palu Indonesia in October 2018 affecting 82,775 people and as recent as January



2019, Indonesia experienced landslide and flooding in Indonesia that affected 6,956 people. The growing intensity of disasters in the region is a reminder for ASEAN on the immediate action needed to address the impact of climate change. ASEAN member states had done and achieve a lot under its numerous initiatives driven by AHA Centre. ASEAN member states also need to continuously strengthen their community resilience, enhance knowledge on best practices in terms of skills and knowledge needed during disasters, sharing of technical know-how knowledge, and including skills in climate prediction and enhancing regional warning systems.

In supporting ASEAN's readiness and preparedness in HADR, the defence sector also need to continuously be prepared and improve the region's defence coordination and cooperation through bilateral or multinational HADR exercises and cooperation, and to upgrade their capabilities and assets adaptable to climate change.

Conclusion

The next two decades would unravel opportunities for cooperation in defence and security against a precarious security environment that is unpredictable and increased uncertainty. Policy makers in ASEAN needs to take on a coordinated and collaborative approach with relevant stakeholders. It could no longer hold on to traditional top down approach but requires involvement from all levels at the public, private and community level as well as across all sectors with ASEAN in dealing with the security challenges.

Summary

With the advent of the fourth industrial revolution coupled with the imminent operationalisation and commercialisation of 5G networks, this would create a next-generation threat landscape to the region's security. The region also face continuous major power interplay in the maritime domain in which needs ASEAN to continue manage tensions and engage with various players through capacity building exercises and sharing of experiences and knowledge. She added that terrorism remains a threat to ASEAN and despite the fall of ISIS, the region remains vulnerable to be exploited and influenced by extremist and radical ideology. The instances of self-radicalisation through social media makes it important for ASEAN to counter the negative narratives. Over the years, ASEAN member states face increased number of disasters but also in its intensity that saw immense losses and needs continuous efforts to strengthen community resilience.

There would be greater opportunities for cooperation in defence and security in the next two decades. In light of the complexity of the issues, this requires policy makers to take a coordinated and collaborative approach with relevant stakeholders including the public, private and community level as well as across all sectors within ASEAN.



Kingdom of Cambodia

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A regional grouping of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been a strength for stability and cooperation in Southeast Asia and Asia for the past fifty years. As the former ASEAN's Secretary-General, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, has mentioned, "ASEAN has emerged as the fulcrum of geopolitical stability in Asia."

Current global situation contains many complex and wide-ranging sets of issues. The world, as well as the Asia Pacific region are experiencing the shift of power and economic influences due to rising of mid and major powers, coupling with the emerging challenge of world's new order of multi-polarity and new emerging challenging of non-traditional characters.

At the same time, major powers continue to rival in competitions over resources, technological developments continue to advance; and the security challenges have expanded into additional spheres from land into the maritime and cyber spaces.

While the number of challenges maybe vast, the security challenges facing ASEAN today gives clues into what the future of security challenges facing ASEAN defence security environments in the coming two decades. Key current security challenges and issues that will continue to impact into the future of the next 20 years may include:

- 1) The changing of global order and strategic competitions in the Asia Pacific region
- 2) Non-Traditional Security Threats
- 3) Maritime Security

Although the future and exact pace of the global shift in economic power is uncertain, it will require a clear understanding of the current issues and challenges and in-depth study of scenarios analysis to foresight in the next two decades on what the ASEAN security dynamics in the next two decades would be.



1. The shifting of global order and strategic competitions in the Asia Pacific region:

Today's current issues includes:

- 1) Trade war between the United States and China
- 2) The Belt and Road Initiative
- 3) The Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Recent trend shows that the redistribution of economic and military power continues to decline in the west and move towards Asia. There is also a shift in defence spending within Asia-Pacific as it has shown notable growth within military expenditures in recent years. Some analysts signal that there is a growing arms race in East Asia, including Southeast Asia.

Although economic power alone does not define the global power, economic strength is considered to be the foundation of military power. The Asia-Pacific economies drives 60% of the total global increase in defence acquisition, research and development as well as 30% of the total global defence acquisition budget through 2020.

Implication

ASEAN will continue to play a key role in forging confidence building measures in the region as well as preventive diplomacy. Their significant influences through different ministerial platforms and dialogues to practical expert groups, continues to build constructive dialogues and enhance trust and confidence building mechanisms to continue maintaining and sustaining stabilities and properties in the region.

The world will become more multipolar. Therefore, ASEAN's influence will be pull by various powers and it will be challenging for each ASEAN member States to continue balancing the power of interests.

As young markets with large potentials for trade, economic and resources, it is recommended that ASEAN looks to create a stronger collective value that will strengthen itself as a polarize power in the region on its own. ASEAN, as an organization, needs to strengthen specific aims and motivation, exclusive and unaffected by any country's interests, in order for ASEAN to remain strong and beneficial.



2. The Non-Traditional Security Threats:

Transnational Crime

The promotion of freer movements of people, goods and capital within Southeast Asia has led to an increase in trade and economic growth in recent years. This is reflected in the significant increase in GDP across the region. This, however, also impacts and affects transnational crime groups who are using this freer movement to their advantage. These groups are using this regional integration to further expand operations in efforts for smuggling drugs, weapons, people, wildlife and more.

It is clear that transnational organised crime groups conducts successful trades through exploitation of weaknesses within state regulations as well as gaps within laws and regional corporations. Specific crimes may also impact issues outside of national security. For example, high illicit exportation of wood-based materials is currently threatening national forests. These illicit activities can lead to deforestation, loss of biodiversity, flooding and soil erosions, resulting in natural disasters.

Regional security leading into the next few decades can not only expect further strengthening of regional policies and law enforcements, but we can also expect more management for climate issues as a result of these illicit activities.

Technology

As technology progresses, it has potentials and will continue to affect social, cultural and economic aspects of the globe at both individuals and state levels. New and developing technologies can potentially impact productivity, living standards, health and resources. Dependent on its use, however, technology can also offer disruptions within our society on a larger scale, impacting stability within the government.

As certain technologies become easier to access, disruptive behaviours can be expected from smaller states and non-state actors as they can acquire and develop more high-tech technologies overtime. The cost of obtaining high-end technologies are becoming less expensive each day. With decrease in cost comes and increase in development of technological advancement, such as drones and robotics, as innovative weapons.

Today's development in wireless communications in stronger than ever before. Militaries are now finding it favourable to push forward with new technology while abandoning older ones due to its high benefits within communication and employment of weapon systems. However, this may also negatively impact states, as the military can becoming overly reliant with their dependencies on technology for operational effectiveness.



We cannot always turn to technology as a solution to all problems. This can lead to neglecting the vulnerabilities of technology itself. Regardless of the availability of technology and its capabilities, we must acknowledge its potential issues and have back up plans for unforeseen failure relevant to these issues.

3. Maritime Security:

Southeast Asian waters has always had strategic importance since ancient times. It is used by both merchants and naval ships as transits in order to access to both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.

Cambodia's maritime domain contains high economic potentials including fisheries, mineral resources and more. Our sea is used for trading purposes, communications, as well as tourist destinations. Cambodia's sea is faced with multiple security threats such as maritime disasters, environmental pollution and transnational crime: illegal fishing, human and drug trafficking, and sea robberies. In order to protect and prevent the harms, maritime security sector has been prioritised.

Conclusion:

ASEAN in the first two decades of its existence focused on a limited range of issues, its mandate has expanded rapidly and may well continue to do so for the next two decades. Its functions now cover a range of new transnational or non-traditional security issues, such as climate change, disaster management, counter-terrorism, pandemics, food security, drug trafficking, people smuggling, and many other issue areas. ASEAN has also extended its institutional model within the wider Asia Pacific and East Asia regions by anchoring new regional institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three (APT), and the East Asian Summit (EAS).

Challenges will require the maintenance of the ASEAN unity and cohesion in the face of the rising challenges, the ability to resolve regional disputes, complying with the provisions and instruments of the ASEAN Charter and the Political-Security Community Blueprint, will set prospects of ASEAN defence and security environment for the next decades.



Republic of Indonesia

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Background

The future of ASEAN defense and security is one of the important points in the Vision of the Political-Security Society which has been formulated to anticipate the development of ASEAN until 2025. In this vision it is stated that outward looking approaches are agreed as one way to safeguard regional peace and stability. The strategic environment in the Southeast Asian region is much influenced by external forces because of its location which is geographically located in the middle of the territory of major countries (great powers). This makes ASEAN a crucial position in determining attitudes and policies towards major countries that increasingly want closer relations with ASEAN Member States. In this case, ASEAN's impartial position requires a more relevant, contemporary and responsive explanation to adjust the times, and to be able to imagine the development of ASEAN's position, especially in terms of defense and security in the next two decades (forward looking).

To be able to see the challenges ahead, we need to pay attention to development trends in recent times to date. First, the development of technology on all fronts, currently continues to affect the industrial and economic world. Industry 4.0 which is full of computerization in the process of producing goods and services, makes the pattern of the economy more reliant on machines that are increasingly able to replace human positions. Artificial intelligence technology (Artificial Intelligence, AI) makes people increasingly unnecessary in menial jobs such as drivers, administrative managers, printmen, mail delivery, receptionists, travel agents, and so on. This condition also needs to be considered by ASEAN, because according to the International Labor Organization (ILO), it is estimated that around 137 million workers or 56% of the total workers will be at greater risk of losing their jobs due to the use of robots.

In the aspects of defense and security, the development of industrial technology 4.0 manifests itself in the rapid development of communication, command and control systems centered on information technology. These developments can be seen in the C4ISTAR conception (Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Information / Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting Acquisition and Reconnaissance), which means that the use of



computers and information technology has become full of command, control, intelligence and supervision. This indicates that war has become increasingly modern which is increasingly centered on the network (Network Centric Warfare). Even warfare has entered the cyber realm, namely the network used by the general public to access information from around the world via the internet. These attacks in cyber warfare can instantly cripple infrastructure in a country.

Second, the security dilemma that occurs in the South China Sea (LCS). Every country certainly wants to maximize its military strength to prevent threats from both state and non-state sources, but the aggressiveness of military forces often poses a threat to other countries. This dilemma occurs in China's claims to the South China Sea region. The emergence of China as a new superpower with increasing military power raises a security dilemma because it is accompanied by claims against parts of Southeast Asia. Some bases on islands made in China are considered to violate UNCLOS marine law. Claims of ownership and militarization in the LCS region made some countries express their disapproval and called for freedom of navigation. The United States (US) calls for the region to become a free sailing area for anyone because it is an international waters according to UNCLOS marine law. The clash between the two superpowers even led to an open conflict, where the Chinese fleet of Chinese Warships and the United States Warship almost collided around the Spratly and Paracel Islands.

On the other hand, the US, which does not want to remain silent, sees China's aggressiveness in the LCS, under the leadership of Donald Trump, which passed the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act. In the law, the US plans to strengthen the commitment of their security alliance with its allies and will allocate US \$ 1.5 billion annually to increase influence in Asia in the next 5 years. The passing of the law is a series of US efforts to offset China's influence in Asia, especially in Southeast Asia. Previously the US together with India, Australia and Japan had formed a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD / Quad). QSD was formed on the initiative of Japan in 2007, and is a security alliance that has held several military exercises in Southeast Asia. From this alliance, the Indo-Pacific concept was born as part of geostrategy to stem China's influence in Asia. This concept presents India as a country that is also growing as a large country whose economy and military power is increasing. Unlike China, India in this regard was promoted as a more pacifist country and prioritized dialogue and freedom of navigation.



Problem

There are many ASEAN instruments and frameworks, but at the same time, there are doubts and reluctance by ASEAN member countries themselves to truly use the ASEAN Centrality instrument. The problem that is supposed to be discussed in this paper is how does ASEAN respond to the situation of the strategic environment with its centrality and neutrality capital, while reviewing the future?

Discussion

As an association of countries in Southeast Asia, ASEAN has an important meaning in determining the size of the influence of the increasingly complex strategic environment. ASEAN has the principle of centrality and neutrality which mandates not to side with any country. However, ASEAN Member Countries will face the competition of the two major countries in a complex manner, because the two countries both offer favorable economic cooperation when the two countries are the main actors driving the world economy. ASEAN is a buffer for its member countries, so they can focus on common real problems and problems.

On the other hand, the real security threat at this time needs to be considered is how ASEAN encourages more and more cooperation in counter-terrorism and disaster management. In the midst of competition for the big countries, the challenge of ASEAN is how to realize cooperation in overcoming the real threat. Since 2016, ISIS terrorist groups have recruited citizens of Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia to fight in Iraq and Syria, or to carry out attacks in their respective countries. The defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq made it necessary to spread its operations in other regions, including in Southeast Asia. In the case of natural disasters, Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia and the Philippines, is an area that is traversed by a ring of fire, making it prone to earthquakes and tsunamis. Other countries are also prone to natural disasters such as floods, whirlwinds, floods and forest fires. Both of these threats have a very high urgency to be addressed together.

The cooperation that has been built by ASEAN to overcome this threat has been carried out. ASEAN cooperation that has been formed to tackle terrorism is the establishment of the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism (ACCT) in 2007, followed by the action plan of the ASEAN Comprehensive Plan on Action on Counter Terrorism in 2009. The ASEAN Leaders viewed terrorism as a profound threat to international peace and security and “a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity of ASEAN and the realization of ASEAN Vision 2020”. They expressed commitment to combat terrorism in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, international laws and relevant UN



resolutions. They also stated that “cooperative efforts in this regard should consider joint practical counter-terrorism measures in line with specific circumstances in the region and in each member country”.

Despite the widespread fear of terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia terrorism has proven to be an exaggerated risk for ASEAN. Modern terrorism is truly a transnational threat, given the ability of radical groups to plan and execute attacks in several countries at the same time, operate across national boundaries, and secure funds and other forms of support sources worldwide. Part of the credit for this should be given to increasing vigilance and preventive actions by individual ASEAN governments. Also important were various forms of bilateral and multilateral both intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism cooperation. Moreover, as noted, as with other transnational threats, especially pandemics, natural disasters and drug trafficking, the threats of terrorism and piracy have proven to be a catalyst for regional cooperation.

Cooperation in natural disaster management was initiated in 2005 with the establishment of ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). This initiative was then followed by the establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Center) in 2011, with its strategic vision of “One ASEAN, One Response”. Disaster resiliency is an important core component of sustainability for ASEAN because ASEAN and East Asia experienced various crises and disasters during the past two decades, and those shocks were utilized to improve resiliency in the region. Not to mention, strengthening regional cooperation in the fields of financial, trade, energy security, food security, and disaster management will pave the way for smooth development in the region. The region has experienced diverse forms of disasters, including floods, typhoons, earthquakes, epidemics, and the financial crises of the late ‘90s, which necessitates better regional organization for quick action. This is the very reason why there is a need for more effective insurance mechanisms against various kinds of disasters. When we consider the actual form of such insurance mechanisms, there are numerous issues involved, such as whether it would be an institutionalized system such as a disaster fund, or something more flexible such as a coordination forum. It is worth pursuing reforms that undertake comprehensive preparations against the risks of a variety of disasters in Asia.

On the regional cooperation, the existing schemes shall be improved to cover better system of financing and transfer. In developing countries, cost of preparation response post disaster is typically following a bell-shaped graph and also reflects cycle-related fiscal needs. Government and individuals spend small portion on preparation efforts therefore when the disaster occurs they are burdened by large financial consequence, some obligations usually filled by donors out of humanitarian considerations, and at later stage, reconstruction may



face delayed and under budgeted program. With appropriate design, the bell-shaped financing burden can be changed into upside down curve –even though not completely. The situation can be changed if there is sufficient fiscal allocation for preparation in pre-disaster, thus in the occurrence of disaster claims will close large part of fiscal needs, and can be used for the later stage as well

In essence, to stay relevant and perform effectively, ASEAN must commit centrality: the principle of ASEAN centrality implies that ASEAN must keep its seat at the “driver’s table” of the most important existing Asian regional institutions, especially the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asian Summit (EAS), and that it should not allow itself to be sidelined or marginalized by the initiatives of others, especially the great powers, to develop new or competing regional bodies covering Asia as a whole. The principle of ASEAN centrality is not an accident of history, but rooted in past historical political conditions favoring Asia’s weaker states in developing regional cooperation. ASEAN centrality is not a result of the generosity of the big powers, but a consequence of two other long-term factors.

Southeast Asia, in the last 50 years has been able to create an ecosystem of peace, not only peace enjoyed by ten ASEAN member countries, but also enjoyed by almost half of the world’s population living in the region around Southeast Asia. ASEAN is able to provide a platform through various ASEAN-led Mechanism, such as the ARF and the EAS, to help large powers meet and dialogue. This is where the centrality of ASEAN serves to bring together all the major powers, such as the US, Russia, China, India, South Korea, Japan and Australia at the same time.

ASEAN has become an organization that has a transformative impact, especially in the context of relations between member countries, relations between ASEAN countries and other broader regions, and also in building people-centered ways. ASEAN has succeeded in bringing economic growth and revival among its member countries, also linking the ASEAN economy with economic forces outside the region. In addition, ASEAN has also succeeded in making Southeast Asia an area that has a ‘voice’ at the global level.

Conclusion

The ASEAN-led mechanism is a form of crystallization from the principle of ASEAN centrality, which can therefore be applied in the face of a strategic environment full of contestation. The ASEAN-led mechanism must be seen as a mechanism that puts forward the resolution of the main problems of ASEAN as a commonwealth organization that houses Southeast Asian countries. The issue of terrorism, natural disasters, climate change, and other non-traditional issues must be a priority. By prioritizing this, ASEAN can be able



to take advantage of the influence of the contestation, by promoting dialogue. ASEAN still has to apply centrality and neutrality in doing so.

With the existence of ASEAN cooperation in overcoming the real threat, it is expected that in the face of the complexity of external challenges, ASEAN is able to remain standing as a power that has its own position by prioritizing its centrality and neutrality. ASEAN needs to be a regional organization that is able to embrace anyone, even those who create threats, by strengthening the habit of dialogue.

Recommendation

In order to encourage habit of dialogue, ASEAN must be able to facilitate the development and strengthening of cooperation based on the ASEAN-led mechanism. The efforts that NADI made to realize this can be done by:

1. Promoting cooperation in handling terrorism based on capability and own resources, one of which is by strengthening supervision of the flow of immigration, especially within the Southeast Asia region.
2. Strengthening cooperation in managing natural disasters, prioritizing AH Center and other existing mechanism

Summary

ASEAN Defence security foresighting in the next 2 decades

1. The development of technology 4.0 which is era of digitalization as step for improving human positions especially the rapid development of C4ISR, in facing challenge revolution technology and great power competition.
2. The problem between USA and China in the region, will impact common security issues among ASEAN member countries. So that we need power strategy with ASEAN solidity, centrality and promoting dialogues.



Republic of Indonesia

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Introduction

Counterterrorism in the last ten years, come to the fore of international relations, and remains in the news almost daily. This is due in large part to the ongoing conflicts in some place in the world, which in turn have also prompted something of a backlash against such military or “hard” approaches to countering terrorism. Partly in response, states and civil society have sought out softer, often preventive, measures to deal with violent extremism, many of which have been deemed more successful than military approaches and less likely to foment a new generation of violent extremists.

“Deradicalization” programs, which are geared toward peacefully moving individuals and groups away from violent extremism, have grown both in popularity and in scope of late, even in just the past five years. While these programs vary widely, with differing subjects (e.g., prisoners, potential terrorists, convicted criminals, repentant extremists), aims (e.g., abandonment of extreme views, disengagement from terrorism, rehabilitation into society), sizes (from just a handful of participants to hundreds), and forms (from arranging jobs, marriages, and new lives for participants, to merely educating them on nonviolent alternatives to their methods), common themes and problems can be discerned. With recent high-profile cases of recidivism by supposedly “deradicalized” individuals, questions are being raised about the efficacy of these programs and about how best to design them.

Background: Definitions and the Radicalization Process

Deradicalization,” meanwhile, refers to the process of divorcing a person, voluntarily or otherwise, from their extreme views, while “disengagement” refers to the process of moving a person away from their extreme group’s activities, without necessarily deradicalizing that person or changing their views. Generally public did not draw this distinction, but focused primarily on deradicalization, except where noted “Counterradicalization,” on the other hand, encompasses those measures taken to prevent a new generation of extremists, and is thus less reactive than deradicalization.

Successful deradicalization depends upon an understanding of radicalization itself. Often due to a person’s socializing with radical individuals, radicalization can take many forms. A detailed study of radicalization is beyond the scope of this paper, but a brief consideration of the paths to radicalization is important for the purposes of this discussion.



As Experts frequently noted, a sound deradicalization program needs to learn from how individuals become radicalized: indeed, both radicalization and deradicalization lean heavily on family or other social ties, and the Internet is increasingly playing a large role in both. Indeed, a particularly striking feature of radicalization is that today it happens primarily over the Internet. As researcher will explore in greater depth later on, an individual need have had no prior contact with a terrorist group, nor have ever traveled to those countries where the group is active, to become directly involved with terrorism. Few examples explain that terrorists are often radicalized “remotely,” sometimes through the Internet alone (exp. “Jihad Jane” in USA and the July 2005 bombings in London). This trend of “self-recruitment” has moved many governments and NGOs to look more closely at the Internet’s role in both terrorism and counterterrorism.

Expert described those generally susceptible to radicalization as having a combination of the following characteristics: trusting a person already involved with a radical group; being “spiritually hungry” and dedicated to their faith, but having limited knowledge of their religion; and being desperate, naïve, or simply in need of money. Those seeking to recruit such people try to cater to their needs and interests.

During the process of radicalization, also described by expert, the “target’s” characteristics are identified to determine their suitability for terrorism. They are then engaged in dialogue, befriended, and their social, financial, or psychological needs are addressed as a means of gaining their trust. This part of the process closely resembles the initial steps taken in many deradicalization programs. However, throughout the recruitment process, radical groups will often isolate the targeted individual and “educate” them about the cause. If they refuse to participate in violence, they may then be asked to do something seemingly innocuous, like renting a car or an apartment to help out the group. This act is then leveraged to elicit continued participation. For example, they may be told that “the security forces now know about you, and they may torture you.” The targeted individual is consequently drawn closer to the radical group.

Deradicalization

While “hard” approaches to counterterrorism are more militaristic in approach involving targeted assassinations or even warfare “soft” counterterrorism programs seek to undo the radicalization process by engineering the individual’s return to moderate society, usually by providing them with a stable support network, probing their original reasons for radicalizing, and divorcing them from their extreme beliefs and social contacts. Other goals of deradicalization are, reducing the number of active terrorists; resocializing ex-members; sowing dissent among terrorists; reducing the financial and social costs of imprisonment; boosting government legitimacy; and reducing dependency on repressive forms of counterterrorism.



Deradicalization in Indonesia

Indonesia's experience with radicalism was being similar to that of Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the motives for individuals' initial involvement in radicalization overlapped significantly, with subjects in both countries citing the media's biased or negative portrayal of the misinformation about jihad. Characteristics of extremists being mostly single, young (aged for the most part in their twenties), high-school graduates, predominantly from middle-class families of above average size (where some have argued that it is hard for parents to control their children), and over half had fathers aged over sixty years, thus it was suggested that where parental control is weak extremism more readily appeals.

In tackling the problem, the Indonesian government engaged in a trial-and-error exercise initially, arriving eventually at deradicalization. In crafting the program, the objectives of deradicalisation were determined, namely: first, to make terrorists abandon acts of terrorism and violence. Second, radical groups transform into moderate and tolerant thinking. Third, radicalists and terrorists can support national programs in building the life of the state in the frame of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.

Run by the police's Special Detachment 88 Anti Terror Unit, the Indonesian program is based on the theory that filling the void that withdrawal from a terrorist group leaves in a person's life will successfully remove that person from the path of violent extremism. As such, the main facets of the program are dialogue, including conversations between program beneficiaries and professors, clerics, and farmers; family involvement, to ensure the beneficiary has a sound support structure beyond terrorism; prayer sessions; medical care; support in starting businesses and other ventures; and even weddings facilitated by the police. Like many other deradicalization programs, this one first studies the prospective participant to determine their commitment to deradicalizing or their potential to commit then diagnoses how challenging their deradicalization will be, before tailoring the steps that need be taken to achieve it.

Focusing mostly on splinters from the Darul Islam group and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and on detainees, the program takes advantage of participants' respect for authority, and the important role of social bonding in terrorist groups. In addition, the specific motives of the individuals are taken into account. An interlocutor described these as "spiritual" (the "true believer" in extreme interpretations of his or her religion or cause); "emotional" (a person desiring social interaction and the group bonding that extremist groups can provide); and/or "material" (a person seeking financial or other material gain through involvement in terrorism). While its creators tout the program's relative successes, they note that certain problems were encountered, including the lack of an inter agency approach to deradicalization, as well as the scant legal basis for it.



Indonesian Deradicalization Strategy

Since 2010, the Indonesian government has tried to eradicate terrorism through the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT), which in recent years began to intensify a “soft-approach” de-radicalization program. One of its tactics is involving former terrorists in the program, that call as “soul approach”. One of the former terrorists recruited was Ali Fauzi Manzi, he is former chief bombing instructor for teroris.

Manzi is brother of one of the Bali bombers, once a chief bomb maker for terrorist group Jemaah Islamiah, the group responsible for the bombing of the club in the Kuta area of the Indonesian tourist island of Bali on October 2002, leaving 202 people dead. Manzi (now 46), was once jailed for terrorism offences in the Philippines, where he had helped build a military training camp for extremists. He learned bomb-making from a man called Hambali, who was sent to the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay in 2002.

Manzi now to be reformed and committed to deradicalizing other would-be terrorists by setting up a foundation to steer people away from the lure of Islamic State. He told The Globe Post that only a former terrorist can handle a radicalized person in the right way; “To handle terrorism, it takes a variety of methodologies. Strategy between one person with another must be different.” Ali Fauzi Manzi is now busy persuading former extremists to live peacefully and integrate back into the community. He used to be a bomb-assembling instructor for terrorists.

In March 2016, Mr. Manzi with the support of BNPT established a community called the Circle of Peace Foundation (YLP), where former terrorists spread a narrative of anti-radicalism. Manzi began to approach these men when they were still in prison. He said he tried to win their hearts, such as by helping their families or befriending them through discussion.

At least 37 former terrorist prisoners have joined YLP in 2016, and about 20 of their children are under the foundation’s guidance. Manzi said his community supports former terrorists to be financially independent, such as by giving them jobs and skills, and supporting them morally. He said the de-radicalization process is not achieved through economic assistance alone, but there needs to be a community whose members understand the situation of the former prisoners. “Because when a terrorist is out of jail while his environment ignores him, then it is possible he will return to their community,” Manzi said.

One man who was persuaded by Manzi to leave his network was Agus Martin, who was jailed for four years for supplying weapons to a terrorist group. Martin, who Manzi had recruited into a radical group, said his heart was not touched when he was advised by the BNPT official and the police, “but when the person who ever recruited him was advising, he began to realize.” He has now joined the YLP and along with other former prisoners is helping the government in an effort to de-radicalize jihadists.



In addition to YLP, at least two nongovernmental organizations have been involved in a number of projects aimed at working directly with prisoners, released prisoners and their families. The Indonesian Alliance for Peace has a program to bring the victims of terrorist bombings into a dialogue with convicted terrorists, with hope that there will be reconciliation between the bomber and victim.

Yayasan Prastasi Perdamaian has been working with prisoners to try to contain the influence of extremist teaching. They are building libraries in a few prisons with books that challenge key tenets of extremism and then bringing in experienced an ustadz, or religious teacher, to hold discussions with inmates. YPP is also helping families of current and former prisoners with small-scale loans and business expertise.

Although it seems successful they are not just released on the move. They are monitored continuously and periodically evaluated by the National Counter Terrorism Agency.

Conclusion

Radicalization is a reality of the contemporary world that will not disappear any time soon. Indeed, some radicals may never leave behind their extreme views, but, if most can be persuaded to, and if more still can disengage from violence, deradicalization programs represent the best means of achieving such progress via soft counterterrorism.

Indonesia's strategy for de-radicalization is to involve former terrorists who are referred to as soul approaches to persuade terrorists to return to society. These results look more effective than other strategies. However, all their activities are not released but they are evaluated periodically.

Summary

Successful deradicalization depends upon an understanding of radicalization itself. Radical as having a combination of the following characteristics: trusting a person already involved with a radical group; being "spiritually hungry" and dedicated to their faith, but having limited knowledge of their religion; and being desperate, naïve, or simply in need of money. Radicalization is a reality of the contemporary world that will not disappear any time soon. Indeed, some radicals may never leave behind their extreme views, but, if most can be persuaded to, and if more still can disengage from violence, deradicalization programs represent the best means of achieving such progress via soft counterterrorism. One of Indonesia's strategy for de-radicalization is to involve former terrorists who are referred to as "soul approaches" to persuade terrorists to return to society.



Lao People's Democratic Republic

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The transnational threats environmental degradation, pandemics, terrorism, maritime piracy, financial volatility, drug trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering, and other forms of transnational crime do not respect national boundaries. Others, like climate change, have a long gestation period, and are thus likely to be ignored by policymakers. Certain aspects of globalization, such as the transport revolution and tourism, aggravate and act as a transmission belt for many such challenges. Perhaps on the positive side, because transnational threats defy unilateral or national remedies, regional and international cooperation becomes a necessity, rather than a matter of choice.

The Climate change may turn out to be especially important as a security challenge to ASEAN for the coming two decades. It is widely regarded as a threat to global and regional security. A study by the Center for Naval Analysis in the US argues: “Unlike most conventional security threats that involve a single entity acting in specific ways and points in time, climate change has the potential to result in multiple chronic conditions, occurring globally within the same time frame. Economic and environmental conditions in already fragile areas will further erode as food production declines, diseases increase, clean water becomes increasingly scarce and large populations move in search of resources. Weakened and failing governments, with an already thin margin for survival, foster the conditions for internal conflicts, extremism, and movement toward increased authoritarianism and radical ideologies.”

An armed race would be decreased. All most projections suggest that defense spending in East Asia, including Southeast Asia, will continue to grow rapidly into the next two decades. In June 2011, some countries in ASEAN projected increase in defense spending in Southeast Asia and East Asia compared with the last decade. But much of the increases in defense spending and arms purchases will be driven by the bigger players China, India, and Japan rather than Southeast Asia.



Malaysia

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Reflecting on past NADI meetings, the general consensus is that ASEAN has been challenged by much more increased vulnerabilities, uncertainties, complexities and trust deficit evoked by economic competition, big power rivalry, increased influence of middle powers, continued emergence of non-traditional security threats, internal security issues resulting in trans-boundary concerns and the surge in regional military modernisation programmes. Based on past and current trends, it is possible to fore-sight that these issues will invariably be the constants in shaping the political outlook and security situation in the region.

It is assessed that in the next two decades, this region and the rest of the world will continue to be challenged by a range of mega trend disruptors such as the shift from a unipolar to multipolar world; the geo-climate shift which is impacting on water, food, energy and environment sustainability and the technological shift which has already seen its disruptive impacts on jobs as well as security of nation states in the cyber realm. According to a report recently released by the World Economic Forum (WEF), nations would fight over weather manipulation tools, food supply chains, space and effective computing. The next twenty years would foresee ASEAN member states embracing much more the fruits of the Fourth Industrial Revolution or Internet of Things (IoT) such as automation, cloud computing, robotics and artificial intelligence in their political, economic and security domains. Wouldn't these technological advances be the very thing that attract and expose them to the threats of cyber politics and warfare?

Recommendations

a) In managing the shift from unipolar to multipolar, it is imperative that ASEAN continuously advocates its centrality as “good international citizenship” in the image of a “middle power” in all engagements its members partake. To be accepted as a middle power, ASEAN centrality must be recognised as being a stabiliser and legitimiser of the world order.



b) In appreciating the impacts of the shift in geo-climate vis-à-vis the security of the region, it is timely joint research projects between government-affiliated policy and strategic research institutes in the region are commissioned as stipulated in the confidence building measures section of the ASEAN Political- Security Community Blueprint.

c) In ensuring the technological shift does not impact the security of the region, it is suggested that there should be an initiative beyond cyber security to establish a practical cooperation in promoting the development of norms for utilising artificial intelligence in robotics either in manned or unmanned military assets which may be exposed to cyber warfare/threats.

d) Whilst ASEAN through ADMM has successfully enhanced defence security cooperation through its many confidence-building measures (CBMs); perhaps it is time to consider moving to the next higher plane of Trust-Building Measures (TBMs) and one recommended initiative is the publication of a Defence White Paper (DWP). Malaysia is in the process of developing its 1st Defence White Paper which will be launched this year.



Malaysia

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The current US-Sino relations must be seen as part of long overdue process of a changing geopolitical world order since the end of WW II where the primacy of the United States of America as a military is being challenged as it can no longer dominate the world as it used to. In a new geopolitical order- Richard Haass calls it a world in disarray -one challenge to the regional security order is likely to come from China, the second largest economy in the world and a power that now dare say “no” to the United States.

The current US-Sino rivalry begins, in my view, when the US perceives China a threat to its primacy or pre-eminence in the region approximately a decade after China became a member of the WTO. Most scholars believed the WTO has expedited China’s economic rise. It is no secret that the US, after many years of resistance, finally allowed China to join the WTO in 2001. Even without the US help China would become a member of the WTO as two thirds of the WTO members were willing to vote China in.

The current trade spat between these two economic giants that together control 40% of the global trade is very much the carry- over from US unhappiness with China’s restrictive domestic business policies. For example, China restricts US investments in sectors critical to US national security. The ballooning US trade deficits with China are troubling and led to the current trade war that benefits no one.

While both sides provide different figures, the amount is very large. The US cited a figure of \$375 billion in 2017 and now demanding that China reduces the deficit by \$20 billion over the next two years to avert retaliation. This target was not met. Hence, the US is pushing for China to do more by 2 March 2019 before another round of trade sanctions. Both sides have been digging in. China claims its trade surplus with the US was \$275.8 billion-a \$99.5 billion difference!

The ongoing trade spat is just a small manifestation of the larger concern in geopolitics-the power game. The end stake is the willingness of the US to share global power/global stage with China, an Asian power that has significant commercial influence in US traditional backyard of Africa and Latin America.



Trade spat aside, of greater concern is the geopolitical nature in the US-Sino relations and their influence on Asean security. Tensions are inevitable as the two contest for a position of influence. However, the two is not to go likely to go to war. Admittedly, the sound of drums of war is getting stronger by the day, yet the leaders on both sides remain friendly with each other.

Neo-cons like Graham Allison, John Mearsheimer and Steve Bennon who believe that the tense relationship can end in a military conflict. Graham Allison, in particular, quoting the Peloponnesian war, believes that China and the US may not be able to avert the “Thucydides Trap” that afflicted the Athenians and the Spartans in Roman times some 2500 years ago.

China is not likely to adopt policies that endanger its security as the Soviets during the Cold War era. Besides, in my view, a nuclear power China riding on strong nationalism and a feeling of victimization in the past is no pushover. I think a lot of people misjudge China’s “craziness” when it comes to defending its regime identity. Look at what happened in the July 1989 Tiananmen incident when the political masters crushed their own people to uphold security. Some say the Tiananmen was necessary for regime survival. While a China that could kill its own people will have no qualms fighting a war against foreigners-the barbarians outside its gate. However, Beijing will only indulge in a war that it can win and in selfdefence.

There are those entertaining thoughts that should a military confrontation takes place the US with its superior military might would be able to defeat China. These cynics fail to account for China’s nuclear weapons in its military arsenal that could deliver a second- strike attack and could probably usher in the Armageddon. Even in the worst mad- case of the Thucydides Trap scenario, we can expect both sides massive destruction on both sides. True Sparta defeated Athens in the Peloponnesian war; both suffered devastatingly. Sparta was defeated by Philip of Macedonia not long after the war.

There is no doubt the US has overstayed the welcome and hospitality of some in the region. Some countries adopt a US coat-tail policy, hanging on to the US coat-tail as a security insurance against what they perceive to be an aggressive China. Some factors are worth noting: first, with the exception of its very limited incursions against Vietnam in 1974, 1979 and 1988 against Vietnam; China has not invaded any country in the region. The US fought a war in Vietnam for over ten years; the war happened during my life-time!! What did it get? It is still waging a proxy war in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan that it could never win. The writing on the wall is very clear. Hence, it is pulling out of Syria and very soon Afghanistan.



Second, it is a given fact in international relations that no power lasted forever. Pax Romania, Pax Persia, Pax Britannia and other powerful nations, all of them wilted like blooming flowers after a while. Professor Norman Davies of Oxford did an extensive study on the history of vanquished kingdoms in Europe, he came one conclusion: that power is transient. In his book “Vanished Kingdoms: The History of Half- Forgotten Europe (Allen Lane, 2011)”, he writes perceptively:

“Students of history need to be constantly reminded of the transience of power, for transience... is one of the fundamental characteristics both of the human condition and of the political order. All states and nations, however great, bloom for a season and are replaced.”

It is unfortunate that the US, for all its greatness, has to end its blooming season by being a destructive power. No nation in the world has waged so many wars over so many continents, across the entire globe in the last one hundred years than the US. It is now time for the US to reboot itself, return home, take care of its economy and probably make America great again.

US reluctance to share hegemony in Asia Pacific (first with Japan, later the Soviet Union and now China) is the major source of political irritation with China. The US defeated Japan in WW11 and rolled back the Soviet Union during the Cold War era thought that it could compel China to oblige its presence. China is at odds with the US policy over Taiwan, the South China Sea and its constant threats of trade wars as well as disagreements over how to resolve the impasse over the Korean peninsula, among other things. Of course, China is also upset with the US support for Japan over the Diaoyu/ Senkaku islands dispute and other allies in the region that Beijing perceives-rightly or wrongly- as ganging against China.

One of the complaints that US have against China is the policy of militarisation in the SCS and citing it as a violation of international law. The US has chided China for not complying with the decision of the International Tribunal in 2016 that was set up without the latter’s consent to look into the complaints by the Philippines with regard to China’s legal basis of maritime rights and entitlements in the South China Sea. The Philippines also asked the Tribunal to judge on the lawfulness of certain actions by China in the SCS. The Tribunal decided on 12 July in favour of the Philippines.

As expected, China-a non-party to the Arbitration- refused to comply mainly on the ground that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction because the subject-matter before the Tribunal. Territorial sovereignty is beyond the concern of the Tribunal. The question is: does China’s refusal to comply with the decision of the Tribunal constitute a violation of international law, state practice or international norms? Before condemning China let us examine state practice over this matter of non-compliance.



The US failed to appear before the ICJ in 1976 over the Nicaragua case. Washington also refused to pay reparations to Nicaragua when the Court found America guilty of mining the ports in Nicaragua. There are two other cases when the US Courts refused to comply with the decisions of the ICJ. Albania refused to pay reparations to the UK for damages it inflicted on British Naval vessels in 1947, as ordered by the ICJ, in one of the most celebrated cases in international law (The Corfu Channel Case). In 2015, the Russian Federation refused to appear before ITLOS brought by the Netherlands. The case was over the legality of Russian seizure of a Netherlands- flagged vessel (Sunrise Arctic) belonging to the Greenpeace International. Similarly, Japan temporarily defied the ICJ ruling in 2014 to cease exploiting whaling in the Southern Sea-Antarctica-in the name of scientific research.

Clearly state practice on compliance with international decisions is patchy.

The US also failed to get the authorisation of the Security Council of the United Nations when it invaded Iraq in 2003. In 2017, the US under Donald Trump unilaterally fired 59 tomahawk missiles at a Syrian target without informing the Security Council. In April 2018, the US, France and Great Britain fired more than 100 missiles against targets in Syria, apparently in retaliation to Syria's use of nerve gas against its people.

The US has not ratified the 1982 UNCLOS-the most important international Treaty that deals with the rules at sea. Current status of UNCLOS: 168/14. US signed only the Implementation Agreement on the ISA in 1994,

The US is also not a member of The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (often referred to as the International Criminal Court Statute or the Rome Statute) the treaty that established the International Criminal Court (ICC). It was adopted at a diplomatic conference in Rome on 17 July 1998 and it entered into force on 1 July 2002.

Against the background of an uncertain world, we now have two major powers-the US and China-at odds with each other over trade and most importantly over power or geopolitics. The US views China as an irritant in its geopolitical relationship. Washington believes that China wants to displace US influence in the Asia Pacific region. The US is not happy with China's policy to undermine its traditional primacy or hegemony in the US.

To substantiate its claim the US points to China's "aggressive" policy towards Taiwan, Japan and its militarisation of the SCS. On the flip side, Beijing finds US policies in the Asia Pacific region as condescending and a total failure in adjusting to the new geopolitical order where China believes it has every right to assert. For China, Taiwan and the territories in the SCS are non-negotiable; Taiwan is a renegade province and its historical claim to the SCS is unchallenged although the arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII to the 1982



United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea between the Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China ruled in July 2016 that China has “no historical rights” based on the “ninedash line” map.

China did not participate in the Tribunal proceedings claiming that it has no jurisdiction to decide on this case. As expected, China not only ignored the ruling but it took steps to convert seven features in the Spratlys into artificial islands complete with airstrips and Beijing also deployed its military on these features and others in the SCS that it has occupied since December 1974.

The most recent operation, the second to take place in the South China Sea (in 2019) was February 12, 2019 where two US Guided Missile vessels (USS Spruance and USS Preble) sailed within 12 nautical miles of Mischief reef. The transit follows last month's FON programme by USS McCampbell, and USS Arleigh.

In response to US constant violations of its “sovereignty” in the SCS, China deployed its medium range strategic bombers in the SCS on 14 May 2018. The H 6 K bombers have a range of about 3,500 kilometres-essentially putting the entire Southeast Asia and Japan within its range.

China's current policy in the South China Sea sea-seen by some as assertive- will not go unchallenged, though. However, China is not likely to withdraw from the SCS after investing heavily on the construction of artificial islands complete with airstrips and gun placements. China has also deployed missile batteries and building a resort at Woody Island that they promise to open to the public by early 2018.

Come what may, China is expected to defend the SCS against any intruder. I do not think China can be easily intimidated in the SCS.

China needs a strong military to challenge the US dominance. Currently, anyone who has studied Chinese military power knows, by all measures, China's military might have a lot of catching up to do. China is years behind the US in sea power terms. China's PLA (Navy), for example, is often erroneously described as a coastal Navy with a very limited strategic reach. Compared with the US that has more than one thousand naval, army and air facilities globally through a network of alliances, according to one China's Think Tank on maritime affairs, China's naval facility at Djibouti is no match. However, according to some, while China may lag the firepower of the US Navy, it has geographical advantages, especially in areas that matter most to Beijing: the South China Sea and the waters around Taiwan. In any short- of- war conflict scenario with the US, it is said that China has the capabilities to inflict serious damage on the US forces “making the US intervention in the region too costly for Washington to contemplate.”



At US\$ 175 billion, China's defence expenditure for 2018 is miniscule compared with \$700 billion for US. Japan and India plan to boost up their military spending by \$45 billion and 46 billion respectively in the same year.

Many in the West view China's rise as destabilising. The contrary view is of a peaceful friendly China with deep pockets providing an economic life-support to many. Its easy money policy-when compared with other funding agencies-in dispensing capital and loans for investments and trade has been a boom to many cash-strapped third world countries.

Critics believe China that has a global reach could pose a challenge to the strategic interests of some status quo powers. The extensive Belt and Road Initiative is often cited as an example of China's soft power to transform the global economic landscape at the expense of the status quo powers like the US. China is expected to consolidate its soft and hard power influence beyond the region with recent decision in March 2018 to remove the two-term Presidential limit.

Given the uncertain geopolitical dynamics and uncertainty, states are hedging their future. States will react differently to new geopolitical nuances in support of their strategic interests. For example, Australia. Canberra has made very clear that it will honour the 1951 ANZUS Treaty with the US. Successive governments, in recent years, have made it very plain that Australia's national interests lie with the US defence of its seaborne trading routes. Quite clearly, in the Australian case, security overrides economic relations with China.

This is because in Canberra's view the US is a better provider of regional security. Historically, Australia has benefited immensely through its alliance with the US. However, there are dissenting views (Hugh White and the late Malcom Fraser, for example) urging Canberra to adopt a more balanced approach. In their view the US could not provide security guarantee to Australia, forever. Moreover, China is fast becoming an influential power in the region that Canberra can only ignore at its own peril.

Canberra has joined the United States, Japan, and India to form an informal security dialogue forum aimed at checking China's assertiveness in the region. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue can be described as Canberra's policy of hedging against China. In other words, when push comes to shove, the present regime in Canberra will side with the US against China.

Other states have reacted to the new dynamics differently. Take the case of the Philippines, for example. President Duterte's non-confrontational policy towards China is quite straight forward. While Manila continues to uphold the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty and the 2014 Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (2014), President Duterte refused



to put China on the spot following the 2016 Arbitral decision that disputed China's claim to the features in the SCS. According to the Tribunal, China has no historic basis to claim the disputed SCS and that the infamous 9-dash line that China published since 1947 has no basis under international law.

It was the Philippines that requested the International Tribunal to make a ruling on the validity under international law of China's nine-dash line and the legal status of features in the Spratly. However, China refused to participate in the proceedings it claimed politically motivated. Although the Tribunal rules that its decisions are binding, China just ignored them.

Manila has adopted a very practical approach towards China- preferring peace to confrontation. President Duterte's policy involves concerted efforts to foster closer relations with China, coupled with calculated moves to distance the Philippines from the United States and US allies over the South China Sea disputes and other international issues. By offering an olive branch, President Duterte has appeased the dragon at the gate, hoping time will be on his side. At the same time, because of his peaceful overtures, he received economic benefits from China and a temporary agreement for Philippines fishermen to continue with their traditional fishing activities around the disputed Scarborough Reef.

Of course, the Philippines diplomatic relationship with China has seen its share of ups and downs. There were some tense moments following warnings from China's Coast Guard against Philippines' military aircraft and naval vessels from operating near China's occupied features in the disputed part of the sea that Philippines calls its West Sea.

Evidently, much as it welcomes investment and economic goodies from China, Manila has communicated to China certain red lines in the SCS that China should not cross. These include the construction of Chinese facilities on Scarborough Shoal, any attempt to remove the BRP Sierra Madre (a grounded ship that the Philippine Navy uses as a military outpost) from Second Thomas Shoal, any attempt to harass Filipino soldiers on resupply or repair missions, and unilateral exploitation of the SCS's natural resources.

It is not clear what Manila will do if China were to breach the redlines.

Vietnam's policy towards the US has changed since President Obama's visit to Hanoi in 2016 and the lifting of embargoes on sale of lethal weapons to Vietnam that have been in place since Vietnam war. Today, Vietnam not only receives military hardware from its once arch enemy but it has bought submarines from Russia. In this context, the United States regards Vietnam as a strategic partner in counter-balancing China's expansionism in the region. Similarly, Hanoi sees an opportunity to join forces with Washington over a common problem i.e., China.



Australia, Japan and South Korea are more likely to stick with the US should push comes to shove. Other states are more likely to pursue a more balanced policy towards the major rivals.

The current détente and rapprochement in the Korean Peninsula will be compromised should Pyongyang reactivate its nuclear weapon policy or when Seoul readopts a hard-line policy against the North to curry favour with the US with whom it has Treaty obligations i.e., the 1953 Mutual Defence Treaty. In the new geopolitical landscape, Seoul faces a prisoner's dilemma -how to develop an independent foreign policy that charts a new role for itself in Asia without undermining relationship with its long-time trusted ally, the US. Seoul's growing economic relationship with China and its policy of engagement towards North Korea is reportedly pulling away from the US.

Clearly, South Korean President Moon Jae-in and President Donald Trump do not see North Korea in the same way. Moon's primary goal is to pursue peace and reconciliation on the peninsula. President Trump wants a "final, fully verified denuclearization" policy of North Korea. There seems to be a disconnect between what President Moon wants and what President Trump aspires to achieve with his policy.

Further evidence of policy hedging against political uncertainty takes the form of military insurance. States in the region are rushing to rearm themselves. According to SIPRI, military spending in Asia and Oceania-which groups Southeast Asia with Australia and New Zealand-has reached \$US477 billion in 2017 making it the second largest region in terms of military spending in 2017. Five of the top fifteen largest global defence spenders are in this region: China (rank 2), India (rank 5), Japan (rank 8), South Korea (rank 10) and Australia (rank 13).

The largest relative increases in military spending between 2008 and 2017 were made by Cambodia (332 per cent), Bangladesh (123 per cent), Indonesia (122 per cent) and China (110 per cent). There were other significant increases (higher than 40 per cent, but less than 100 per cent) in Viet Nam, the Philippines, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal and India. Only five countries in Asia and Oceania, according to SIPRI, decreased spending over the decade: Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, Fiji, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam.

Summary

The current US-Sino relations must be seen as part of long overdue process of a changing geopolitical world order since the end of WW II where the primacy of the United States of America as a military is being challenged as it can no longer dominate the world as it used to. The rivalry is likely to have a negative impact on Asean security and its cohesiveness as a regional organisation.



Republic of the Union of Myanmar

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ASEAN will be able to maintain present situation of regional peace and stability in spite of traditional and non-traditional security challenges would be key issues and challenges for our region in the next 2 decades. It is clear that cooperation is needed among AMSs in order to strengthen the three pillars of ASEAN, namely: the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), and the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC).

The ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) is the highest defence consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN. The ADMM has to fulfill its ambition of to promote mutual trust and confidence through greater understanding of defence and security challenges as well as enhancement of transparency and openness. At the same time, it also has to promote regional peace and stability through dialogue and cooperation in defence and security since it is one of fundamental objectives of the ADMM. Moreover, ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus was also established for ASEAN and its Eight Dialogue Partners to strengthen security and defence cooperation for peace, stability and developments in the region.

The ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus are useful platforms for sharing perspectives of AMSs and their partners on various defense and security issues. Through these mechanisms, we are able to discuss how such challenges could affect our region and our respective states and how we could collaborate to address our common concerns.

Outside the ASEAN framework, various military-to-military interactions and activities have been held over the years, namely ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces Meeting, ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting, ASEAN Navy Chiefs' Meeting, ASEAN Air Chiefs' Conference, ASEAN Military Intelligence Meeting and ASEAN Armies Rifles Meet. I believe abovementioned mechanisms are quite useful to find ways to strengthen security and defence cooperation among AMSs. But it is obviously needed to continue modifying those mechanisms to be relevant and effective.



We are currently confronted with several security challenges as a region and as individual countries. It has become imperative for us to engage our neighbors and partners across the region to find collective solutions to address these challenges. Such have been made possible by abovementioned platforms within its ambit.

Either the Asia Pivot Policy or the Indo-Pacific Strategy clearly shows how the Asia is important for the United States. Meanwhile, the regional power China tried to accelerate its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It is sure that our region, Southeast Asia, plays a strategic important role for both China and the United States. Tension between the U.S. and China definitely would affect AMSs and thus we all have to prepare for our national interest and to focus defence and security of ASEAN as well.

If necessary, ASEAN should remind the power countries, namely the US, China, Japan, Russia and India, not to use ASEAN as a proxy for their rivalry. And we have to reaffirm the unity and solidarity of ASEAN amidst this emerging superpower competition.

Transnational organized crimes such as terrorism, human trafficking, illegal drugs trafficking, arms smuggling would be key challenges and threats for ASEAN in the next 2 decades. Such kinds of crime could not be addressed alone and thus coordination and cooperation among AMSs would be needed.

In line with current situation of the region, AMSs and partners focus and cooperate on the following sectors:

- (a) maritime security;
- (b) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief;
- (c) counter-terrorism;
- (d) military medicine;
- (e) peacekeeping operations;
- (f) humanitarian mine action;
- (g) cyber security.



We are all aware that the wide array of security challenges will remain to be a threat to the peace and prosperity of ASEAN in the next two decades. As is widely acknowledged, the regional security architecture is evolving, with more complicated security challenges emerging while other usual security challenges persist. States must deal with these challenges in partnership with other states. Indeed, the need to deal with these challenges is the foremost driver for cooperation.

Needing to ensure that ASEAN will remain united and relevant in the next decades amidst the growing superpower rivalry in the region, economic slowdown, natural disaster and looming threats from terrorism, piracy, and drugs. But the most important one we have to ensure is ASEAN centrality and all of platforms, mechanisms and cooperation must reaffirm it.

Summary

ASEAN will be able to maintain present situation of regional peace and stability in spite of traditional and non-traditional security challenges would be key issues and challenges for our region in the next 2 decades. Cooperation is needed among AMSs in order to strengthen the three pillars of ASEAN, namely: the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), and the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC).

The promotion of practical cooperation indeed enables regional states to address security challenges and at the same time contribute in the building of a security community in Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific. Cooperation in dealing with some of security challenges might become difficult because of some fundamental differences of views. But HADR, counter-terrorism, military medicine and cyber security, might be easier for states to cooperate. We need to ensure that ASEAN will remain united and relevant in the next decades. The most important one we have to ensure is ASEAN centrality and all of platforms, mechanisms and cooperation must reaffirm it.



Republic of the Philippines

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The Philippines' perspectives on the future of ASEAN defense and security, based on a scenario-building exercise conducted in 2018. Based on different driving forces, trends and projections from the current strategic environment, four plausible scenarios were derived:

- 1) The Best-Case-which projects the flourishing of international cooperation and successful management of disputes according to international law;
- 2) Status Quo-which foresees the persistence of a tense relationship among major powers especially in maritime areas, with increased risk of miscalculation and misinterpretation;
- 3) The Worst-Case-which envisions probable violent confrontations among major and middle powers, low-intensity clashes in maritime zones, and extreme divergence on sensitive geopolitical issues between AMS leading to weakened regional order; and
- 4) A Cloudy Future-beyond the next decade, the rise of artificial intelligence will bring new uncertainties in economics, politics and military operations.

The following questions for consideration:

- 1) How can ASEAN confront these plausible scenarios while keeping its relevance and effectiveness?
- 2) How can ASEAN and ADMM promote thoughtful conversation between and among Track I and Track II personalities and institutions regarding major-power contestation in the region?
- 3) How can ASEAN/AMS harness functional cooperation measures towards solving sensitive issues?
- 4) How can ASEAN promote deeper engagements among AMS' agencies and forces in the region in such a way that ASEAN strengthens a rules-based regional order?



Republic of Singapore

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That due to the still evolving major power rivalry and uncertainty over their contest for dominance, it will be more realistic to consider a shorter timeframe for ASEAN defence security foresighting for the next five years, and to be reviewed later. For ASEAN, the primary concern is to avoid being drawn into major power rivalry and focus on promoting peace and stability and regional economic development, as well as the three pillars of cooperation in ASEAN.

The geopolitical shifts in the region, including the implications of major power rivalry. President Donald Trump's policies have resulted in uncertainty domestically and abroad. The US-China trade war brings major risks of escalation. China's continuing rise and its growing influence is viewed by the US as a challenge to its global dominance. The Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, as well as China's technological advancements, can be viewed as part of a rising China and its growing influence. Meanwhile, Japan will seek to enhance its military capacity and attempt to become a major regional power, adding complications in its engagement of Southeast Asian countries. The Korean Peninsula faces much uncertainty, and will further draw in the major powers of the US, China, Japan and Russia, with a risk of Southeast Asia getting dragged into this issue.

That these major shifts will adversely affect ASEAN. As the major powers assert themselves in the region, they might urge ASEAN or individual ASEAN Member States to take sides, that can have major impacts on ASEAN unity and centrality. Nonetheless, there have been calmer waters in the South China Sea. ASEAN will need to navigate these evolving developments carefully and engage all major powers for economic benefits for all ASEAN Member States. ASEAN should maintain unity when dealing with the external powers.



Kingdom of Thailand

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Introduction

For over half a century or 51 years of cooperation from various countries in Southeast Asia, also known as “ASEAN”, has created changes for this region continuously. Whether developed cooperation in economy, trade, investment, technology, maintain of political stability and also includes the integration of culture through the movement of people in ASEAN. All of these are the driving for the community with population over 640 million to move forward steadily.

The important cooperation of the ASEAN member states, whether creating the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) or creating a free trade area (FTA) with many countries outside region such as China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, resulting to have more trade links. As well as the efforts of maintain the ASEAN Centric to create a new strategy balancing in the Indo-Pacific region. Including the implementation of cooperation plan for the ASEAN plus three, economic integration to develop ASEAN into a single production base and one market, and accelerating the negotiation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: RCEP to success quickly (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018, pages 1-2).

In addition to the economic achievements that mentioned above, the issue of political stability between ASEAN has made a great effort to support the cooperation between ASEAN and China in the South China Sea, especially in the Code of Conduct on South China Sea: COC to change this area into a sea of peace, stability and sustainability. And also support developing of the positive situation in the Korean Peninsula, especially the discussion between the leaders of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as well as cooperation in supporting humanitarian aid and natural disaster prevention. Considering that the cooperation of the ASEAN member countries attracts the attention of the international community, whether dimension on diplomacy, trade, investment, tourism, and even the diversity of beliefs of people, which are the “strong points” that leads to further connection to all parts of the world. All these show that ASEAN is a cooperation community and supporting members that increase the bargaining weight on the world stage successfully.



However, ASEAN still faces security challenges. From the perspective of academics organized by ISEAS Yusof Ishak, National University of Singapore¹, held on January 9, 2018, commented that in addition to ASEAN having to carry out a common policy to maintain the balance of power between the United States and China, ASEAN also have many security challenges including maintaining of economic stabilization, delaying reform in financial and business sector, delaying reforms in structure and economic policy, trade barrier measures, and international political issues such as the Korean Peninsula situation, the situation in Rakhine State, Myanmar, terrorism in the Mindanao of the Philippines, etc. All these inevitably affect to the economy of the region, moreover the institutions also surveyed the opinion of ASEAN people on ASEAN security challenges, the results appear as follows, political instability in domestic (53.7%), ethnic and religious tensions (52.9%), climate change (51.6%), economic downturn (51.1%), military tensions (42.7%) and terrorism (37.2%), which accordance with the opinions of the academics that mention above.

The Strategic Studies Center, National Studies Institute of Defense, consider that the issue of climate change is an important and interesting issue, because it effect to the natural disaster in a broad and effect to all countries such as floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, high temperature weather and drought etc. Therefore the Strategic Studies Center take the issue of climate change to draw the future scenario of ASEAN security by applying the Foresight Framework, which has 4 steps to do are

Step 1 Analysis of Driving Force: to find the trend that will occur in the framework of society, technology, economy, environment, politics and military (STEEP-M) and then find the link and the impact of events in climate change for the ASEAN region.

Step 2 Evaluation: to identify impact and uncertainty of the issues or Impact-Uncertainty Classification.

Step 3 Interpretation: by looking at the current results to the future direction then expect to be the main issue in the future.

Step 4 Prospecction: to create the scenario planning.

Step 5 Establishing of ASEAN guidelines for future security: by SWOT analysis then determine the resources and tools (Means) that must be used to create ways for ASEAN to cope with the climate change.



Analysis of future trends

By taking the issues in Critical Scenario as “Preparing to cope with the climate change in the ASEAN region” to analyze by the different black-bone, not related each other, important affects to create future scenario of ASEAN that are “Political Will” and “Social Participation”, there have 4 possible scenarios are

1) Scenario A

- There are conflicts in society due to people do not cooperate with government sector, so there is only the government who solve the problem of climate change.
- People are not aware of the problem for climate change, and also break the law too.
- All projects do not get cooperation from the people.

2) Scenario B

- There are establishment of a standard for legal measures in ASEAN both government sector and non-government sector.
- There are networks of cooperation for solving problems.
- People cooperate in compliance with laws, rule, order, and also do practice together.
- ASEAN is strong in dealing with climate change.
- There is an effective response to the disaster, since monitoring, preparation, disaster reliefs, and disaster recovery.
- Having a complete stock piling.

3) Scenario C

- There are no common ASEAN for a legal standard measures, both government sectors and non-government sectors.
- There is no cooperation network to solve problems.
- There is no cooperation in compliance with laws, rule, order, and no practice together.

4) Scenario D

- People are aware of the problem.
- The government has just begun to recognize the problem.
- There has law enforcement, but it is inefficient.
- The law is very complicate and it is hard to edit.



Conclusion

From the future of ASEAN Foresighting for dealing with climate change, it can be seen that there are 4 scenarios in different ways. It depends on the driving force in each axis, Political Will and Social Participation. However, the future scenario that ASEAN should be concern is scenario C which low of Political Will and at the same time it is also low of Social Participation. In this case, ASEAN will not have legal standard measures in both the governmental and other sectors, ASEAN does not have a cooperation network to solve climate change problem. Therefore, ASEAN should have guidelines for dealing with in this case.

Summary

The issue of climate change is an important and interesting issue, because it effect to the natural disaster in a broad and effect to all countries such as floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, high temperature weather and drought etc. There have 4 possible scenarios, which one;

1) Scenario A: There are conflicts in society due to people do not cooperate with governmental sector, so there is only the government who solve the problem of climate change. People are not aware of the problem for climate change, and also break the law too. All government projects do not get cooperation from the people.

2) Scenario B: There are establishment of a standard for legal measures in ASEAN both governmental sector and non-governmental sector. There are networks of cooperation for solving problems. People cooperate in compliance with laws, rule, order, and also do practice together. ASEAN is strong in dealing with climate change. There are effective responses to the disaster, since monitoring, preparation, disaster reliefs, and disaster recovery. ASEAN have a complete stockpiling.

3) Scenario C: There are no common ASEAN for a legal standard measures, both governmental sectors and non-governmental sectors. There is no cooperation network to solve problems. There is no cooperation in compliance with laws, rule, order, and no practice together.

4) Scenario D: People are aware of the problem and the government has just begun to recognize the problem. There has law enforcement, but it is inefficient. The law is very complicate and it is hard to edit.



Socialist Republic of Vietnam

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Peace, cooperation, and development continue to be the mainstream in the region and the world in recent years. The political, security environment, however, continues to witness complex developments. Insecurity and unpredictability are the most prominent feature, reflecting a fierce competition between trends and power centres in shaping a new world order. Meanwhile, hot spots and security challenges continue evolving unpredictably. These, consequently, strongly impact on defence and security environment of Southeast Asian in which some main factors are as follows:

First, increasingly acute strategic competition between major powers. The Indo-Asia-Pacific region has become a focal point for global attention, which is the place for interest convergence and and strategic competition between major powers. Most of big powers within and beyond the region have increased their presence and deepened their involvement in the region with the aim of competing for influence and balancing against each other to establish their standing and shape regional order in their interests. Through economic cooperation and increased military presence, major powers seek to carry out the strategy of both cooperation and competition to create intertwined interests. This will not only bring about opportunities but also pose numerous difficulties and challenges. The risk of collision, or even confrontation between major powers may threaten peace and stability in the region. Their competition within multilateral mechanisms and impact on policies of regional countries may weaken these mechanisms and the solidarity of ASEAN.

Second, geopolitical shifts in the region. The U.S. Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy is looming more clearly, which reflects not only the strategic competition between major powers but also an inevitable trend in the increasingly deep and wide integration process. The extension of regional thinking may be followed by more diversified and complex security issues. The scope of cooperation and rivalry will be broadened and widespread. Participation of many nations and organisations in regional context and architectures places requirements to establish new institutions and rules in the region.

Third, multilateralism and multilateral institutions are facing a number of challenges. Pragmatic ationalism and power politics continue to spread in international relations. Many nations, especially the major powers, have adjusted their policies in the pragmatic direction, which attaches importance to individual interests, maximises their interests by all means



regardless of interests of other nations and the region, and is willing to renounce their commitments if they does not serve their interests. Additionally, the tendency toward to bilateral, trilateral, or quadrilateral arrangements in the region may undermine the role of multilateral mechanisms.

Fourth, nontraditional security issues continue to envision complex developments. Issues, including violent extremism, cyber security, transnational crime, food security, energy security, climate change, etc. remain huge challenges to global and regional security and exceed any single nation's capacity to address. More importantly, many nontraditional security issues are being exploited in favour of political, military plots, or becoming a pretext for military operations such as the financing of terrorism, cyber attacks, and so forth. In addition, scientific and technological progress in military field, which gives rise to modernised weapons and equipment, including military robots, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), etc., is posing great challenges to national security and sovereignty.

Southeast Asia lies in the centre of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, its defence and security in the next two decades will be greatly influenced by regional upheavals and shifts, which include the following ones:

The risk of collision, confrontation, and armed race in the region is likely to escalate as a result of increased strategic competition between major powers and the inclination to use force and unilateral actions.

ASEAN's centrality is likely to cope with many challenges. Given its central role in Indo-Pacific region, ASEAN will continue to play a central role in the new regional architecture. Nevertheless, this role will be under new pressure and challenges due to rivalry between major powers, power politics, increasingly popular pragmatism in international relations, and influence of the formation of new regional architectures. ASEAN-centric mechanisms for defence and security cooperation, particularly the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM), ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), are likely to be influenced by new players in a wider region.

Additionally, some ASEAN member states may face domestic issues such as religious, ethnic conflict, and secession, and become more inward looking. Thus, ASEAN's centrality is likely to face a number of challenges, especially in the leading of regional forums and settlement of regional issues.



Maritime security will be probably one of the biggest challenges to ASEAN. Southeast Asia, which straddles important sea lines of communication (SLOC), may face many challenges to ensuring maritime safety and security. Despite recent progress, disputes over national sovereignty and interests at sea, especially in the South China Sea, will be still hard to be resolved fundamentally and comprehensively in the coming time. Besides, militarisation, increased military operations, dispute over natural resources, piracy, armed robbery at sea, etc., could continue to pose serious threats to maritime security in Southeast Asia.

Nontraditional security issues are likely to develop complicatedly and unpredictable developments, which will threaten peace and stability in Southeast Asia, notably terrorism, extremism, cyber security, food security, illegal migration and human trafficking, climate change, and environmental security. Achievements of the Fourth Industrial Revolution may be exploited, which gives rise to new challenges and escalate the risk of nontraditional security issues, including terrorism, cyber security, information security, financial security, epidemics, and so on.

Upheavals of political and security environment in the region and the world in recent times and the next two decades, on the one hand, will bring about opportunities to promote cooperation, development, peace, and stability in Southeast Asia, but on the other, they will also pose a number of difficulties and challenges to defence and security of each nation and of the whole region. Being small and medium-sized countries, ASEAN members states should unite with each other and make joint efforts to build an increasingly strong Community and consolidate ASEAN's centrality in the new regional architecture, which helps to safeguard our interests and enables us to respond effectively to increasingly complex defence and security challenges. Solidarity represents a vital factor and the key to success of each member state and the whole Community.

Summary

Peace, cooperation, and development continue to be the mainstream in the region and the world in recent years. The political, security environment, however, continues to witness complex developments. Insecurity and unpredictability are the most prominent feature, reflecting a fierce competition between trends and power centres in shaping a new world order. Meanwhile, hot spots and security challenges continue to linger on and evolve unpredictably. Southeast Asian defence and security environment has been strongly influenced by increasingly acute strategic competition between major powers; geopolitical shifts in the region; challenges to multilateralism and multilateral institutions; and complicated development of nontraditional security issues.



Southeast Asia lies in the centre of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, its defence and security environment in the next two decades is likely to witness the risk of collision, confrontation, and armed race; increased challenges to ASEAN's centrality; maritime security; and nontraditional security issues. In order to safeguard our interests and enable us to respond effectively to increasingly complex defence and security challenges, it is necessary for ASEAN members states to unite with each other and make joint effort to build an increasingly strong Community and consolidate ASEAN's centrality in the regional architecture.

Drivers that lead to Sustainable Security





Brunei Darussalam

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Ministry of Defence*

Overview

In an increasing integrated, interconnected and interdependent world, countries and the region are not free from global risks in political, security, economy and technological aspects. Today's regional security environment is increasingly uncertain and unpredictable. There are more complex trends that crosscuts issues of concern. The concept of sustainable security identifies underlying drivers of insecurity which could range from climate change, competition of resources, socio-economic marginalisation and global militarisation. In ensuring sustainable security, navigating and managing these trends is crucial where countries and the region-wide identify opportunities and threats and possible strategies to deal with them.

Drivers of sustainable security in ASEAN

ASEAN wide

Within the wider ASEAN context, drivers for sustainable security has been rooted since its formation in 1967. This could be identified through firstly, ASEAN's collective leadership and political equality. ASEAN recognises the strength in unity through diversity and have evoked the ASEAN way of consultation and consensus. With equal footing, each ASEAN member states have a say in shaping the region's future.

Secondly, ASEAN has taken a comprehensive approach to security in which it is cognizant that the three pillars of ASEAN Community in Political Security Community, Economic and Socio-Cultural are interlinked and interdependent in building ASEAN Community. In this regard coordinated and collaborative efforts have undertaken in all three pillars. The cooperative feature in ASEAN framework has built resilience and cultivated trust and comfort level through various initiatives and efforts in confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy.



Thirdly, ASEAN has placed importance on cohesiveness and inclusiveness at both levels within internal ASEAN to become a more people-centered and oriented community. Externally, ASEAN aims to be open, flexible and outward looking in close cooperation with its dialogue partners and friends.

ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC)

In the realisation of APSC, ASEAN has underscored the importance to build the Community that is based on shared norms and rules of good conduct in inter-state relations, effective conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms and post-conflict peace building activities.

The shaping and sharing of norms developed over the years adheres to various principles. This includes non-alignment, fostering of peace oriented attitudes of ASEAN member states, conflict resolution through non-violent means, renunciation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and avoidance of arms race in Southeast Asia; and renunciation of the threat of the use of force. All of these are embedded in the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Declaration, the ZOPFAN, the TAC and the SEANWFZ regimes.

ADMM and ADMM Plus

From the defence aspects, drivers of sustainable security lay importance of establishing and reaffirming good ties between defence and military organisations. Looking at the defence and military platforms, ASEAN have progressed well at various levels of diplomacy and cooperative efforts in bilateral, regional and international arena.

DEFENSE/MILITARY DIPLOMACY & COOPERATION

ASEAN	ASEAN with Dialogue and Partners	Cooperation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2000 ACAMM • 2001 ACDFIM & ANCM • 2002 AMIM • 2004 AACCC • 2007 ADMM Retreat, ADSOM, ADSOM WG • 2011 ACMMC, AMOIM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1997 ARF HDUCIM • 2002 ARF DOD • 2002 SLD • 2005 ARF APSC • 2010 ADSOM Plus & ADSOM Plus WG • 2010 ADMM EWG MS, CT, MM, HADR • 2009 ASEAN-Japan Vice Minister Defense Forum • 2014 ASEAN-US Defense Ministers Informal Meeting & ASEAN-Japan Defense Ministers Roundtable • 2015 ASEAN-China Informal Defense Meeting • 2016 ASEAN-Russia Defence Ministers Informal Meeting • 2019 ASEAN-ROK Vice Defense Ministers Talk 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1991 AARM • 2005 ARDEX • 2009 ARF DIREX • 2013 ADMM+ Exe HADR/MS & ADMM+ EWG HMA • 2016 ADMM+ Exe MS/CT & ADMM+ EWG CS • 2018 ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise • 1998 CHOD • 1999 WSPNS • 2010 PJ Forum • 2011 JIDD • 2012 SDD & International Security Moscow Conference • 2014 Xiangshan Forum

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ASEAN member states, through ADMM and ADMM Plus has made significant progress. Based on the principles, amongst others, for ADMM to be as the primary driving force and collective responsibility among ASEAN defence and military through development of common understanding on security issues.

Over the years, there is growing and stronger support towards the process. This is reflected with ADMM Plus Cooperation not only in its expanding EWGs but also the high-level exchanges among ASEAN ministers and vice ministers with their dialogue counterparts. There are also interest from countries like the UK, France, Canada and EU to be part or as an observer of the ADMM Plus. This in part is a recognition to the ASEAN that brings together partners for strategic dialogue that contributes to mutual trust and confidence.

The defence and military in ASEAN has moved from dialogue to a more action-oriented cooperation. In the last few years, the region saw multilateral exercises done between ADMM and ADMM Plus. This includes the HADR and MM Exercise in 2013, MS and CT Exercise in 2016, MS Exercise in 2016 and ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise in 2018 that aimed to improve their cooperation, coordination and interoperability; enhances knowledge based on the sharing of best practices; and most importantly to reduce strategic mistrust among one another.

Yet there are challenges in managing the expectations of ADMM and ADMM Plus specifically as an emerging security architecture. Today, ASEAN increasingly faces delicate balance between national or domestic responsibility vs regional commitment as society becomes more involved and the broader interest of other countries for ASEAN to play a more prominent role. The use of ASEAN platforms such as the ADMM Plus, ARF and EAS to further their respective strategic interests calls for ASEAN to keep the agenda focused on the long- term vision to build on the ASEAN Community.

In practical terms, issues such as HADR, Counter-Terrorism and Maritime Security are also discussed in existing multilateral processes namely the AMM, ARF and EAS as well as within ASEAN+3 and cooperation with individual Dialogue Partners. The ADMM and ADMM Plus often overlaps in its agenda focus and cooperation with the ARF, only region-security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region. There is no clear distinction between defence and security yet there is a need for synergy especially in light of constraints in resources and capabilities must be prioritised. The commitments towards practical cooperation particularly in planning of major exercises needs careful consideration and include scenarios that will enhance civil military readiness and response.



Conclusion

As the concept of sustainable security identifies underlying drivers of insecurity and place emphasis on preventive strategies to manage and resolve conflicts in addressing the future of security. This underscores the importance of resilience, early detection and fast recovery so the region remains agile and anticipatory to challenges ahead.

NADI could further contribute in defence and security discourse on strategic challenges with implications to ASEAN. This could cover developments of FoNOPs in East Asia, 'new' strategic concepts such as the Indo-Pacific Strategy of different extra-regional powers, understanding impacts of 4IR technologies and the impact of defence diplomacy towards building APSC and ASEAN Community as a whole.

Summary

The driving factors specifically the foundations that lead to sustainable security from the ASEAN context. In this regard, the ASEAN-wide drivers identified were its collective leadership, comprehensive security approach as well as the importance placed on ASEAN to be inclusive, open and outward looking community. These elements have been further driven in the realisation of ASEAN Political Security Community in particular through the shaping and sharing of norms developed among ASEAN and its dialogue partners. In defence perspectives, sustainable security place importance in the establishment and reaffirmation of good relations between defence and military organisations.

There is growing support towards ASEAN processes and for a stronger ASEAN role. Within the ADMM, this is reflected with a more action oriented cooperation in the form of multinational exercises and high level exchanges among ADMM and its Plus partners. Today, she observed, the challenge lies in managing the expectations of this emerging security architecture from countries outside the region and underscores the importance for ASEAN to retain its driving force in the process. In practical terms, existing ASEAN multilateral processes particularly the ARF overlaps with ADMM agenda and a synergy of cooperation is ever more crucial in light of constraints in resources and capabilities. In the context of increasingly complex security trends, she viewed that ASEAN needs to look further into cross sector cooperative efforts in order to build ASEAN's resilience, early detection/warning and fast recovery so the region remains agile and anticipatory to challenges ahead.



Kingdom of Cambodia

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When speaking of security, we often take military force or balance of power into consideration; with the end state of achieving stability through containment. There is an alternative approach that focuses more on “sustainable security”.

The central focus of sustainable security is the recognition all consequences from conflicts (or insecurity) cannot be controlled. States must work and understand root causes to conflicts before implementing solutions instead of merely contain conflict situations that arises. Policies must work to address true reasons for conflicts. These can be done through a number of measures includes utilizing an integrated analysis of security threats and an application of preventative approach to responses.

Sustainable security requires analysis to make distinctions between trends and other security threats (for example, terrorism or organised crime). It requires focuses on the interconnected long-term drivers of conflicts (or insecurity). Major key drivers to conflicts include:

- 1) **Climate change:** the loss of infrastructure, resource scarcity and the mass displacement of peoples;
- 2) **Competition over resources,** including food, water and energy;
- 3) **Marginalisation: the political,** economic and cultural marginalisation of the vast majority of the world’s population.
- 4) **Global Militarisation:** the increased use of military force.

Asia is a region in transition and uncertainty. The political, economic and societal landscape power shifting, increased in polarity. Climate change and other long-term emerging threats to security are present trends within the ASEAN security dynamic.



They require regional responses and comprehensive and systemic approach that takes into account the interaction of different trends which are generally analysed in isolation by others.

Places particular attention on how the current behaviour of international actors and western governments is contributing to, rather than reducing, insecurity.

Secondly, Sustainable security takes global justice and equity as the key requirements of any sustainable response, together with, the progress towards reform of the global systems of trade, substantial steps towards nuclear disarmament and the control of biological and chemical weapons; and a shift in defence spending to the non-military elements of security. This requires balanced considerations for policies to address the long-term global drivers with the immediate security pre-occupations (foregoes) of ordinary people.

Sustainable security is inherently preventative in nature, in that, it addresses the likely causes of conflict and instability before the ill-effects becomes reality. It builds on elements from previous attempts to reframe thinking on security to include the concepts of common, comprehensive, human, just and non-traditional security. Many of these approaches can be addressed through national security policies.

While there are many immediate security concerns in the region, there are three principal drivers of insecurity over the medium to long-term: Maintaining state integrity, particularly against (i) internal instability, (ii) regional power shift; and (iii) environmental, and; Humanitarian disasters.

In Asia, while shifting power dynamic is, in itself, a potential source of uncertainty and instability, other factors such as terrorism, natural and manmade disasters and the potential impact of trade-war between major powers in the region; can ignite sources of conflict and insecurity.

Among the most serious challenges facing Asia are the numerous environmental and humanitarian disasters affecting the region. In addition, serious food and water security problems rises as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is predicting a shift in rainfall patterns and a decrease in freshwater availability in most of Asia (particularly for those states dependent on Himalayan glacier melt water).

Many drivers of the insecurities outlined above can be addressed. Mechanisms can be put in place to resolve the long-term causes, but there are impediments. These include the regional focus on sovereignty, the lack of inclusive and effective regional security architecture and the absence of a powerful, neutral country to take the lead.



Many of the post-colonial countries in the region are understandably reluctant to compromise their own sovereignty in any way, even if this creates difficulties in addressing pan-regional issues. Often, national security takes precedence over regional stability and global security.

Inclusive regional security:

The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) does encourage such regional communication and has been successful in many respects.

Mechanisms could be developed to prevent the growth of insecurity and conflict in the longer term.

Specific initiatives could include:

- **Climate change:** Countries in the region that are not signatories to the Kyoto Protocol need to recognise that they too have a responsibility to aid stability and cut their greenhouse gas emissions and accept that economic development cannot come at the expense of social and environmental stability. The United States and other developed countries must negotiate a fair post-Kyoto agreement, which should include radically reducing their own emissions.
- **Regional architecture:** International institutions, such as, the United Nations, European Union, and other influential players both within and outside the region, should support the development of a strong, inclusive regional security architecture.
- **Power shift:** President Barack Obama's new administration should accept the rise of China and move from balance-of-power politics to policies of engagement and trust-building, particularly in the areas of trade, environmental protection and regional security.
- **Taking the initiative:** Given the lack of one powerful, respected and neutral country, Asian civil society organisations might draw together an independent, high-level panel of respected individuals, with a particular focus on preventive diplomacy and educating the public and governments on the seriousness of threats facing the region.

Over the next five to ten years, a radical shift towards sustainable approaches to security will be hugely important. A change in thinking could lead to an era of substantial progress in developing a socially just and environmentally sustainable regional order.



Republic of Indonesia

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Introduction

Sustainable security redefines how we think about national security in today's shifting, globalized world. Instead of focusing solely on traditional threats, we also need to help spur greater prosperity, encourage effective international development, and work to protect innocent civilians. Such an approach is good for us and good for others. While we need to maintain a highly capable military, diplomacy and development can often be more cost-effective investments that create new opportunities, prevent crises before military force is required, and better manage our shared challenges.

The central premise of sustainable security is that you cannot successfully control all the consequences of insecurity, but must work to resolve the causes. In other words, 'fighting the symptoms' will not work, you must instead 'cure the disease'. Such a framework must be based on understanding integrated security trends and developing preventative responses.

In order to achieve the sustainable security, ASEAN Defense and Security Cooperation was conceived to address certain nagging questions towards contemporary ASEAN dynamics relations and its responses to several kind of threats. The member states of ASEAN then should take the responsibility to maintain the Southeast Asia regional order which is in this current situation there's must be some obstacle ahead that must be passed. Meanwhile for Southeast Asian member states, security will always have a wide spectrum of issues such as social, cultural, economic, political, and military. Based on that, the conceptual framework of threat become more complex and certainly it might be called as Non-Traditional Security Threats. This essays would examine about the unarguably unique region; ASEAN with its Non-Traditional Threats that currently become shifted significantly since the Cold War. ASEAN by the Defense and Security Cooperation is overcoming these lack of security phase that might be happen if the goals of its Defense and Security Cooperation in ASEAN can't be achieved. Enhancing the Defense and Security Cooperation in the region then become the only way to reduce the potential factors into the lack of security condition.



Problems

Security status in Southeast Asia has changed to become more complex in several times. This complexity of security can be seen from the presence of nontraditional security issues that emerges the course consideration reminding that state security has influenced by several factors which has never been discussed before. It can be viewed as a comprehensive security that characteristically requires non-military responses to address a number of emerging security threats (Anthony, 2008). Non-traditional security challenge undertakes regional dynamic such as common goal of cooperation and regional security management.

This problem becomes important because nontraditional issue has its own impact for domestic area of a state and furthermore giving influence to regional area. This domestic problem is a real threat which is also can be observed as transnational threat influencing Southeast Asia region. The rising of non-traditional security issues in the domestic area related to interstate affair describes the tendency to the growing number of debate and creates emphasis on non-military security concern.

Furthermore, states have always been relating their agendas to non-traditional issue as new security challenge. This trend can be observed while analyzing the changing ASEAN's approach of non-traditional forms that can be understood from ASEAN countries'. Efforts to face problem of terrorism, epidemic disease (transborder health issue), poverty, transnational crimes, natural disaster, maritime security, environmental problems, piracy, human trafficking, and communal violence (Sukma, ASEAN and Non Traditional Security, 2010).

Discussion

Based on natural disaster in sub region, calculation in a periodical time between 1970 to 2014 is total of 11,985 natural disaster events, of which 5,139 (or 42.9 per cent) took place in Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP, 2015). It shows that natural disaster has big impact in Southeast Asia where floods and storms were the most frequent in the region, followed by earthquakes and tsunamis, landslides, epidemic, etc (ESCAP, 2015). Overall, Southeast Asia is the second higher of natural disaster events with 1446 events, followed by East and North East Asia, Pacific and North and Central Asia (ESCAP, 2015).

In a further discussion, this natural disaster trackling begins from domestic issue that can influence regional area, so does Indonesia. Natural disasters are a domestic security concern in Indonesia by identifying Indonesia as one of the world's most vulnerable countries because it has 18,000 islands that have many risks of natural hazard (ADB, 2013). Yet, in its Indonesia's natural disaster often causes many victims and damages in all public



area, with the result that Indonesia should handle this problem by developing human development in many aspects. In giving responsibility respond, Indonesia didn't just involve locally system decision making and national policy, but also there were many cooperations taking under this matter indeed.

Regarding in Tsunami case on December 2004 that it has suffered most casualties, more than 160,000 were in Indonesia and also happened in another countries (France-Presse, 2014). This Tsunami was the worst of the disaster in order to international community provided 7.2 billion dollar in total reconstruction support, comprising 5.2 billion dollar in grants from the government and aid agencies, 1.6 billion dollar from non-government organizations, and 0.4 billion dollar from multilateral and bilateral agencies (ADB, 2013). These parties involvement shows that the effect will happen for many parties and they help each other to trackling all problems together in the framing of cooperation. In the political aspect, regional cooperation can be understood through Indonesia's role in many activities that have common value and goal related to natural disaster management. In the ASEAN countries, priorities on the issues of monitoring, forecasting and early warning of disasters caused by natural hazards are gaining importance, and there is a shift from the traditional response-oriented approach to a mitigation oriented approach (Gupta, 2010).

In addition to natural disaster, maritime security and Armed Robbery is the next challenge. Piracy and armed robbery againts ships are one of the biggest non traditional threat for countries in region. ASEAN is the region with highest number of piracy and armed robbery in the world in 2015. In January-March 2015, there are 21 attempt of attacks in 3 Indonesia; one in Malacca Straits, three in Malaysia, two in Philippines, two in Singapore Straits, one in Thailand and eight in Vietnam (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2015).

Piracy and armed robbery in the South East Asia has increased after the financial crisis in 1997. The aim of those acts usually to ransom acquaring. While in ASEAN there are more diverse goals such as political motivation, transnational syndicate backed and oil theft (Jeong, 2015). There are two vulnarable points of maritime piracy and armed robbery in South East Asia such as Malacca Straits and South China Sea. But the Malacca Straits has higher amount of accidents than South China Sea since it was accounted for 40% of overall global incidents in 2005 (Jiang, 2014). Malacca straits is the strategic trade and oil shipping lines. It is contain 15, 2 billion barrels of crude oil transported (The Diplomat, 2015). It is also passing by 45% of total world trade carrier (Jiang, 2014). Some accidents happened in October 2015 at Malacca Straits such as Lucina Providence LPJ Tanker Panama and Almi Spirit Oil Tanker Liberia (International Maritime Organizaton, 2015). Most of piracies did by small amount of robbers with gun and knife, stollen all of cargo, take hostages, have a suspected



connections with the oil shipping industries and did not hijacked vessels randomly but targeted the most expensive cargo such as an oil (ReCAAP, 2015).

In 2014, South East Asia potential loss because of 185 total piracies attack was 3654 seafarers subjected to attacked, 5 seafarers killed, 227 estimated number of seafarers exposed to attempted boardings, 3.427 number of seafarers exposed to successful boarding. Moreover 289 known number of seafarers held hostage, 800 seafarers subjected to violence or threat of violence. Then 51% of attacks involved weapons, 64% of attacks occurred near the Malacca or Singapore Straits (Matthew R. Walje, 2014). Therefore maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships should become focus attention for South East Asia. There are two approaches to solve those problems. First, by enhancing regional initiatives and second is to curb piracy incidents with external forces by dispatching international naval ships (Jeong, 2015).

There are some institutions that handled the maritime piracy in South East Asia such as International Maritime Bureau (IMB) which is the part of International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), International Maritime Organization and Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). So ASEAN can start to strengthening the role of those institution and internal cooperation to against the maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships.

Recommendation

To build sustainable security in ASEAN, its member countries need to prioritize cooperation in handling issues that are common problems together. The issue of non-traditional security such as natural disasters, terrorism and climate change, as well as various other humanitarian issues must be a priority. Therefore it is recommended:

1. Strengthening the institutions and mechanism for cooperation to secure the human development process.
2. To continue to promote the importance of creating the environment in order to maintain security sustainability to face the transnational security threats.

Summary

The recent threat of AMS (ASEAN member states) is non traditional security issues, Therefore AMS should be strengthening the institutions and mechanisms for cooperation to secure the human development process and to continue promoting the importance of creating the environment in order to maintain security sustainability.



Malaysia

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In today's globally connected world, a sustainable national security policy cannot be achieved through national capabilities alone. Security actions or resolutions based merely on containment would be ineffective in the long run as it will only create a pressure cooker effect. Chris Abbot of the Oxford Research Group singled out four main drivers of insecurities that sustainable security should focus which are Extreme climate changes, Race for resources, Marginalisation of the 'majority world' and Global militarization.

Bilateral and multilateral engagement through defence diplomacy between AMS plays a pivotal role in addressing current security threats. Managing distrust (trust deficit) and building trust between AMS and other partners must be ramped up through more practical CBM. Escalating ethnic and religious conflicts within the region have caused the mass exodus of marginalized communities to flee and seek refuge in the neighboring states. This catastrophic humanitarian crisis has also greatly impacted Malaysia's social structure with emerging social issues such as the involvement of illegal refugees in transnational organized crimes, spread of epidemic diseases. AMS need to seriously work together in addressing the continuous influx of illegal immigrants and resolve it based on humanitarian grounds and adherence to human rights principle.

While terrorism has been recognized as serious threat to regional security, its impact on the economy cannot be disregarded. The launching of the Our Eyes Initiative (OEI) or ASEAN Our Eyes Initiative (AOEI) underscores the importance of multilateral cooperation given the transnational nature of the threat. Although there would be challenges in the operationalisation aspect of it, AMS should contribute expeditiously towards the full realization of this platform. The complexity of the South China Sea issue has increased with major powers confrontation, airspace over flights and issues of freedom of navigation. In order to preserve ASEAN Centrality and its leading role as a meaningful actor in the SCS issue, it is essential for it to achieve the peaceful resolution it has stressed in particular the Code of Conduct (COC).

For the past years the importance of HADR has been highlighted in numerous paragraphs within the Joint Declaration of the ADMM. Furthermore, AMS leaders at the highest level have all signed the ASEAN Declaration on One ASEAN, One Response in September 2016. Malaysia being the initiator of ASEAN Military Ready Group (AMRG) on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (AMRG on HADR) is currently in the process of operationalising and testing the AMRG on HADR SOP. It is hoped that AMS will give full support in providing relevant personnel during the testing of AMRG on HADR SOP.



Republic of the Philippines

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Sustaining security, defined as just and lasting peace, is about making long-term investments in government capacities, internal socio-political stability, and international cooperation. Sustainable security is about strengthening the foundations of a free and prosperous society where chances of conflict and risks of instability are managed, if not totally eliminated. In order for ASEAN to effectively promote sustainable regional stability, member countries, individually and collectively, must make long-term investments in achieving domestic political stability and maritime border security. At the domestic level, drivers that lead to sustainable security includes battle for the hearts and minds of the people, peaceful negotiations and meaningful autonomy, government presence in previously ungoverned spaces, and economic opportunities based on traditional trade. At the international level, institutionalized maritime border cooperation is also a driver for sustainable security.

ASEAN in general and ADMM in particular must look into cooperation on local governance and maritime border patrol. Strengthening local governance, which also involves the civil society and private sector, is one of the effective ways in establishing government presence in previously ungoverned spaces. ASEAN or ADMM can serve as platform or catalyst for consultation in this regard. With support from the ASEAN community, basic social services, law and order, a vibrant economy may result from improving local governance, especially in rural and remote areas. Maritime border cooperation can also elevate law-enforcement presence in maritime areas, thereby minimizing chances of transnational crimes. ADMM can help facilitate closer interactions between and among local governments, small- and medium-scale enterprises, local economies, traditional trading communities, law enforcement agencies, and military units assigned in sensitive rural and maritime areas. Particular areas of concern include customs and immigration, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, trade of strategic goods, and trade of illicit goods. ASEAN in general and ADMM in particular should explore more creative and region-wide ways in countering violent extremist ideology, involving mainstream and social media, and ensuring that thought leaders, opinion-makers, and cultural figures are onboard. If terrorists operate as one network across the region, it makes sense if countries in that same region coordinate both contents and approaches in countering violent extremism. The region must address distortions of historical facts, the counterproductive nature of violence, the commonalities among cultures, and the sinister objectives of violent extremists. Particular target of peace and deradicalization efforts should be the youth, both within and outside formal schooling. Social media accounts and online platforms that are believed to be facilitating violent ideology should also be monitored closely, and regional intelligence cooperation on this matter should be intensified.



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Whole-of-government approaches are crucial for ASEAN to achieve sustainable security. To tackle underlying security issues, ASEAN must also strive for greater international cooperation in every sector, and continue established cooperation under its three pillars. In terms of political security, the region is experiencing increase major power rivalries, which threatens to divide ASEAN. To maintain unity, AMS must make conscious efforts to understand each others' core interests. In the economic realm, ASEAN as a bloc has huge economic potential and is predicted to become the world's fourth largest economy by 2030. However, growing trends towards protectionism in the US present risks for ASEAN. An open and inclusive international trading system is crucial for the region's sustained economic growth. In terms of socio-cultural security, the region is faced with growing fault lines among communities in the region, which have been intensifying through the spread of fake news via social media. At the same time, radicalisation continues to be a major threat. More social interactions across all sectors are crucial for improving mutual understanding and helping to forge a sense of community within ASEAN.

For the consideration of the ADMM:

- 1) ASEAN must remain neutral in the face of pressures from external powers, on contentious issues such as the South China Sea. ASEAN should continue to work towards a Code of Conduct for peace and stability in the South China Sea.
- 2) ASEAN centrality must be maintained to ensure it remains in the driver's seat in terms of regional agenda setting.
- 3) ASEAN should support all economic initiatives which can bring about regional growth and development without choosing sides.



Kingdom of Thailand

Colonel Nirut Duangpanya

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The world politic tends to change into many powers, with the United States facing challenges from Russia and China. In addition, getting of the new global economic power such as BRICs, consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa; increasingly role in the international stage and also need to define the rules of the world with significant movements in the international economy trade and investment. This is a challenge and a creating of new power, and has a tendency to affect changes in the world order, both politic and economy. These situations result to ASEAN to have implemented flexible policies in order to maintain the balance of relations between ASEAN and superpowers. In addition, the security factor on energy, environment and natural disaster are major issues. In particular, seeking new energy resources may lead to international conflicts while environmental factor such as climate change is directly affects to natural disaster and more severe. It is necessary to have international cooperation to cope with the disaster, and balance superpowers that may interfere in the countries or using a trade barrier.

Expanding the influence and role of the superpowers in Southeast Asia, the policy has been changed. It reflects the trend of competition and the expansion of the superpowers, both in the form of military power and economic power in order to support their benefits. Of cause, the intervention from the superpowers in the internal affairs of various countries in this region, if there is a conflict; it may impact to ASEAN security and interests.

At present, transnational threats are rapidly expanding according to the globalization that affects the overall of economy, politic, society and national security, especially the effects of terrorism and transnational crimes. In the issue of terrorism, the driving forces of ideological struggle remains strong and expand their ideology and belief to people in areas that have risk conditions and are ready to change themselves to be terrorists in many forms. The conditions that are important driving factors are the rancor caused by getting unfair in economy, society, politic, and identities of race and culture. In addition, the dissemination of extremist narrative of international terrorism and extremist groups in Southeast Asia are still remaining. In both the terrorism from extremist groups in area which are inspired by foreign countries and infiltrating operations from terrorist groups outside the region.



Summary

For ASEAN, to maintain sustainable regional security must be aware of the driving force from the root causes in every dimension, which considering from STEEP-M. The driving factors that lead to sustainable security in each dimension are

1) Social and cultural dimension (S): consists of reducing social inequality in all aspects, creating awareness and exchange of multi-cultural societies, especially in level of people to people, and focusing on human resources as well as promoting lifelong learning to be able to adapt to the changing of environment and technology.

2) Technology dimension (T): consists of preparation for cyber security, promoting technology competitiveness, and promoting biotechnology including space technology.

3) Economic dimension (E): consists of preparation for dealing with the trade competition of the superpowers, using of modern technology to support in economic operations such as production process, analysis system, transportation system etc., and promoting economic cooperation within ASEAN.

4) Environmental dimension (En): consists of preparation to cope with disasters in various forms, creating awareness of the importance of the environment, promoting creative tourism, and promoting the use of clean energy.

5) Politic dimension (P): consists of reducing of corruption, preparing for the competition of superpowers in the regional, building trust each other, creating cooperation to prevent in non-traditional threat.

6) Military dimension (M): includes promoting in disaster relief on a crisis situations such as tsunami, earthquake, flood, etc., Build ASEAN capacity to the world stage such as organizing peacekeeping forces in the name of ASEAN, using defense diplomacy to reduce misunderstandings such as meetings, sharing information, etc.



Socialist Republic of Vietnam

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The world and region have been witnessing a period of upheavals and uncertainties, when each nation and individual have to face constant threats to their own security and safety. Security and sustainable security have become the common goals pursued by each individual, nation and the whole international community.

There have been not a common concept of sustainable security so far. However, there are two popular approaches to sustainable security. First, sustainable security seeks to compromise short-term security needs with longterm goals of developing a legitimate and feasible security system. In other words, it is a process to identify and address root causes of insecurity. Second, sustainable security is a harmonious combination of people's individual security and safety and security of nations, regions, and the whole world.

Southeast Asia is situated in an area which connects the Indian Ocean, Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Due to its position of strategic importance, peace, stability, and security of the region are not only of benefit to regional countries but also to those in the Indian Ocean, Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Nevertheless, regional security continues to witness many complex developments, which potentially threatens sustainable security in Southeast Asia. These factors are as follows:

First, power politics focusing on power, the use or threat use of force, and increasing unilateral actions continues to be threats to global peace and stability. In fact, national interests do not always coincide with those of the whole region and the world. Some nations with superior power and influence take unilateral actions regardless of law. There actions have created bad precedents in ignoring law, threatening sovereignty and benefit of other countries and peace and stability of the region. Sustainable stability can only be established in the region and the world when inter-state relations are developed on the basis of equality, mutual respect and law. National interests harmonise with those of the region and international community.

Second, strategic competition between major powers in the region is increasingly fierce. Southeast Asia has become an area for geopolitical competition between major powers, especially between the United States and China. Major powers have ceaselessly enhanced



their presence and competed for influence in the region by all means, including military. Military presence of major powers in the seas of paramount importance is likely to increase the risk of collision and confrontation, or even armed conflict at sea. Additionally, it is likely to weaken mechanisms for multilateral security cooperation, including ASEAN-led mechanisms.

Third, unresolved disputes over sovereignty and natural resources and existing divergences may cause tension in the region. Despite effort to settle disputes made by concerning parties through regional cooperative mechanisms, fundamental issues and root causes of disputes have not been addressed.

Fourth, nontraditional security issues, particularly challenges to human security, are witnessing complex, unpredictable developments, which exceed the coping capacity of a single nation. Terrorism and violent extremism; risk of religious and ethnic conflict; cyber security; environmental security; food security; and climate change are the biggest challenges. In addition, the growing gap between rich and poor, social inequality, and differences in the levels of development between countries are exerting a strong influence on sociopolitical stability in some nations and the whole region. Many people in the region, especially the most vulnerable groups, are not entitled to achievements, and face the risk of being left out of the developmental processes, thus driving them to extremism.

In order to establish sustainable security in Southeast Asia, ASEAN member states need to carry out a number of synchronous and comprehensive measures as follows:

First, upholding rule of law, opposing use or threat use of force in international relations, and creating a real convergence of national and regional interests and those of the international community. Second, investing effort in resolving disputes and divergences by peaceful means on the basis of international law, and promoting conclusion of an equitable and effective South China Sea Code of Conduct.

Third, strengthening solidarity and consensus between ASEAN member states in the context of upheavals in the region and strategic competition between major powers, and firmly preserving ASEAN's central role in regional mechanisms for security cooperation, especially the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM+), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and East Asia Summit (EAS).

Fourth, enhancing cooperation in building an increasingly prosperous ASEAN Community, promoting cooperation in economic development to narrow the development gap between countries and regions, and spurring people-to-people exchange and cultural exchange with the aim of building a cohesive, tolerant community in diversification.



Fifth, deepening cooperation in coping with nontraditional security issues such as climate change, environmental security, food security, water security, and so forth.

Sustainable security is an aspiration and goal pursued by all nations. This is an enduring, difficult process, which can be only accomplished when all nations make joint effort on the basis of responsibility, equality, and mutual respect for the benefit of each nation and the whole region.

Summary

Sustainable security seeks to compromise short-term security needs with long-term goals of developing a legitimate and feasible security system. It can be also coined to describe a harmonious combination of people's individual security and safety and security of nations, regions, and the whole world. Sustainable security in Southeast Asia is facing a number challenges, including violent thinking, strategic competition between major powers in the region, unresolved disputes over sovereignty and natural resources and existing divergences, and nontraditional security issues.

Sustainable security is an aspiration and goal pursued by all nations. In order to establish sustainable security in Southeast Asia, ASEAN member states should try their best to establish a law-based regional order; oppose use or threat use of force in international relations; invest effort in resolving disputes and divergences by peaceful means on the basis of international law, and promote conclusion of an equitable and effective South China Sea Code of Conduct; strengthen solidarity and consensus between ASEAN member states; enhance cooperation in building an increasingly prosperous ASEAN Community; and deepen cooperation in coping with nontraditional security issues.

Practical Cooperation for the Future of ASEAN Security





Lao People's Democratic Republic

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Amidst the international situation, the world is in a constant state of change that is difficult to predict namely: the tensions in the South China Sea, the dispute in the Korean Peninsula, the war in Syria in which violence continues to elevate, terrorism, the conflict in the Middle-East and the trade war between China and the United States of America which have vastly impacted all aspects of the World economy. This constant state of unpredictability and issues have sent negative impacts to the state of security of the world.

In a similar light, ASEAN continues to face various forms of challenges such as: terrorism, transnational crime, illicit trade, cyber crimes and natural disasters. Furthermore, major powers are also trying to expand their influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Under these circumstances, ASEAN must be prepared to respond to these challenges in order to ensure the protection of peace, stability and unity of the ASEAN Community.

As the ASEAN faces these international and regional circumstances, it is my opinion that continuing to strengthen practical cooperation for the future of ASEAN security especially on counter terrorism, developing computer security systems and enhancing the capacity to respond to natural disasters in the ASEAN region is of utmost importance.

Firstly, strengthening cooperation to counter terrorism efforts which all countries and organizations have attached great importance to this issue seen apparently with the signing international treaties to combat terrorism as well as implementing the ASEAN Convention on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism in 2003. Therefore, in the future we must continue to build on this momentum and enhance activities to train and strengthen capacity to counter terrorism as well as the exchange of information and valuable experiences especially at the technical level so that knowledge on this particular issue can be circulated and shared efficiently.

Secondly, on practical cooperation on enhancing computer security, we have seen that at the present computer security issues have become a large threat to all countries around the world. In the advent of the ICT era, terrorist groups have found methods in utilizing computer networks to destroy their targets or cyber attacks. According to reports published by News agencies has shown that many countries in the region are directly affected by



cyber attacks. This shows the risk inherent in computer security systems. Base on the Joint Declaration by the ADMM in Singapore on the 19th of October 2018, it was expressed that cooperation on enhancing computer security systems specifically in the ASEAN region is an urgent issue that is incremental to alleviate challenges in this area. More specifically, we must strengthen cooperation on the technical and expert level as well as cooperation on modern technologies and computer security programmes. If ASEAN member countries are prepared and readily equipped on Cyber Security than we will be able to respond effectively to cyber attacks in the future. In order to accomplish these goals to strengthen cyber security capacity, we will need to rely on support from many countries around the world especially developed countries.

Thirdly, practical cooperation is needed on assistance and helping victims of natural disasters or HADR. We know full well that the world is facing problems from global warming which has resulted in emergence of various natural disasters around the world namely: droughts, floods, tsunamis, earthquakes and forest fires. This has directly impacted the livelihoods and well-being of the population residing in the ASEAN region. The collapse of the saddle dam in the Lao PDR stems from the effect of increased water volumes from continuous rainfall. Pertaining to this national disaster, the Government of the Lao PDR has received support from many counties and international organizations to enhance relief efforts to the affected areas. However, at the present, these areas still are unable to return to its original state and still must rely on a long term solution. Therefore, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting have agreed in consensus that the enhancement of cooperation on HADR must continue into the future specifically on developing a clear, concise and consistent plan for training cooperation as well as facilitating the exchange of information that is modern and swift by relying on experts and modern technologies.

In Conclusion, these are the points that would to raise on today's thematic focus which is the "Practical Cooperation for the Future of ASEAN Security".



Republic of the Union of Myanmar

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The wide array of security challenges remains to be a threat to the peace and prosperity of ASEAN. We are currently confronted with several security challenges as a region and as individual countries. It has become imperative for us to engage our neighbors and partners across the region to find collective solutions to address these challenges. ASEAN Member States (AMSs) must deal with security challenges in partnership with each other. Indeed, the need to deal with these challenges is the foremost driver for cooperation.

Mechanisms including the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and the ADMM-Plus enable regional countries to cooperate in addressing the various security challenges. Through these mechanisms, we are able to discuss how security challenges could affect our region and our respective states and how we could collaborate to address our common concerns. Today, the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus not only facilitate dialogue but also promote practical cooperation as well through the conduct of activities and exercises.

The promotion of practical cooperation indeed enables regional states to address security challenges and at the same time contribute in the building of a security community in Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific. Cooperation in dealing with some of security challenges might become difficult because of some fundamental differences of views. But I think those domains, namely HADR, counter-terrorism, military medicine and cyber security, might be easier for states to cooperate.

Cyber security issue would be main security challenges for our region near future and each country has to prepare for it. Meanwhile, we also need to cooperate and coordinate with other countries in dealing with cyber security threats and challenges.

In order to secure ASEAN security, practical cooperation among AMSs is very important. At the same time, increasing mutual trust and understanding are important as well. We need to mind the fundamental principles of ASEAN like noninterference in the internal affairs of one another, mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, and national identity of others.



Summary

ASEAN will be able to maintain present situation of regional peace and stability in spite of traditional and non-traditional security challenges would be key issues and challenges for our region in the next 2 decades. Cooperation is needed among AMSs in order to strengthen the three pillars of ASEAN, namely: the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), and the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC).

The promotion of practical cooperation indeed enables regional states to address security challenges and at the same time contribute in the building of a security community in Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific. Cooperation in dealing with some of security challenges might become difficult because of some fundamental differences of views. But HADR, counter-terrorism, military medicine and cyber security, might be easier for states to cooperate. We need to ensure that ASEAN will remain united and relevant in the next decades. The most important one we have to ensure is ASEAN centrality and all of platforms, mechanisms and cooperation must reaffirm it.



Republic of Indonesia

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Introduction

Mindful of the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, which, inter alia, undertakes to strengthen cooperation at bilateral, regional and international levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner. Reaffirming the commitment to counter, prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, international law and all the relevant United Nations resolutions or declarations on international terrorism, in particular the principles outlined in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1267 and 1390.

Viewing acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed wherever, whenever and by whomsoever, as a profound threat to international peace and security, which require concerted action to protect and defend all peoples and the peace and security of the world.

Indonesia's strategy to fight terrorism is to involve former terrorists to carry out deradicalization which we call a "soul approach" of deradicalization, but on the other hand we also prepare other capabilities in fighting terrorism as an anticipatory measure. The ability that we honed was through bilateral cooperation with America.

Cooperation

The implementation of cooperation in dealing with acts of terrorism is applied in carrying out job desks on established programs, namely Anti Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program through the Bureau of Diplomatic Security US for National Police Terrorism Detachment 88, and Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) through the Department of Defense (DoD) for the TNI.

Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program in Detachment 88

This program is in the form of assistance and training in handling terrorism based on law enforcement specifically given by the FBI. The US also funds training for these special forces through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program. Likewise, other assistance in the form of special anti-terror equipment.



Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) in the TNI

CTFP was established to build partnerships in global war on terror through non lethal training, combating terrorism (CbT) training and training. CTFP provides counter-terrorism education and training directly to mid-level / senior international military officers, the ministry of defense, and security officials (United States Department of Defense, 2008: i).

CTFP for Indonesian military forces, the TNI, more specifically through the US Pacific Command or USPACOM (United States Pacific Command). CTFP trainings for the TNI are: Comprehensive Security Responses to Terrorism, Military and Peacekeeping Operations, Boarding Officer Course, Military Intelligence Captains Career Course, International Counterterrorism Fellows Program, Intelligence in Combating Terrorism, Special Operations and Combating Terrorism Course, Port Security/ Vulnerability , CTFP Continuing Education Event Continuing Education, Event Civil-Military Responses to Terrorism, Special Operations Program - Curriculum 699 (United States Department of Defense, 2008: 28).

Indonesia also did combat terrorism cooperation bilaterally with ASEAN countries, but on this occasion we did not discuss it. In the regional context collaboration in handling terrorism that has been running in Southeast Asia is in the form of intelligence exchange cooperation which is referred as “our eyes”. Our eyes program is to monitor the international networking of terrorism and its activities, which are then informed by all country members of our eyes to do anticipate terrorist movements in their respective countries. The activity of our eyes is adopted from the principle of five eyes cooperation.

The Five Eyes, often abbreviated as FVEY, is an Anglophone Intelligence Alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. These countries are UKUSA agreements to joint cooperation in signals intelligence. In FVEY all intelligence powers are deployed which can be seen in the following table:



Country	Agency	Abbr	Role[1]
Australia	Australian Secret Intelligence Service	ASIS	Human intelligence
	Australian Signals Directorate	ASD	Signal intelligence
	Australian Security Intelligence Organisation	ASIO	Security intelligence
	Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation	AGO	Geo intelligence
	Defence Intelligence Organisation	DIO	Defence intelligence
Canada	Canadian Forces Intelligence Command	CFINTCOM	Defence intelligence, Geo Intelligence
	Communications Security Establishment	CSE	Signal intelligence
	Canadian Security Intelligence Service	CSIS	Human intelligence, Security intelligence
	Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security	DDIS	Defence intelligence
	Government Communications Security Bureau	GCSB	Signal intelligence
New Zealand	New Zealand Security Intelligence Service	NZSIS	Human intelligence
United Kingdom	Defence Intelligence	DI	Defence intelligence
	Government Communications Headquarters	GCHQ	Signal intelligence
	Security Service	MI5	Security intelligence
	Secret Intelligence Service	MI6, SIS	Human intelligence
United States	Central Intelligence Agency	CIA	Human intelligence
	Defense Intelligence Agency	DIA	Defense intelligence
	Federal Bureau of Investigation	FBI	Security intelligence
	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency	NGA	Geo intelligence
	National Security Agency	NSA	Signal intelligence

The cooperation of “OUR EYES” is also expected to lead to the mobilization of all potential intelligence from each ASEAN country in an effort to monitor the network and activities of International Terrorism in ASEAN. The joint action to eradicate terrorism adheres to the working principles outlined in the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Fight Terrorism with the following principles:



I. Continue and improve intelligence and terrorist financing information sharing on counter-terrorism measures, including the development of more effective counter-terrorism policies and legal, regulatory and administrative counter-terrorism regimes.

II. Enhance liaison relationships amongst their law enforcement agencies to engender practical counter-terrorism regimes.

III. Strengthen capacity-building efforts through training and education; consultations between officials, analysts and field operators; and seminars, conferences and joint operations as appropriate.

IV. Provide assistance on transportation, border and immigration control challenges, including document and identity fraud to stem effectively the flow of terrorist-related material, money and people.

V. Comply with United Nations, Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1267, 1390 and other United Nations resolutions or declarations on international terrorism.

VI. Explore on a mutual basis additional areas of cooperation.

Conclusion

To eradicate terrorism in the global and regional cooperation context, the ways of cooperation that can be done is by:

- Collaboration in the form of assistance cooperation in fighting terrorism to be more effective in tackling terrorism
- Collaboration in the form of Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program to build partnerships in global war on terror.
- Intelligence exchange cooperation in combating terrorism in the form of a framework of “our eyes” cooperation

Summary

Mindful of the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, which, inter alia, undertakes to strengthen cooperation at bilateral, regional and international levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner. Reaffirming the commitment to counter, prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts in accordance with the Charter of the United



Nations, international law and all the relevant United Nations resolutions or declarations on international terrorism. To eradicate terrorism in the global and regional cooperation context, the ways of cooperation that can be done is by: Collaboration in the form of assistance cooperation in fighting terrorism; Collaboration in the form of Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program to build partnerships in global war on terror; and Intelligence exchange cooperation in combating terrorism in the form of a framework of “our eyes” cooperation



Malaysia

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As Asean member states invest more in military capabilities in the cyber space, the need for rules and norms of responsible state behaviour becomes very pressing. To avoid surprise attacks, unintended and accidental encounters by states, proxies, and false flags, for example, Asean states can emulate NATO which has produced a document on international law governing military cyber operations.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations has been long on promises but short on implementation when it comes to cooperation on cyber security. The Asean member states have been discussing need to combat cyber-attacks and terrorists misuse of the cyberspace since 2006 (Asean Regional Forum, 28 July 2006). More significantly, the Asean Summit at Manila in November 2017 adopted a number of measures to cooperate and prevent cybercrimes. They included need to harmonise laws on cybercrimes and electronic evidence as well as the need to cooperate with Asean Dialogue Partners. There was also commitment to work closely with agencies like ASEANPOL, EUROPOL and the INTERPOL.

There is no shortage of resolutions in Asean calling for cybersecurity cooperation and combatting cybercrimes. But so far, beyond rhetoric there is little real commitment to establish the norms of responsible state behaviour among the ten-member states. At the recent 51st Asean Foreign Ministers meeting at Singapore (August 2018), the Ministers further reaffirmed commitment:

- To formalise an Asean cyber security mechanism to coordinate cyber security.
- To support the eleven voluntary, non-binding norms recommended in the 2015 Report of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the context of International Security (UNGGE).
- To focus on regional capacity building in implementing the agreed norms.
- To form the Asean Network Security Action Council (ANSAC) to prepare a proposal paper for “a formal ASEAN cybersecurity coordination mechanism”.



The time is now ripe for Asean to seize the opportunity to concretise the paper commitment. Over the years, most notably since 2006, there has been a significant rise in the number of cyber incidents and cyber mercenaries worldwide. The national critical infrastructure-banking systems, water treatment plants, power grids, ports and roads-have become vulnerable to hacking and other forms of cybercrimes. So far, no Asean member has admitted of similar attacks. However, attacks on critical infrastructure have already occurred in Iran, United States, Ukraine and Estonia, among others. In 2010, the US and Israel intelligence used a malware-the Stuxnet-to partially disable the Iranian nuclear weapon programme. The Stuxnet was the first digital weapon used by a nation-state to intentionally cause “physical damage to an adversary’s industrial control system.”

While blaming Israel, North Korea, China, Iran and Russia for cybercrimes, the US is no saint. According to the Guardian “more than 45,000 attacks recorded in ninety-nine countries including the UK, Russia, India and China in 2017 may have originated with the “theft” of ‘cyber weapons’ from the US National Security Agency”.

In the past, cyber-attacks have rarely created political risks. They now do as national assets are digitised, easy targets to cyber mercenaries. Security in the digital domain becomes more complex when governments, state-owned companies and proxies also use the cyber space for coercive power projection purposes, where the lines between offense and defence are blurred.

In 2016, the US Cyber Command awarded one contract worth US\$460 million to “six private companies to undertake offensive cyber operations.” In the Worldwide Threat Assessment (2019), the CIA posits that “the potential for surprise in the cyber realm will increase in the next year and beyond as billions more digital devices are connected-with relatively little built-in security-and both nation states and malign actors become more emboldened and better equipped in the use of increasingly widespread cyber toolkits.”

The WTA reckons the US will be a major target of cyber operations. To deter the threat, the US has empowered the Cyber Command to launch cyber-attacks on the guilty foreign nations and their proxies. According to the WTA, some forty countries have the capability to mount cyber-attacks, a fourfold increase since 2011.

David Sanger revealed in *The Perfect Weapon* that, since 2015, the US military has armed its Cyber Command with an offensive virus capable of dismantling Iran. Operation Zeus Nitro was devised to disable “Iran’s air defences, communications systems and crucial parts of its power grid” as back-up to the Stuxnet.



The biggest challenge in managing the security in the cyber domain is the absence of internationally recognised rules similar to the Geneva Convention of 1949. The UNGGE was tasked in 2016/2017 session of the UN General Assembly with the study of “existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security” and measures to address them, including “norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviour of states, confidencebuilding measures, and capacity-building.” Without support from the member states, the UNGEE process has reached a dead end. Reason: many states are not willing to surrender sovereign right over cyber security to the United Nations.

Under the current UN Charter, any state can use force to retaliate against an aggression by invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter: the “inherent right of self- defence”. Suppose Saudi Arabia were to classify a cyber- attack from a foreign source (e.g., Iran) on one of its critical assets as an act of aggression and take reprisal measures in self-defence, would it not clandestinely start a new war in the Middle East? The tit-for-tat dynamics is precisely why David Sanger warns cyberweapons can be so effective for “states of all sizes” to exercise coercive influence cheaply “without starting a shooting war.”

The absence of international law regulating military activities in cyberspace, which accounts for the inherent right of self-defence and the law of state responsibility, plus the authorised countermeasures under the doctrine of self-help can be fatal to the longheld concept of sovereignty. Hence, rules preventing aggression and intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states via the cyber space are critical to maintain international peace and order.

Whether in the cyber or terrestrial domain, an invasion is still invasion. Not only we cannot see the movement of troops across borders, we only learn of the identity of the perpetrators post incidence. Although cyber weapons have upended the traditional definition of force under international law, such activities remain illegal.

The problems of anonymity, secrecy and attribution are peculiar to cyberwarfare. Nationstates can hide their cyber operations by outsourcing them to third parties. Often, the effect of cyber operations hardly creates any physical damage unlike in a typical conventional military operation. As Asean member states invest more in military capabilities in cyberspace, the need for rules becomes very pressing.

To avoid surprise attacks, unintended and accidental encounters by states, proxies, and false flags, for example, the Asean member states can emulate the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which produced the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the international law applicable to cyber operations. Although these rules are not binding, they provide a framework for cooperation and confidence building.



Calling on the Asean Defence Ministers Meeting, to jointly develop the rules for military operations in the cyber domain as a matter of urgency.

Summary

As Asean member states invest more in military capabilities in the cyber space, the need for rules and norms of responsible state behaviour becomes very pressing. To avoid surprise attacks, unintended and accidental encounters by states, proxies, and false flags, for example, Asean states can emulate NATO which has produced a document on international law governing military cyber operations.



Republic of the Philippines

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Southeast Asian countries continue to face both traditional and non-traditional security challenges, which undermine peace, stability and economic prosperity within the region, hence, the necessity for practical security cooperation within ASEAN. ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Groups (EWG) forge practical security cooperation in seven key (7) areas: maritime security; terrorism; cyber security; humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR); peacekeeping operations; military medicine; and humanitarian mine action. The underlying theme in addressing these security challenges is cooperation, coordination and collaboration.

The Philippines actively participates in various initiatives and mechanisms aimed at concretizing practical cooperation to address the abovementioned key areas. In maritime security, the Philippines encourages continuing respect by all parties of the ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the expeditious conclusion of the Code of Conduct (COC). On terrorism, the Trilateral Cooperative Agreement (TCA) can be used as a template by other AMS and international partners to develop context-specific counter-terrorism and border security measures. Cybersecurity initiatives include crafting point-of-contact directories, compiling terminology glossaries, devising communication plans, and organizing seminars for subject matter experts. On HADR, the Philippines contributes to the development of a unified disaster response mechanism. The Philippines also promotes the sharing of best practices at peacekeeping centers throughout ASEAN.



Republic of Singapore

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Singapore focused on three major NTS issues: counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. It will highlight how ASEAN governments should strengthen national organisational structures and laws to deal with radicalization, including developing long-term plans for the military and police to work. For cybersecurity, he highlighted how Singapore's Ministry of Defence is developing capabilities as part of a total national effort, and how Singapore has been building cooperation with regional countries. However, momentum for HADR cooperation appears to have slowed in recent times due partly to the affected ASEAN Member States making a greater effort to manage their situation. The presentation will highlight the lack of clear framework for national coordination centres, the need to promote a regional monitoring and coordination centre to be more effective in responding to regional disasters as proposed by NADI in previous meetings and workshops, and how technological advancements could be used to expedite HADR efforts.

In view of the above, The following recommendations are for the consideration of the ADMM:

1) On the growing terrorist threats in the region, the ADMM should cooperate closely with the Plus countries in the sharing of information and intelligence as well as to enhance the capabilities of the AMS so that they would be able to as to respond more effectively to the terrorist threats. AMS should also develop longer term plans for the military and police to work together.

2) On HADR, each ASEAN country could enhance its current focal point into a national coordination centre that will include the military, civilian disaster response agency and other related organisations. ASEAN and ADMM could continue to study the possibility of establishing a "Regional Crisis Management and Response Centre" to coordinate HADR efforts with the proposed national coordination centres. In addition to existing centres such as the AHA Centre, ACMM and AMRG, the RHCC and the IFC could be part of the regional coordinating efforts to develop better and more effective regional level responses to national disasters and crises in the region. AMS should also consider using technological advancements to expedite HADR efforts.



3) ASEAN could promote national and regional capacity building in the cybersecurity sectors and closer cooperation among the ASEAN countries. The Singapore International Cyber Week (SICW) and the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on Cybersecurity will be useful platforms for further networking and the enhancing of cooperation in the ICT sectors among regional countries and with the ASEAN Dialogue Partners to promote a safer digital domain. An ASEAN-wide cybersecurity training centre should be established. AMS should also strengthen governance of the cyber and digital domains and start to develop cyber norms and rules.



Kingdom of Thailand

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SWOT analysis

First of all, we do SWOT analysis of ASEAN in dealing with climate change. The results appear as follows.

1) **Opportunities** include

- ASEAN is friendly, open mind and has trust.
- There is unity so has bargaining power, as in the case of ASEAN plus.
- For international relation, have a good friendly with all countries.
- Emerging trend of new industries.
- The industry trend in ASEAN is growing.
- Be a logistic hub.
- Have the opportunity to be a center for communication technology.

2) **The obstacle and challenge** include

- People have little knowledge and awareness in this matter.
- Each area has differences in culture and belief.
- There is an ASEAN way which makes the policy agreement rather slow and difficult.
- There is a problem of corruption.
- There is an inequality in economy and wage.
- There are same or similar products in region so making it competitive.

3) **Strength** include

- Being an ASEAN Community has more power in bargaining.
- Being important geopolitics.
- Characteristics are flexible and compromise.
- There are multicultural society and has an attractive culture.
- There is coordination in policy level such as AHA Center.
- Have expertise in dealing with different disasters.



4) The weakness include

- People are not ready for disaster response.
- Each country consider on country benefits or country strategy more than ASEAN benefit or ASEAN strategy.
- Still cannot work together, during a disaster.
- Staff lacking skill to deal with disaster.
- Lack of awareness for prevention.

Guideline for practical cooperation

From the 4 future scenarios of ASEAN, in case of climate change, it can be analyzed to define the resources and tools for creating appropriate ways to build practical cooperation for the future of ASEAN to cope with climate change are

1) In the first phase, ASEAN should have a quality selection process of leader and should have a suitable term for office, which a period of time in 5 years should be appropriated because it can be able to drive the policies to be practical such as

- Arrangement of mutual agreements to rescue, relieves, and restores humanitarian victims.
- Determining guidelines for sharing resources to prevent damage from disaster.
- Creating mutual and worthily in mechanisms / measures for sharing resources / technology.
- Arrangement / issue guidelines, rules, and order for disaster management by taking the mutual benefits of ASEAN.

2) In the next 10 years period, ASEAN should establish a cooperation mechanism or have a channel to get support from dialogue countries / countries from outside the region, or other friendly countries such as

- Build cooperation with the superpowers in disaster management.
- Strengthen cooperation with friendly countries in politics, economy and society.
- Establish alliances in negotiating trade and tax agreements at both bilateral level and multilateral level.
- Integration / coordination in knowledge management, practice, training with other countries in disaster reliefs.

3) In the next 15 years period, ASEAN should create a common culture of ASEAN as well as creating common value and common norm for ASEAN people such as

- Develop people skill in disaster reliefs by building cooperation with friendly countries.



- Integration / coordination in knowledge management, practice, training with other countries in disaster reliefs.
- Establish a disaster learning center in disaster management by applying new technology to support operation in the incident.

4) during the next 20 years period, ASEAN should establish and promote the good governance in both the government and non-government sector.

Summary

In case of climate change, it can be analyzed to define the resources and tools for creating appropriate ways to build practical cooperation for the future of ASEAN to cope with climate change.

1) In the first phase, ASEAN should have a quality selection process of leader and should have a suitable term for office, which a period of time in 5 years should be appropriated because it can be able to drive the policies to be practical such as arrangement of mutual agreements to rescue, relieves, and restores humanitarian victims, determining guidelines for sharing resources to prevent damage from disaster, creating mutual and worthily in mechanism or measure for sharing resources or technology, arrangement guidelines, rules, and order for disaster management by taking the mutual benefits of ASEAN.

2) In the next 10 years period, ASEAN should establish a cooperation mechanism or have a channel to get support from dialogue countries or other friendly countries, build cooperation with the superpowers in disaster management, strengthen cooperation with friendly countries in politics, economy and society, establish alliances in negotiating trade and tax agreements at both bilateral and multilateral level, integration or coordination in knowledge management, practice and training with other countries in disaster reliefs.

3) In the next 15 years period, ASEAN should create a common culture of ASEAN as well as creating common value and common norm for ASEAN people such as develop skill in disaster reliefs by building cooperation with friendly countries, integration or coordination in knowledge management, practice, training with other countries in disaster reliefs, establish a disaster learning center in disaster management by applying new technology to support operation in the incident.

4) During the next 20 years period, ASEAN should establish and promote the good governance in both the governmental and non-governmental sectors.

Recommendations





Recommendations and Other matters

Recommendations

In view of the foregoing, delegates would like to make the following recommendations to the ADMM for their consideration.

1) NADI could consider studying how differing national considerations in doing foresighting can be converged. In this regard, NADI could consider holding a workshop to exchange views on this matter.

2) Counter-terrorism could be further discussed in NADI workshops, in particular how cooperation could be strengthened with the law enforcement agencies.

3) Cyberattacks continue to pose a serious threat to the AMS economy, and various organisations of the government including financial and defence organisations, since they use info communication ICT for their processes. Therefore, greater effort should be made with a whole-of-nation approach to develop capabilities in cybersecurity to counter threats. At the regional level, there should be greater coordination and training and exchange of views to respond. AMS should also discuss the strengthening of cyber norms and rules to better manage the governance of the cyber and digital domains.

4) Climate change is a major threat to countries in this region and around the world. Weather changes and natural disasters pose threats to food production and human life and property. A NADI workshop will be relevant to identify responses to sea level rises and natural disasters arising from climate change. The development of human resources and capacities and the transfer of expertise from the Plus countries would be beneficial. The workshop can also discuss the use of technology to promote faster and better responses to HADR challenges and threats.

Problems and Obstacles in NADI Meeting from the last 2 years and Future of NADI Direction





Problems and Obstacles in NADI Meeting from the last 2 years and Future of NADI Direction

Discussion

NADI members discussed and exchanged views on problems and obstacles in NADI meeting from the last 2 years and future of NADI direction. The highlights of the discussions were as follows:

- a) Engagement with Track I
 - i) Each NADI member should send strengthen the internal arrangement to increase the linkages with ADSOM.
 - ii) Clarity of role of Track II NADI.
- b) Research and publication
 - i) Joint papers and publication can be shared with ADSOM.
 - ii) Cost of joint papers and publications should be borne by the initiating NADI member.
- c) Enhancing NADI's effectiveness
 - i) Participation in non-NADI activities.
 - ii) Early information on NADI annual activities for budget planning.
 - iii) Aim and purpose of proposed activities.
 - iv) Follow-up on outcomes of workshops in annual meetings.
 - v) Maximizing the use of digital connectivity between heads of NADI members.
 - vi) Rotation of hosting retreat.

Future of NADI Direction

NADI has made a lot of progress. However, there are more opportunities to build on NADI's collaborative research potential. For hosting of retreats, a new format is agreed to. This will ensure every NADI member has an opportunity to host the retreat. Vietnam should start the new cycle in 2020.

Concluding Remarks

- 1) The Chairman extended his congratulations to the NADI members for the comprehensive and insightful discussions during the Retreat.
- 2) The NADI members conveyed their appreciation for the hospitality of and excellent arrangements by Thailand in chairing the Track II NADI 4th Retreat.

Annex





Annex I

Agenda

NADI 12th Annual Meeting

1. Opening Remarks by the Commanding General of National Defence Studies Institute or representative
2. Session I: Presentation by keynote speakers on “Foresight Framework”
3. Session II: Presentation by NADI delegations, 8 minutes for each member on “ASEAN defence security foresighting in the next 2 decades”
4. Session III: Presentation by NADI delegations, 7 minutes for each member on “Drivers that lead to Sustainable Security”
5. Session IV: Presentation by NADI delegations, 7 minutes for each member on “Practical Cooperation for the Future of ASEAN Security”
6. Other Matters
7. Consideration of the NADI 12th Annual Meeting on the Chairman’s Report
8. Closing Remarks

NADI Retreat Meeting

1. Opening Remarks
2. Discussions of NADI Delegates on “Problems and Obstacles in NADI Meeting from the last 2 years”
3. Discussions of NADI Delegates on “Future of NADI Direction”
4. Other Matters
5. Consideration of the NADI Retreat Meeting on the Chairman’s Report
6. Closing Remarks



Annex II

Programme

NADI 12th Annual Meeting

Day 1: Monday, 25th Feb 2019

TIME	ACTIVITIES	PLACE	REMARKS
All Day	Arrival of Delegation, Chiang Mai International Airport - Check in at the Holiday Inn Chiangmai Hotel	Chiang Mai	
18.00 - 20.00	Welcome Dinner, hosted by the Director of SSC	the hotel	Smart Casual

Day 2: Tuesday, 26th Feb 2019

TIME	ACTIVITIES	PLACE	REMARKS
07.00 - 08.30	Breakfast	the hotel	
08.30 - 09.00	Depart for Phamuang Force HQ.	Chiang Mai	Smart Casual
09.00 - 10.00	Brief by Phamuang Force		
10.00 - 10.30	Depart for The Study Centre of Sufficiency Economy According to His Majesty's Initiative	Chiang Mai	
10.30 - 11.30	Visit The Study Centre of Sufficiency Economy According to His Majesty's Initiative		
11.30 - 12.00	Depart for Lunch		
12.00 - 13.30	Lunch	Chiang Mai	
13.30 - 14.00	Depart for Centre for ASEAN Studies (CAS), Chiang Mai University	Chiang Mai	
14.00 - 16.00	Brief and Discussion with CAS on "ASEAN Cooperation to Cope with Security threats in the future"		
16.00 - 16.30	Depart for the hotel	Chiang Mai	
18.00 - 21.00	Official Dinner, hosted by Chief of Staff of National Defence Studies Institute	the hotel	Smart Casual



NADI 12th Annual Meeting (*Continued*)

Day 3: Wednesday, 27th Feb 2019

TIME	ACTIVITIES	PLACE	REMARKS
07.00 - 08.00	Breakfast	the hotel	
08.00 - 08.30	Registration		Suit with tie
08.30 - 08.40	Opening Remarks , addressed by the Commanding General of National Defence Studies Institute or representative		
08.40 - 08.55	Group photo	the hotel	Suit with tie
08.55 - 09.00	Adoption of agenda		
09.00 - 10.00	SESSION I: Keynote Speech on “Foresight Framework” by General Jerdwut Kraprayoon		
10.00 - 10.20	Coffee break		
10.20 - 11.20	Presentation by representative of ADSOM Working Group		
11.20 - 12.00	SESSION II: Presentation on “ASEAN defence security foresighting in the next 2 decades” by <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Brunei (SHHBIDSS) - Cambodia (GDPFA) - Indonesia (CSS, TNI) - Indonesia (IDU) - Lao PDR (MOD) 		8 minutes per each
12.00 - 13.30	Lunch		
13.30 - 14.40	SESSION II: (Continued) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Malaysia (MiDAS) - Malaysia (NDUM) - Myanmar (AFT, MAF) - Philippines (NDCP/OSSSM) - Singapore (RSIS) - Thailand (SSC) - Vietnam (IDS) Discussions and Recommendations		8 minutes per each
14.40 - 15.05	Coffee break		



NADI 12th Annual Meeting (Continued)

Day 3: Wednesday, 27th Feb 2019

TIME	ACTIVITIES	PLACE	REMARKS
15.05 - 16.15	<p>SESSION III: Presentation on “Drivers that lead to Sustainable Security” by</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Brunei (SHHBIDSS) - Cambodia (GDPFA) - Indonesia (CSS, TNI) - Malaysia (MiDAS) - Philippines (NDCP) - Singapore (RSIS) - Thailand (SSC) - Vietnam (IDS) <p>Discussions and Recommendations</p>		7 minutes per each
16.15 - 17.15	<p>SESSION IV: Presentation on “Practical Cooperation for the Future of ASEAN Security” by</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lao PDR (MOD) - Myanmar (AFT, MAF) - Indonesia (IDU) - Malaysia (NDUM) - Philippines (OSSSM) - Singapore (RSIS) - Thailand (SSC) <p>Discussions and Recommendations</p>		7 minutes per each
17.15 - 17.35	Other Matters		
19.00 - 21.00	Dinner	the hotel	Casual
Day 4: Thursday, 28th Feb 2019			
07.00 - 09.00	Breakfast	the hotel	
09.00 - 10.30	Consideration of Chairman’s Report		Suit with tie
10.30 - 11.00	Coffee break		
11.00 - 12.00	Consideration of Chairman’s Report (Continued)		



NADI 12th Annual Meeting (Continued)

Day 4: Thursday, 28th Feb 2019

TIME	ACTIVITIES	PLACE	REMARKS
12.00 - 13.30	Lunch	the hotel	
13.30 - 15.00	Closing Remarks		
15.00 - 16.30	Free time		
16.30 - 17.00	Depart for Dinner		Casual
17.00 - 18.00	Dinner		
18.00 - 18.30	Depart for Chiang Mai Night Safari		Casual
18.30 - 20.30	Visit Chiang Mai Night Safari		
20.30 - 21.00	Depart for the hotel		

NADI Retreat Meeting

Day 5: Friday, 1st Mar 2019

TIME	ACTIVITIES	PLACE	REMARKS
07.00 - 09.00	Breakfast	the hotel	
09.00 - 09.05	Opening Remarks - Adoption of agenda		Suit with tie
09.05 - 10.30	- Discussions on “Problems and Obstacles in NADI Meeting from the last 2 years” - Discussions on “Future of NADI Direction”		
10.30 - 11.00	Coffee break		
11.00 - 12.00	- Consideration of Chairman’s Report - Closing Remarks		
12.00 - 13.30	Lunch		



NADI Retreat Meeting			
Day 5: Friday, 1st Mar 2019			
TIME	ACTIVITIES	PLACE	REMARKS
13.30 - 14.30	Depart for The Bhubing Palace		
14.30 - 16.30	Visit The Bhubing Palace		
16.30 - 17.30	Depart for Dinner		
18.00 - 21.00	Dinner		Casual
NADI Retreat Meeting			
Day 6: Saturday, 2nd Mar 2019			
TIME	ACTIVITIES	PLACE	REMARKS
07.00 - 08.30	Breakfast	the hotel	
08.30 - 12.30	Visit Royal Park Rajapruek		Casual
12.30 - 13.30	Lunch		
16.00 - 16.30	Depart for Chiang Mai Night Bazaar		
16.30 - 21.00	Free time at Chiang Mai Night Bazaar		transportations depart for the hotel on 19.00 pm and 21.00 pm.
Day 7: Sunday, 3rd Mar 2019			
TIME	ACTIVITIES	PLACE	REMARKS
All Day	Departure of Delegation* - Depart for Chiang Mai International Airport (CMI) and back to their home countries	Chiang Mai	

** transportations from airport / hotel to hotel / airport provided by the Strategic Studies Center (SSC).*



Annex III

Administrative Arrangements

I. Workshop Venue:

The NADI 12th Annual Meeting on “ASEAN defence security foresighting in the next 2 decades” and Retreat will be hosted during 25th Feb – 3rd Mar 2019, and will take place at the Holiday Inn Chiangmai Hotel, Chiang Mai, Thailand.

II. Hotel Accommodations:

The SSC will be responsible for hotel accommodation for all the invited participants. You will only need to inform all necessary information for reservations in the Reply Form, Which sent by the SSC.

The Holiday Inn Chiangmai Hotel:

Address: 318/1 Chiang Mai-Lamphun Road
Tumbol Wat Kate, Amphur Muang
Chiangmai 50000 Thailand

Tel: +66 5327 5300
+66 5380 1460

Fax: +66 5327 5299

E-mail: reservations.chiangmai@ihg.com

Website: <https://chiangmai.holidayinn.com/th>

Facebook: www.facebook.com/HIChiangMai

Your comfort and convenience come first at Holiday Inn Chiangmai Hotel. Our picturesque location on the banks of the Ping River provides easy access to all of Chiang Mai’s unique dining, shopping and sightseeing options. Comprehensive facilities, thoughtful amenities and some of the biggest guest rooms in Chiang Mai ensure a comfortable stay, whether you’re on a business trip, a weekend escape or a romantic getaway.

This hotel offers views of the Mae Ping River and Doi Suthep Mountain, just a 5 minute drive from Chiang Mai City’s famous Night Bazaar and temples. It houses 4 dining options and an outdoor pool. Free shuttle service to Night Bazaar and Weekend Walking Streets is provided.



Holiday Inn Chiangmai Hotel's spacious rooms feature a seating area. They include a flat-screen TV with cable channels and tea/coffee making facilities. Offering a modern décor, the private bathroom comes with a bathtub.

Holiday Inn is a 10 minute drive from Chiang Mai International Airport and is within a 30 minute drive of 5 golf clubs, including Chiangmai Lamphun Golf Club. Borsang Village is 10 km away.

Guests can relax in the sauna or exercise at the gym. Other facilities include a business centre and a tour desk. Room service is also available.

Serving Thai and international favourites, River Terrace offers a choice of indoor or outdoor dining. China Palace features Dim Sum menu and Shabu Shabu buffet.

III. Transportations:

The SSC will provide transportation for all coming participants to-and-from Chiang Mai International Airport and the Holiday Inn Chiangmai Hotel, Chiang Mai, Thailand, as well as transportation for Activities in the programme.

***** Remarks:** Please notice that some international airlines will have final destination in Chiang Mai (CNX) International Airport. Some airlines, connecting (domestic) flights may be required from Suvarnabhumi International (BKK) Airport to Chiang Mai (CNX) International Airport. For more information kindly visit : <http://www.sscthailand.org/index.php/sscprogram/home>, (Username: NADI2019/Password: ANNUAL)

IV. Attires:

25th Feb 2019

Welcome Dinner : Smart Casual

26th Feb 2019

Academic Visit : Smart Casual
Official Dinner : Smart Casual

27th Feb 2019

Workshop : Suit with tie
Dinner : Casual



28th Feb 2019

Workshop : Suit with tie
Dinner : Casual

1st Mar 2019

Retreat : Suit with tie
Dinner : Casual

2nd Mar 2019

Cultural Tour : Casual

3rd Mar 2019

All Day : Casual

V. Weather (Chiang Mai):

Winter season (Nov-Feb): The temperature between 15°C-25°C. This is the ideal time to visit Chiang Mai because the weather is perfect for all kinds of outdoor activities. While it does not get too cold, you should carry a jacket and some light woollens. January is usually considered the best month and sees a high influx of tourists. If you plan a trip in November you will catch the Loi Krathong festivities and in February you will see the Chiang Mai flower festival.

Summer season (Mar-May): The temperature between 25oC-40oC. While summers start setting in from the end of March, tourists still visit Chiang Mai and it's a good time to look for deals on hotels and flights. Even if the temperature during the day is high you can spend the afternoon in the pool and head out after sunset. Temperatures rise up to 40°C between April and May. Carry light cottons, sunglasses and hats to beat the heat, especially Songkran Festival between 13-15 of April.

Rainy season (Jun-Oct): The temperature during the rainy season, around 20°C-30°C, cools down although the humidity rises. While it rains less than southern Thailand, monsoons are still heavy in Chiang Mai as well. So you will have to be prepared with umbrellas, raincoats and study shoes. Not many tourists visit Chiang Mai during the monsoon so if you are looking for a quieter holiday in this ancient town, then this is the time for you.



VI. Map and Views:

The Holiday Inn Chiangmai Hotel, Chiang Mai, Thailand



VII. Miscellaneous Expenses:

Extra charges and miscellaneous expenses, not arranged by the SSC, will be borne by concerned participants. Participants are encouraged to settle in advance for their own accounts at the hotel before checking out from the hotel. The spouse accompanied with the Participants will be borne by own expenses.

VIII. Useful Calls in Chiang Mai & Bangkok:

Chiang Mai

The Holiday Inn Chiangmai Hotel	+66 5327 5300
	+66 5380 1460
Chiang Mai Tourist Police	+66 5321 2147
Chiang Mai Highway Police	+66 5324 2441
Chiang Mai Ram Hospital	+66 5392 0300
Chiang Mai Klaimor Hospital	+66 5320 0002
Chiang Mai Hospital	+66 5341 1234
Chiang Mai International Airport	+66 5392 2100



Bangkok

Tourism Authority of Thailand	+66 2250 5500
Bangkok Hospital	+66 2310 3000
Samitivej Srinakarin Hospital	+66 2022 2222
Vibhavadi Hospital	+66 2561 1111
Emergency (Police)	191
Suvarnabhumi Airport Tourist Police	+66 2132 1155
Suvarnabhumi International Airport	+66 2132 1888
Don Mueang International Airport	+66 2535 1111

IX. Contact Details:

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(Username: NADI2019/Password: ANNUAL)



Annex IV

List of Participants

Brunei Darussalam

1

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Kingdom of Cambodia

2

Core Institution

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Kingdom of Cambodia

Maj.Gen. Sin Sokha

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Lt.Col. Bou Chankolrath

Position: Chief of Finance Section of GDPFA

Lt.Col. Sowath Phuchistar

Position: Deputy Chief of Quick Reaction Office of GDPFA

Republic of Indonesia

3(a)

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3(b)

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Lao People's Democratic Republic

4

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Malaysia

5(a)

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Malaysia	
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Republic of the Philippines

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<p>7(b)</p>	<p>Partner Institution Chief Office for Strategic Studies and Strategy Management (OSSSM) Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)</p> <p>Focal Point Ms. Rowena S. Tatad Position: Administrative Officer IV (Chief Defense Analyst) of Strategic Studies Division of OSSSM, AFP Email: osssm_ssd@afp.mil.ph/ oss.afp@gmail.com / ssd.ossasm.afp@gmail.com Tel: +6392 6678 7699 Fax: +6329129007</p> <p>CC Brig.Gen. Adriano S. Perez JR AFP Position: Chief of OSSSM, AFP Email: oss.afp@gmail.com/ asp.perez37@gmail.com Tel: +6391 7895 1168</p> <p>Ms. Ann Febel Q. Bajo Position: Defence Analyst of Strategic Studies Division of OSSSM, AFP Tel: +6391 7712 9107</p>



Republic of Singapore

8

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Kingdom of Thailand

9

Core Institution

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Kingdom of Thailand

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Socialist Republic of Vietnam

10

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**NADI Secretariat****11**

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Annex V

Activity Photos

Opening Remarks by Lt.Gen.Pisan Pathom-ame, Chief of Staff of National Defence Studies Institute (NDSI), RTARF HQ (NADI 12th Annual Meeting and Retreat Meeting).



Group Photograph of Head of delegates and representatives of the ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI 12th Annual Meeting).



Keynote Speech on “Foresight Framework” by Gen. Jerdwut Kraprayoon, Special Advisor, Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters.





Keynote Speech on “Foresight Framework” by Dr. Taworn Thunjai, Director of Fishing Control and Surveillance Division.



Presentation of the participants on “ASEAN defence security foresighting in the next 2 decades” by Brunei Darussalam, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand and Socialist Republic of Vietnam.





Presentation of the participants on “Drivers that lead to Sustainable Security” by Brunei Darussalam, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand and Socialist Republic of Vietnam.



Presentation of the participants on “Practical Cooperation for the Future of ASEAN Security” by Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore and Kingdom of Thailand.





Opening Remarks by AVM. Poomjai Leksuntarakorn, Director of SSC, NDSI, RTARF HQ (NADI Retreat Meeting).



Group Photograph of Head of delegates and representatives of the ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI Retreat Meeting).



Discussions on “Problems and Obstacles in NADI Meeting from the last 2 years” and “Future of NADI Direction”.





AVM. Poomjai Leksuntarakorn, Director of SSC, NDSI, Visiting to the Phamuang Force, The Study Centre of Sufficiency Economy According to His Majesty's Initiative and Centre for ASEAN Studies (CAS), Chiang Mai University.





Activity Photos.



Other presentations.





Annex VI

Terms of References (TOR)

Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI)

The Terms of Reference serves as reference and guidelines for all meetings and workshops conducted under the Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI).

A. Introduction

1. The Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI) was initiated in August 2007 by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore, as the Track II think tank group to support the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM). The inaugural meeting was attended by representatives from Track II institutions of ASEAN members.
2. The establishment of NADI was timely and necessary to discuss, in a Track II setting, issues of defence and security cooperation that the ASEAN Summit and ASEAN Defence Ministers had raised, as well as fresh ideas and issues that are ahead of the curve, and can contribute to further enhancing ADMM cooperation and its cooperation with the Plus countries.
3. NADI participants are encouraged to discuss issues and ideas in their personal capacities so that they can go beyond their national positions and to suggest relevant inputs and policy recommendations, without attribution to any participants but as a collective view of the meeting, to the ADMM track.
4. The informal Track II platform offers a more conducive environment for a free discussion of defence and security cooperation in ASEAN as well as raising ideas and proposals that may be deemed too sensitive to be formally tabled at an official Track I meeting. However, NADI should bear in mind the positions on sensitive issues taken by the ASEAN Leaders Meeting, ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting and the ADMM, and not go beyond their positions on those issues.



B. Aims

5. NADI aims to perform the following functions and roles:
 - a. A forum to network, promote dialogue, build confidence and familiarity among ASEAN think tanks and research institutions to facilitate closer cooperation.
 - b. A useful forum for policy analysts specializing in defence and security issues, academics researching security cooperation and defence officials to discuss issues of defence and security cooperation including those that the ASEAN Summit and ASEAN Defence Ministers have raised.
 - c. A forum where NADI could think beyond their governments' positions, to provide timely and new ideas as well as relevant recommendations to the ADMM Track to enhance ADMM cooperation and its cooperation with the Plus countries as well as to promote closer cooperation among militaries of the ASEAN.
 - d. A forward looking platform to discuss issues relating to future defence and security challenges as well as opportunities particularly in but not limited to Non Traditional Security related cooperation.

C. Principles of NADI meetings & activities

- a. The core NADI institution of each ASEAN country will act as focal contact point. The list of core NADI institutions will be updated from time to time.
- b. The core NADI members are limited to Track II institutions among ASEAN members only. The core institutions may bring in representatives from other think tanks and officials to participate in their personal capacities as observers or resource persons.
- c. NADI participants could present their national positions in their presentations. However, in discussing fresh ideas and issues the participants should do so in their personal capacity. This encourages participants to think creatively and innovatively on defence and security issues beyond their government's positions and to contribute fresh and relevant ideas and recommendations to the ASEAN defence track and the ADMM process. This shall ensure ideas and recommendations submitted to the ADMM are not attributed to any NADI members.



- d. All NADI activities are to be conducted in a closed door manner without major media publicity. Only delegates from the core NADI institutions can attend the NADI Annual Meetings, Retreats and Workshops.
- e. The Chairman shall at the end of each NADI meeting, workshop or retreat, submit the Chairman's Report to the ASEAN Defence Senior Official's Meeting (ADSOM) for their information and attention, and for ADMM's consideration. The NADI Chairman will inform all heads of the core NADI institutions and the NADI Secretariat of this action. The NADI Secretariat will only upload the NADI Chairman's Report onto the NADI website after ADSOM has been informed.

D. Arrangement of NADI Meeting & Activities

NADI Meeting:

- a. The main purpose of the annual meeting is to review activities conducted throughout the year, revisit important points made and brainstorm on new ideas for the upcoming year. The delegation could also review the regional political and security environment and identify emerging challenges to peace and stability in the region.
- b. The NADI Meeting shall meet once a year and shall cover two working days, where one and a half days would be dedicated for discussions in a meeting and half a day for visit programme. The meeting is usually held either in March or April. New workshops can be proposed under the agenda item 'Any Other Matters'. The NADI delegation proposing a new workshop should give a brief presentation on the theme, purpose and objectives of the workshop, for consideration of the meeting. The programme for the NADI annual meeting should include a meeting with the Leader of the ADSOM for an exchange of views and for the NADI Chairman to brief ADSOM and for NADI members to have a better understanding of ADSOM's areas of interest.
- c. The hosting of the annual NADI Meeting shall be rotated alphabetically to coincide with the ASEAN country holding the Chairmanship of the ADMM.
- d. If an ASEAN country hosting the ADMM does not have a Track II defence and security institution, it shall be decided by mutual agreement of the ASEAN countries for another ASEAN country to host the Track II meeting.
- e. The host's invitation letters to NADI core institutions and the NADI Secretar-



- iat should be sent out at least two months before the meeting together with (a) the agenda, (b) the programme, (c) administrative notes to provide information on hotel accommodations, hotel rates, weather, local transport arrangements and (d) reply form on participation and delegation list, request for accommodation bookings, and the flight details (arrival and departure) of delegation.
- f. NADI members including heads of delegations shall pay for their own return air tickets.
 - g. Host countries shall pay for the hotel accommodations of head of delegations only while other members shall bear the costs themselves. All other personal expenses (telephone/fax services, laundry, mini bar, internet) will be borne by heads and members of the delegation.
 - h. The host country shall provide participants with conference facilities and other local hospitalities.
 - i. By the end of the meeting, the Chairman shall submit the agreed Chairman's Report to ADSOM for their attention and for ADMM's consideration. The Chairman's Report could include the NADI matrix of annual activities and the work plan.

NADI Workshops:

- a. The main purpose of the workshops is to discuss various defence and security issues that were agreed on; and come up with a collective list of recommendations on how the issue should be dealt with.
- b. The hosting of NADI workshops can be based on country's interest and does not have to be in an alphabetical order. The workshop should be on a relevant topic that can further enhance ADMM cooperation as well as cooperation among the militaries of the ASEAN countries.
- c. NADI Workshops shall, as far as possible, be organised 2–3 times a year in between annual meetings. Each workshop shall cover 2 working days. The host may offer site visit during the workshop.
- d. The scheduled workshop may be arranged to be conducted every 3–4 months. This shall provide ample time for substantive preparations as well as budgetary concerns.



- e. The host's invitation letters to NADI core institutions and the NADI Secretariat should be sent out at least two months before the meeting together with (a) the agenda, (b) the programme, (c) administrative notes to provide information on hotel accommodations, hotel rates, weather, local transport arrangements and (d) reply form on participation and delegation list, request for accommodation bookings, and the flight details (arrival and departure) of delegation.
- f. NADI members shall pay for the return air tickets and hotel accommodations of the heads as well as members of the delegations.
- g. The host country shall provide participants with conference facilities and other local hospitalities.
- h. The final outcome of the workshops' report shall capture substantive discussions and recommendations agreed upon at the workshop. The Chairman of the NADI Workshop shall submit the Chairman's Report to the ADSOM Chairman for circulation to ADSOM members for consideration.
- i. Any matters pertaining to NADI activities and other issues to be followed up from the annual NADI meeting could be taken up under agenda item 'Any Other Matters'.

NADI Retreat:

- a. The NADI Retreat should be held once every two years. If there is a special need for a retreat which is agreed to by all NADI members, it can be arranged.
- b. The purpose of retreats, among others is to provide longer term recommendations for cooperation to the ADMM and its related meetings.
- c. For convenience, the NADI Retreat could be held in the second half of the year.
- d. NADI members shall pay for the return air tickets and hotel accommodations of the heads as well as members of the delegations.
- e. The host country shall provide participants with conference facilities and other local hospitalities.



E. Secretariat

- a. RSIS, as agreed in the 1st NADI Meeting, shall be the main Secretariat of NADI.
- b. The main role of the Secretariat is to provide an update on the current status of NADI activities and its website.
- c. At the request of some NADI core institutions, the NADI Secretariat could provide advice on the conduct of NADI meetings and workshops, and on the agenda of these meetings.

F. Review of TOR

6. The Terms of Reference shall be reviewed on a needs basis.

Note

The NADI Terms of Reference (TOR) was proposed by the Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (SHHBIDSS) in March 2013 for consideration of the 6th NADI Annual Meeting in Brunei Darussalam. The TOR was agreed to on 7 March 2013. At the NADI Workshop held in Bali in October 2015, a few NADI delegations suggested that the NADI Secretariat should update the TOR to reflect the practices in the organisation and conduct of NADI annual meetings and workshops since 2013. The NADI Secretariat has updated the TOR after consulting SHHBIDSS for inputs.

Dated 3 March 2016





ASEAN
THAILAND 2019

TRACK II NETWORK OF ASEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS (NADI)



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